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Preface
This dissertation is offered as part of conversations going on in several areas within the 
economics profession. Firstly there is a particularly Australian literature debating the 
merits or otherwise of 'economic rationalism'. Secondly, within the economics 
profession more generally there is a well developed literature which discusses the 
emphasis which modern economics gives to formal technique and the concomitant 
neglect of other disciplinary values. Given the polarised nature of contemporary 
attitudes to the discipline, both from within and without the profession itself, it is 
appropriate for me to offer some clarification of the relationship between this dissertation 
and these literatures.
Firstly, although it is critical of aspects of 'economic rationalism', this thesis does not 
argue, as do many critics of economic rationalism, that economists were wrongly located 
on some spectrum between faith in market forces and faith in state intervention. Indeed 
in the instances this dissertation examines, the very preoccupation with the market/state 
intervention dichotomy appears to be part of the problem. Preoccupation with the 
dichotomy between free markets and intervention displaced the more urgent and 
important task of choosing how one would move towards what was generally agreed to 
be desirable - freer trade. Preoccupation with the 'markets versus intervention' 
dichotomy also distorted the perceptions of participants in the debate. Economists 
tended to see certain innovations in trade policy as inherently 'interventionist' whereas, 
they could just as easily have been seen as instruments of trade liberalisation. In this 
sense, although the thesis is critical of aspects of early Australian economic rationalists in 
the seventies and early eighties, it takes pains to locate its critique from within 
essentially the same framework they adopted.
Secondly, it is appropriate to offer some comment on the relationship between this thesis 
and a growing unease with the positivism and formalism which has so dominated 
economics since World War II. Consistent with Popper's project to offer some 
methodological rules of demarcation between the scientific and the unscientific, post 
WWII economic methodology sought to 'legislate' what was and was not acceptable 
scientific practice for economists. Following the likes of Feyerabend and Rorty in the 
Philosophy of Science, McCloskey has argued that one cannot sensibly legislate for 
what is, and is not legitimate in scholarly debate: that the rules of Official Methodology 
are habitually broken by economic practitioners and that the only rules which can be
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sensibly legislated are those which the participants of serious, conscientious 
conversation improvise and accept for themselves.
As the reader will discover, I have some sympathy with these points. But for me there 
remains a kind of remoteness with much writing in the methodology of economics which 
limits its practical usefulness in improving the quality of economic practice. Much 
methodological writing within economics today is practiced by methodological 
specialists and published in specialist books and journals as if it were a properly defined 
sub-discipline of the profession. This goes hand in hand with the idea that 
methodological reflection is something of a luxury - an interesting pastime, but not 
something of critical importance to the health of disciplinary practice. For all the sound 
and fury of McCloskey's denunciation of orthodox economic methodology, his ultimate 
conclusion - that "[economics at present is . . . moderately well off" (see § 1.3.1) - is, 
amongst other things, a deprecation of the importance of his own methodological 
endeavours. For McCloskey, the economic practitioners will look after the health of 
economics themselves.
The methodological reflection in this dissertation is not primarily a response to current 
methodological literature. It is anchored in practice. It arises from pondering what I 
consider to be shortcomings of both academic and bureaucratic (policy advising) practice 
and has been integral to producing a diagnosis of these shortcomings. I have tried to 
drive this diagnosis home with careful expositions of the way in which unsatisfactory 
methodological values within the discipline harm economic reasoning in various ways; 
leading amongst other things to injudicious partialities of vision (§ 1.2.3), the waste of 
disciplinary resources on unpromising projects (§ 1.3.3) and the unnecessary 
polarisation of discourse and the irrational deprecation of important considerations in 
policy formulation (Chapters Three to Ten). For me there is a further anchor in practice. 
I would not have concluded that economic practice was deficient if I had not come to find 
some of their most dearly held convictions unconvincing. In this regard, my case for 
rethinking the discipline's stance toward unorthodox means of trade liberalisation is 
woven into the story as a central element.
Notes on Sources
My own circumstances changed considerably between the commencement and 
completion of this PhD thesis. I went from teaching at ANU, to advising the Treasurer, 
to being appointed by the Treasurer to the Industry Commission. The Commission was 
the institutional successor of the very body which was to be subjected to a 'case study' 
in the thesis! This provided me with a better feel for the difficulties which such an
ix
Preface
organisation faced and with access to some of the people who had been in the 
organisation during the time under study. It also provided me with access to the I AC's 
archives. As the reader will note, I have made use of those archives and several things 
should be said about this. Firstly, many of the inadequacies of the Commission's work 
which the archive material permits one to elucidate in some detail - for instance the 
Commission's inability to measure cost disabilities accurately - were generally conceded 
in the Commission's published outputs. Thus while it has enabled a sharper focus and 
deeper analysis on a range of points, the essence of the case study of the IAC was not 
changed by access to the archives. Secondly I have been careful in my use of the 
archives. I have used them in the same way I would have used them had I been privy to 
them when directing an inquiry within the Industry Commission. I have not reported 
them in a way which would reveal any commercial in confidence information.
Given that the Commission is not a particularly secretive place and that it is certainly not 
so at Commissioner level, I was given free access to the archives without being required 
to gain anyone's permission to do so. Nevertheless I did inform the Chairman that I was 
working with the archives in the course of post graduate research. I would argue that the 
critique offered in this dissertation is essentially within the spirit of the Commission's 
original mission - that of subjecting competing claims about economic policy to critical 
and rational scrutiny using the resources of the discipline of economics. Nevertheless I 
am aware that it is likely to be taken by some as an attack upon the IAC - the predecessor 
of my current employer. Given my position there, public debate on the material 
contained herein is likely to pose difficulties both for me and the Commission. In these 
circumstances I have chosen to raise the kinds of issues I have raised in this thesis, 
within the Commission when appropriate, rather than in public debate.
Notes on Terminology
By 1970 the trade magazine Automotive Industry Matters had changed its car definitions. 
"Previously the car market was broken into three categories - light medium and luxury. 
This year there are four classes: light small; light medium; medium and luxury" (March, 
17, 1970: 5). Henceforth this dissertation adopts these categories. It has been usual for 
car models to gradually increase in size as one model replaces another of the same name. 
In the early and mid 1970s Corollas were small light, Coronas were large light whilst 
Holdens and Falcons were medium and Fairlanes and Statesmans were upper medium. 
By the early 1980s the vehicle classes corresponding to the above model names were 
small, medium, upper medium and large. For the purposes of consistency, this 
dissertation adopts the former classification throughout the period under study
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notwithstanding the fact that by the early 1980s Holdens and Falcons were indeed large 
cars by most people's standards.
Notes on Style and Length
I have used standard Harvard style of referencing throughout with one modification. 
Where more than one reference has been cited for a single author in a single year, instead 
of distinguishing between references with letters - for instance Krugman, 1987a and 
Krugman, 1987b, I have taken a word or two from the titles of the referenced works to 
remove ambiguity. This has the advantage of minimising consequential changes in 
referencing, where a reference is discovered late in the day. It is also helps the reader 
remember to which reference I am referring on any given occasion.
Where I have added emphasis to a quotation I have always acknowledged this. Thus 
wherever emphasis appears in a quotation and such an acknowledgment does not appear, 
the emphasis was in the original.
Unless the context otherwise makes clear, references in parentheses to sections - eg 
§ 1.3.2 - are references to sections and subsections of this thesis.
In cross referencing the dissertation I have used sub-section numbers rather than page 
numbers.
The dissertation is slightly under 100,000 words long. There are 274 pages and 
103,846 words from the prologue to the end of Chapter Ten. However the word count 
includes citations, tables and chapter headings. On the basis of sampling twenty pages 
of the thesis, I estimate that just eliminating citations would reduce the count by at least 6 
per cent.
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Abstract
What are the trade policy implications o f intra-industry trade and specialisation, 
particularly in the context o f trade liberalisation?
This dissertation argues that where intra-industry trade is important, and 
protection is afforded by traditional 'inwardly oriented' instruments such as 
tariffs and quantitative restrictions, policy makers seeking to effect gradual trade 
liberalisation should consider introducing mechanisms which assist exports 
during the transition to free trade. Doing this allows one to liberalise intra­
industry trade ahead o f the achievement o f complete free trade.
The dissertation provides a critical narrative detailing shortcomings in the way 
this issue was handled by economists and policy advisers during the decade in 
which economic rationalism first emerged as an institutional force in Australia - 
between the early 1970s and the early 1980s. I argue that there were serious 
shortcomings in the 'practical reason' o f economic policy advisers and that many 
o f these shortcomings stemmed from the culture o f the economics profession. 
The dissertation focuses on the economics profession in general although there is 
a particular focus on the advice o f the Industries Assistance Commission (IAC) 
and on the issues as thrown up by the automotive industry protection policy.
Chapter One introduces the themes o f dissertation whilst Chapter Two outlines 
the state o f the automotive industry and automotive industry policy up to the early 
1970s.
Chapters Three to Five then examine the economics o f trade liberalisation and 
particularly 'non-traditional' approaches to trade liberalisation which deviate from  
the approaches sanctioned by economic orthodoxy - equi-proportional across the 
board tariff reductions and top down reform (reducing the highest tariffs first). 
These chapters explore the case fo r  'non-traditional' trade liberalisation, 
particularly policies which facilitate the rapid expansion o f intra-industry trade 
where the rate o f tariff reform - and so the rate o f inter-industry trade expansion - 
is more gradual.
Chapters Six to Nine provide a case study o f the issues introduced in earlier 
chapters. They depict the extent to which economists were provided with 
material which would have enabled them to think through the normative
Abstract
economics of trade liberalisation in the presence of intra-industry trade and the 
extent of their failure - one might even say their refusal - to do so.
Chapter Ten concludes with some further (and bolder) speculations on the nature 
of economic science as currently practiced, and the possibilities which might have 
been realised had the subjects of the study engaged more fully with the material 
before them.
xv i
He who knows only his own side of the case, knows little of that.
. . . He must be able to hear the arguments of adversaries; . . . 
He must feel the whole force of the difficulty which the true view 
of the subject has to encounter and dispose of . . .  Ninety-nine 
in a hundred of what are called educated men [do not do this], even 
those who can argue fluently for their opinions. Their conclusion 
may be true, but it might be false for anything they know. They 
have never thrown themselves into the mental position of those 
who think differently from them, and considered what such 
persons may have to say, and consequently they do not, in any 
proper sense of the word, know the doctrine which they themselves 
profess.
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, 1975: 46-7.
In science, as in business, problems may be opportunities in 
disguise. They may offer new chances to demonstrate the power 
of our paradigms, if only we have the wit to see how.
Brian Loasby, 1976: 197
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Prologue
The economist's job is to say 'this or that, not both. You can't do both'.
Kenneth Arrow, 1970: 17
In the mid 1970s the Industries Assistance Commission - an incipient, but already 
prestigious bastion of economic expertise - advised the Federal Government on 
protection for the automotive industry.
The Commission was keen to reduce the absolute level of protection which had been 
accorded to many industries for many years and it was also keen to reduce the disparities 
of protection between different industries.
Preeminent amongst its 'targets' for reform was the automotive industry. Behind 
increasingly restrictive protection from imports afforded by both tariffs and local content 
schemes, Australia assembled small Japanese cars from imported components at 
effective rates of assistance which sometimes approached infinity!
Yet at the same time, a much larger sector of the industry manufactured medium 
(Holden) sized cars quite competitively. Medium sized cars were also achieving strong 
export growth. By the mid 1970s, over 15 per cent of medium sized car production was 
exported.
Over the 1960s, Australian domestic demand gradually swung towards smaller vehicles. 
Small Japanese cars became increasingly competitive and in the mid 1970s this trend 
dramatically accelerated as petrol prices surged. These circumstances provided the new 
Commission with some interesting challenges.
The Australian market had always offered limited scope to exploit the very significant 
economies of scale which characterised the industry. The new developments 
underscored the intuitive case for the industry to specialise, not only within Australia but 
in export markets. And by the early 70s export oriented development strategies had 
demonstrated their promise in countries such as Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Singapore.
Free trade would have enabled the industry to specialise in its most competitive activity 
but this was not judged a likely possibility for a long time: the Commission's terms of 
reference required recommendations consistent with the prosperity of the industry, and, 
apart from this, too rapid a rate of reform was likely to be politically impossible.
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The Commission accordingly recommended that the industry receive significant 
assistance for at least the next decade. But what form should it take?
The Commission was keen to replace the local content plans with something simpler and 
more administratively transparent. A simple tariff regime would achieve these goals, but 
would discriminate against specialisation within the industry in two related ways.
It would continue to underwrite fragmentation of production for the domestic market as 
firms sought to 'cover the field' of domestic consumer demand to take advantage of tariff 
inflated domestic prices. But it would provide no equivalent assistance to automotive 
exports.
Also, where firms sought to increase their level of intra-industry trade, importing 
products so as to concentrate more fully on producing their most competitive products 
for both domestic and export markets, tariffs would tax them for so doing.
Given these considerations, two alternatives suggest themselves: direct production 
subsidies could have replaced tariffs, thus providing firms with the same level of 
assistance regardless of whether their output was destined for the domestic or export 
markets and regardless of the degree of intra-industry trade in which the industry 
engaged. Similar incentives would have been created by complementing tariff assistance 
with export assistance and/or tariff concessions to firms in proportion to their exports.
There was some evidence that had assistance been provided in a such a form, it might 
have been (politically) possible to provide it at a lower rate.
Subsidies were never seriously considered by governments, probably because of their 
budgetary cost. And the Commission feared that the latter course might open up a new 
front for rent seeking by Australia's powerful manufacturing lobby.
The Commission was placed in the paradigmatically economic dilemma of choosing 
between various evils. Yet although the choice was made - as choices inevitably are - it 
was made without properly weighing the potential costs and benefits of alternatives.
This dissertation illustrates the claims made above and tries to show how the situation 
described in the previous paragraph could have come to pass.
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1 A Sketch of the Argument: Some
Problems with Modern Economics
In a world where we are inevitably ignorant about some of the past and present, 
let alone the future, the co-ordination of activities is less important than the 
perception of new problems and opportunities, and adaptation to them.
Brian Loasby, 1976: 191-2
This thesis offers a contribution to the disciplines of economics and public policy in three 
related ways.
1) It offers an exposition of the economics of certain questions about which 
academic economists and policy makers deliberated in the period under 
study - the mid 1960s to the early 1980s - and which remain current 
today. In particular, what are the trade policy implications of intra­
industry trade and specialisation, particularly in the context of trade 
liberalisation?
2) It offers a critical narrative detailing shortcomings in the way this issue 
was handled by economists and policy advisers. The focus is on the 
economics profession in general although there is a particular focus on the 
economists and policy advisers of the Australian Industries Assistance 
Commission (IAC) and on the issues as thrown up by the automotive 
industry during the period.
3) In the course of 2), an historical explanation-cum-methodological 
diagnosis of 'what went wrong' is developed.
Arguments 1) and 2) largely stand or fall together. Argument 3) on the other hand is 
more ambitious. Being more general it is less easily demonstrated. But if accepted, its 
conclusions have implications for the way economics is practiced generally. I hope that 
those who doubt it may, nevertheless, find some merit in the first two arguments. This 
chapter sketches the arguments. While the work as a whole must bear the burden of 
their demonstration, this chapter is intended not only to whet the reader's appetite but 
also to begin the process of demonstration and persuasion.
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Chapter One Sketching some Problems of Modern Economics
1.1 Choosing a Voice
A theory is not like an airline . . . timetable. We are not interested simply in 
the accuracy of its predictions. A theory also serves as a base for thinking. It 
helps us to understand what is going on by enabling us to organise our 
thoughts. Faced with a choice between a theory which predicts well but gives 
us little insight into how the system works and one which gives us this insight 
but predicts badly, I would choose the latter, and I am inclined to think that 
most economists would do the same.
Ronald Coase, 1988: 64
In a discipline in which disputants often understand one another according to where they 
'fit' in fairly well understood spectrums of opinion (eg see Anderson et al 1993; 
Anderson, 1994), it is necessary to say what this thesis is not. This study is in 
fundamental sympathy with the IAC's conception of its intellectual, political and 
economic mission - that of winding back the excesses of 'protection all round'. It is also 
sympathetic to the fundamental inclinations of classical and neoclassical economics and 
political economy.1 But this is not because their picture of a perfectly competitive 
economy in general equilibrium more accurately describes the economy than do the 
alternatives. The frame of reference or 'appreciative system' we choose to inhabit will 
always be a compromise. It must correspond with reality sufficiently to guide action. It 
must also provide some coherent foundation for systematising our thought. And it must 
also be sufficiently shared by our fellows to mediate communication (eg see Coase 
quoted above and Vickers in Rein and Schön, 1993: 147).
1 I have not defined either classical or neoclassical economics precisely here - which, in any event, is 
impossible. The particular qualities of the two approaches which are taken to be distinctive are as 
follows. 'Classical economics' is taken to generally endorse the idea that Adam Smith's 'invisible hand' 
is a good descriptor of what happens in economies and accordingly a worthy model upon which to base 
positive and normative microeconomics. Neoclassical economics is perhaps pre-eminently associated 
with a certain formal technique. As Posner puts it:
In order to facilitate mathematical formulation and exposition, neoclassical 
economic theory routinely adopts what appears to be, and often are, from both a 
physical and psychological standpoint, highly unrealistic assumptions: that 
individuals and firms are rational maximisers, that information is costless, that 
demand curves facing firms are infinitely elastic, that inputs and outputs are 
infinitely divisible, that cost and revenue schedules are mathematically regular, 
and so forth (1993: 74).
Nevertheless, as Mirowski has pointed out (1986), formal mathematical analysis can be applied to 
economics in a variety of ways. The set of formal techniques which comprise neoclassical method have 
developed around the formal exploration of Classical themes relating to the efficiency of markets.
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Chapter One Sketching some Problems of Modern economics
There are several reasons, therefore, that I have chosen to stick fairly closely to the 
neoclassical 'straight and narrow’ in this dissertation. Firstly, it offers a reasonably 
coherent picture of how the economy works. If it is to rise above the crudely ad hoc, 
economic analysis requires some investigation of the net outcomes of interacting effects. 
Classical and neoclassical economics have done this by appealing to the concept of 
equilibrium - whether partial or general - and the assumptions which tend to produce 
equilibrium most easily are those of perfect competition. Imperfect competition, as 
outlined by Robinson and Chamberlain in the early 1930s, is a more encompassing - 
though in itself still very artificial - description of most markets than perfect 
competition.2 However imperfections in competition are immensely destructive of the 
possibilities of stable or unique equilibrium and hence of the kind of intuitive 
understanding of the likely effects of possible policies which Adam Smith's view of the 
invisible hand made possible. It was for these reasons that Keynes argued that it was 
impossible to think clearly about what today we call microeconomic questions without 
classical theory "as part of one's apparatus of thought" (1936: 340). Providing it avoids 
too great a violence to the truth, there are large pay-offs in 'making do' with 
classical/neoclassical conceptions of perfectly competitive general equilibrium, and 
conversely, significant obstacles to alternative frameworks. Hicks is quoted on this 
point shortly.
Secondly, the neoclassical framework provides a powerful and compelling language 
with which to communicate economic ideas to others. The simplicity of the 
classical/neoclassical schema offers a powerful conjunction between politics and 
economics. If one can assume that markets adjust to produce movement towards optimal 
resource allocation, one can retreat from a wide range of potential policy problems, 
solving them not with elaborate calculations and/or negotiations, but according to 
principle. And the principle invoked need not be some obscure economic precept, but a 
simple political one: in the absence of good reasons to the contrary, trade within and 
beyond a nation's borders should be free. It is not surprising that Adam Smith saw 
himself as uncovering an idea embedded in Nature itself! Nor is it surprising that almost 
from the time of Smith, the allure of this framework has sometimes led economists to a 
narrowness, and a trusting too well in the analytic elegance and ease which it provides. 
This is one of the pitfalls of economics (Groenewegen, 1994).
2 One can make this true by definition if we make perfect competition a 'special case' of imperfect 
competition.
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This dissertation offers no quibbles with the Commission's goal of uniformly low or 
zero protection in the absence of good reasons to the contrary. My focus is not on what 
kind of economics was applied but on the 'practical reason' with which it was applied. 
What is meant by 'practical reason' will become clear enough, but it may be defined here 
as the faculties and strategies used to mediate between 'theory' and 'practice'. I argue 
that there were serious deficiencies in the way economists applied their expertise. For 
this there are two broad explanators. The first is economists' conception of what and 
who their enemies were. This leads to what I call the 'anti-naturalistic' or 'anti- 
mercantilistic' orientation of professional economics. David Henderson has painted a 
perceptive portrait of professional economics battling popular economic misconceptions. 
In Henderson's schema, in democratic countries at least, good economic policy is 
forever at the mercy of what he calls the 'do-it-yourself economics' of everyman. Whilst 
I am in sympathy with his point, Henderson's own words introduce the problem 
commendably:
I have described the characteristic state of mind of do-it-yourself- 
economics as one of innocence, and I think this is just. But a significant 
number of my professional colleagues . . . might be disposed to remind me 
that in the Hans Anderson story it was precisely the innocence of the child 
which enabled him to see, and say out loud, that the emperor had no clothes 
( 1986: 14).
Resisting the fallacies of 'do-it-yourself economics was a central preoccupation of the 
economists under study. This was altogether appropriate given their mission. But this 
blinded them to the fruitful leads which were being proposed by businessmen, economic 
amateurs and even some professional economists. The second explanator is what might 
be called the positivist culture of economic expertise and the correspondingly poor 
quality of those aspects of human thought and dialogue which are undervalued or even 
deprecated within that culture. Both explanators are elaborated respectively in the 
subsequent two sections.
Before proceeding a disclaimer is in order. The project is an ambitious one. The subject 
deals with the policy predilections not just of a particular organisation - the IAC - but 
also with the economics profession at large. For that reason, the 'explanation' must be 
broad enough to encompass both, yet specific enough to shed light on what happened. 
As is often the case when seeking to explain human behaviour, neither explanator is 
offered as determinate, although in a given instance it may be decisive. That is, the 
explanation offered here seeks to help the story 'make sense', without suggesting that 
the various positions the actors took were predetermined. Indeed the piquancy of the
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story lies precisely in all the 'might have beens': in the smallness of the intellectual 
changes which were necessary to arrive at better conclusions and the richness of the 
opportunities which the actors had to arrive at them.
1.2 'Dangerous Supplements': The Economist as
Combatant
Classical economics was dedicated to the view that many propositions that 
appealed to the common sense of ordinary people, including quite sophisticated 
businesspersons, were wrong.
Richard Lipsey, 1993: 73
As soon as you get an equilibrium approach to life, suddenly you realise that a 
lot of what you'd thought was wrong.
John Hewson, cited in Wallace, 1991: 91
Certain post-modernist scholars 3 have argued that since the Enlightenment, Western 
political thought has been oriented around fundamental dualities - such as public and 
private, reason and desire, objective and subjective. In each case the strategy of 
'modem' (ie Enlightenment) thought involves favouring one of the poles of the duality at 
the expense of the other. The disfavoured pole is described as the 'dangerous 
supplement' to its respective dominant pole because of its subversive, even anarchic, 
potential. The dangerous supplement is subversive firstly, because it is indispensable: 
each pole of a duality acquires definition in juxtaposition with the other. Secondly, 
because it is ever present, though subordinate, it remains a threat to the interpretive and 
normative standards which have been established around the favoured pole (c/Drahos 
and Parker, 1990: 35).
1.2.1 The Threat of Incoherence
This schema fits aspects of economics very well. In all science incoherence is the 
'dangerous supplement' of coherence. And coherence in classical and neoclassical 
economics is usually won by appeal to the concept of equilibrium which helps ground 
both normative and positive economics. Disequilibrium is its dangerous supplement and
3 Most particularly Derrida. I have deliberately chosen not to develop the idea from Derrida's primary 
source material because it may introduce extraneous elements of interpretation which detract more than 
they add in this context. I am working from the exposition of the framework as outlined in the 
secondary source cited at the end of this paragraph.
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is accordingly under-represented within the discipline.4 The following subsections 
explore the way in which, in positive and normative economics, imperfect competition 
stands as a dangerous supplement to perfect competition and how in normative 
economics 'second best' considerations are likewise a dangerous supplement to 'first 
best' ones. Note at the outset that the dangerousness - or at least the relative 
undesirability - of the dangerous supplements is already signaled in economic language. 
Given the myriad benefits of competition, who wants it to be 'imperfect'? And who 
wants to be second best?
1.2.1.1 Perfect and Imperfect Competition in Positive and
Normative Economics
[In the presence of scale economies,] [t]here must be something to stop the 
indefinite expansion of the firm, but it can just as well be stopped by the 
limitation of the market as by rising marginal costs. . . .  It is, I believe, only 
possible to salvage anything from this wreck - and it must be remembered that 
the threatened wreckage is that of the greater part of economic theory - if we can 
assume that the markets confronting most . . . firms . . .  do not differ very 
greatly from perfectly competitive markets. . . .  At least this get-away seems 
well worth trying. We must be aware, however, that we are taking a dangerous 
step, and probably limiting to a serious extent the problems with which our 
subsequent analysis will be fitted to deal. Personally, however, I doubt if most 
of the problems we shall have to exclude for this reason are capable of much 
useful analysis by the methods of economic theory.
John Hicks, 1939: 84-5
The concepts of perfect and imperfect competition evolved together in the early decades 
of this century - each being defined in juxtaposition with the other as the various 
assumptions implicit in Marshall's system were made explicit. After considerable 
disciplinary turmoil, it turned out - perhaps somewhat to the participants' surprise - that 
imperfect competition threatened to wreak potentially critical damage on the coherence 
which Marshall had forged (Loasby, 1976, Chapter Ten). Imperfect competition was 
subversive of both the intellectual and political roles of perfect competition - that of 
providing stability in calculation and of legitimising the free market paradigm 
respectively.5 Its disciplinary status as a dangerous supplement was dramatically 
captured in Value and Capital, where John Hicks muses on the profound indeterminacy
4 As Lancaster puts it, "economists have virtually no theory of how individual decision-makers behave 
out of equilibrium" (1969: 3).
5 The text proceeds to develop the former of these two claims. The latter, political aspect of imperfect 
competition was one of its main attractions to Joan Robinson (cf Robinson, 1969: x).
8
Chapter One Sketching some Problems of Modern Economics
which imperfections in competition bring to microeconomic analysis. He then makes his 
celebrated 'getaway' into the world of perfect competition (see quote above).
Note how delicate is the quest for equilibrium, and so coherence in neoclassical theory. 
In Hicks' example, the assumptions allowed included perfect knowledge and foresight, 
static, homogenous technologies, costless government and transactions and all the other 
things which are brought to bear in generating a perfectly competitive equilibrium - 
except one. Yet once firms gain some discretion in setting prices, the analysis is 
engulfed by complexity. As Krugman explains, despite today's much greater 
mathematical sophistication, imperfect competition cannot be modelled without arbitrary 
- indeed "silly" - assumptions about tastes, technology, behaviour, or all three 
("Counterrevolution", 1993: 20).
1.2.1.2 First Best and Second Best Perspectives in 
Normative Economics
[N]ecessary conditions are not very interesting. It is sufficient conditions for an 
improvement that we really want.
Ian Little, in Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956-57: 17
In normative economics, 'second best' principles and perspectives also stand as a 
dangerous supplement to 'first best' ones. The theory of the second best emerged 
formally towards the end of the 1950s. It showed that where one of the conditions of 
Pareto optimality was violated - by (say) some divergence between price and marginal 
cost in some market - it was in general no longer desirable to move in the direction of 
achieving other conditions of Pareto optimality. Again there was a good deal of 
disciplinary turmoil, about the implications of the new work and whether it should be 
interpreted as another 'impossibility' theorem ä la Arrow (see Mishan, 1962: 205). The 
turmoil is hardly surprising. The world is constantly breaching the conditions of Pareto 
optimality. And even where one focuses on a „ingle set of 'distortions' like trade 
barriers, as if they were the only obstacles to an optimum, where they cannot be 
removed immediately and totally, the theory of the second best threatens a fair amount of 
'wreckage' for the coherence with which economists can think through the normative 
economics of gradual reform (c/Vousden, 1990: 203).
1.2.1.3 Coping with Theoretical Insufficiency: Disciplinary 
Collapse into Commonsense
According to the interpretation offered here, the content of dangerous supplements are 
not simply 'subjects' within the discipline. On the contrary, one would expect
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approaches to them to mark the sites of strategic choices made - and battles fought - 
about how the discipline itself is practiced and what its social role might be - what it 
'stands for'. But the 'dangerousness' of the supplements - their subversion of the 
coherence of the discipline - means that these choices are difficult indeed. And as 
Herbert Simon has remarked, difficult choices frequently mark the site of irrationality 
(1989: 34 and see below). The choices made by the discipline in the 1970s and 1980s 
make the backdrop for this study. The main focus is on choices made about 'second 
best' issues, although a different choice made about imperfect competition features as an 
interesting foil.
By the early 1970s, economics had dealt with the destructive tendencies of both 
imperfect competition and the theory of the second best in a similar way. The discipline 
continued to orient its thinking around its favoured poles - perfect competition and 'first 
best' normative principles - but it made pragmatic exceptions where the case for so doing 
seemed strongest. Thus for instance, Donald Winch commented in 1971 that "[t]he 
general conclusion about optimisation in an imperfect world is clear. . . .  In the 
presence of imperfections, the best policy in any situation cannot be calculated with 
precision from available data. The rules of first-best optimality, coupled with the caveat 
of second-best, do however, constitute part of the fund of guidelines from which good, 
if not perfect, policy might be formulated. . . . This is a delicate business, lacking 
scientific precision" (1971: 116). Mutatis mutandis, this description of 'second best' 
reasoning in economics, aptly describes the role of imperfect competition, certainly in the 
economics of trade in the early 1970s. Many economists considered scale economies 
and imperfect competition to be an important engine of trade, including the man who 
engineered the 'getaway' from imperfect competition cited above - John Hicks! (eg see 
1959: 183). Some systematic attempts had been made to accommodate scale economies 
into trade theory (eg see Linder 1961; and Dreze in Vernon, 1970: 176-7). Various 
economists, like Harry Johnson for instance, called for increased effort to accommodate 
imperfect competition into trade theory. But others like Bhagwati reflected the orthodox 
pessimism about the technical possibilities of moving very far beyond the existing 
position. Bhagwati called on Johnson to explain "precisely" what he had in mind (In 
Vernon, 1970: 24).
After the seventies the disciplinary status of these dangerous supplements diverged. 
After what one might call the 'repressive tolerance' of the 1970s, 'second best' 
principles were progressively marginalised over the 1970s and 1980s. This dissertation 
looks at how this happened and at some of the problems this raised for policy making. 
By contrast, during the same period economists attempted to storm the citadel of
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imperfect competition in the interests of the 'realism' of their discipline. As the final 
section of this chapter illustrates, the results confirm the dangerousness of imperfect 
competition. In trade theory at least, as Paul Krugman now concedes, economists did 
not get far (see § 1.3.3). A decade on, the preeminent exponent of the new international 
economics of imperfect competition considered that we should stick to 'first best' 
approaches to trade - ie free trade - unless there are compelling reasons to do otherwise 
(Krugman quoted in AFR, 3rd May 1989: 14). We are back to the 1970s.
As Herbert Simon puts it, "a choice between undesirables is a dilemma, something to be 
avoided or evaded" (1989: 34). With both imperfect competition and 'second best' 
considerations for policy, choices were made, but they were made by default rather than 
design. As this dissertation seeks to demonstrate, the choice to marginalise 'second 
best' reasoning, was made largely by appeal to the fallacious notion that policy can 
generally choose between 'second best' policies and something better - 'first best' ones 
(see Chapters Three and Six to Ten). By contrast, the protagonists of reconstructing 
trade theory along imperfectly competitive lines proceeded to engage the dangerous 
supplement in apparent disregard of the costs of their quest for the robustness, generality 
and tractability of their results. In this regard, the methodological choices made by the 
discipline defied the axiomatic injunctions of the discipline itself! Where 'second best' 
normative principles were condemned by reference to their potential costs for policy 
(with insufficient regard for their potential benefits), so imperfect competition came to 
dominate the 'forefront' of the discipline largely by virtue of an appeal to its analytic 
benefits (realism) which took almost no account of its analytic costs! (robustness and 
generality) (see § 1.3.3).
1.2.2 The Threat of Subversion by Politics and 'Do-it-
Yourseif Economics'
To expect . . . that the freedom of trade should ever be entirely restored in 
Great Britain, is as absurd as to expect that an Oceana or Utopia should ever be 
established in it. Not only the prejudices of the public, but what is much more 
unconquerable, the private interests of many individuals irresistibly oppose it.
Adam Smith, 1776: 437-8
It is frequently argued that protection will provide general benefits to the public - or 'the 
nation' - in the process of providing particular advantages to its direct beneficiaries. 
Despite their plausibility to the lay public, such calls are typically either wholly or partly 
fallacious. The crudest forms of protectionism can be refuted by reference to the 'second 
round' or unintended consequences of policy. A typical refutation goes something like
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this: impediments to imports raise domestic costs. These higher costs are passed onto 
domestic consumers as higher prices, but exporters compete against international 
competition and so cannot raise their prices. Export production becomes less profitable 
and so exports fall. General equilibrium can only re-emerge once exports have fallen by 
as much as protection has reduced imports. Thus ultimately protection does nothing to 
affect the trade balance (which is fundamentally determined by other forces) but national 
income falls as low productivity import replacement displaces higher productivity export 
activity.
Here economists' intellectual and social roles come together with particular force. Their 
critiques of public misconceptions protect the public from inefficiency whilst illustrating 
the potency and importance of economic expertise (c/Krugman, 1993, "Arguments": 
362, Henderson, 1986: 53). There is surely particular satisfaction involved in this 
turning of the tables, in showing how the seemingly attractive expansion of an industry 
is actually harmful, and how the seemingly harmful contraction of a protected industry is 
beneficial.
The orientation of professional economics appears to have been influenced in important 
though subtle ways by its role as a foil to the mercantilist fallacies of do-it-yourself 
economics. If mercantilistic policies are typically motivated by their expansionary first 
round effects on chosen industries, economic orthodoxy appears to have developed a 
strongly anti-mercantilistic aesthetic of reform which emphasises the ultimately beneficial 
effect of contractionary first round effects. For the methods of unilateral trade 
liberalisation which have received easiest acceptance within orthodox economic theory 
and political economy are 'top down' and 'across the board' tariff reductions. (Top 
down reform involves cutting the highest tariffs first, then the next highest and so on. 
Across the board reform involves reducing all tariffs by the same proportional amount.) 
The immediate (first round) effect of both types of reform move is to contract protected 
sectors as imports increase. The beneficial expansionary effects of reform only emerge 
once the resources thus liberated are employed more productively elsewhere (IAC, 
Annual Report, 1973-4, 1974: 22).
It might seem obvious that the simplest and most direct way to liberalise trade is to 
remove existing trade barriers. But when trade liberalisation must be gradual, such 
simplicities obscure important questions. While tariffs remain at whatever level, to what 
extent should tariff concessions be provided to exporters? Should industry assistance 
remain inwardly oriented until free trade is achieved? Tariff concessions and other forms 
of assistance to exporters from traditionally protected sectors have some appeal to the
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mercantilistic intuition of 'do-it-yourself economics precisely because of their 
expansionary first round effects. And there is no logical reason why contraction should 
be the first effect of reform. The same effect can be achieved where less protected 
sectors expand and draw resources from the protected sectors.6
Suffice it to say here that economists deliberations on these issues reflected strong anti­
mercantilist orientations. The issue of tariff concessions for exporters remained almost 
wholly unaddressed within the profession. And where the issue of facilitating or 
assisting the emergence of exports in the context of trade liberalisation was addressed, 
many in the profession were instinctively hostile towards policies which sought to 
improve Australia's industry structure by promoting or facilitating the development of 
particular industries (see Chapters Three and Ten). As demonstrated in the following 
section, the anti-mercantilistic orientation of the discipline also provides a possible key to 
aspects of economists' treatment of the normative economics of trade negotiation.
1.2.3 An Illustrative Digression: The Normative Economics
of Trade Negotiation
In economists' discussion of trade liberalisation, unilateral trade liberalisation has 
generally occupied the 'high ground' with trade negotiation between countries being 
correspondingly deprecated as either wholly inexplicable or at least paradoxical from an 
economic point of view (see below). From a neoclassical perspective it is hard to 
understand why countries negotiate to open their markets to each other because they are 
trading 'concessions' which are unilaterally beneficial in their own right. And when it 
comes to trade negotiation, multilateralism has occupied the high ground against 
regionalism and bi-lateralism .7 There may be 'practical' wisdom in these rankings -
6 The point made is a logical one. It will frequently be practically difficult to design policies to expand 
lightly or negatively assisted sectors in such a way that their expansion draws resources from the most 
protected sectors. The distinction remains however between what one might call a 'contractionary' 
reform path driven by contraction of the most protected sectors (with the subsequent deployment of 
liberated resources in more productive activities) and its converse - an 'expansionary' one in which less 
protected sectors expand (drawing resources from more protected sectors). In the typical exercise in 
comparative statics used to explore these scenarios, ceteris paribus the expansionary and contractionary 
reform paths to free trade would be welfare equivalent.
7 Those amongst the orthodoxy who tolerate regionalism tend to do so to the extent that it might 
complement multilateral trade liberalisation (see for example Johnson, 1968: 167). The preference for 
multilateralism is expressed in the following passage from the Australian daily press. "NAFTA is 
second best. It is trade liberalisation, but it is discriminatory liberalisation. . . . First best would
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related to the domestic and international political tendencies of different approaches to 
liberalisation - but it is hard to justify them theoretically.
From a neoclassical perspective two effects should be taken into account in trade 
negotiation - a country's access to imports and the access its exporters enjoy in foreign 
markets. Other things being equal, unilateral trade liberalisation offers the best possible 
result with regard to the first of these objectives, and nothing with respect to the second. 
Both regional and multilateral trade negotiation may compromise the first of these 
objectives because paradoxically, in 'trading concessions' countries surrender to some 
extent their freedom to act unilaterally. (If other countries know a country will embrace 
its own interests unilaterally and remove its trade barriers in any event, this cannot be 
described as 'negotiation'). On the other hand, a country participating in regional and 
multilateral trade negotiations can often have some effect on its own access to foreign 
markets. The net result of these two effects in any scenario is an empirical question 
which has defied attempts to establish the 'in-principle' value of one approach over 
another (Wonnacott and Wonnacott, 1981; 1984). Yet these trade negotiation 
alternatives are not neutral in their appeal or lack thereof to the mercantilist intuition. For 
the gains from traditional unilateral trade liberalisation emerge only after the contraction 
of protected industries. These are the gains which are all but invisible to the lay public 
and which economists are trained to see. By contrast, the expansionary first round 
effects attending improved access to foreign markets are not only easily accessible to 
commonsense mercantilism, but highly influential in motivating it (Wonnacott and 
Wonnacott, 1981: 705).* 8
Consistent with the hypothesis outlined above, the economics profession appears to have 
given considerably more attention to the effects which justify unilateral trade 
liberalisation and much less attention to the effects which justify trade negotiation. The
have been a better GATT" (Editorial, AFR, 19th November, 1993: 24). For an example from academia,
see El-Agraa who claims that "the evaluation of any regional scheme of economic integration should
incorporate a consideration of the validity of the view that . . . constraints do exist to justify the 
pursuit of second-best rather than first best solutions" (1985: 205). Both statements imply that the
alternative to regional free trade is global free trade - the only thing which will remove the situation from
the world of the second best. It seems unnecessary to "check" whether this is possible. The relevant
question is, "Given that global free trade is not on offer, is greater liberalisation offered by regional or
multilateral approaches?"
8 This is particularly the case where the number of trade negotiators is small - where trade liberalisation 
is regional or bilateral - and the mercantilist logic of traded 'concessions' is most evident in the outcome 
because 'free riding' on others' concessions can be minimised.
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benefits of access to foreign markets were recognised in various ways in the literature - 
such as Harry Johnson's exploration of trade wars using offer curves. Yet despite this, 
since the 1960s, it has been argued by many economists - including Johnson! - that the 
only economic motive for a country to engage in trade negotiation is to provide the 
domestic political circumstances to enable it to reduce its own trade barriers (Wonnacott, 
1993: 18-20). As Ronald Wonnacott observes, despite occasional recognition of the 
importance of foreign tariffs "it is surprising how much life remains in the contrary 
1960s-1970s view of free trade as being almost synonymous with unilateral elimination 
of [one's] own tariff" with reductions in foreign tariffs seldom in view. Thus in 
standard textbook treatments of trade liberalisation, for instance, there is much on the 
elimination of the triangular deadweight losses associated with tariffs on the import side 
but little if anything on the elimination of the analogous deadweight losses accruing to 
the domestic (exporting) country where its trading partners liberalise.9
As Wonnacott explains, this lacuna existed not just within economic pedagogy but even 
at the level of empirical estimation:
Thus those working in trade became split between those like Harris and 
Whalley who, in the course of their empirical estimation of issues such as 
the cost to developing countries of the multi-fibre agreement, recognised 
the importance of foreign trade barriers, and those who were silent on this 
issue. While most in the silent group were not working on empirical 
estimation, there were some in this group who were, such as those who were 
evaluating the various effects on a country of joining an economic union 
and were taking into account the cost of trade diversion on the import side 
but not the benefit of preferences acquired on the export side (Wonnacott,
1993: 18-20).10
9 Wonnacott goes on:
This is particularly surprising, since other things being equal, a country might 
expect to gain more from a reduction of a partner's tariffs on its own exports 
than from reducing its own tariff on its imports, because 1) the former involves 
a terms of trade gain while the latter involves a loss (with both generating 
efficiency gains) 2) in bilateral or plurilateral reciprocity in which preferences are 
created there is a special cost of own tariff elimination in the form of trade 
diversion, whereas there is a special benefit from partner's tariff elimination in 
the form of preferential treatments received in [the] partner's market.
10 Wonnacott goes on to outline a similar intellectual phenomenon with regard to the 'unilateral tariff 
reduction' (UTR) theorem which demonstrated the superiority of UTR over the formation of a customs 
union by assuming away the very thing which a customs union can provide which UTR cannot - terms 
of trade gains (p. 20) And see footnote 2 on p. 20 where Wonnacott details a similar 'double standard' 
in favour of the consideration of the import side advantages of UTR and, in analogous circumstances, 
against the consideration of the terms of trade benefits offered by foreign tariff reductions.
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In apparent exasperation, Wonnacott asks rhetorically "How did this happen?" without 
providing a satisfying answer.11 Whether or not it provides a complete explanation, the 
facts certainly square with the anti-mercantilist orientation of economics as explored in 
this section.
1.3 Positivism and Practical Reason
It is a mark of the trained mind never to expect more precision in the treatment 
of any subject than the nature of that subject permits; for demanding logical 
demonstrations from a teacher of rhetoric is clearly about as reasonable as 
accepting mere plausibility from a mathematician.
Aristotle, 1976:1, iii, 65
This section argues that the culture of modem - post war - economic expertise is infused 
with the values of rational deduction and that this has had an important effect on the 
quality of economists' 'practical reason' and so the quality of their contribution to policy 
advice. My intention here is to juxtapose two approaches to thought itself which have 
gone under a variety of names through the ages and in different disciplines. They were 
contrasted as 'logic' and 'rhetoric' in the pre-modern Aristotelian tradition. Lindblom 
contrasts the methods of 'foundationalism' and 'immanent critique' (1990: 42-3), as 
earlier in the century he contrasted 'synoptic' and 'incrementalist' procedures of analysis 
(Braybrook and Lindblom, 1963). McCloskey contrasts 'positivism' and 'modernism'
11 Because the thesis does not return to it, and because it makes a contribution - albeit tangentially - to 
the argument, it is noted here in passing that, when it came to trade negotiation, the IAC too, put 
considerable effort into developing an exclusively unilateralist focus which had countries 'negotiating' 
trade concessions by reference only to the "restructuring required to make [their] own domestic industries 
more competitive" rather than the foreign market concessions which could also contribute to domestic 
welfare (Mauldon, 1988: 131, and see generally IAC Annual Reports, 1984-5 and subsequent years). For 
instance, the IAC commented that:
Reducing barriers to international trade does not guarantee, for individual 
participating nations, an improved domestic incentives structure. The 
international objective of lowering trade barriers is important. Its contribution 
to the domestic objective, of a less disparate environment of incentives and a 
more competitive industry structure, is paramount (IAC, Annual Report, 1984- 
5: 3).
Without supporting empirical evidence, the assertion that the domestic focus is "paramount" is arbitrary. 
Note however that in other contexts, the IAC did acknowledge the gains to Australia from other 
countries' trade liberalisation, (see eg Annual Report, 1974-5: 110; and also Rattigan and Carmichael, 
"GATT survival crucial for us", AFR, 13th December, 1993: 15).
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with 'rhetoric'; persuasive or 'probable' argument with indubitable argument (1985, 
passim).
There is now a vast literature attaching to each of these terms proposing distinctions 
between them and consequent refinements. Like McCloskey, I am more concerned with 
the contrast between the two styles of thought and use terms referring to the same sides 
of the divide synonymously (McCloskey, 1983: 483). The particular concern here is 
with the pre-eminence of one mode of thought and with the way which, within 
economics, "probable argument" is so often made "entirely subservient to indubitable 
argument" (McCloskey, 1983: 483). Naturally the pre-eminent status accorded 
indubitable argument and formal technique in economics does not prevent economists 
from exercising the techniques of practical or 'probable' reason. The subjects of this 
study used their judgment and supported it with informal argumentation, as indeed they 
had to in order to design and advocate reform. I argue that the quality of this argument 
was inadequate.
1.3.1 The Practice of Economics and Policy Making:
Positivist or Rhetorical Discourse
Let me make a confession. Back when I was 20 I could perceive the great 
progress that was being made in econometric methods. . . .  I expected that 
the new econometrics would enable us to narrow down the uncertainties of our 
economic theories. . . . My confession is that this expectation has not worked 
out. . . . [I]t seems . . . that there does not accumulate a convergent body 
of econometric findings convergent on a testable truth.
Paul Samuelson, 1986: 793
After the Second World War, the rational-deductive ideal dominated the philosophy of 
science and even social science for many years. Many social scientists dedicated their 
energies to transforming their own disciplines into 'sciences'. Nowhere was this 
tendency more pronounced than in economics, not least because so much of its subject 
matter was naturally quantified and quantifiable (cf Mirowski, 1988: 180ff). 
Throughout the period, dissenters both within and outside the mainstream have warned 
that such adulation of the rational-deductive ideal could come at the price of practical 
reason. Keynes, (the later) John Hicks and Marshall - and arguably Adam Smith 12 -
12 References for the first three authors are provided where these author's work is discussed in this 
introductory chapter, (see also Marshall cited in § 8.2.2 below). For Smith see his condemnation of 
the 'man of system', in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Smith, 1976: 234) and the emphasis he placed 
on the aesthetics of theory choice (Thompson, 1965).
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argued as much while they were alive. Since the publication of Kuhn's The Structure o f 
Scientific Revolutions (1962), the positivist understanding of the logic of scientific 
discovery and justification has been in retreat.
Recently Donald McCloskey has led the anti-positivist charge in economics, arguing that 
the discipline does not in fact follow the precepts laid down for it in its rational-deductive 
'official methodology' and that, moreover, this is a good thing. Like the anti- 
foundationalist philosophers of science, such as Feyerabend and Rorty, McCloskey 
proposes that economists should appreciate that there are no indubitable foundations for 
their discipline: that in so far as one can describe or prescribe for what goes on in the 
discipline, one can only say that economics follows - or should follow - the rules of 
disciplined conversation. It should admit formal, deductive reasoning but in a spirit of 
pluralism rather than exclusion. Much good and important argument will appeal to 
criteria which are inadequately recognised in the positivist canon. It will appeal to 
authority, to aesthetic qualities and to elements which appeal to intuitive faculties such as 
'judgment'. McCloskey describes such a discourse as 'rhetoric' not in its pejorative 
modern sense - as ornament or 'mere' rhetoric - but in its pre (and post!) modem sense - 
as "the art of discovering good reasons, finding what really warrants assent, because any 
reasonable person ought to be persuaded" (1983: 482).
Similar issues were explored in Herbert Simon's and Charles Lindblom's critique of 
'decision making as optimisation' in the late 1950s. Policy making as optimisation 
sought to include all relevant information and to reduce the various dimensions of a 
policy problem into some form which could then be solved by objectively optimising 
some agreed welfare function. Even to describe this strategy is to be struck by how 
sensible it appears. But both Lindblom and Simon were concerned that this was a 
misleading description of what actual decision making was or could even aspire to be. 
Both were concerned with describing strategies for what Lindblom later termed "skillful 
incompleteness": strategies which found a place for the intuitive processes of judgment, 
exploration, redefinition and improvisation by which people seek to meet multiple 
objectives (Lindblom, 1982: 136).
Simon proposed 'satisficing' in which the decision maker sought satisfactorily to meet or 
exceed specified objectives without seeking a single, unique 'optimal' solution (Simon, 
1987: 243). Lindblom's vision was similar, but where Simon envisaged an essentially 
unitary or hierarchical decision making organisation reaching a decision which would 
satisfy a plurality of objectives, Lindblom's 'disjointed incrementalism' was socially as 
well as analytically pluralistic. It placed value on the 'mutual adjustment' and
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accommodation of a plurality of values, viewpoints, social and economic interests and 
decision procedures (including, where appropriate rational deductive methods of cost- 
benefit analysis, operations research and so on).
Both Lindblom and McCloskey offer a critique of practitioners' self-understanding 
which suggests that many are profoundly misunderstood about what they do, and 
accordingly what they might reasonably aspire to do. At this point McCloskey's and 
Lindblom's messages diverge. Despite arguing that the Official Methodology in 
economics is hopelessly, indeed "scandalously" misguided, McCloskey concludes that 
"[e]conomics at present is, in fact, moderately well off. It may be sleepwalking in its 
rhetoric, but it seems to know in any case approximately where to step" (McCloskey, 
1985: 139, 174;13 cf Neuberg, 1989: 291). The co-existence of good practice with 
'scandalously' bad methodology suggests of course that methodological reflection has 
relatively meagre practical significance. On the other hand, the burden of Lindblom's 
message has been to stress the way in which such misunderstanding can undermine 
practical reason. It certainly seems plausible that argument which placed almost 
exclusive value on formal analysis but which relied extensively on informal judgment, 
might be informal argument of a relatively untutored and even disoriented kind. As 
Lindblom has put it:
A [rational-deductive] (in aspiration) attempt to choose and justify the 
location of a new public housing unit by an analysis of the entirety of a 
city's land needs and potential development patterns always degenerates at 
least into superficiality if not fraud. . . . The choice . . .  is simply between 
ill-considered, often accidental incompleteness on the one hand, and 
deliberate, designed incompleteness on the other (1982: 129, 130).
The contents of this thesis support Lindblom's instincts in believing that the issue is an 
important one for practice.
1.3.2 Some Intellectual Vices of the Rational/Deductive
Self Image
This section outlines several ways in which the intellectual culture of the economics 
profession provides fertile soil for a variety of intellectual vices to grow. Of course not 
every episode examined in subsequent chapters exhibits each of these vices. 
Nevertheless given that each makes its appearance amply in the subject material under
13 McCloskey's use of the expression "in fact" conceals a few rhetorical tricks of his own. It appears to 
stand for the expression "in my opinion".
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study, it seems worth the attempt to relate them to their intellectual 'root causes' where 
this can be done plausibly.
1.3.2.1 Technical and Integrative Skill and the Need for
Evaluative Judgment
I just don't accept the . . . view that until you have a good, solid, theoretical
explanation of a phenomenon you have to ignore the phenomenon.
Alan Blinder, cited in Hahn, 1986: 279
Section 1.1 argued that frameworks and so modes of discussion must seek to satisfy 
several objectives simultaneously. Those objectives include internal consistency, 
simplicity, 'realism' and the breadth of illumination offered by alternative approaches. 
Thus, to use Simon's terminology, choosing between them is an act of 'satisficing'. 
Greater formalism will typically improve the internal consistency of an argument. And 
by thus making way for "modification and qualification" (Samuelson, 1947: 92), it can 
sometimes contribute to better meeting other objectives. But often it will not (Loasby, 
1976: 56-7, and see § 1.3.3 below). And in most acts of satisficing, better meeting one 
objective comes at the cost of others. The strictures of logical consistency can weigh 
down a discussion (see Blinder above and Keynes below § 1.3.2.2.2). As IAC 
modeller David Vincent commented, "[gjiven the time constraint under which staff 
operate, the initial model specification is crucial. . . . only minor modifications 
. . . can be implemented as the inquiry progresses" (Vincent, 1990: 299-300). Less 
formal approaches are less constrained in this way.
Economists appreciated this point in the first half of this century. As Dewey has 
explained, there were good reasons why an earlier generation of economists - 
preeminently Marshall - held back from formally defining competition. Such 
forbearance permitted them to organise their discussions flexibly: "The model of perfect 
competition could be introduced whenever it could usefully illuminate some important 
feature of reality. It could be laid aside whenever it got in the way of the study of other 
important features of reality" (Dewey, 1969: 7-8). Today's economics does not escape 
the dilemmas of inconsistency. As Loasby puts it, the methodological difficulties 
involved in reconciling current 'static' and 'dynamic' perspectives cannot be solved - 
only lived with (1976: 202). Indeed, they go back to the birth of Western Philosophy 
and Zeno's paradoxes about stasis and motion which have never been compellingly 
solved. 'Comparative statics' usually runs the gauntlet of these paradoxes by suggesting 
implicitly that one static state somehow 'becomes' another - without (alas) having solved 
the problem of how this takes place either within the strictures of the model or the world.
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In contemporary practice the economist frequently switches the scenery - instantaneously 
as it were - with very little, if any, deliberation on how partial perspectives might be 
brought into some (albeit inadequate) coherence. In the I AC study discussed in Chapter 
Nine below, the IAC itself provides an example of formally inconsistent analyses 
brought to bear on the same problem. The IAC's ORANI analysis assumed imperfect 
substitution between imports and domestic production, whilst its assistance evaluation 
was done according to a standard procedure one of the implicit assumptions of which 
was perfect substitutability (IAC, PMVs, 1981, Appendix Nine and Appendix 12, and 
See Corden, 1971: 60). Yet there is little if any discussion of how the two frameworks 
might relate to one another. The approach of economists like Marshall - what Shackle 
has called "deliberate imprecision of argument" (1988: 143) - had the great advantage of 
emphasising the role of evaluative judgment and interpretive skill in integrating partial 
perspectives into an imperfect, but possibly useful whole.
As well as being massively complex, the economy is also forever evolving. Formal 
method has trouble with both complexity and evolution. Hicks has commented that the 
experimental sciences are "in the economic sense, 'static'". Their data is provided by 
experiments which, being replicable, provide data which has validity in some timeless 
sense. He argues that while there are economic problems which can be dealt with 
according to such a method, "there are not many of them":
The more characteristic problems are problems of change, of growth and 
regression and of fluctuation. The extent to which these can be reduced 
into scientific terms is rather limited; for at every stage in an economic 
process new things are happening, things which have not happened before - 
at the most they are rather like what has happened before. . . .  As 
economics pushes on beyond 'statics' it becomes less like science and more 
like history (1979: x-xi, cf Caimcross in Henderson, 1986: 105).
To use Hicks' felicitously vague expression, the development of policy responses to 
emerging economic developments requires skill in comparing 'rather like' with 'rather 
like'. One will need skill in working with frequently seriously inadequate information. 
Formal modelling and statistical techniques may be of some use. But their usefulness 
will probably be strictly limited. Where economic developments and the ideas to 
interpret them are new, the data will rarely be available in a form which permits rigorous 
analysis (Coase, 1988: 71). For instance many of Keynes' arguments in the general 
theory were not formulated as statistically testable hypotheses until the early 1950s 
(McCloskey, 1983: 489). Throughout economics, but particularly where new 
phenomena and so new possibilities are emerging, adaptive, informal and 'probable' 
reasoning will be crucial.
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Against the 'technical skill' with which practitioners manipulate formal identities one 
may compare the skill and the fruitfulness with which they exercise the less exact skill of 
judging when, whether and in what circumstances analogies and distinctions between 
'rather like' and 'rather like' enlighten more than they mislead (cf Marshall, 1947: 774). 
This is the skill - 1 will call it 'integrative skill' - by which a practitioner will decide the 
worth of a particular piece of economic theory and whether and how to apply it in 
specific circumstances. On inspection it will be evident that technical skill is dependent 
upon integrative skill for its usefulness. For the technical manipulation of formal 
identities is of no scientific interest but for some judgement made that what is 
manipulated - say the formal conditions which specify perfect competition - bears some 
useful resemblance to (is 'rather like') empirical phenomena of interest. A simple, and 
so compelling, example of inadequate integrative skill is provided by the IAC's treatment 
of economies of scale in the automotive industry. As Chapters Seven to Nine 
demonstrate, IAC analysts devoted considerable resources to technically estimating 
minimum efficient scale (MES) in the automotive industry for various activities without 
even considering whether the particular textbook specification of MES they were using 
was appropriate in this instance.14 The IAC took MES to be the output at which a 
further doubling of output would lower average unit costs by less than two per cent 
(IAC, PMVs, 1974: 100). But why two per cent? Other textbooks have minimum 
economic scale being the point at which a doubling of output would lower average costs 
by five per cent! (eg see Fisher and Dornbusch, 1983: 167). In plenty of markets even 
a five per cent cost disability is not critical to viability. Indeed the automotive industry is 
such a market (see § 7.5.2.1).
Integrative skill also enables the practitioner to look at phenomena from several 
perspectives in search of what Stretton has called 'manipulative opportunities' (1969: 
62). Thus, in positive economics, if two reasonable perspectives on a problem each 
highlight something as an explanator of observed behaviour, this adds to the confidence 
with which it can be identified as important. The normative implications of competing 
perspectives or models can be integrated in an analogous way. Where it is not possible 
to choose confidently between alternative models or perspectives, progress may
14 An even more striking example of this kind of problem - of economists learning techniques which are 
then uncritically applied - is provided by McCloskey and Ziliak, 1996 who show how alarmingly often 
in economic practice, statistical significance is substituted for economic significance. Note that tests of 
statistical significance are technical exercises whereas assessments of economic significance require some 
evaluative judgement to be exercised (1996: 98).
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nevertheless be facilitated by searching for areas in which the policy implications of one 
approach are not vitiated (or better still, supported) by alternative perspectives.
The following chapters outline a situation in which there was a range of perspectives on 
trade liberalisation and industrial development within the economic literature in the 1970s 
and 1980s. Each offered partial perspectives on a range of issues of some relevance to 
Australia's circumstances. During the period under study, Australia's industry structure 
was changing and new possibilities were emerging. In the automotive industry, after 
two decades of inwardly oriented growth and protection, domestic demand was 
becoming saturated by domestic production. At the same time opportunities were 
emerging to deploy Australia's industrial capability as an 'export base'. What was 
happening was, 'rather like' what had happened to America's manufacturers in the fifties 
- although of course it had its differences. What Raymond Vernon had just christened 
'product cycle trade' was becoming possible for Australia's manufacturers (see Chapters 
Two and Three).
Australia's circumstances were also 'rather like' those confronting the firms and policy 
makers of North East Asia. The policy makers of Japan, Korea and Taiwan were aware 
of the limitations of inwardly oriented growth. They were thus keen to shift the focus of 
an increasingly competent industrial base towards export markets and keen to achieve 
technology transfer from foreign multinational enterprises (MNEs). In the early 1970s 
the formal micro-economics of these issues were in a relatively primitive state. As 
Dunning put it "the debate on the role of MNEs on trade and the transfer of technology 
and the location of production, is still in its infancy. It is an area hazardous and not 
altogether attractive for the academic economist; the issues are controversial; the concepts 
are elusive the data are not easily subject to quantitative manipulation and appraisal, and 
the standard of debate is often low" (1977: 413-4). The discipline of economics was not 
well endowed with insights into these issues.
Yet the appeal of policies to deliver industry assistance in ways which facilitated intra­
industry trade enabling firms to specialise in existing or developing competitive strengths 
was amenable to commonsense, and the North East Asian countries used such policies 
extensively (see Chapters Three to Five below). By contrast, within the Australian IAC, 
the act of formalising the problems itself concealed the very phenomenon of intra­
industry trade from view. Three of the four of the simplifying assumptions made by the 
IAC in its measurement of effective assistance were logically inconsistent with any level
23
Chapter One Sketching some Problems of Modern Economics
of intra-industry trade and specialisation (Rattigan et al, 1989: 107-8).15 These 
assumptions were taken directly from the economics profession's trade theory of the 
day. Where Asian policy makers improvised a range of new instruments to expand trade 
"before it could be realised how beneficial the transformation of policy . . . would 
prove to be" (Taiwanese Minister Li, 1988: 135), economists in the IAC actively 
opposed similar instruments and indeed actively opposed any of the exploratory 
innovations in trade policy and trade liberalisation which had been so successfully 
deployed in North East Asia.
1.3.2.2 The Temper of Economic Discourse: Dichotomies
and Impatience for Closure
Modernism has also had a profound effect on the 'temper' of economic discourse. The 
previous sub-section suggested that the technical skill, so prized by modernist 
methodology, could come at the cost of 'integrative skill'. The following sections 
explore how this is reinforced by a range of tendencies, which tend to militate against the 
prospect of mutually beneficial dialogue between those with differing perspectives.
The assumptions are:
• perfect substitutability between local and international goods
• In the absence of assistance, domestic prices are set by international prices
• "The direction of trade in the absence of assistance can be assessed. Unusually this is 
further simplified by assuming that import competing goods remain import competing 
and that goods exported continue to be exported [even given changes in the assistance 
structure]." (In fact it is further simplified by assuming that industries which are net 
importers do not export and that industries which export do not import. Thus, 
although the commission was aware of the point which its consultant Peter Lloyd had 
stressed - that there were wide disparities in both competitiveness and assistance level 
within as well as between industries - [see eg Annual Report 1973-4: 12; §82 and 22; 
§152] - this virtually never entered its formal analysis.)
• The production relationships between inputs, between outputs and between inputs and 
outputs for each activity remains unchanged by the structure of assistance
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1.3.2.2.1 Preoccupation with Polarities: Inattention to Local
Possibilities
We need to focus on how to deal with the transitional issues - it is less 
important whether you think that free trade or strategic trade is the ideal than 
how you get out of the mess you are in now.
Nancy Barry, 1989
In a recent book Lindblom offered an instructive contrast between two approaches to 
policy on euthanasia. Where a foundationalist approach might attempt to deduce 
appropriate policy from a principle about (say) the value of human life, the alternative 
approach would build from what was known to it asking "Who are the people for whom 
euthanasia is a possibility? What is their situation? What do they think about it and 
why? What do others think about it and why? Can I find relatively concrete persuasive 
reasons for agreeing or disagreeing with either? On what grounds might my line of 
thought then in turn be challenged? One method descends, the other ascends" (1990: 
42). A foundationalist approach which orients itself around polarities can be 
counterproductive if it obscures more immediately relevant issues. Indeed, as Lindblom 
argued in the 1950s, it can serve to orient the discussion around concepts like 
'competition', 'capitalism' 'planning' and 'socialism' which do not describe actual 
alternatives confronting policy makers:
Since all relevant real-world systems are combinations of these 'systems', 
what is at stake at any point of marginal policy adjustment is a 'systems 
mix'. Hence the general case for or against any of these pure systems, we 
find, is not a case for or against any actual policy choice that is in fact open 
(1958: 310).
This describes the texture of professional economic discussion of liberalisation well. 
Despite perennial preoccupation with the 'big questions' on free markets versus 
intervention and whether or not to liberalise, economics is frequently unhelpful on the 
smaller questions of system design and amelioration. Thus for instance, despite lengthy 
debate on the merits or otherwise of protectionism, Max Corden observed in 1968 that 
Australian economists had "until recently, offered very little guidance on what the 
structure of a tariff system should be, given the fact that a general argument for 
protection is accepted" (1968: 26). More recently Michaely commented in 1986 that 
while liberalisation was often "of primary importance" in improving efficiency and 
growth, investigating the desirable path of liberalisation constituted a serious gap in both
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the empirical and analytical literature on liberalisation policy (1986: 41).16 The World 
Bank has put considerable effort into addressing 'transitional' issues since then. Even 
so, the emphasis has typically been at a very aggregated level which offers little guidance 
on the issues covered in this dissertation: "Which are the key markets to be liberalised 
and in what order?" (Donges et al 1991: 219). This thesis sketches a wide canvass of 
options for liberalising just one system of intervention - trade barriers - which has 
received scant attention from economists.
1.3.2.2.2 Science as Convergence Toward Truth: Burdens of Proof and 
the Disparagement of Dialogue
[Ojne does not go about identifying the weaknesses of what another person 
says in order to prove that one is always right, but one seeks instead as far as 
possible to strengthen the other's viewpoint so that what the other person has to 
say becomes illuminating. Such an attitude seems essential to me for any 
understanding at all to come about. This is nothing more than an observation.
It has nothing to do with an 'appeal' and nothing at all to do with ethics. Even 
immoral beings try to understand one another.
Hans Georg Gadamer, in Michelfelder and Palmer, 1989: 55
Modernist discourse not only downplays the importance of 'probable' reasoning. 
Modernism often actively deprecates 'probable' reasoning and in so doing places upon it 
a burden of proof which, by its nature, it cannot discharge. Modernists concede that 
scientific discovery may require imagination. But where truth, or successively closer 
approximations to it, are presumed to emerge from the data, the logic of scientific 
justification becomes a matter of excluding the 'untrue' and the 'unscientific' (eg see 
Popper, 1986: 36ff; 89). As Brown puts it . . . "No longer a collaborator in 
persuasive discourse", the reader "is now to be convinced by the force  of facts and 
logic" (1987: 20). Or in Klamer's words, for modernists, "agreement is only a matter of 
time" (cited in de Marchi, 1988: 272). In this framework dialogue provides an engine 
for scientific consolidation. But this is dialogue as a contest in which the winner carries 
the day. Mutually exploratory and cooperative dialogue is less obviously valuable. 
Indeed it might even retard scientific consolidation by compromising the rigour of the 
struggle for survival in the marketplace of ideas. Integrative skill and judgement about 
the plausibility of alternative ideas is subservient to the technical skill which one can
16 cf The World Bank:
The nature of a desirable path - the sequencing - of trade policy reforms, specifically those 
economic measures that lead to a contraction of effective rates of protection is a significant 
omission in research on trade policy (1984, pp. 55-6).
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bring to 'letting the data speak'. Samuelson tilts at the standards of rhetoric - the appeal 
to persuasion, judgement and authority - when he declaims:
It is not elder statesmen's wisdom that kills off a young whippersnapper's 
foolishness, but rather another whippersnapper's regression data (1989: 97).
Dissenters from 'modernism' have generally been concerned with communication 
between those who see things see things differently. For them mutually exploratory and 
cooperative dialogue is indispensable to the progress of science. Thus some 'openness' 
of the texture of disciplinary discussion is seen not as an indulgence but rather a 
prerequisite of social reason. Towards the end of his labours over The General Theory, 
Keynes became fascinated with the way in which his own struggle towards new ideas 
was also a struggle to escape from old ones (1936: xxiii). Thus he insisted on the 
importance of communicating whole "bundles of ideas" with "a quasi-formal style" 
which, though it is imperfect, is the best means of communication available. Such a 
style relies on the interpretive intelligence and good will of readers, who might otherwise 
raise "a thousand futile, yet verbally legitimate" objections (cited in Moggeridge, 1976: 
33-4).17 Keynes' view accords with Kuhn's description of paradigm change in science 
which is the result of a "conversion experience that cannot be forced" (1970: 151). 
Keynes' own description of the wide range of qualities necessary for the good economist 
stressing the importance of judgment, rigour and goodwill (1936: xxiii) contrast sharply 
with Samuelson’s view of the scholar's motivation - avarice for fame amongst peers - 
providing grist for the evolutionary mill of survival of the fittest ideas (1986: 806).
This issue is related to the polarisation of economic discourse. Just as formal economic 
theory is generally best at dealing with the kinds of limiting cases which typify the 
extremes of a situation - like perfect competition versus monopoly, competitive markets 
versus central planning - and far less powerful in the complex area between such poles, 
so the areas of common ground which emerge between those with fundamentally 
diverging interests or perspectives will often exist somewhere between the poles. Thus 
in Australia, after the mid-seventies, enormous effort was then, as it is today, exercised 
debating the relative merits of 'free trade' versus 'intervention', rather than attempting to 
generate as wide a consensus as possible in favour of worthwhile improvements in 
Australia's industry and policies (also see P. Lloyd, 1978: 288-90). There was 
remarkably little dialogue as cooperation although there was plenty to be had, if not
17 See also Keynes' personal note repudiating Hayek's critique of his Treatise on Money: 
Hayek has not read my book with that measure of 'good will' which an author is 
entitled to expect of a reader. Until he can do so, he will not see what I mean or 
know whether I am right (cited in Moggeridge, 1992: 534).
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concerning whether to liberalise trade, then on how to optimise industrial development in 
the context of liberalising trade.
Not only is formalism frequently inhospitable to the formulation of new insights and to 
the integration of differing perspectives. Those who seek such integration are frequently 
required to meet an impossibly heavy burden of proof in convincing modernist doubters. 
Where those opposed to the modernist tradition have argued that each side of the debate 
bears a heavy burden of interpretation in order to understand and 'make the most of the 
other (see Gadamer in head quotation above), the modernist tradition imagines that the 
problem may be solved (at least in-principle) with a shoot out in which the bullets are 
formal logic and/or statistical regressions. Modernists who are unpersuaded but not, in 
their own terms refuted, might all too easily assume that the problem lies with their 
opponents.
As Chapters Seven to Ten demonstrate, one of the chief means by which the IAC 
avoided engagement with those who differed with it was to impose upon them a burden 
of proof which it was effectively impossible for them to discharge - and indeed one, 
which on inspection, the Commission itself was also generally unable to meet. A brief 
foretaste may be provided here. In its 1966-67 Annual Report the Tariff Board 
announced that it would not recommend 'infant industry' protection for an industry 
unless its "prospects of operating with lower levels of assistance within a reasonable 
time" could be demonstrated "beyond reasonable doubt" (1966-7: 9). One need not, as 
this author does not, disagree with this scepticism about the 'infant industry' argument 
for protection - especially in Australia in the late 1960s - to observe nevertheless that the 
Board was proposing a standard of demonstration for its opponents which has 
traditionally been regarded as more suited to dealings with murderers than protectionists! 
And evidently such a test pre-empts any possibility of making policy recommendations 
around assessments of the probable costs, risks and benefits of a proposed policy 
alternative. Needless to say the IAC never found an industry worthy of infant industry 
protection.
1.3.2.2.3 Peremptory Rules or Meliorative Themes?
Perhaps the most important aspect of the mathematisation of any intellectual
project is its sociological impact upon the membership of the discipline. It is
only fairly recently that the issue could be seriously discussed.
Phillip Mirowski, 1986: 191
Phillip Mirowski has suggested that disciplinary traditions of mathematical formalism in 
economics lead to a very low professional threshold of toleration for any debate which
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does not seem to be headed toward definitive conclusion (1986: 192). An important 
theme in anti-modernism has accordingly been the struggle to allow a discipline to be 
"more 'open minded' - more adaptable to circumstances" than modernist methodological 
predilections are likely to permit (Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1963: 155). In this regard, 
Braybrooke and Lindblom make a useful distinction between 'peremptory rules' and 
'meliorative themes'. Peremptory rules constrain discussion. Meliorative themes may 
embody the same considerations as are reflected in rules, but they seek to force the 
debate towards mutual accommodation of alternative perspectives rather than the triumph 
of one perspective over the other.
To simplify Braybrooke's and Lindblom's discussion somewhat, they exemplify the two 
approaches in an (imagined) debate concerning the initiation of a pilot school dental 
service. Group one argues against the initiative according to the 'peremptory rule’ that 
dental services are not part of the function of the school. Group two bring a range of 
'meliorative themes' to bear. They argue that there are no alternative ways of bringing 
proper dental care to a significant proportion of the school population and they stress the 
inherent value of so doing. They also show ways in which their program might be seen 
to promote certain educational aims, for instance by educating children in dental hygiene. 
Finally, they concede (perhaps for the sake of argument) that the program might not be 
central to the school's educational function. But they seek to engage their opponents by 
proposing that their decision criterion be expressed so as to allow more 'room to move' - 
'Would the pilot program interfere with the basic pedagogical functions of the school?' - 
to which they answer 'no'. Their reasoning is thus exploratory in a number of senses. 
It searches for common ground with its opponents, and it seeks to "trade one value 
against another in margin-dependent comparisons" (1963: 157). Braybrooke and 
Lindblom continue:
The freedom of maneuvre gained (or rather maintained) by working with 
themes rather than rules has been described as a freedom of maneuvre 
against other disputants, but [it] is not merely an asset in debate - it is a 
freedom of discovery as well. . . . Shifting and changing from one theme 
to another, the meliorative party discovers ways of looking at the proposed 
policy that would perhaps not have occurred to its members if they had 
confined themselves to insisting on a particular policy's connection with a 
certain rule (1963: 165).
As with the other issues in this introductory chapter, the burden of demonstration falls to 
subsequent chapters. Suffice it to say here that the subjects of this study display a 
certain intolerance towards exploratory discussion and a corresponding inclination to 
search for peremptory rules of policy. In searching for common ground between
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perspectives as set out above, 'meliorative themes' are likely to offer much more room to 
make fruitful connections than peremptory rules. Given the history of Australian post 
war protectionism, one can sympathise with the Tariff Board's indication quoted above 
(§ 1.3.2.2.2) that it would be loath to recommend 'infant industry assistance'. Yet it 
might be important that this be expressed as a meliorative theme rather than a peremptory 
rule. For there might be circumstances where the infant industry argument is 
unpersuasive on its own but decisive in conjunction with other considerations. Whether 
or not the battle against protectionism was to be ultimately won or not, the inevitability of 
protection remaining at relatively high levels while it was gradually reduced raised 
secondary questions and the 'infant industry argument' had some relevance in this 
context.
For if significant assistance was to continue into the medium or long term, infant 
industry considerations had some relevance to the form  in which assistance was offered. 
As the Commission suggested, the greatest assistance had tended to be provided to those 
manufacturing activities with the least export orientation (LAC, Annual Report, 1973-74: 
16). Australia's most promising manufacturing infant industries might accordingly be 
those which had or would achieve a high degree of export orientation. In this context, 
'infant industry' considerations suggest that restricting what assistance remained to 
tariff-only assistance was wasteful because it was least available to those firms whose 
superior export performance identified them as the most promising prospects within their 
industry. Other questions which arise from the gradualism of Australian trade 
liberalisation include: could its worst effects be mitigated relatively quickly even if more 
substantial trade liberalisation would take longer? Might some forms of industry 
assistance prepare industry for the ultimate withdrawal of protection better than others? 
And how might the relative successes of Asian trade and development programs affect 
the specification of sensible trade liberalisation for hitherto protectionist developed 
countries like Australia and New Zealand? Yet in the economic literature, as in the IAC's 
analysis, there was little effort given to this kind of exploration.
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1.3.3 An Illustrative Digression: Increasing Returns in Trade
Theory
It is rather obvious, that in an economic environment in which firms and
industries operate under increasing returns to scale and exhibit non-competitive
behaviour, there exists room for beneficial intervention.
Flam and Helpman, 1987: 80.
This sub-section offers an illustrative digression which argues that progress in 
understanding trade has been hampered by the 'modemist' values of economics. This 
sub-section forms a companion piece to the sub-section 1.2.3 above, which illustrated 
how the anti-mercantilistic orientation of modern economics had likewise distorted its 
focus.
The imperfectly competitive phenomena about which debate had raged in the 1920s and 
1930s were almost wholly marginalised in the neoclassical synthesis of the fifties and 
sixties (Groenewegen, 1984: 22). Given this, the recent rehabilitation of increasing 
returns in trade is fortunate. However the way in which increasing returns has been 
rehabilitated shows many of the disciplinary vices which were responsible for their 
previous eclipse. The official history of the rehabilitation of increasing returns offered 
by one of its prime movers - Paul Krugman - is one in which economists vision is tied to 
their technical powers. Increasing returns disappeared from view because they were 
difficult to model technically and economists took the "line of least mathematical 
resistance". Economists could only 'see' them again when models of imperfectly 
competitive phenomena were constructed (1988: 8, and see 1993 "Counterrevolution").
There is surely an unfortunate complacency in Krugman's account. It is clearly 
unacceptable for a discipline to simply ignore pervasive and important phenomena 
because it has difficulty formally modelling them. Hicks did not say that imperfectly 
competitive phenomena should be ignored by economists and did not ignore them 
himself (see § 1.2.1.3 above). But he did argue that there were virtually 
insurmountable difficulties in exploring the implications of imperfect competition by the 
methods of economic theory (see § 1.2.1.1 above). Given this disciplinary heritage, the 
challenge before those seeking to reconstruct trade theory around increasing returns 
(Krugman, 1993, "Arguments": 366) was to show how and why the concerns of Hicks 
and others could now be met. They did this poorly if at all.
Some of the new work has undoubtedly been useful. Despite Hicks' warnings, 
economists have built models of trade in the context of monopolistic competition which 
have elucidated some of the necessary properties of trade when firms face fixed costs.
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(Fixed costs are pervasive in the economy but strictly incompatible with perfect 
competition.) Helpman and Krugman showed how monopolistic competition could be 
brought within a general equilibrium HOS framework (see § 3.2.1) generating trade 
which was driven by both relative factor costs and product differentiation (Bensel and 
Emslie, 1992: 258). Harris and other Canadian economists extended this approach into 
empirical estimation with computable general equilibrium models in which economies of 
scale and the resulting monopolistic competition were embedded within a traditional 
HOS framework (1984). This permitted them to illustrate the way in which traditional 
HOS models might significantly underestimate the gains from trade. Even here, 
however, for the sake of tractability the model of competition in the presence of fixed 
costs was very abstracted, and it left many of the phenomena largely unexplained (Gray, 
1988).
Another tack was to accept Hicks' point that once competitive imperfections entered, 
economic theoretic analysis was likely to be much more indeterminate and to adapt one's 
methods accordingly. Peter Gray has put it well since then:
To be able to embrace all of the various forces which act on IIT [intra­
industry trade] 18 in a single model which yields a precise solution, is 
impossible because the variables are too numerous and their effects can be 
inconsistent across cases and through time. Even if it were possible to 
produce a definitive treatment of IIT, the model would be so general and 
would not be operational in the sense of either being subject to empirical 
test or useful for policy prescription. . . . Such is the complexity of IIT that 
our understanding of this phenomenon will be better served by . . .  a 
general 'loose and untidy' model than by a selectively precise or rigorous 
one (Gray, 1988: 223-4).
Both Linder's (1961) and Gray's (1976) consideration of trade in manufactures for 
instance are identifiably within the broad tradition of the discipline of economics and 
both set out aspects of their arguments formally. However their methods also hark back 
to the economics of the Marshallian period in their preparedness to situate elements of 
formal analysis in a relatively informal context or, in Gray's case, to offer a quite 
elaborate formal structure which is offered as an heuristic rather than a determinate 
framework, or - as he later put it - a "paradigm" rather than a model (1988: 224).
However such approaches were unappealing to the modernist canons of intellectual 
prestige within the discipline which, as Coats argues, elevates the formal methods of 
economic theory "preferably supplemented by rigorous measurements [to] the top of the
18 Gray uses the expression IIT in a broad sense and his comments apply to virtually all trade in 
manufacturers which is not driven by relative factor costs.
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pecking order" (1989: 345). Within the discipline the prestige and prominence did not 
go to works like Gray's, but to the explosion of ad hoc models which became 'strategic 
trade theory'. Strategic trade theory took its name from its exploration of the scope for 
competitors in scale sensitive industries to seek advantage through strategic behaviour. 
In this context, strategic actors could be firms within industries, or national governments 
seeking advantage for their own firms. Not surprisingly the literature demonstrated no 
limitation of instances in which such strategic behaviour would benefit the firm or 
country engaging in it. The motivation behind most strategic trade theory was to 
illustrate the logical possibility of successful, self-interested strategic behaviour in trade 
(c/Silvestre, 1993: 109), rather than to build up a more accurate picture of the complex 
industrial reality and the normative implications to which this might give rise. However, 
the scope for strategic interaction between firms and their host governments in scale 
sensitive industries was already intuitively clear (see head quotation above). Scale 
economies often generate scope for strategic behaviour and provide cost (and often 
additional strategic) advantages to larger firms over their competitors. Given that 
countries, and/or their governments are characteristically larger than virtually all domestic 
firms and subsidiaries of foreign firms domiciled within those countries, it is fairly 
obvious that if governments are committed and sufficiently well informed, they can 
advantage their own firms in their strategic interactions with foreign firms and that by so 
doing they can advantage national economic welfare.
Whether or not one takes exception to strategic trade theory itself, one must surely 
question the prominence it received. Krugman himself has subsequently described the 
work as "a virtually complete rethinking" of trade theory (1991: 7) and his work was 
celebrated at the time as "truly ground breaking stuff . . . asking, to what extent does 
the presence of imperfect competition invalidate the case (hitherto thought to be rock 
solid) for free trade" (The Economist, December 24, 1988: 97).19 As to the potential 
usefulness of strategic trade theory for forging robust practical approaches to policy 
formulation, two strategic trade theorists, Flam and Helpman, give the game away: 
"[A lthough there potentially exists a case for industrial policy, its nature is as yet 
unknown; every policy has to be evaluated for each country separately, using detailed
19 The latter quoted comment is a thoroughly misleading description of the state of trade theory at the 
time. As McCulloch notes:
Throughout the 20th century, and even before, economists have probed not only 
the theoretical benefits of free trade but also the multitude of circumstances (eg. 
monopoly . . . increasing returns, externalities, labour market distortions) in 
which maximisation of national income requires policy intervention (1993:
368).
33
Chapter One Sketching some Problems of Modern economics
information about the structure of its industries, their interaction through factor markets, 
the nature of competition and the structure of preferences". One can add to this list of 
difficulties almost at will. It does not mention externalities, uncertainty, imperfect 
information, moral hazard and adverse selection problems involved in intervention and 
so on. Even without these additional complications Flam and Helpman conclude "To 
collect the necessary information and then to evaluate contemplated policies seems a 
formidable, if not impossible task" (1987: 95).
With hindsight Krugman laments that such "fundamental rethinking of theory can have 
such modest implications for policy" (1993, "Arguments": 366), but one might surely 
wonder how much of the disappointment might have been anticipated at the outset, or at 
least kept under review along the way. As he helped construct the new field, Krugman 
for instance, deprecated the "educated guesswork and suggestive analogy" (1983: 57), 
of prior treatments of the issues whilst at the same time proposing formal treatments 
which were, by his own admission "implausible" and which did not capture "any of the 
richness of detail involved in real decisions" (1993, "Counterrevolution": 20; 1983: 57, 
72). Krugman's formalisations had the methodological benefit of rigour and precision. 
But they also had heavy methodological costs - in particular the partial and 'unrealistic' 
nature of their assumptions. His own descriptions of his project did not dwell on the 
possible costs and implied that, however contrived or ad hoc the assumptions of his 
models were, formal treatment of a problem had an inherent value which transcended 
these methodological compromises (see Krugman, 1983 particularly).
Another architect of strategic trade theory, Gene Grossman, hoped aloud that, with 
imperfectly competitive phenomena receiving increasingly mathematical treatment, 
modem economics would one day come to an understanding of imperfectly competitive 
environments which matched its understanding of perfectly competitive ones (1985: 31). 
This aspiration is hard to fathom. Perfect competition is a 'limiting' case of imperfect 
competition in which competition so constrains firms that they have no discretion over 
the price they charge and indeed are technically and behaviorally identical. Imperfect 
markets are rather like Tolstoy's unhappy families in Anna Karenina. Each is imperfect 
after its own fashion. With firms being spared the burden of being and behaving 
identically, all manner of market structures are possible. And strategic interdependencies 
are not unlikely. And while game theory can yield insights into 'optimal' strategies for 
firms, game theory - indeed any formal treatment - has great difficulty dealing with 
'adaptive' expectations and uncertainty about competitors' current or future moves 
(Arthur, 1994). Here we are in the world of history or perhaps as Arthur has suggested, 
the 'ecology' of economic agents (1994: 409).
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Take the following example as an illustration of the way in which strategic trade theory 
absorbed itself in the formal demonstration of special cases which shed little useful light 
on the economics of trade - except perhaps as an antidote to the previous pervasive 
neglect of imperfect competition. In the mid 1980s Brander and Spencer showed that an 
industry-specific export subsidy could be beneficial for a nation which was host to a firm 
which was a Cournot competitor against a foreign firm (1985). (A Cournot duopolist 
seeks to maximise its profits by taking its competitor's level of sales as given.) 
Krugman reports that this "idea" generated a "flurry of excitement" (1993, "Arguments": 
363). I find it hard to see what was exciting about such an idea. Indeed, as Flam and 
Helpman indicate above, the scope for beneficial intervention in such circumstances 
seems intuitively clear. The next year Eaton and Grossman published an analogous 
model in which duopolists acted according to Bertrand rather than Cournot assumptions 
(1986). (A Bertrand duopolist maximises its profit by taking its competitor's price as 
opposed to its output as given.) This change of assumption reverses the Brander and 
Spencer conclusion making the optimal policy an export tax! It is hard to know what to 
make of all this given that both Cournot and Bertrand assumptions about duopolists are 
themselves fairly crude mathematical makeshifts rather than plausible descriptions of 
commercial behaviour (Vousden, 1990: 138).
Note that even where it does not involve strategic interaction, the "innate complexity" of 
monopolistic competition "makes it necessary to resort to special assumptions" 
(Vousden, 1990: 153 also see Krugman, "Counterrevolution", 1993: 20). Accordingly 
even where models do not contain strategic interactions as, for instance, in the 
monopolistically competitive models mentioned above, results are typically sensitive to 
assumptions and robust conclusions from the literature are thin on the ground. After a 
decade of strategic trade theory, Ronald Wonnacott commented that it "may not yet have 
even scratched the surface. To identify one of the large number of possible new cases, 
all that is required is the combining of one of the many causes of market failure with one 
of the many mercantilist instruments that could then be used to increase welfare" (1993: 
18).
Yet Krugman's recipe for improving development economics today, is the same as his 
recipe for improving trade theory in the 1980s - the translation of plainly evident 
phenomena into simple formal models so that economists can once again 'see' them 
(1993, "Counterrevolution"). As with strategic trade theory, Krugman emphasises the 
benefits of formalisation, without careful consideration of its possible costs. He 
comments that "there are, unfortunately, no general or even plausible tractable models of 
imperfect competition". This necessitates having "the courage to be silly, writing down
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models that are implausible in the details in order to arrive at convincing higher-level 
insights" (Counterrevolution", 1993: 20). And the point of this? The principal higher 
level insight to which Krugman has so far treated us in his recent reworking of 
development economics is that it was foolhardy to disregard the claims of development 
economics simply because a lot of it was expounded verbally rather than mathematically. 
"The irony is that we can now see that high development theory made perfectly good 
sense after all" (1993, "Fall": 3).
Paul Römer has recently bemoaned economists' profligacy with evidence: their failure to 
admit important evidence where it "does not come with a f-statistic attached" (1994: 19- 
20). The burden of this chapter is that this is a small sub-set of the modem discipline's 
profligacy. Krugman recognises that development economics "anticipated in a number 
of ways the cutting edge of modern trade and growth theory" (1993, 
"Counterrevolution": 16). Yet in his telling of the story, its insights remained largely 
inaccessible to Western economists. By contrast, as Jayawardena observes in response 
to Krugman's view of the world, "[a]ny lack of rigour in articulating high development 
theory did not prevent its determined and fruitful application in East Asia, particularly in 
Japan and the Republic of Korea, whose planning models embodied its insights" (1993: 
53). Krugman's production of "controlled silly models that illustrate key concepts" in 
development economics (1993, "Fall": 3), may have some value. Yet ignoring what has 
yet to be formalised and unambiguously 'proven' is surely an enormously profligate 
procedure - especially since, as strategic trade theory so clearly shows, formalisation 
may not usher in much new useful knowledge.
The 'strategic trade theory' episode illustrates the cost of marginalising judgement from 
the discipline and replacing it with the technical chatter of Sam uelson's 
'whippersnappers' (see § 1.3.2.2.2). In the story just told, the architects of strategic 
trade theory were all young 'whippersnappers'. And what warnings came that they 
might be wasting their time, often came from 'elder statesmen' such as Bhagwati and 
Ronald W onnacott. Indeed as a concluding aside one may note that the 
'whippersnapper' Krugman initially had trouble having his early work on trade and 
monopolistic competition published. Referees (who embodied the role of 'elder 
statesmen' if not literally, then institutionally) were unconvinced that an "understanding 
of these issues would be helped by writing down formal models". These comments are 
now offered as a suitable topic for mirth by Krugman and others (Gans and Shepherd, 
1994: 170). One can concede that Krugman's referees' concerns might not justify 
refusing publication of Krugman's clever models - particularly the model of trade and 
monopolistic competition to which these comments applied. However their concerns
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have, according to Krugman's own account of it, been largely vindicated. With 
hindsight they can be seen as a salutary warning that, in economics, technical facility 
should be regarded as a subordinate methodological value to anticipated usefulness.
1.4 The Structure of the Dissertation
The rest of this dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter Two introduces the 
automotive industry with a brief description of the industry's history and structure up to 
the early 1970s. Chapters Three to Five then examine the economics of trade 
liberalisation and particularly 'non-traditional' approaches to trade liberalisation which 
deviate from top down and across the board tariff reform sanctioned by neoclassical 
orthodoxy. The principal purpose of these chapters is to explore the case for 'non- 
traditional' trade liberalisation, particularly policies which facilitate the rapid expansion 
of intra-industry trade where the rate of tariff reform - and so the rate of inter-industry 
trade expansion is more gradual. Nevertheless at the same time, an attempt is made to 
show how a preoccupation with polarities, an absence of dialogue as co-operation and a 
lack of attention to 'meliorative' possibilities meant that these alternatives were 
inadequately explored in the economic corpus.
Chapters Six to Nine present a case study of the issues introduced in earlier chapters 
with particular regard to the IAC's advice on automotive tariff policy. Chapters Six to 
Eight deal with the Commission's formation, its first major automotive inquiry and some 
minor inquiries before 1979, whilst Chapter Nine discusses the Commission's 1979-81 
automotive inquiry. These chapters depict the inadequacies of practical reason 
introduced above. In common with some of the earlier chapters, Chapter Six sketches 
the extent to which there was scope for some 'mutual adjustment' between perspectives 
which led towards the kinds of intra-industry trade facilitation policies discussed in 
earlier chapters. Chapter Seven shows how the Commission's approach foreclosed such 
possibilities. Chapter Eight sees the Commission archetypically participating in dialogue 
as contest and outlines the costs of such an approach. For although their contributions 
were rejected, the Commission's adversaries had much to contribute to the discussion. 
Indeed the Commission and some of those it saw as antagonists had skills and 
perspectives which were highly complementary. Chapter Nine, outlining the 
Commission's 1979-81 inquiry, shows a continuation of the patterns established earlier. 
In this case those proposing alternative views included traditional allies of the 
Commission in supporting tariff reform, but the Commission nevertheless failed to 
engage them. Chapters Seven to Nine all show how the Commission's formal 
quantitative work was either largely irrelevant to the issue of intra-industry trade
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facilitation or actively obscured the issue from view. And they show how thoroughly 
the Commission failed to engage with the 'dangerous supplement' of the 'second best'. 
Chapter Ten concludes with some further speculations on the themes introduced in this 
chapter and illustrated in subsequent ones.
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2 Problems and Opportunities in
Australia's Automotive Industry: An 
Historical Introduction
[T]he [car] market. . .  is too restricted at present to provide an outlet for more 
than one modem large-scale factory. To allow several manufacturers to split the 
market, would inevitably mean over-capitalisation, with excessive overhead 
costs, and they could carry on only by agreeing to maintain an excessive price, 
which would need to be made effective by inordinately high tariff protection.
The Sydney Morning Herald editorial, 5th July, 1939
This chapter surveys the development of the Australian automotive industry in the fifties 
and sixties to acquaint the reader with the emerging economics and political economy of 
the industry in the early 1970s.
2.1 Introduction
Protection inflates domestic prices and thus assists local manufacturers to supply the 
domestic market. This can encourage fragmentation if it attracts more entrants to an 
industry than can be supported at economic scale. In Australia's post WWII automotive 
industry, this effect was greatly intensified by several factors. The 1960s saw a 
dramatic increase in the diversity of demand for automotive products. Consumers 
demanded cars and their derivatives - utilities and vans - in an increasing number of 
model configurations and sizes. This effect was powerfully reinforced not only by the 
dynamics of competition in the industry, which drove firms to imitate each others 
product offerings, but also by the political economy of post-war protectionism. Time 
and again protective arrangements were altered to favour new entrants in the industry 
frequently in ways which directly discriminated against incumbent firms. The result of 
course was even greater fragmentation of production. This chapter sketches this 
unfortunate conjunction of forces.
2.2 Economies of Scale, Product Differentiation, 
and Diversity of Automotive Demand
Even without tariffs, Australian automotive manufacturing was always likely to be 
unusually fragmented. Substantial natural protection was available to Australian 
automotive production. Transport costs were about 20 per cent of imported value in the 
early 1960s falling to about 15 per cent by the 1970s (IAC, PMVs, "Papers", 1974, Vol.
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1, § 2.4.1.7; IAC, PMVs, 1974: 149). And economies of scale and scope were 
sufficiently important in the industry that they were of great significance even in much 
larger markets than Australia. GM's handling of these issues was one of the decisive 
events in its dominance of the American industry. In the 1920s and 1930s Ford (US) 
continued to pursue its initially successful strategy of cost reduction via standardisation 
and the resulting economies of scale to which this gave rise. By contrast, GM relied on 
product differentiation and economies of scope. It strove to increase the apparent 
diversity of its product range, whilst minimising the production cost of so doing. 
Instead of liquidating the marketing networks of the various firms absorbed into General 
Motors - Oldsmobile, Pontiac, Chevrolet, Buick and Cadillac - the huge conglomerate 
maintained their marketing identities and networks. These were used to market cars 
which were similar in technical specification, but differentiated in design (Sloan cited in 
Swan, 1972: 365).
In post World War II Australia, GMH did what Ford had done in America earlier in the 
century. It designed and built a single new car for the mass market and it focused on 
cost reduction through standardisation (AFR, 7th November, 1963: 4). Like Ford (US), 
it was massively successful - to begin with. In constant prices, the list price of Holden's 
standard model fell by approximately 40 per cent in the period between 1948 and 1960 
as GMH concentrated almost all its production effort on increasing the scale and 
efficiency with which the Holden car line 20 was produced. GMH's annual production 
grew from just over 20,000 cars in 1949 to over 140,000 in 1960 (Swan, 1972: 504). 
Yet as time passed GMH's marketing and production strategy was progressively 
undermined both by growing consumer demand for variety and also by the largesse 
which governments heaped upon GMH's competitors. The following two sections 
explore these additional factors.
20 The expression 'car line' is a useful piece of industry jargon meaning a line of cars or models which 
share basic mechanical features. Accordingly, to take an example from the current new car market, the 
Commodore Acclaim, and Calais are part of the same car line, although they are marketed as different 
'models'. Likewise vehicles manufactured to either seem or perform very differently from the 
Commodore are likewise referred to as part of the same car line because they share major mechanical 
components with it. These include the Commodore Wagon, the Statesman and the Commodore Utility.
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2.3 'Product Proliferation'
In recent years the passenger vehicle market has fragmented into a greater
number of definitive categories than has been recognisable in the past.
Ford Representative to the Tariff Board, IAC, PMVs, 1974, Transcript: 1634
As the Australian industry matured, consumer demand for variety increased on several 
fronts. There was a growing demand for cars which were equipped more extensively 
and luxuriously and with new options such as disc brakes and automatic transmission. 
And, where the 1950s had seen demand concentrated strongly in medium (Holden sized) 
vehicles, the 1960s saw a drift towards smaller vehicles. The market share of 'small' 
vehicles, such as the Morris Minor and the Ford Cortina, went from 30 to 44 per cent in 
the decade to 1972 (MIP, August 1972: 10).21
Typically, new demands were first met from imports. Automatic transmissions and disc 
brakes for instance, were initially imported from countries with larger, more mature 
industries - particularly America (Stubbs, 1972: 80; SMH, 2nd, July, 1965: 20; CT, 
15th September, 1962). Likewise, as demand for smaller cars grew, much of the 
increase in demand was met from imports. Thus Datsuns and Toyotas were imported 
from the early 1960s. When they were not assembled from CKD (completely knocked 
down) packs, they were imported CBU (completely built up) (Stubbs, 1972: 91). 
While, British Motor Corporation (BMC: later Leyland Australia), then Ford, and then 
GMH did supply the domestic market with small cars, they nevertheless made more 
extensive use of imported components than became usual in the medium car sector (IAC, 
PMVs, 1974, Appendix Seven: 22). Likewise Australian the market share of light 
commercial vehicles rose steadily throughout the 1960s and early 70s with much of the 
growth coming from imports (IAC, "Commercial Vehicles", 1974: 37; also see AIM, 
22nd May 1973: 6).
2  ^ Because the size of particular 'categories' of vehicles have a habit of changing over time, it is worth 
trying to standardise the terms with which this thesis discusses them. Accordingly I use the terms used 
by the IAC in 1974, despite the changes in size since then. Accordingly, Corolla, Escort, Gemini sized 
cars are referred to as 'small light'; Corona, Cortina and Torana sized cars are called 'large light', whilst 
Falcons and Holden Kingswoods and Commodores are called 'medium' sized cars. Fairlanes and 
Statesmans are 'upper medium' whilst very expensive (mainly European) imports are called 'luxury' cars 
(IAC, PMVs, 1974, Appendix 7: 18, Table A7.15). In my terminology the Corollas of today are still 
referred to as 'small light' even though today they are now closer to the size of the 1974 Corona or 'large 
light' vehicles with a smaller 'micro' class entering to fill the vacuum created by this gradual inflation.
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'Product proliferation' also occurred in the medium car sector with Chrysler and Ford 
making major manufacturing investments towards the end of the 1950s to compete for 
Holden's lucrative medium car market. In an ironic reversal of their previous history in 
America, Ford (Australia) forced a somewhat reluctant GMH into progressively greater 
product differentiation in the sixties and seventies. The Holden received one minor 
facelift in the first seven years since its launch in 1948, and it retained the original engine 
for thirteen years (Swan, 1972: 485). By 1963, the Financial Review was contrasting 
GMH's strategy of "heavy concentration over a relatively small front" with Ford's 
strategy of "blanket[ing] the market with a large number of models" and "frequent model 
changes" (AFR , 7th November, 1963: 4). As Ford gained market share, Holden 
followed its lead in marketing. Five of the seven new Holden models introduced 
between 1948 and 1972 were introduced after Falcon's introduction in 1960 (Swan, 
1972: 495). In addition, the American companies competed to extend the market reach 
of their medium car lines. Thus each introduced high powered V8 models, long 
wheelbase luxury limousines and sports coupes, all of which required substantial capital 
investment in design and tooling. By 1973, as the IAC observed, most manufacturers 
and assemblers marketed at least three car lines covering the three volume areas of the 
market. Small light, large light and medium passenger vehicles (IAC, PMVs, 1974: 36).
2.4 Ad Hoc Mercantilism: Protection from the
1950s to the 1970s
Even by the early 1950s the automotive industry was both relatively large and complex. 
Although increasingly self sufficient, it nevertheless continued to import much of its 
componentry and its financial, physical and 'human' capital. This had its effect on the 
politics and administration of automotive protectionism. Agmon and Hirsch argue that 
when negotiating its first large fixed investment in a foreign country, a multinational 
corporation (MNC) is in a very strong bargaining position. It has capital and know-how 
which will benefit the potential host country. But having not yet committed itself, it 
remains free to seek satisfaction elsewhere. As investment increases however, positions 
are reversed. With increasing sunk capital the MNC has progressively more to lose in 
negotiations with the host government; the host government progressively more to gain 
in exploiting its new found negotiating power (1979: 341-3). Australian automotive 
protection exemplifies the phenomenon almost perfectly. One after another, automotive 
MNCs were drawn into the web and, once they had become an incumbent, were 
discriminated against in favour of newcomers. First Ford and Chrysler were favoured 
against GMH. Then the British firms and Volkswagen were lured into increased
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investment - ultimately in each case, disastrously. And in the 1960s it was the turn of 
the Japanese to receive the largesse of the Department of Trade.
The terms on which manufacturers or assemblers received access to imports were 
particularly crucial. Before World War II, minimal tariffs on 'chassis' and prohibitive 
tariffs on 'bodies' had virtually forced importers to assemble locally (Swan, 1972: 338, 
Stubbs: 1972: 10). Most 'chassis' parts, like engines for instance, were not 
manufactured in Australia and so were admitted at concessional levels of duty. GMH's 
investment in the late 1940s changed this. But although its manufacture of chassis 
products would ordinarily have triggered tariff increases to protect local production, 
tariffs were not increased on engines, perhaps because they were not a final product and 
the 'unfairness' to the local manufacturer was accordingly concealed. Thus from the 
outset, the most competitive firm in the Australian industry received significantly lower 
levels of effective assistance from the protective arrangements than its competitors, who 
could import engines duty free. After GMH had entered the market, McEwen and the 
Department of Trade continued to negotiate individual import access arrangements with 
newcomers. These arrangements, and the local content plans to which they ultimately 
led, exacerbated the problems inherent in the original arrangements.
Whilst originally manifested in various ad hoc arrangements, discrimination against 
incumbents became increasingly systematic. By the late 1950s the Department of 
Trade's administration of import licensing and the tariff by-law system had developed 
into a program of favours to those newcomers in the industry, such as Ford and 
Chrysler, whose local production plans it had 'approved' (Tariff Board, 1957: 9).22 
The Department of Trade and the major firms in the industry supported the superficially 
plausible proposition that "rates of duty should be highest on a completely assembled 
vehicle, which contributes nothing to the Australian economy, and lowest on the 
components imported by local manufacturers" (Tariff Board, 1957: 86, 7, 9 and see 
Transcript: 80).23 The evidence taken by the Tariff Board inquiries reporting in 1957
22 Before this time, GMH was discriminated against on at least one occasion more directly. In 1950, 
GMH sought to more than double annual Holden capacity from 20,000 to 50,000 units. The 
Government refused to permit the necessary import expenditure on capital equipment and components 
from the US on the grounds that it would deplete the Australia's scarce resources of US dollars. Soon 
afterward the Government approved an application from GMH's competitors which involved a greater call 
on US dollars for less than a third of the capacity expansion envisaged by GMH (Bennett, 1994: 21-2 
and see also Swan, 1972: 480-1).
23 The wording is from Ford's submission though similar sentiments were either expressed or implicit 
in the recommendations/comments of the Department and GMH, Chrysler and the parts manufacturers.
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and 1965 vividly illustrates the emerging political economy of automotive protectionism. 
Throughout the fifties and sixties, most manufacturers maintained a degree of solidarity 
with other manufacturers' claims for protection (Bell, 1993: 29). But the automotive 
industry was an exception (Tariff Board, 1957: 37). The complexity and multi-stage 
nature of automotive manufacturing meant that one man's meat was another's poison. 
Protection for component suppliers was an impost on assemblers. And many firms were 
both assemblers and importers of fully built up vehicles. An attractive solution to the 
economic and administrative problems produced by multi-stage production in a protected 
environment would have been uniform ad valorem tariffs. Yet such a possibility was 
never in contention. For reasons which will become clear below, it was unpopular with 
virtually all interested parties.
The supplications of the various 'industry' representatives gravitated towards expanding 
production at the expense of government revenue rather than by way of structural change 
and adjustment within the industry. Firms with high levels of imported content in their 
cars could agree to increase local content where the cost of so doing would be 
underwritten by administrators providing cheaper access to those components which 
they continued to import. And those who currently imported built up vehicles could 
agree to assemble them locally where this would qualify them for discounted rates of 
duty on unassembled packs of components. Even those from outside the automotive 
industry who sought lower assistance argued from their own perspective as vehicle 
users. For them the final cost of automotive outputs was a more important consideration 
than the efficiency of resource allocation either within the automotive industry or the 
economy. Thus while farming lobbies tended to support lower tariff levels they were 
also keen to preserve duty concessions for automotive manufacturers. For they lowered 
the assembly cost and so price of automotive products to users (Tariff Board, 1957, 
Transcript: 498, 501-7).
The local content schemes institutionalised administrative practices and political 
dynamics which had been evident for some time (see McEwen, CPD, 24th May, 1965: 
1894). Yet if the policy of the 1950s was ill-advised, the local content plans were folly 
indeed. They were introduced when demand for variety was growing strongly (see 
§ 2.3 above). And at a time of full employment, the theory of effective protection 
demonstrated the costs of such arrangements on the efficiency of resource use within the 
industry and the economy. The first (1964) local content scheme sought to encourage 
increases in local content by imposing progressively stricter volume limits on the 
production of lower local content vehicles. Thus at 45, 50 and 60 per cent local content, 
2,500, 5,000 and 7,500 units (per annum) of any car line respectively could be
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assembled. If firms wished to locally assemble more cars than this, they were given five 
years to reach 95 per cent local content whereupon all restrictions on the volume of their 
output be lifted.
Not surprisingly this arrangement was unstable. For several manufacturers had small 
light and or large light vehicles for which they sought to achieve volumes greater than 
those allowed under the local content schemes, but which were unlikely to be viable at 
95 local content given the then tariff rate of 35 per cent. As Volkswagen and BMC got 
into financial difficulty in the late 1960s, arrangements were changed to permit 25,000 
units per annum production at 85 per cent local content (although this was insufficient to 
save Volkswagen which withdrew from local manufacture shortly afterwards). Even so, 
the plans continued to underwrite fragmentation of production. The plan rules defined 
models by their engine capacities. Accordingly firms were able to expand assembly 
production by assembling a certain model with more than one engine. Ford doubled 
production of its Capri entered in the 60 per cent plan by assembling it with two different 
engines. Renault spoke of increasing its market share by "adding one model after the 
other" (A/M, 15th November, 1970: 2).
Following a lengthy departmental review (AFR, 13th December, 1971: 5) the phasing 
out of the low local content plans was announced in December 1971. In part the phasing 
out of the small volume assembly plans demonstrated the learning of lessons. But the 
revised plan was full of the same ad hoc mercantilism which had characterised previous 
plans. As Max Walsh observed at the time, it was also "explicitly aimed at forcing 
Japanese car companies mainly making light cars, to move into local production with 
Australian made components" (AFR, 17th December, 1971: 1). It did this, not simply 
by phasing out tariff concessions on components imported for assembly, but also by 
making it prohibitively costly for a firm to import vehicles of the same 'class' as those it 
manufactured under the plan (IAC, PMVs, 1974, Appendix Six: 16; § 6{d}). Again 
firms with the least investment in Australia were rewarded. Amongst the Japanese firms 
the amendments effectively constrained the import plans of Nissan and Toyota, given 
their desire to continue production in Australia. By contrast importers like Mazda, who 
had stuck to importing built up cars, were untouched by the new restrictions.
The changes also showed the usual squeamishness about structural adjustment within the 
industry as the authorities sought to placate as many discordant interests as possible. 
Although the changes sought to protect manufacturers operating under the 95 and 85 per 
cent local content plans from the hitherto more highly assisted assemblers, the changes 
entrenched new forms of discrimination against the most established manufacturers. The
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plans became a ratchet with which firms were perpetually pressured to increase their 
local commitment or, where they had already achieved high levels of local content, 
prevented from improving their efficiency by reducing it. Thus according to the new 
plans, participants in the 95 and 85 per cent local content plans were prevented from 
moving to a lower local content plan unless this was "satisfactory to the administering 
authority" (IAC, PMVs, 1974, Appendix Six: 10).
In both 95 and 85 per cent plans this new rule was to operate alongside the 'non­
reversion rule', which required Australian manufacturers who had once bought local 
components not to 'revert' to importing the same components without consulting the 
Department of Trade (IAC, PMVs, 1974: 141, and Appendix Six: 10, 13). As GMH 
put it, for those who had invested in the industry in the past and built their local content 
to a high level, the 'no-reversion' rule was a "straight jacket" (IAC, PMVs, 1974, 
Transcript: 74). By contrast, favours done to newcomers continued. Duty free 
importation of components would be permitted on a gradually diminishing proportion of 
imported components for the next five to seven years depending on gradually increasing 
local content targets being met. {AIM, 18th January, 1972: 2; also see IAC, PMVs, 
1974, Appendix Six: 5, 9, 12).
As the automotive consultancy Martec put it, the successive revisions of the plans 
throughout the 1960s were probably best construed as attempts to reconcile conflicting 
objectives and the "hesitant groping towards a more internationally relevant policy for 
automotive manufacture" {New Directions, 1972: 1.3). From an economic perspective 
there were two important signs of hope in the revisions of December 1971. The first 
was the seeds of what became the export facilitation scheme in the 1980s, according to 
which exports could be counted as local content and so earn 'credits' for the duty free 
importation of automotive products. Its emergence and the economics of such schemes 
are discussed below (Chapters Four and Five). The second was the Government's 
response to pressure from rural and other lobby groups. As a result of a change in 
opinion led by the new Chairman of the Tariff Board, Alf Rattigan, there were now 
powerful lobby groups in Australia who associated their own interests with tariff reform. 
The Government promised to submit the automotive industry to a Tariff Board review by 
1974 {AFR, 7th March, 1972: 5).
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2.5 Specialisation and Trade within the Australian
Automotive Industry
2.5.1 The Pattern of Imports
[W]hen a new vehicle or set of vehicles comes in, some people would purchase 
them just because they were different. . . . Some . . . because they fill a 
slot . . .  a technical slot not fully filled by local production but again this is a 
limited field. . . . Japanese vehicles . . . have also filled a geographic 
advantage . . .  in supplying the Northern Territory and Queensland because 
they have freight advantages there.
Tariff Board Member, Boyer, Tariff Board, 1965, Transcript: 176
Trade was facilitating increasing specialisation in the Australian industry. Despite efforts 
to extend local vehicles' market coverage, imports predominated in the areas least well 
served by local manufacturers - small, luxury, sporting and commercial vehicles and 
relatively technically advanced or product-specific components. The Europeans 
imported many of the sporting and smaller luxury vehicles, the Americans the larger 
luxury vehicles, whilst the history of the Japanese industry saw it well placed to supply 
robust commercial vehicles and small cars (Tariff Board, 1965, Transcript: 42, 73, 193, 
259, 362).
2.5.2 Automotive Exports in the 1950s and 60s
[The Holden] has been able to stand on its own cost/price/value relationships in 
overseas markets because of its indigenous design and character: there is no 
place in the world to buy that kind of a car, except from Australia. We would 
go so far as to speculate that given even moderate freedom from 95% local 
content, and reasonable shipping costs, the export Holden would become an 
even more outstanding export product for this country and a highly profitable 
element of GM's Australian activities.
Peter North, Managing Director of BMC, IAC, PMVs, 1974, Transcript: 1756
2.5.2.1 Exports and Attitudes from the War to the 1960s
Already in 1949, the first full year of its Holden production, GMH had its eye on 
potential export markets particularly New Zealand, South Africa, India and Indonesia; 
and the industry journal Automotive Industry noted the scope for export market 
development in former British colonies in South and South East Asia - India, Pakistan, 
Ceylon, Burma and Malaya. Australia's access to British trade preferences and its 
manufacture of right hand drive vehicles, were thought to give it unique advantages in 
these markets. Those countries then had a combined market of 311,000 units per annum
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(.Automotive Industry, February, 1949: 17, 22-3) over seven times the then Australian 
market (Stubbs: 1972: 23).
By the time of the first major post-war Tariff Board report in 1957, GMH was exporting 
nearly five per cent of its domestic sales volume (Table A2.1, Statistical Appendix). Yet 
compared with the attention given to import replacement, exports and the policy 
implications of automotive exporting were much more rarely mentioned by Australian 
politicians, opinion leaders and policy makers. Even where exports were considered, 
this was generally within the milieu of an 'industrial cringe' about Australia's capabilities 
and natural place in the world akin to the Australian cringe in matters cultural. Thus for 
instance, six years after negotiating the 1957 Australia-Japan trade treaty, McEwen 
confessed his "surprise" that the Australian industry had sought access to the Japanese 
market. "I think this is quite a remarkable achievement for the Australian industry" 
(CPD, HR, 16th October, 1963: 1838).
But why was it so remarkable? In 1957 Australia's automotive industry was much 
larger and more sophisticated than the Japanese one (Stubbs, 1972: 41; Tariff Board, 
1965, Transcript: 297, 21st September, 1964). And both countries drove on the same 
side of the road. But McEwen's comment foreshadowed a tradition of similar 
perceptions from Australian commentators and policy makers, who likewise tagged the 
industry’s export performance as "remarkable" and by so doing implicitly assumed what 
one journalist made explicit . . . "clearly export proportions like [Germany's and 
England's 48 and 42 per cent respectively] are just not in the realms of possibility" (eg 
see AFR, 26th January, 1961: 15; 2nd February, 1961: 43; also see 15th July, 1968: 1). 
There were exceptions to this. As Deputy Leader of the Opposition, Gough Whitlam 
argued that the Australian industry's performance had not been very 'remarkable' by 
international standards. Yet, he argued, it was "the industry upon which we should rely 
more than on any other for export income if we ever are to get an export income from 
our manufactures".
There is no motor manufacturing country in the world, - we are among the 
first ten; possibly among the first seven - which exports such a small 
percentage of its production (CPD, 14th September 1961: 1185-7).
2 . 5 . 2.2  The Post War Tariff Board and Automotive Exports
The Tariff Board reports of 1957 and 1965 were in the tradition of the Australian 
'industrial cringe'. There was remarkably little interest in the policy implications of 
exporting. Despite its explicit reference to the dangers of fragmentation in a small 
market, and the consequent limitations of import replacement, the Tariff Board's 1957 
policy recommendations were designed to further import replacement while mitigating
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the economic cost of so doing (1957: 64). In thirty pages of discussion and 
recommendations on the economics of the industry (1957: 36-66), there was no serious 
analysis of the economic or policy implications of export activity and no comment on the 
prospect of import protection directly increasing the costs of inputs to automotive 
exporters.
In 1957 these omissions were very typical of their time. But by the time of the 1965 
report, various commentators saw exporting as crucial for the industry's development 
and for policy making. Gough Whitlam's 1961 comments have already been quoted. 
And a simple 1965 survey article for adult education in NSW called for the Government 
to "move beyond import replacement and into bigger export markets" and drew attention 
to the failure of local content schemes to promote exports (Crowley and Rorke, 1965: 
138, 143). Likewise, in 1964 in an article presented in evidence to the Tariff Board, The 
Economist drew attention to the "increased costs" associated with the new local content 
schemes "just when the Australian industry was congratulating itself on the fact that 
vehicle exports . . . were going well" (The Economist, 9th May, 1964; Tariff Board, 
1965, Transcript: 816).
Having left GMH, where he had masterminded the 'all Australian car' in the 1940s, 
Lawrence Hartnett had become an importer of Datsun cars. Nevertheless he remained a 
visionary for the Australian industry pointing out in Tariff Board hearings that the 
domestic sales of the Holden alone were greater than the total production of the eight 
vehicle builders of Japan until the early 1960s.24 Hartnett argued that exports would 
play an increasingly important role in the industry's development. He argued in his 
1964 autobiography that Holden could not reduce its prices without taking up a 
'monopolistic' share of the Australian domestic market which might contravene the 
Sherman Anti-trust laws in America.
What's the answer to these problems? . . . Part of the answer, I believe
would be to increase exports of Holdens. GM-H could export up to
24 The Vehicle Output of Japan and GMH
Year Total Japanese Car Output Holden
1950 1,594 20,113
1953 8,789 44,175
1956 32,056 68,893
1959 78,598 115,308
1962 268,784 133,325
Source: Lawrence Hartnett's evidence to the Tariff Board 
(Tariff Board, 1965, Transcript: 44)__________________
In 1962 GMH still produced more cars than any Japanese firm (Tariff Board, 1965, Transcript: 44).
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200,000 Holdens a year, for the export price could be reduced without any 
country challenging that the cars were being sold under cost (1964: 226).
Despite all this, the Tariff Board's 1965 report showed virtually no interest in automotive 
exports and made no comment on the policy implications of exporting. By 1973 when 
the Board received its next major reference on the automotive industry it had been 
transformed. Where the former Tariff Board had permitted itself to become a 
handmaiden of protectionism, its successor was a very different organisation committed 
to exposing the costs of protectionism and to proposing something more rational. But as 
subsequent chapters make clear, there was little discontinuity between the old Tariff 
Board's approach to manufactured exports and that of the new IAC.
2.5.2.3 'Identity Bias' and Automotive industry Policy
Australian policy making and discussion was dominated by what Anne Krueger has 
subsequently dubbed 'identity bias' (1990). There was considerable interest indeed 
passion where import replacement was concerned. Automotive imports displacing local 
business were given considerable public attention. For instance in 1965, time in 
Parliamentary question time was taken up not once but twice with questions concerning 
the Government's purchase of 14 imported Toyota vehicles (CPD, 30th March, 1965: 
413, and CPD, 13th May 1965: 1436).
By contrast there was virtual disregard of Australian exporting. Despite their promise, 
Australian automotive exports were being stymied at every turn by foreign 
protectionism. New Zealand and South Africa were developing their own industries and 
imposing progressively more draconian import restrictions. Likewise Asian markets 
were being spoiled by "high tariffs, severe import restrictions and in many cases, 
excessive tax-rates - often at discriminatory rates against six cylinder vehicles". India 
was substantially closed to automotive imports whether of built up cars or components 
(AFR, 26th January, 1961: 15). In 1961 Chrysler intended exporting about 100 
Chrysler V8s to Japan but it canceled the whole operation after the Japanese suddenly 
imposed selective import restrictions (AFR, 2nd February, 1961: 43). Apart from 
occasional low key references in newspaper articles, automotive protectionism in 
countries which were actual or potential importers of Australian automotive products left 
virtually no trace on Australia's public record. There were no questions asked in 
Parliament and, judging from the public record, no diplomatic protests or public 
discussion of the issues it raised for Australian trade diplomacy.
Notwithstanding this, the largesse of 'protection all round' was extended to 
manufactured exports. In addition to export market development allowances, the
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industry qualified for payroll tax relief on exports. With strong export growth in the 
early 1970s, the IAC reported that the industry received approximately $6 million in 
export assistance in 1970-71 by way of payroll tax rebates and export market 
development allowances (IAC, PMVs, 1974: 147). On an export turnover of 
approximately $60 million in 1970-71 (IAC, PMVs, 1974, Appendix Seven: 21) this 
produces a nominal rate of assistance of approximately 10 per cent. Nevertheless 
because the major form of assistance - payroll tax relief - was calculated on increases in 
export revenue, the industry continued to receive approximately the same dollar amount 
in export assistance (Working Paper B13: 2) despite nearly doubling its export earnings 
by the year 1972-73 (IAC, PMVs, 1974, Appendix Seven: 21). In December 1973 the 
Government announced a revised export incentive scheme to replace both payroll tax 
rebates and export market development allowances. It targeted small and medium sized 
firms and accordingly limited incentives to export to $100,000 per firm per annum 
(Working Paper B13: 2-3). As the Commission reported, this would see export 
assistance "greatly reduce[d]" (IAC, PMVs, 1974: 148), as the major vehicle 
manufacturers had accounted for the lion's share of the previous export assistance 
receiving several million dollars each (Working Paper B13: 2). As will be seen from 
what follows, at the same time the level of assistance to import replacement was 
progressively increasing.
2.5 .2 .4 The Evolution of Automotive Exports to the Early
1970s
Export is the end, not the beginning, of a typical market expansion path.
Staff an Burenstam Linder, 1961: 88
Automotive exports grew strongly and steadily after the mid 1950s. GMH's exports 
expanded as it gained technical maturity in the mid 1950s and, after 1960, exporting 
relatively sophisticated products became possible for firms other than GMH. Declining 
growth of, and increasing competition in, the domestic market may also have helped 
motivate firms to look to export markets. In 1961, the economist Linder suggested that 
product specific scale economies and product differentiation combined with local tastes 
and transport costs to influence the pattern of trade in manufactures (1961: 87ff). In 
particular, he suggested that countries domestically manufacture differentiated products 
which can be manufactured at economic scale because they appeal to majority home 
market tastes. At the same time they import products to meet minority tastes. Minority 
tastes cannot be efficiently served from local manufacture because low levels of demand 
prevent local manufacturers achieving scale economies. Where these products meet
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majority tastes in other countries, they can be manufactured there at lower cost and then 
exported back to countries where they meet minority tastes. The resulting pattern of 
mass marketing at home and niche marketing abroad is well represented in many markets 
for manufacturers, not least the market for automobiles - particularly luxury European 
vehicles (see § 7.5.2.1 below).
The Australian market also fits Linder's description. The successful export products 
tended to be unique to Australia and were usually produced at relatively high volumes for 
Australia. As Ford developed its export markets, it did so with its Falcon, and not with 
vehicles which were manufactured in similar specifications elsewhere at vastly greater 
volume - Zephyrs, Anglias and Fairlanes.25 And as Stubbs observed, the strongest 
export performers - the Holden, Falcon/Fairmont and Valiant were also the three best 
selling domestic models (1972: 295). By the late 1960s the Holden and Falcon were 
unique Australian designs whilst the Valiant contained substantial Australian design input 
(Correspondence with GMH and Ford). Even where products were unique to Australia 
- as was the case with GMH's Torana of the late 1960s and early 1970s - the products 
with solid volume bases at home were generally more successful in export markets. By 
1970, on the domestic market, GMH was selling one third as many Toranas as its 
traditional car line now named the 'Kingswood'. Yet the Torana accounted for about 
one tenth of GMH's exports (Correspondence with UAAI).26 In July 1972 the new 
industry magazine Motor Industry Prospects commented that the "overwhelming 
majority of car exports are Holden [ie: Kingswood], Falcon and Valiant models and 
derivatives" (July, 1972: 7, also see IAC, PMVs, 1974: 95).
25 Note that at this time the Ford Fairlane was not a derivative of the Australian Falcon but rather 
assembled from American CKD Fairlane packs (personal communication with Ford). For volumes see 
Tariff Board, 1965, Table No. 7: 10. By 1963 over 40,000 Falcon registrations took place in Australia 
per annum - over 10% of the domestic market. Falcons were being produced with Australian pressed 
panels and were being rapidly further 'Australianised'. The Zephyrs, Anglias and Fairlanes received fewer 
than 2,500 registrations each and all achieved shares of less than 1% of the Australian market. As the 
Financial Review noted unsurprisingly, "this would seem to suggest that the Australian company cannot 
compete successfully with its fellow subsidiaries in the UK and Canada for the latter three models" 
(AFR, 2nd February, 1961: 43).
2(> 1,960 Toranas and 19,309 'other' exports - presumably almost exclusively Holden Kingswoods and 
variants thereof (UAAI supplied figures with similar relativities for the years 1971 and 1972).
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2.5.2.5 Export Bases and 'Niche Marketing' from Australia
Australia is the hub of this area [the Asia-Pacific region].
Lee Iacocca, October 1973 in Mori, 1974: 30
A number of scholars have appealed to ideas similar to those of Linder in drawing 
attention to the possible importance of 'export bases' in the development of 
manufacturing industry (eg see, Porter, 1990: 19). From the mid fifties, Australia 
gradually became an automotive 'export base'. By the mid 1960s, Asia was growing 
strongly with a huge population and a comparatively tiny number of cars (AFR, 26th 
January, 1961: 15). In 1972 what Ford referred to as the Asia-Pacific market included 
more than 30 per cent of the world's population and had three per cent of the world's 
automobiles (Automotive Topics, May, 1972: 3). Australia had significant automotive 
manufacturing capabilities, a long tradition of political stability, relative economic 
prosperity and openness to direct foreign investment. It was located in a region in which 
the combination of these characteristics was hard if not impossible to come by. Even 
Japan's automotive industry was relatively unsophisticated until the 1970s, and the 
automotive industries of other Asian countries were literally decades away from 
maturity. Australia was also a base from which a non-British firm, could gain access to 
British Commonwealth trade preferences around the globe (AFR, 20th November, 1967: 
23). As well as the efforts of Australian vehicle manufacturers, various Australian and 
foreign owned component manufacturers were speaking of ventures and joint ventures in 
Asia (eg see IAC, PMVs, 1974, Transcript: 1076, 1424, 2276).
In right hand drive Asian export markets Australian industry enjoyed advantages over 
both America and Europe because of geographical proximity and because Australia's 
domestic vehicles were right hand drive. Both General Motors and Ford had major 
investments in England. However these generally produced smaller, less sturdy vehicles 
for colder climates than those of much of Asia (Correspondence with GMH and Ford). 
Holden became a major export base for General Motors in right drive markets by the 
early 1960s by which time its export intensity by volume was over six per cent (see 
Table 2.1, Statistical Appendix). By 1967 both Chrysler and Ford had designated their 
Australian operations as their "world centre" for right hand drive versions of their Valiant 
and Falcon vehicles respectively (AFR, 20th November, 1967: 23). In 1970 The 
Australian correspondent commented that "Led by GMH the Australian motor industry is 
developing into a manufacturing base for markets in South-East Asia, the Pacific, New 
Zealand and especially South Africa" (9th June 1970: 3, also see Mori, 1974: 30). 
Product differentiation could be decisive even where it was minor. The British parent of
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BMC Australia produced both left and right hand drive versions of most BMC vehicles, 
usually at much greater scale than the Australian subsidiary. The British parent also 
enjoyed British trade preferences (Crowley and Rorke, 1965: 142). Nevertheless the 
Australian market demanded significantly different characteristics which then became the 
foundation for export opportunities. The Mini-delux for example was exported from 
Australia because the Australian variant had wind up windows and a more powerful 
motor than its UK equivalent (.AFR, 20th November, 1967: 23).
Australian cars were not being exported in large numbers to countries with developed 
automotive industries (CPD, 26th December, 1965: 2227; 16th August 1966: 79). Some 
Australian medium vehicles were manufactured at a similar cost to some European 
medium vehicles. However, their parent firms also had subsidiaries in Europe, and 
given tariff and transport costs into Europe, Australian vehicles would have been at a 
cost disadvantage there (see § 7.4.3.2 below). Had the Australian industry been less 
dominated by foreign equity it might have been more likely to have persevered in 
developed country markets seeking to find some profitable 'niche' market there in the 
way that Volvo of Sweden did in Australia - even given the Volvo's unsophisticated 
mechanical specifications and lack of price competitiveness with comparable Australian 
vehicles (see § 7.5.2.1 below). Even so, both Ford Australia and Chrysler Australia 
exported to Britain although neither was a major success. There was some scope for 
complementary specialisation however. By 1970 Chrysler had abandoned its low 
volume manufacture of six cylinder vehicles in Britain in favour of Australian Valiant 
exports (Stubbs, 1972: 285). Yet the features which detracted from the desirability of 
Australian cars in developed Northern Hemisphere markets were those which made them 
attractive elsewhere. Australian medium vehicles were large, powerful, sturdy and 
technically unsophisticated. As Ford's Bruce Burton explained to the Tariff Board, 
because the Falcon was engineered to withstand the Australian outback and poor roads, 
"it was soon found to be an ideal vehicle in New Zealand, South Africa, Asia, West 
Indies and the Pacific where similar conditions . . . prevail" (IAC, PMVs, 1974, 
Transcript: 1610).
Having commenced the development of a left-hand drive Holden exclusively for export 
in 1960 (AFR, 26th January, 1961), by 1964-65 808 of the 5,000 built up Holdens 
exported went to left hand drive markets (CPD, 16th August 1966: 79). Together the 
Arab countries imported over 50 per cent of them. It seems reasonable to presume that 
Australian vehicles appealed because the Arab countries were relatively undeveloped, 
their road systems were poor, and their temperatures and levels of ultra-violet radiation 
were high. In 1970 the chairman of Chrysler was very optimistic about export growth.
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Asked if Chrysler were exporting left hand drive cars he replied "Not yet - But we hope 
to" {AIM, 21st April, 1970: 4). These developments are of significance not just as a 
pointer to the evolution of the industry, but also as a yardstick of the competitiveness of 
the industry in export markets. The United States was the most competitive producer of 
medium sized vehicles (see § 7.4.3.2 below). GMH and Chrysler could each have 
supplied the Middle East with American manufactured vehicles which were roughly 
comparable with Australian medium vehicles (on which the Australian vehicles had 
originally been based) and which were already tooled for left hand drive. Thus, 
although formal studies of cost competitiveness were fraught with practical problems 
(see § 7.4.3.1 below), the development and intended development of left hand drive 
vehicles in Australia, even with strong negative assistance from the local content 
schemes (see § 5.7.2) provides strong anecdotal evidence that Australian medium 
vehicle production was relatively competitive in the mid to late 1960s and may well have 
been viable at free trade.
2.5.2.5.1 Specialty Vehicles
Industries in which product differentiation is the most important structural
feature of the innovation process offer the greatest chance for success for
smaller firms from a small open economy to establish export market bases.
Richard Harris, 1985: 136
In the early 1970s, Ford Australia participated alongside its parent in Dearborn Michigan 
and Ford Asia-Pacific (a separate office also located in Australia) in the design of the 
'Fiera' - a vehicle for the developing markets of Asia. It was designed for the "rough 
terrain and difficult climates" of Asia {Automotive Topics, May, 1972: 3). Production 
was to commence with a pilot plant in the Philippines but Ford was also moving towards 
production in Taiwan and Thailand. The car was "conceived, designed and engineered" 
at Ford Australia and many of its parts would be sourced from Australian suppliers 
(IAC, PM Vs, 1974, Transcript: 1585).
Ford was following BMC's example of the Mini-Moke - a small basic utility vehicle 
which shared mechanicals with the Mini-Minor. As Automotive Topics commented, the 
Moke was "ideally suited for the Asian market with rugged, simple construction, good 
ground clearance and great adaptability, as well as being much cheaper than conventional 
vehicles" {Automotive Topics, June 1972: 4). Intuitively one can imagine such 
arrangements as a excellent model of the mutually advantageous international integration 
of the Australian automotive industry. There was significant domestic demand for the 
Moke and capacity to manufacture it from components common to other Australian
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manufactured vehicles. BMC began exporting the Moke from Australia in 1967. By the 
early 1970s Australia was the sole source of supply for built up Mokes to the world 
(.Automotive Topics, June 1972: 4). And as will be seen, its export intensity was by far 
the greatest of any Australian vehicle of the period. As if to defy those quoted above 
who had claimed that Australia's industry could never match the export intensity of 
European industries, BMC consistently exported over 40 per cent of the Mokes it 
produced and in 1972 over 50 per cent of them went to export markets (personal 
communication with JRA, 1984).
56
3 The Economics of Trade and Trade 
Liberalisation
Does anyone consider autarchy realistic? Outside the confines of academe, who 
is interested in tests of the 'ultimate' determinants of observed trade patterns at a 
point in time? Policy makers work in the confusing real world of constant 
change, innumerable market imperfections and governmental interventions, 
both foreign and domestic. They are interested in the evolution of so called 
'dynamic comparative advantage' and the sources of economic progress. They 
seek to utilise international exchange 'optimally' so as to foster development 
rather than simply to allocate efficiently in static terms.
Helleiner, 1990: 211
3.1 Introduction
As outlined above, this thesis argues that the economics profession's handling of certain 
issues was deficient and that this stemmed from the culture of the profession itself. 
Chapter One claimed that the profession's vision was too strongly oriented around its 
self styled role as a foil to popular mercantilistic biases. It claimed further that the culture 
of economic expertise placed inadequate weight on integrating insights from multiple 
perspectives, that it frequently placed an unreasonably high 'burden of proof on 
heterodox views, and that it had a penchant for spelling out the normative implications of 
its analysis by way of 'peremptory rules' which narrowed the scope for dialogue. This 
and the next two chapters develop these arguments by reference to the handling of certain 
issues within the profession generally while subsequent chapters detail them further in a 
case study of the IAC's advice on Australia's automotive industry.
Of course to mount such an argument convincingly one must provide some glimpse of 
an alternative. Thus in the process of their critique, the following three chapters sketch 
out an alternative appreciation of the issues. It should be stressed that this alternative to 
orthodoxy is built from orthodoxy itself. That is, it does not embrace some 'key' to the 
economy which is hidden from orthodoxy - for example the Marxist theory of surplus 
value or 'structuralist' theories of economic growth and dependency. Instead it explores 
a range of perspectives - each of which was well regarded within economic orthodoxy.
Those perspectives include:
1) neoclassical trade theory, particularly the 'Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson' 
(HOS) framework;
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2) technological theories of trade;
3) intra-industry trade in similar products; and
4) the emerging development consensus of the 1970s.
The following three chapters attempt to put those perspectives - the resources of 
orthodoxy - to more productive use than the orthodoxy put them during the period under 
study. Thus the 'engine' of improved productivity here is not some improvement in 
theory, technique or data but in the 'fitness' of the conversation to its normative 
purposes, in its sensitivity to context and its ability to make fruitful analogies between 
'rather like’ and 'rather like'.
Within economic orthodoxy, insights from the perspectives outlined above tended to be 
confined to particular areas of influence. Thus economists tended to confine the insights 
won in the 'new development consensus' to developing economies. Likewise the 
insights generated in the 'non-traditional' perspectives on trade - 2) and 3) above - had a 
limited influence on the normative economics of trade liberalisation. This was because 
the normative implications of these perspectives tended to be read within the polarity of 
'free trade versus protection' and this was associated with a failure to explore the 
'meliorative themes' which these literatures suggest.
The 'dangerous supplement' of 'second best' policies makes its first appearance in the 
final section of this chapter which explores Australia's 'tariff compensation' debate of 
the mid 1970s. The section outlines the ways in which the debate polarised around the 
dichotomy of whether to 'compensate or eliminate'. It will be argued that a crucial sub­
text of the debate was about the tone of normative economics - and in particular about 
whether normative economics should provide 'peremptory rules' for policy making or 
offer instead more fluid, context dependent 'meliorative themes'. Those who polarised 
the debate arguing for elimination rather than compensation were successful in their 
campaign although this chapter argues that their 'victory' in the debate was founded to a 
significant extent on theoretical confusion. In the upshot some of the more important 
'meliorative' aspects of the tariff compensation issue were left largely unaddressed.
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3.2 Positive Frameworks
Hufbauer's study finds that the crude factor proportions theory performs
surprisingly well. . . . But so, embarrassingly, does every other theory
proposed by a competent observing economist.
Harry Johnson in Vernon, 1970: 15
This section introduces the various frameworks so as to throw light in passing on 
various themes of the dissertation. The frameworks are elaborated initially with regard 
to Australia's automotive industry. The section argues that the profession was at its 
most useful not where it was most rigorous - within the context of the HOS framework - 
but rather where it was most pragmatically eclectic and meliorative - where it forged new 
ways of thinking about links between trade, technology and development.
3.2.1 Perfectly Competitive Frameworks
The Classical economist Ricardo had taken the comparative costs of production in 
different industries within countries as in some sense 'given', and had shown how trade 
could lower the cost of securing a given national income (Caves, 1960: 8). If relative 
costs determined trade patterns, Ricardo showed how this related to relative costs within 
each domestic market compared with relative costs within other domestic markets. 
Thus, even if England could produce both wine and cloth at lower absolute cost than 
Portugal, each country could still enjoy gains from trade by exchanging the product 
which they produced at comparatively lower cost (in which they were said to have a 
comparative advantage) for the one they produced at comparatively higher cost. The 
neoclassical re-interpretation of this story involved countries with perfectly competitive 
internal markets trading according to the competitive costs generated by their respective 
factor endowments. Given certain assumptions the neoclassical - Hecksher-Ohlin- 
Samuelson (HOS) framework - suggested that countries will be exporters of those 
products which embody factors which are domestically relatively cheap, and they will 
import goods embodying factors which are relatively costly.
Both classical and neoclassical approaches provide a useful starting point for 
appreciating the circumstances of the Australian automotive industry. Because of its 
factor endowment, Australia was strongly comparatively advantaged in the production of 
a variety of agricultural and mineral commodities and ipso facto it enjoyed a comparative 
disadvantage in other areas. The neoclassical framework also allows a useful distinction 
to be drawn between allocative or economic efficiency and technical efficiency. For a 
firm or industry may be very technically efficient in producing inputs from outputs, and
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yet still be economically inefficient because other domestic industries can operate more 
advantageously given prevailing domestic factor prices.
For this reason, even if Australia had been relatively technically efficient at vehicle 
manufacture, the favourable factor prices faced by agriculture and mining, meant that 
automotive production was always likely to face comparatively worse factor prices and 
so to that extent be comparatively disadvantaged in international trade. Australia's status 
as a net importer of vehicles is thus well 'explained' by classical approaches to 
international trade. However, there are other characteristics of the industry which fit this 
framework poorly. For instance, although imports grew strongly in the 1960s, so too 
did exports.
3.2.2 Technological Theories of Trade
Where one nation has gotten the start of another in trade, it is very difficult for 
the latter to regain the ground it has lost; because of the superior industry and 
skill of the former, and the greater stocks, of which its merchants are 
possessed, . . . which enable them to trade on so much smaller profits. But 
these advantages are compensated, in some measure, by the low price of labour 
in every nation which has not an extensive commerce.
David Hume, "Of Money”, (1752), 1955: 34
As the above extract from David Hume indicates, the idea of innovation and technology 
influencing trade patterns is hardly new. Nevertheless 'technological' theories of trade 
have remained peripheral to mainstream economics until recently. Following Posner 
(1961), Vernon argued in 1966 that trade in manufactures was strongly influenced by the 
changing comparative costs emerging from the manufacturing 'product cycle' (1966). 
His schema refocuses on Adam Smith's concept of the division of labour casting it in a 
dynamic form in the context of international trade and development. Because innovation 
and improvisation are paramount when products are first developed, production is 
relatively unstandardised and so immobile between locations. However over time, 
production becomes more standardised and relatively stable industrial configurations 
emerge. This enables firms to relocate some or all of their production to locations with 
more favourable factor prices.
Frequently the home market will retain some production, finance and continuing research 
and development of products and processes. At a later stage in the product cycle, it may 
become economic for the 'follower' to export back to the innovating country. It will be 
producing relatively standardised products, sub-assemblies or components and may have 
the advantage of lower costs - particularly for labour. At this 'mature' stage, trade is
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likely to flow in two directions. 'Innovators' will export 'know-how' or intellectual 
property, specialist or technology intensive capital equipment and/or components whilst 
the 'followers' will produce and/or assemble standardised products for local 
consumption and for export back to the innovator. At each stage of this process, trade is 
driven by the comparative costs and/or exigencies of production emerging from the 
product cycle.27
At this point the product cycle approach can offer an insight into evolving patterns of 
trade and development in the developed and developing world. As countries develop, 
their technological capabilities typically rise as do their wage rates. Accordingly the 
comparative advantage of original 'followers' will move away from labour intensive 
production to more capital and skill intensive production. By this stage, original 
innovators may have moved on. Original innovators will retain their lead in some 
aspects of the industry, particularly in 'leading edge' technology. But more 
sophisticated manufacture - and perhaps some research - can now be done most 
efficiently by the original 'follower'. And the original 'follower' is now engaged in 
product cycle trade with a later follower country which enjoys lower labour costs than 
the earlier follower and so on. This pattern has been lyrically captured in the image of 
countries as 'flying geese' continually 'catching up' to the geese in front, which, like 
them, move further still (Fukasaku, 1992: 22). It was this kind of 'catching up' which 
the Japanese and other East Asian countries appear to have made a cornerstone of their 
trade and industry development policies.
For all their differences, the product cycle and the HOS frameworks can be brought into 
a relatively easy intuitive compatibility and complementarity. The product cycle 
approach focuses on the imperfectly competitive dynamics of innovation and economic 
development and the management of indivisibilities in production. Where some 'shift' 
comes about in production and trade under this model, it does so as a result of the joint 
action of comparative costs and competition. Thus in a sense, the monopolistically 
competitive product cycle framework contains the perfectly competitive HOS framework 
within it. And each framework can merge into the other by virtue of appropriate re­
definition. 'Factor' supplies can be specified at whatever level of disaggregation
27 For the sake of generality, where the product is unavailable from any other country or firm, this can 
be regarded as an infinite cost advantage. Note that this kind of trade can take place between firms at 
'arms length', but it will often occur between 'parent' firms and their subsidiaries. In its original form 
the 'product cycle trade hypothesis' was intended to offer some explanation not just of trade but of foreign 
direct investment. However the main focus here is on trade patterns.
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necessary to interpret phenomena consistently with the HOS framework. One could thus 
argue that America of the 1920s had a comparative factor cost advantage in the factor of 
'automotive know-how' (c/Posner, 1961: 328). Likewise distinct activities in the 
production chain can be regarded as distinct industries or as integral to a single industry. 
If textile and apparel manufacture are regarded as two distinct industries the migration of 
apparel manufacture to low income countries is an instance of HOS trade. If the two 
activities are regarded as part of the same industry, the same phenomenon can be seen as 
product cycle trade {cf Johnson, in Vernon, 1970: 17-8). The 'flying geese' pattern of 
trade and development can likewise be 'derived' from the HOS model, {cf Krueger, 
1977: 11, 25, and see Figure 1).
And of course both 'theories' are the acme of commonsense. One could read either or 
both into Hume's words at the head of this section. Illustrating the themes of Chapter 
One, within the economic literature the two approaches have frequently been juxtaposed 
as alternative hypotheses rather than as crystallisations of empirical tendencies the 
existence of which no-one should need convincing. Each 'hypothesis' enjoys significant 
support from the evidence - providing that some way is found to represent human capital 
as a factor within the HOS framework. As Johnson put it in 1970:
[T]he 'adversary procedure' of testing one hypothesis against another is a 
useful scientific procedure up to a point; but, when both hypotheses 
perform well and seem to be fairly evenly matched, it is not necessarily the 
best scientific procedure to send the challenger back to training camp with 
good advice on how to prepare for the next month. In the realm of ideas, a 
conflict of equally well (or equally imperfectly) supported hypotheses may 
be more fruitfully resolved by merger into a composite hypothesis (in 
Vernon, 1970: 17).
3.2.3 Intra-Industry Trade in Similar Products
The factor proportions account is only one of many. . . .  It is important to 
realise this, or we shall not be able to get off the side track onto which we have, 
in effect, been shunted.
Staffan Burenstam Linder, 1961: 16-7
Cross trade in manufacturers has increasingly dominated world trade in modem times. 
In 1899 trade between industrial countries already accounted for over half of world trade 
in manufactures. Yet the elegant lure of Ricardian comparative advantage and its 
successor within economic orthodoxy - the HOS framework - have both dominated the 
profession, apparently inducing a degree of myopia. Until at least the 1940s, economic 
orthodoxy assumed that manufactures trade would fall as poorer countries gained
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industrial know-how (Rayment, 1983: 1-3). Ironically, it was Bertil Ohlin - the "O" 
from the HOS framework - who, in the 1930s, drew attention to the "surprisingly large 
volume" of specialised manufactures trade between industrialised countries, suggesting 
that Marshall had underestimated the importance of economies of scale and 
specialisation. Yet his comments appear to have had little or no effect on empirical work 
and none on theoretical work until at least the late 1960s (Rayment, 1983: 4, and see 
Krugman, 1993, "Arguments": 363).
Economists Herbert Grubel and Peter Lloyd became interested in the phenomenon of 
cross trade in similar products in the late sixties, but were still able to report six years 
later that the phenomenon had yet to be seriously studied (1971; 1975: xiii). They listed 
a wide variety of causes of intra-industry trade all of which were generated by 
relaxations of the standard Heckscher-Ohlin assumptions. It is a testament to the 
untidiness of economic life that most of these kinds of intra-industry trade could be 
found in the Australian automotive industry by the early 1970s. Intra-industry trade can 
be driven by factor prices if, contrary to the standard HOS framework, industries contain 
other industries with differing factor usage. Thus the automotive industry 'contained' 
various industries which added value to Australian iron and steel and which may have 
gained traditional 'comparative advantage' from that fact. Both Holden and Ford 
exported body panels for assembly into cars to a wide variety of destinations throughout 
the sixties and seventies. Later in the seventies and 80s there would be considerable 
export specialisation within the industry in iron and aluminium castings. Trade in 
Australian automotive products also reflected transport costs with import penetration 
being greater in the northern states and territories which were closer to Japan and further 
from Australian production bases in the South-Eastern States. Likewise Australia's 
exports did best in markets within its region (see § 2.5.1 above).
Yet as Chapter Two demonstrated, much intra-automotive industry trade reflected 
indivisibilities in production and the resulting scale economies. Thus from the late 1950s 
on, Australia was a net exporter of the medium sized cars which were so successful 
domestically and a net importer of smaller vehicles in less domestic demand, with a 
similar pattern being reflected for components.28 Grubel and Lloyd suggested that this
28 Whilst Australia enjoyed a comparative advantage from the factor prices facing iron and steel making, 
trade in panels and engines reflected indivisibilities in production with Australia's sectoral trade balance 
in both reflecting Australia's specialisation in medium six cylinder vehicle production (IAC, PMVs, 
Papers, Volume 1, 1974, § 2.2.3.4ff). Australia was a net exporter of engines and panels for six 
cylinder cars and a net importer of the same commodities for four cylinder vehicles. In 1972 very few 
panels or engines for six cylinder cars were imported. About 5,000 six cylinder vehicles were assembled
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kind of specialisation was the most quantitatively important source of intra-industry trade 
offering some plausible - though fairly sketchy - evidence for their assertion. Product 
differentiation was important in many large manufacturing industries. Trade in these 
products tended to be between countries with similar factor endowments. And while 
scale economies at the industry level were important, there appeared to be significant 
room for product differentiation, suggesting scale economies of equal or greater 
importance at the product level. The large industrial firms in Europe had not, by and 
large, decimated the small. Trade liberalisation within Europe had increased intra­
industry specialisation much more than inter-industry specialisation (Grubel and Lloyd, 
1975: 91; also see Balassa, 1966: 472).
In the 1980s, intra-industry trade received extensive professional attention. Today after 
several decades in obscurity, Ohlin's commonsensical explanation of intra-industry trade 
has been absorbed into textbook orthodoxy (Fischer and Dornbusch, 1983: 847; also see 
Harris, 1993: 768). And an extensive contemporary sub-literature is devoted largely to 
formal expositions of various themes of Ohlin. In 1975 Grubel and Lloyd also noted 
that "oligopolistic market structures" could also determine patterns of intra-industry trade 
and so could make their own story richer and more realistic. They neglected to model 
such factors explicitly largely because "these kinds of models are often indeterminate or 
based on particular assumptions, the validity of which is questionable" (Grubel and 
Lloyd, 1975: 92-3). Ten years later the gap they had left to intuition was partially filled, 
with various models in which oligopoly drove intra-industry trade in identical products 
(Brander, 1981; Brander and Krugman, 1983; Venables, 1985). At the same time their 
own insight about the usefulness of such work looked like being borne out as debate 
raged over the practical usefulness of similar models within 'strategic trade theory'.
from packs with imported panels and engines comprising Toyota Crowns, Triumph 2500s and Rambler 
Rebels and Hornets (IAC, PMV Papers, Volume 1, Table 2.4.5). By contrast panels and engines for 
smaller vehicles were imported in large numbers with all vehicles participating in low local content 
plans being manufactured largely from imported components including panels and engines. Four 
cylinder engines were not manufactured in Australia until after the mid 1970s (Interview, Bill Hartigan, 
1991).
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3.2.4 The 'New Development Consensus'
Instead of the chaotic selectivity of the incentive policies for 'import 
substitution' which seems to be the main focus of our trade-theoretic analysis, a 
more important inhibition on growth may in practice be the speed with which 
import substituting industrialisation is geared toward 'export promotion'. . . .
[T]he key to success is not the absence of detailed, selective and target-oriented 
export promotion . . . .  The distinguishing feature of superior export 
performance seems to be the pursuit of 'indiscriminate' and 'chaotic' but 
energetic policies to promote exports from industries which have been nurtured 
under protection in the first place.
Jagdish Bhagwati, 1973, in Kenen, 1975: 513-4
The 'development economics' of the 1950s and 1960s emphasised the pervasiveness of 
market failure in developing economies, the difficulties they faced in achieving export 
growth, and the consequent need for extensive intervention including typically, trade 
protection to stimulate industrialisation and growth through import substitution 
(Edwards, 1993; Krugman, "Counterrevolution", 1993). In the 1970s this approach 
was challenged by a small number of major cross country studies into trade and 
development regimes in developing countries (Little, Skitovski and Scott, 1970; Balassa, 
1971; Krueger, 1978; Bhagwati, 1978). The studies showed how high and how 
disparate protection had become in many developing countries. Protection might once 
have been justified for 'infant industries', but the 'infants' were all too often not the ones 
receiving protection (Balassa, 1971: 134). Industrialisation behind protectionist walls 
had generated high cost enterprises, excess capacity and production which was "rapidly 
coming up against the limits of the home market" (Little et al, 1970: xviii).
The studies dealt a considerable blow to export pessimism or at least provided striking 
counterexamples with which to refute any general export pessimism for developing 
countries. Taiwan for instance, had achieved phenomenal export growth in both 
manufactures and agricultural products (Little et al, 1970: 254-8). None of the studies 
denied the presence of extensive 'market failure' in developing countries. Nor did they 
reject the case for assistance to manufacturing and potential infant industries (Little et al: 
158ff, Balassa, 1971: 99, Krueger, 1978: 284). Yet, following the logic of the 'optimal 
intervention' literature, {eg see Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1969 and this chapter below) 
they argued that policies to correct market failure should act on it directly. This 
suggested industry promotion rather than protection (Little et al, 1970: 12Iff). 
Promotion might be in the form of wage subsidies where excessive industrial wages 
were the impediment to better development (Little et al, 1970: 145), or industrial output 
subsidies where there were positive 'externalities’ to industrial production; though in
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either case there was little to be said for excessive rates of subsidy (Little et al, 1970: 
159; Balassa, 1971: 98-9).
Using the recently refined concept of effective protection, considerable effort was 
expended in searching for some link between developing country success and the 
absence of selective interventions in resource allocation (Bhagwati in Kenen, 1975: 513- 
4). Certainly there were successful (and somewhat unusual) countries such as Hong 
Kong and Singapore whose background as entrepot ports had led them to very liberal 
trade regimes. But countries like Taiwan and Korea for instance, were clearly much 
more interventionist. As Bhagwati noted in 1973, "Korea shows as much variation in 
domestic resource costs as you could now expect to find among the import substituting 
industries in 'inward looking' countries" (Bhagwati in Kenen, 1975: 513-4). The new 
development consensus nevertheless steered a fruitful, if at times somewhat tendentious 
path through these difficulties in generalising from the variety of experiments in 
economic development against the backdrop of economic theory. Amongst other things, 
the new development consensus built on the importance which the old development 
economics gave to the value of foreign exchange in development. However where 
emphasis had previously been placed on discouraging the unnecessary use of foreign 
exchange the new approach focused on the importance of earning foreign exchange with 
exports - both traditional and 'non-traditional' (Little et al, 1970: xx).
Although some of the work was methodologically questionable (Edwards, 1993: 1373), 
the explanatory apparatus of the new literature was built around what Bhagwati calls a 
"mix of analytical insights, casual empiricism and econometric evidence" (cited in 
Milner, 1990: 17) which was both suggestive and persuasive. Krueger suggested that 
the observed superiority of export promotion could be attributed to two classes of 
influences. Firstly export promotion was more conducive to the achievement of 
economies associated with learning and scale (also see Balassa, 1971: 76-9). Secondly, 
some of the most distorting interventions associated with import replacement involve 
attempts to manipulate domestic demand rather than supply - for instance by banning 
imports over a certain level. Analogous kinds of interventions cannot be practiced in 
export markets. Governments seeking to expand export market share must do so by 
subsidising exporters (either implicitly or explicitly). In either case, export promotion 
must work "through pricing, rather than quantitative, interventions". In such 
circumstances the costs of policies are likely to be more transparent limiting both the 
magnitude and the duration of major policy mistakes (Krueger, 1978: 284).
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To use some terminology introduced in Chapter One, the new approach melded aspects 
of the old development economics, the effective protection and optimal intervention 
literatures with 'integrative' and 'meliorative' skill. Riedel puts it well. "A free trade 
strategy works best of all in theory, but alas has rarely been tried in practice. The single 
case of it in recent times Hong Kong, is a phenomenal success, but is routinely 
dismissed as irrelevant because of the peculiarities of Hong Kong. . . . The case for 
export promotion is therefore a practical compromise between free trade strategy which 
looks good in theory but has not been practiced, and . . . import substitution . . . 
which looks bad in theory and worse in practice" (1990: 137). One need not decide the 
case for or against free trade to recognise that both theory and evidence were combining 
in a powerful case against inward orientation. In constructing their arguments in such a 
way, the new development economists made contributions both to the 'protectionist' and 
the 'free trade' camps: their fruitfulness was a direct result of their integrative 'mutual 
adjustment' between different perspectives.
3.3 The Normative Economics of Trade and Trade
Liberalisation: Some Perspectives and 
Principles
This section suggests some conclusions which can be drawn from the corpus of 
normative economics and the frameworks discussed above, taken as far as possible, 
together.
3.3.1 Protection versus Promotion
During the 1950s the case for free or freer trade was at a discount in most of the 
less-developed countries. Laissez faire had failed to develop them, so it was 
argued; hence free trade had failed. In the [next] stage of thought the link 
between . . .free trade and . . . laissez-faire has been broken. One can 
believe that there are many reasons for the government to intervene in the 
economy . . . and yet one can also believe that, broadly speaking, 'free trade 
is best'. The point is simply that intervention in trade may not be the best way 
of [intervening].
Max Corden, 1974: 4
Where the search for good policy takes place as an exercise in 'mutual adjustment' 
between perspectives and objectives, and where the emphasis is on the plausible rather 
than the indubitable, some robust policy principles emerge from the literatures explored 
above. The conclusion which emerges most robustly from the four sub-disciplines 
above emerges from each of them. That conclusion is not about the merits of free trade
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versus protection, but rather about what form industry assistance should take if 
provided. For if one assumes that protection seeks to increase the output of protected 
industries, the sub-disciplines all suggest that traditional protection imposes costs which 
are unnecessary to its policy objectives: that accordingly, if assistance is provided, it 
should promote rather than protect leaving firms to decide their own preferred level of 
intra-industry trade. A simple HOS model illustrates the costs which tariffs impose on 
consumption. These costs are avoided by subsidies. HOS models with multi-stage 
production, and models of intra-industry and product cycle trade suggest that tariffs also 
impose costs on producers where subsidies do not. And the latter approaches suggest 
that, as well as the allocative inefficiencies illustrated by the HOS framework (associated 
with sub-optimal factor usage), losses from protection will also include productive 
efficiencies (associated with the loss of scale economies).
These points were developed in the literature of the 1970s which relied to a considerable 
extent on informal reasoning (see § 3.2.4 above and eg Balassa, 1971: 76-9; Krueger, 
1978: 284). By reference to both the 'optimal intervention' and 'new development' 
literatures, Max Corden's mid-1970s textbook on the normative economics of trade 
commented adversely on the unwanted distortions associated with protection, 
particularly the 'home market bias' which had become typical of protected industrial 
structures. He included Australia as one of the bad examples (1974: 24). Rattigan's 
Tariff Board commonsensically set out its appreciation of these issues in 1971. 
Responding to a reference emphasising the Government's desire to maintain the 
shipbuilding industry, it recommended reducing the rate of assistance and extending the 
existing bounty scheme to exports because it would improve both allocative and 
productive efficiency within the industry (1971: 21).
Some local yards producing small or special types of ships already have a 
useful export trade - mainly to areas adjacent to Australia. Subsidising 
exports would extend these markets and thus increase the efficiencies of 
these yards. Of greater importance is the fact that it would provide other 
local producers . . . with more opportunities to exploit efficiencies of 
specialisation and economies of scale (1971: 21).
Here there were the makings of some consensus which would have been no less real for 
being partial. For essentially the same points were being made by those more 
sympathetic to protection. In 1971 the Australian Industries Development Association 
(AIDA) published a survey of industrial firms together with an analysis by economist 
Neville Norman. AIDA styled its role as integrative and ecumenical; as "bringing 
together information and opinion emanating from industry, government and academic 
economists" (Norman, 1971: v). When questioned about the effectiveness of existing
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industry assistance schemes and whether or not industry assistance should be extended, 
two fifths of firms surveyed argued that assistance should be extended. Yet nearly all 
the firms were unhappy about the way in which assistance was being administered and 
nearly all made specific proposals for changing the form of assistance they enjoyed. In 
response to these comments, Norman then offered the benefits of his own expertise, by 
suggesting which kinds of proposals received from business were "soundly based" and 
which were fallacious or misguided (1971: 62). Although more sympathetic with 
protection than the Commission, Norman's position was far from crudely protectionist.
Norman invoked the principle of comparative advantage arguing that proposals for the 
extension of assistance on the simple ground of cost disability could not be justified in 
the national interest. Likewise he argued that it was difficult to justify an increase in 
general tariff levels given the burden this would place on consumers. Norman ignored 
several industry proposals to re-impose quantitative restrictions altogether. Accepting 
the traditional arguments that protection was consistent with the "primal economic 
objective" of supporting "a high rate of growth of population and expansion in the 
industrial base", Norman argued that assistance should not be reduced if this would lead 
to a reduction in the value added in tariff assisted industries. He concluded that "There is 
a strong case, though, for reducing the emphasis on the tariff in Australian policy 
towards industry" (1971: 62). Prompted by one executive's observations that "the same 
level of assistance in a different form" would reduce costs and create "the opportunity for 
expansion . . . large scale plants, frequently with export potential" (1971: 85), Norman 
advocated the gradual, and widespread, though not wholesale, replacement of tariffs by 
subsidies (1971: 63; 73).
3.3.2 Trade Liberalisation and the Two 'Rules' of Piecemeal
Reform
The conditions outlined above augured well for the emergence of an approach to gradual 
trade liberalisation built around the specific circumstances of the Australian economy and 
insights from the contemporary professional literatures on trade and development. 
However as will be seen, as economists' vision of reform took hold through the 1970s 
and 80s, this never occurred. This was for two reasons which resonate with the themes 
introduced in Chapter One. Firstly, technical skill displaced integrative skill. Chapter 
One explained how economists paid little attention to context when applying a concept 
from the textbooks like 'minimum efficient scale' (see § 1.3.2.1). When it came to 
trade liberalisation, economists did something similar. They applied the top down and 
across the board tariff reform rules which had the sanction of economic theory and the
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textbooks. And this displaced the attempt to adapt the perspectives explored above to 
Australia's circumstances. Secondly the traditional reform rules met the 'contractionist' 
aesthetic of orthodox reform (see § 1.2.2 above) while alternatives had a more 
expansionist and so 'second best' and 'mercantilist' flavour. These issues are addressed 
in turn below.
3.3.2.1 Were the Neoclassical Reform Rules Optimal?
A disposition against deviations from top down and across the board reform rules would 
have been less unfortunate had the rules themselves been what Corden took them to be - 
"optimal tariff dismantling" rules (1974: 366ff). But they were not. To use Simon's 
jargon introduced earlier, the rules do not optimise a single objective. The test they meet 
is a 'satisficing' one. They satisfy the following two objectives: firstly, if partial reform 
episodes are repeated sufficiently they ultimately sum to complete reform - free trade. 
Secondly, each and every partial reform episode is a step in the right direction - towards 
freer trade. These are worthwhile objectives. However their origin lies not in any 
considered ordering of the priorities facing policy makers but instead in the exigencies of 
formal proof within economic theory. In other words, there is no practical reason why a 
reform sequence should consist of identical moves all of which sum to the ultimate 
objective or only of moves each of which could in-principle do so. But this is a 
convenient way of formally specifying the search for a simple rule which can guide 
gradual trade liberalisation. Indeed, where policy makers are seeking to engineer trade 
liberalisation so as to optimise development and dynamic comparative advantage in the 
sense referred to at the head of this chapter by Helleiner, those conditions are curious 
constraints to place upon policy. If a particular policy will generate gains and liberalise 
trade in a particular circumstance - say cutting tariffs to the second most highly assisted 
industry or offering some assistance or tariff concessions to exporters - it seems perverse 
to rule it out on the grounds that in different circumstances a similar move might not be 
trade liberalising.
Although the above argument can be elaborated in an HOS framework,29 it becomes 
stronger when one considers 'post HOS' models of trade. Because of its construction
29 In a sufficiently simple version of the HOS world - particularly one which does not allow for multi­
stage production - a tariff to an import replacing industry has the same effect on production in that 
industry as a subsidy at the same effective rate. As a consequence, ignoring consumption effects, the 
strategy of trade liberalisation seems reasonably unproblematic and involves the removal of tariffs and/or 
quantitative restrictions at a greater or lesser rate. In principle however, even here a sufficient knowledge 
of the appropriate elasticities would enable policy to 'optimise' net trade creation in any trade
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around perfectly competitive markets and their concomitant 'law of one price',30 the 
HOS framework cannot capture simultaneous imports and exports in differentiated 
products with similar factor proportions. The focus which both product cycle and intra­
industry trade 'theories' place on indivisibilities in production also suggests that a 
'critical mass' of production may be important - that supply may be very elastic at the 
margin of viability. They also suggest that intra-industry trade involves dynamic gains. 
A net importing industry which nevertheless exports enjoys the various informational 
privileges and 'demonstration effects' associated with exporting. And because product 
cycle trade occurs around the evolution of comparative advantage and technological 
'catching up', it ought to facilitate various dynamic gains associated with technology 
transfer and 'learning by doing'. If these 'post HOS' perspectives are considered, trade 
liberalisation can be considered as having two objectives - facilitating HOS inter-industry 
trade (improving allocative efficiency) and 'post HOS' intra-industry trade (which will 
improve scale economies and so technical efficiency). Moreover, post HOS frameworks 
provide glimpses of something which, as Frank Hahn puts it, stares us in the face, even 
if neoclassical theory helps us not to see it: economic processes are often path dependent. 
If the economic structure which emerges in response to liberalisation can be path 
dependent (Hahn, in Hey, 1992: 48; Grubel and Lloyd, 1975: 96, 92; Falvey, 1992: 67; 
Krugman, 1991, "Geography": 9), then the case for at least considering variations on the 
neoclassical decision rules in the light of the development and trade expansion priorities 
and opportunities in particular circumstances seems compelling.
3.3.2.2 Heterodox Reform Options and the Aesthetics of
Reform
It is possible to sketch an introductory taxonomy of trade liberalising possibilities which 
deviate from the two neoclassical rules of reform:
1) 'Anomalous reform' - reducing particular tariffs which are not the highest;
2) 'Concessional reform' - providing duty concessions (such as tariff 
concession orders or duty drawback for exports) on otherwise dutiable 
products;
liberalisation episode by 'targeting' reform - whether it be in the form of tariff reductions, concessions or 
'compensatory' assistance - so as to produce the greatest trade creating demand and supply responses (cf  
Shone 1972: 84-5).
30 Under perfect competition and abstracting from transport costs, a good will have the same price - its 
production cost (including normal profit) - in all places. If it did not, some producer somewhere would 
be earning above normal returns which would attract entry by other competitors until prices were 
equalised.
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3) 'Compensatory reform' - extending direct assistance or 'tariff 
compensation' to activities which would otherwise be penalised by trade 
barriers.
The profession’s response to each different type of non-traditional reform varied 
considerably in ways which square with the interpretive framework proposed in Chapter 
One. Anomalous reform was accepted, with some discomfort, as indispensable to the 
exigencies of reform given Australia's institutional framework. Given that the IAC’s 
advice almost invariably came in a 'piecemeal' form - in response to government 
references on specific industries - strict insistence on traditional reform would have 
prevented trade liberalising recommendations in any inquiries other than those into the 
most highly assisted activity (cf IAC, Annual Report, 1975-6: 111).31 One might 
suggest that 'anomalous reform' commanded disciplinary approval because it deviated 
least from traditional reform in form and appearance. It was confined to reducing tariffs 
- the only compromise being the order in which they were reduced. And where it 
resulted in reductions in assistance to highly assisted activities (even if they were not the 
most highly assisted) anomalous reform accorded with the contractionist aesthetics of 
traditional reform. Relatively high cost industries would contract liberating resources for 
relatively lower cost industries.32
By contrast, if they are to be trade liberalising, both concessional and compensatory 
reform achieve their effects by ameliorating the worst effects of tariffs - on the 
emergence of low cost exports - and in this sense can be seen not to address 
liberalisation 'directly'. In this form, concessional and compensatory reform also have a 
more immediately expansionist and so 'mercantilist' flavour. If they liberalise trade they 
will typically do so by initially expanding (predominantly) low cost activities and so
31 The IAC accordingly reconciled itself to a degree of pragmatism and frequently endorsed 'anomalous 
reform'. It recommended reduced assistance to certain industries even though other industries would 
continue to receive even higher assistance at least until the IAC inquired into them. Its proposals to 
reduce assistance to the automotive industry were a case in point, for there were some apparel 
manufacturing sectors with even higher levels of assistance (IAC, Annual Report, 1973-74: 69).
32 For this and subsequent examples, it is possible to think of counterexamples. For instance it is 
possible to think of anomalous tariff reductions the initial effect of which is expansionist where for 
instance they have an immediately expansionary effect on the costs of a user industry. However 
economists' 'stories' of why trade liberalisation generates gains almost invariably envisage an initially 
contractionist schema (eg see IAC, Annual Report, 1973-4, §152: 22).
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ultimately drawing resources from (predominantly) higher cost activities.33 Of the latter 
two non-traditional reform moves, concessional reform has a more ambiguously 
mercantilist appearance than compensatory reform. Typically concessional reform 
functions by facilitating the expansion of relatively low cost activities - by unburdening 
them of some of the negative assistance imposed by existing protection - whereas 
compensatory reform occurs by way of an unmistakable touchstone of mercantilistic 
political economy - direct assistance.
Consistently with the framework presented here, both concessional and compensatory 
reform received much less favourable consideration within the profession than 
anomalous reform. Concessional reform was largely ignored within the professional 
literature but often treated with instinctive hostility where economists considered it (see 
Chapter Four). In contrast, by directly engaging the 'dangerous supplement' of second 
best reasoning, 'compensatory' reform occupied centre stage in Australian trade policy 
discussion for the best part of a decade and was the focus of considerable hostility. 
Within economic orthodoxy at least, it was ultimately marginalised as a reform option. 
The issue is introduced in the remainder of this chapter which discusses the tariff 
compensation debate of the mid 1970s.
3.4 'Directness1 of Reform and the Tariff
Compensation1 Debate
It is quite logical for persons engaged in our export industries to say that, if they 
cannot have their costs reduced by means of lower customs duties, the same 
measure of protection as is enjoyed by other industries should be enjoyed by 
them.
John McEwen, 1934, in Wood, 1994: 26
This section introduces some of the economic aspects of the 'tariff compensation' debate 
of the late sixties and seventies at the same time as arguing that the debate was marred by
33 It need hardly be said here that I am examining scenarios in which these heterodox reform options 
actually do liberalise trade. The normative perspective of the policy maker is assumed to be something 
similar to the IAC on the many occasions when it recommended anomalous tariff reduction: an 
understanding that cutting some tariffs 'anomalously' can worsen welfare and that cutting others can 
improve it together with a desire to use anomalous reform to improve rather than worsen welfare. To 
object that given certain circumstances one can choose kinds of heterodox reform moves which worsen 
welfare and to thus associate heterodox reform moves with welfare losses seems overly circumspect. It 
would for instance have prevented the IAC from recommending reducing assistance to any industries 
below the (exorbitant) level which was being enjoyed by the apparel industry.
73
Chapter Three The Economics of Trade and Trade Liberalisation
a degree of theoretical confusion. In particular, it was rarely clear whether and at what 
stages participants were appealing to the theory of the second best and when they were 
appealing to a related literature with simpler normative implications - the optimal 
intervention literature. In this regard it was unclear who was defending the high ground 
of 'orthodox' top down and across the board reform. For the first shots in the tariff 
compensation debate were fired not in support of extending assistance to export 
industries but rather against lowering their assistance before the orthodox reform rules 
would sanction such a move - ie before assistance had been reduced to more highly 
assisted activities.
Although 'tariff compensation' was a foundation stone of Australian Protectionism (see 
above quotation), the issue was raised again in 1968 by a leading advocate of trade 
liberalisation (Gruen, 1968). Although no stranger to economists' "crusade" of 
exposing the special pleading of interest groups, Fred Gruen cavilled at the "attitude 
. . . that anything any farm pressure group asked for was ipso facto unjustifiable" 
(1986: 16-7). The debate acquired central policy significance in 1974 when the Green 
Paper on Agricultural Policy embraced the tariff compensation argument as a far- 
reaching justification for agricultural assistance. Partly because of its own wording, but 
partly because of the 'polarising' tendencies of economic discourse (see Chapter One), 
the Green Paper and 'tariff compensation' came to stand for an 'alternative' - bottom up - 
approach to tariff reform which contrasted with the top down formula from the 
textbooks.
Notwithstanding his co-authorship of the Green Paper, Gruen later felt that it overstated 
its case (1986: 17) - a point with which this author agrees. Where it acquired the flavour 
of an alternative to tariff reform, the case against 'tariff compensation' was strong.34
34 That case emerged from several considerations. They include:
• the low degree of substitutability in consumption and production of manufactured and 
agricultural goods, suggesting that compensation should be at low levels;
• the complexity of calculating the 'optimum second best' compensations;
• the multiplicity of assistance instruments used to assist agriculture many of which 
involved additional distortions;
• the difficulty of ensuring that, once calculated, tariff compensation policies would 
survive their political passage into policy; and
• the danger which 'tariff compensation' posed for undermining any prospective 
consensus in favour of eliminating poor policy interventions rather than compensating 
for them (P. Lloyd, 1975, Warr, 1977, 1979).
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3.4.1 'Bestness', Optimal Intervention and the Theory of the
Second Best
Engagement with the dangerous supplement of 'second best' issues created difficult 
dilemmas of principle and practice. Economists were understandably suspicious of 
'second best' considerations given the role such considerations played in underpinning 
'protection-all-round'. As subsequent chapters demonstrate, ultimately an in-principle 
choice against second best policies was made rather than one based on the merits of 
particular circumstances. And within a decade and a half, ’second best’ considerations, 
at least in Australia's trade liberalisation debate, had been vanquished. Yet as 
protagonists of tariff compensation insisted, where reform was piecemeal, second best 
principles could be ruled out 'on principle' only at the peril of irrationality. Chapter One 
has already asserted that the difficult choices to be made in these circumstances were not 
faced up to, and so made by default rather than design. Below I illustrate how the 
difficult issues were avoided in large measure by way of theoretical confusion.
By the early seventies, the expression "second best" was often used to refer to the 
'indirectness' of a policy in meeting its objectives. Policies which addressed their policy 
objective directly were 'first best'; those which did so at the cost of a 'by-product' 
distortion were 'second best', with each additional distortion taking a policy from nth to 
(n+l)th best (Corden, 1974: 29). This language is grounded in the 'domestic distortions 
and optimal intervention' literature, not the related but conceptually distinct theory of the 
second best. By contrast, the 'second bestness' invoked by the theory of the second 
best relates typically, not to the policy under consideration but to the policy making 
situation. Here constraints on policy force policy makers to choose between policies 
which achieve a second best optimum, and policies which do not. There is an 
unintended irony in Bhagwati's comment that "first best policies applied in second best 
contexts can be counterproductive" (in Kenen, 1975: 515). In the constrained 
circumstances presupposed by the theory of the second best, second best is the best one 
can do. Policies which we would today call 'first best' will generally be worse than 
second best policies - and they cannot improve on them!
The distance which economics has traversed in its use of the term 'second best' is 
striking. In the context of the optimal intervention literature the ranking of policies and 
the language of 'nth best' is, appropriately enough, tendentious. Policy should address 
its objectives as directly as possible. Adam Smith pointed out as much (Smith, 1937: 
483). Who wants to be second best? By contrast James Meade's original mid-1950s 
terminology captures the very different analytics of the theory of the second best - policy
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making in 'second best' situations. He does not juxtapose first and second best policies 
but "[ujtopian versus second best solutions" (1955: 8). Who wants to be utopian? It 
says something about the resistance of modem economics to the impending anarchy and 
paralysis threatened by one of its 'dangerous supplements' that Meade's terminology has 
all but disappeared from use.
At different stages of the debate both sides made theoretical appeal to concepts from the 
theory of the second best and the optimal intervention literature without offering 
clarifications. Gruen's original work was grounded in the theory of the second best, and 
the Green Paper's case for tariff compensation was, by its own description a 'second 
best' one although its reference to tariff reform as 'first best' suggests an optimal 
intervention framework (Harris, et al, 1974: 42, §3.64, c/Harris, 1975: 131). 
References to the language of 'second best' suggested the technical difficulties of 
estimating the tariff compensation policies necessary to achieve a second best optimum 
and, as Peter Lloyd pointed out, even to the nightmarish spectre of a "sequential and 
gradual process of second best intervention" and optimisation (1975: 151).
Was all this necessary to the tariff compensation debate? Once the Green Paper had been 
interpreted as proposing tariff compensation as a partial or complete alternative to tariff 
reform, this was probably inevitable. The Green paper conceded that tariff 
compensation was a '"second best' course of action" (Harris et al, 1974: 42, § 3.64, 
emphasis added) implicitly framing the discussion within the optimal intervention 
framework which defies the 'second best' nature of the situation (of piecemeal reform) 
which Gruen had first sought to address. As Alan Lloyd insisted, the focus on tariff 
compensation and tariff reform as alternatives essentially "distorts the discussion. 
Clearly the choice is between both policies combined or the latter only".
Likewise he charged that the IAC's invocation of 'optimal intervention' principles; its 
argument that reform should be determined "directly" by the reform objectives rather 
than the need to compensate for previous interventions had a "nice ex cathedra ring to it". 
But it simply substituted an optimal intervention framework for the second best 
framework which was the only one which captured the analytics of the situation in which 
the IAC found itself as a piecemeal reformer. "[A]s I far as I can unravel it" Lloyd 
protested his bemusement, "it is merely an assertion which takes us back to square one" 
(A. Lloyd, 1975: 15). To a considerable extent, the case for tariff compensation could 
have been made without extensive reference to the theory of the second best and the 
complications it implied. Gruen wished principally to insist that policy makers departed 
from the top down or across the board reform orthodoxy at their peril. In the
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circumstances of high rates of assistance elsewhere in the economy, Gruen asked "Can 
we really be sure that seven per cent [effective assistance then provided to the wheat 
industry] is economically unjustifiable?" (1968: 12).
3.4.2 Peremptory Rules versus Meliorative Themes
With hindsight, one may use the terms introduced in Chapter One to argue that what was 
really at stake in the tariff compensation debate was whether policy makers and 
economists would make their way from the corpus of the discipline to policy prescription 
by way of 'peremptory rules' (which disparaged tariff compensation as a matter of 
principle), or 'meliorative themes' (which introduced tariff compensation as one 
consideration to be balanced against a range of others). The Green Paper had accepted 
that there were legitimate reservations about tariff compensation 'all round' and 
proceeded to outline some of the circumstances which would strengthen the case for 
tariff compensation in specific instances. Likewise the IAC's treatment of the issue (IAC 
Annual Report 1973-74, Appendix 5.5) was a sufficiently skillful piece of writing to 
embrace the possibility of occasionally endorsing the tariff compensation rationale for 
assistance to low cost industries - which it seems was necessary to secure all 
Commissioners' agreement (A. Lloyd, 1975: 2) - whilst rehearsing a strong 'in- 
principle' case against tariff compensation which was widely interpreted as the essence 
of the IAC’s position (A. Lloyd, 1975: 2).
Yet as Alan Lloyd insisted - though he did not himself use Braybrooke's and Lindblom's 
terminology - any peremptory rule banishing tariff compensation considerations from 
advice on industry assistance is a travesty of economic science, a contradiction of the 
"whole IAC philosophy" which sought to examine the worth of policy alternatives from 
an 'economy wide' perspective (1975: 15 and see § 6.2 below). Alan Lloyd was 
concerned more than anything that "IAC staff and Commissioners should not feel 
constrained, as a matter o f policy to disavow the compensatory assistance argument", 
warning that any such disavowal was irrational (1975: 20, 5 emphasis added). He 
accordingly pressed the Commission to develop its aversion to tariff compensation in the 
context of a range of 'meliorative themes':
The questions which the [IAC's first] Annual Report did not seek to answer, 
but which must be answered, are: 'Bearing in mind the difficulties and 
counter-arguments, under which conditions would it be sensible to allow for 
compensatory assistance? (ie for what industries and in what
circumstances?)'. 'How much compensatory assistance should be granted 
and in what circumstances?' (1975: 3).
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In this context, both the Green Paper and Alan Lloyd pointed out the potential for 
different arguments for assistance to mutually support one another. If there were a 
strong case for assistance on tariff compensation grounds, then this would gain strength 
from any additional case for assistance which might be made out in the same 
circumstances on other grounds. In this regard the Green Paper argued that "it would 
make good economic sense, on both efficiency and welfare grounds" to use assistance 
countercyclical^ to distribute agricultural incomes "more evenly over time" (Harris, 
1974: 45, § 3.79, 80). It is not clear whether it was proposing any new assistance in 
this section or merely exploring implications of this line of reasoning for existing 
schemes.
The suggestion that different objectives of policy might in certain circumstances each 
mutually reinforce the case for tariff compensation was beyond the pale for Peter Lloyd. 
He did not debate the economic merits of such an approach but argued that peremptory 
rules offered greater protection against the risks of political subversion. "This 
suggestion of using compensation for the dual purposes of improving resource allocation 
and stabilizing farm incomes is dangerous. It opens another door for disguised long­
term assistance which is difficult to measure and control" (1975: 147). Peter Lloyd's 
concern with the political risks of tariff compensation was legitimate enough. But 
politics is more than a field of threat for good policy. It is the necessary medium through 
which economic ideas pass into policy. As such, it is a field of both risk and 
opportunity. To take the example used above, permitting a plurality of objectives might 
well involve risks of having assistance extended when conditions in agriculture were 
parlous. But the prospect of increased rural assistance when times are hard may be 
politically inevitable in any case. And if admitting the plurality of objectives does 
increase risk - it might also increase the risks for farmers of having their assistance 
reduced when times were good. More substantial examples of the potential gains from 
admitting the plurality of objectives are outlined in the subsequent sub-section and in 
Chapters Five and Ten. For when they are more fully sketched out, it is difficult to 
choose between different perspectives on the politics of tariff compensation.
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3.4.3 Political Considerations: Second Best as a Field of
Threat or a Field of Opportunity?
If the IAC is seen to be actively and directly doing something 'constructive' 
towards expanding low-cost industries (as distinct from the 'destructive' but 
immensely beneficial role of reducing high tariffs) its public image and 
influence will be strengthened.
Alan Lloyd, 1975: 20
Of course one can concede the case for tariff compensation in economic theory and still 
reject such a policy in the belief that it will complicate and so jeopardise the politics of 
reform. This sub-section briefly introduces political considerations. It seeks to expand 
and enrich the field of view, rather than argue a particular case. It provides material for a 
claim which will be elaborated further in Chapters Five and Ten: those who advanced 
'political' arguments against 'compensatory' export assistance did so in a summary 
fashion without showing that alternative perspectives were inferior.
As Glezer puts it, for the IAC, tariff compensation cut to the heart of a central economic 
and strategic problem:
Giving rural groups compensation for manufacturers' tariffs, mainly in the 
form of export subsidies, would have strengthened the commitment of these 
groups to the IAC. However it also meant the creation of assistance which, 
in the long term, would prove difficult to remove and might even have led 
the compensated industries to support the high protection granted to some 
manufacturers. To compensate lightly protected industries was to endanger 
the policy of eliminating assistance as far as politically possible (1982:
124).
Glezer’s analysis illustrates just how ambiguous and rich the politics of reform can be. 
For it suggests that, at least in the short to medium term, some tariff compensation 
would have promoted the cause for reform by politically galvanising its beneficiaries 
behind the IAC. And while Glezer's echoing of the IAC's depiction of the dangers for 
long term policy are plausible enough, so too are other possibilities. Had initial reform 
proceeded more smoothly and generated benefits more rapidly, this might have improved 
the political prospects of reform later. It could have done so both by promoting greater 
public support of reform and by moving the economy faster to freer trade from whence it 
would be a smaller and so politically easier step than otherwise to complete free trade (A. 
Lloyd, 1978: 12).
Also, it is a commonplace of neoclassical political economy that trade liberalisation is 
politically difficult because its costs are immediate and concentrated and visible whilst its 
gains emerge more slowly and are diffuse, and so much less visible (IAC, Annual
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Report, 1973-4, 1974: 22). The politics of reform are further undermined by the 
popular mercantilistic appeal of protection and, as Alan Lloyd pointed out, impeding 
'cheap imports' always had a certain xenophobic appeal. As a consequence, there was 
widespread popular suspicion of trade liberalisation in the early 1970s, and as jobs were 
lost in the 1974-75 recession, suspicion turned to strong hostility. Alan Lloyd argued 
that judiciously applied, tariff compensation offered to turn these conventional wisdoms 
of political economy on their head, improving the public image of reformers into the 
bargain. Export assistance for some activities would be direct and visible, whilst its 
indirect effects - subverting the protection provided by tariffs - would be much less so 
(1975). And - as Ross Gamaut argued over a decade after the tariff compensation debate 
- export assistance might promote liberalisation by permitting faster tariff reform than 
would otherwise be possible (1991: 30). These issues are explored further in Chapter 
Five, which considers the politics of export assistance to manufacturers and the forms in 
which it might be offered in order to maximise the chance of entrenching a virtuous 
political economy of trade liberalisation in which successful reform helps accelerate 
further reform.
3.5 Until Completed, the Most Direct (First Best?)
Reform Paths usually Contain 'Second Best1 
Policies
Had the debate been less preoccupied with the dichotomy between 'compensating or 
eliminating' (see Warr in Kasper and Parry, 1978: 295-6), it might have proceeded to 
develop further some of the principles from the optimal intervention literature to which 
both parties appealed at different times. This task is now taken on here.
If trade barriers are the problem, then clearly removing them is the 'first best' or 'most 
direct' reform. And policies which allow them to remain and seek instead to offset their 
effects will be less 'best'. Yet (leaving practical matters of implementation aside for 
argument's sake) this logic does not hold where trade reform is partial - and thus where 
it is gradual. In one sense top down and across the board tariff reform are direct. Their 
focus is on the policy to be dismantled and they concentrate reform in areas of highest 
effective assistance - where existing policy deviates most from the ultimate ideal. Yet in 
another sense, they are not the most direct attack on the problem because they do not 
focus on the deleterious incentive effects of the unwanted policy, the disparities of 
assistance to which tariffs lead. If one wishes to reform these as directly as possible, 
one would focus on the two extremities at once, concentrating reform where positive
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assistance rates are highest and lowest (most negative) .35 In principle at least, these 
considerations suggest a path of 'symmetrical' tariff dismantling in which top down or 
across the board tariff reform is complemented with tariff compensation focused on the 
most negatively assisted activities until the rates of tariff and tariff compensation 
assistance converge.36 Beyond this point, tariff and tariff compensation rates would be 
lowered until free trade was reached. In this sense, 'compensatory assistance' 
instruments play a necessary role in a 'symmetrical' - ie the most direct - approach to 
gradual tariff reform. From this perspective, immediate free trade is 'first best', 
symmetrical partial tariff reform is next best37 and asymmetrical partial tariff reform is 
next best again. And if theoretical considerations suggest symmetrical concertina tariff 
reform, so it seems would the empirical work associated with the 'new development 
consensus' where - it will be recalled - export assistance was taken to complement other 
liberalisation measures and accelerate the transition to outward orientation. These and 
other points will be revisited in Chapter Five.
35 Although both tops down and across the board trade reform will typically reduce the negativity of the 
most negative rates of assistance, they do so indirectly - that is as a by-product of reducing the highest 
positive rates of assistance. Thus they do not necessarily concentrate reform in the areas experiencing 
the greatest disparities from the average. Where the most highly assisted industry does not produce 
inputs for the most negatively assisted industry or to industries supplying it, the first round of 'tops 
down' reform will generate little relief for the most negatively assisted industry. Because across the 
board reform replaces 'tops only' reform with 'tops mostly' reform or reform which is most concentrated 
at the top, analogous arguments apply to it mutatis mutandis.
36 Corden refers to 'tops down' reform as the "concertina method" (1974: 369) and the symmetrical path 
mooted here is also more consistent with this imagery of the concertina!
37 Note the analogy with Corden (1974: 29) where he provides an illustrative list of interventions to 
deal with overpriced labour to manufacturing in a less-developed country. A subsidy to manufacturing 
labour is 'first best', a production subsidy to manufacturing next best, a tariff plus an export subsidy is 
next best with a tariff only regime coming in last.
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4 'Intra-Industry Trade Policy' in the
Sixties and Seventies: Policy Makers, 
Economists and the Accommodation of 
Intra-industry Trade
[W]e are looking for an institutional arrangement between two or more 
countries which would promote competitive specialisation and at the same time 
hinder, or at least limit, complementary specialisation. Describing the task in 
these terms already suggests the solution.
Peter Elkan, 1965:52-5
4.1 Introduction
Amongst economists, both in the 1970s and today, considerable attention has been 
focused on the implications of intra-industry trade for the old debate between free trade 
and mercantilism (Grubel and Lloyd, 1975: 150-1; Lancaster, 1991). But there are a 
range of issues which the ubiquity of intra-industry trade raises for trade policy which 
are less fundamental, but, on account of that, perhaps of greater immediate significance. 
In particular - accepting for the sake of the argument that some protection exists because 
it is 'politically' imposed, economically desirable, or because trade liberalisation, though 
desirable must be gradual - how can protection's intra-industry trade suppressing effects 
be ameliorated? This chapter explores the way in which both economists and policy 
makers responded by improvising new policy instruments to address these issues. The 
chapter continues the argument begun in Chapter One that the energies of the economics 
profession were marshalled very imperfectly to addressing such 'meliorative' themes. 
Because the automotive industry was one of the pre-eminent cases in which intra­
industry trade confronted policy makers, and because some of the important 
contributions were Australian, the story about the theory and practice of 'intra-industry 
trade policy' and the story about policy making in the Australian automotive industry 
merge in these sections.
A few economists raised a range of 'meliorative' possibilities; however, their individual 
contributions were not taken up within the literature and so the discipline failed to build 
towards any systematic insights or growing consensus in the area. Some economists 
like Kiyoshi Kojima and Peter Drysdale offered pragmatic contributions addressed to 
particular circumstances. These fell from view relatively quickly and very little attempt 
was made within the discipline to deal with the issues they raised more generally. Only
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one economist sought to consider the normative economics of intra-industry trade and 
protection more generally. This was Peter Elkan who proposed systematic institutional 
adaptations of traditional protection and customs union instruments in the mid 1960s. 
His work offered the prospect of a fertile beginning to a disciplinary conversation which, 
alas, never really got started. Elkan's work provoked very little response at all from 
economists. As this chapter outlines, what response it did engender smacked of several 
typical vices of 'poor conversation'. This foreclosed prospects for improved 
disciplinary insight. Following a discussion of this failure of disciplinary dialogue, the 
chapter briefly considers ways in which the new development consensus was also 
pointing towards the usefulness of what I call intra-industry trade policy, although again 
it failed to explore the area systematically.
4.2 Ad Hoc Proposals to Facilitate Intra-Industry
Trade
Whilst some were pointing out the ways in which intra-industry trade might affect the 
choice between traditional trade liberalisation instruments (eg Grubel, 1967: 384), a 
number of economists suggested variations on custom s unions to capture 
complementarities between industries in different countries. Japanese economist Dr 
Kiyoshi Kojima asked "[w]hat kind of adjustment is desirable and needed for the future 
expansion of Japan's trade?" (1965: 118). He argued that Japan should expand intra­
industry trade. He suggested the formation of a preferential tariff area between 
developed countries in the Pacific to facilitate each country producing "sophisticated 
manufactures" at increased scale "reciprocally furnishing each other's markets" (1965: 
119; also see Kojima, 1964: 57). He believed that the multilateralism of the Kennedy 
Round of GATT negotiations might not sufficiently meet the interests of Japan. While a 
large trade block was both unrealistic and undesirable for Japan, "some sectoral 
integration in heavy and chemical industries among Japan, the United States, Canada and 
Australia and New Zealand might be desirable" (1965: 119-20). But Kojima was short 
on the specifics of such arrangements.
ANU economist Peter Drysdale was an enthusiast for some of Kojima's ideas (The 
Bulletin, 8th August 1964: 56), and a few years later took them up again. He pointed 
out in 1969 that the Japanese and Australian automotive industries were highly 
complementary. Eighty two per cent of Japan's car output was in vehicles of less than 
1.5 litres with the bulk of Australian production being concentrated in vehicles of over 
2,200 cc capacity (1969: 333). Drysdale concluded that there was "considerable scope 
for more effective specialisation in motor-car production within the western Pacific
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region, with Japan specialising in the production and export of small and small medium 
sized passenger cars, and Australia in the production and export of medium sized cars" 
(1969: 334). The resulting increases in production scale would lower costs and 
strengthen each industry in third country markets (1969: 334).
Drysdale added that until demand for medium cars in Japan and small cars in Australia 
had grown sufficiently to justify local production, it seemed "quite irrational" for each to 
cover the field of production "when the viability of the important section of the industry 
in each country is well established" (1969: 334). He suggested that a bilateral 
arrangement between Japan and Australia in motor vehicles could be attractive to both 
parties and that the (possibly) necessary GATT waiver ought to be available, given the 
GATT waiver for a the US-Canada auto pact of 1965 (see § 4.4.2 below).
4.3 Intra-Industry Trade Facilitation Policy:
'Customs Drawback Unions'
The idea that intra-industry trade might require essentially new economic institutions and 
approaches to protection and/or to trade liberalisation figured very little in the literature. 
Peter Elkan's work was an exception. Elkan, considered the policy issues arising from 
intra-industry trade and specialisation over a decade before interest in them increased 
dramatically in the economics profession in the late 1970s. He was one of the few 
economists of the early and mid sixties to draw attention to the likelihood that economies 
of scale were becoming increasing important to industrial development and to make this 
an important focus for his policy thinking (eg see Elkan, 1965: 47 and Elkan, 1972).
Without doubting that protection was the correct policy for New Zealand, Elkan 
anticipated the new development consensus in his concern that inward orientation would 
rob a small country's protected sector of important economies of scale (1965: 45). He 
was particularly concerned with what he called the "problem of assortment". Many 
economies of scale were product specific, when a good deal of thinking about them had 
assumed homogeneity of output within an industry and so had thought about scale 
economies at the industry level. His focus on the "outlet for every narrowly specified 
product" led him to conclude that "if local sales of any particular item do not reach the 
minimum scale at which it can be manufactured efficiently, its production necessarily 
entails either a permanent acceptance of low efficiency . . .  or the practicability of 
exports in significant volume" (1965: 45).
Like many economists at the time, Elkan suspected that for small and/or underdeveloped 
countries, increasing inter-industry specialisation in primary products would lead to a
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syndrome of underdevelopment in which the skills and so productivity of the labour 
force stagnated and the country had difficulty expanding export volumes without 
depressing export prices. On the other hand an increase in what he called 'competitive' 
trade specialisation "that is, . . . the international exchange of goods belonging to the 
same broad class, is practically always highly desirable" because it allowed specialisation 
and access to economies of scale in production not otherwise available without the 
offsetting costs which increased inter industry specialisation might entail (1965: 52). 
Elkan accordingly went in search of institutional arrangements which would foster the 
desirable whilst limiting the undesirable (see quote at head of this chapter). In seeking 
an institution which would "abolish tariffs conditionally" for those imports which were 
matched by exports from the same broad commodity class, Elkan turned naturally to the 
existing institution of customs drawback.
Under existing export drawback arrangements, an exporter received a rebate of tariffs 
paid on imports if they were physically incorporated into products and then re-exported. 
Elkan proposed to modify the condition under which drawback was granted so that 
drawback on imports would be allowed in proportion to the extent of exports from the 
same broad commodity class irrespective of whether or not the imports were 
incorporated into exports. An importer would receive a receipt on payment of duty 
which could be drawn back by those exporting goods from the same broad commodity 
class. The duty paid receipts which could be redeemed by exporters were to be freely 
transferable to ensure that they went to their highest value uses (1965: 53). The 
economics of such instruments are explored more fully in Chapter Five below.
Perhaps because he was particularly concerned with New Zealand's trade arrangements 
with Australia, and with customs unions as instruments of development, Elkan's focus 
in outlining his proposals was regional rather than unilateral or multilateral. The 
drawback arrangements he proposed were to operate vis a vis trade between individual 
countries which had elected to join what he dubbed a 'customs-drawback-union'. 
Nevertheless he observed in a footnote the "logical possibility" that the arrangements he 
was proposing could also be introduced unilaterally by a country with respect to its trade 
in all directions (1965: 53). A variation on this 'logical possibility' was to find its way 
into the actual policy making of automotive protectionists in Australia in the automotive 
local content plans within six years of Elkan's article. Some years later a more liberal 
and thoroughgoing import/export link called the export facilitation scheme was 
introduced into the industry.
85
Chapter Four 'Intra-Industry Trade Policy' in the Sixties and Seventies
Ironically, as interest in the phenomenon of intra-industry trade grew within the 
economics profession, and as a number of countries such as Canada, Australia and the 
ASEAN countries explored variations on Elkan's proposals (see below), professional 
interest waned in the kind of intra-industry trade facilitation policy which Elkan had 
proposed. Virtually nothing of Elkan's proposals survived in the literature. Elkan's 
name was never mentioned by those participating in inquiries which considered export 
facilitation for the automotive industry - effectively a unilateral 'customs drawback 
union' in Elkan's terminology - and no-one cited any body of work devoted to the 
economic analysis of these kinds of instruments - for there was none. Despite, or 
perhaps because of its growing technical sophistication, the discipline never focused 
systematically on the meliorative themes suggested by Elkan's work. Some speculations 
as to why this could have been so are offered below.
4.4 Experience with Intra-Industry Trade
Facilitation Policies
The fundamental obstacle to production efficiency is the diseconomy of scale 
associated with production oriented to internal markets of limited size. 
Adjustment models must seek to overcome the scale disadvantage . . . 
through extending the size of the market. . . . [This] may be achieved 
through regionalism or specialized production for world markets.
World Bank Staff Occasional Paper, Baranson, 1969: 69
The following sub-sections explore various instruments used in the 1960s and 1970s to 
facilitate intra-industry-cum-intra-regional trade. The first four sub-sections explore 
intra-industry trade facilitation policies which were implemented at the regional level. 
The final section deals with the prominence of intra-industry trade facilitation in the 
successful developing countries whose experience inspired the new development 
consensus.
4.4.1 The Swedish Automotive Industry
The Swedish automotive industry had integrated itself with the European industry by 
virtue of its arrangements within the European Free Trade Area (EFTA). Like Australia, 
Sweden's automotive exports were negligible in 1950. But Sweden's exports had risen 
to 123,000 vehicles by 1967, or over 64 per cent of production (Rhys, 1972: 205). 
Most Swedish automotive exports went to Europe but nearly a third went to the United 
States (Swedish Embassy, 1994). Volvos and Saabs were successful on world markets 
because they were marketed into specific 'niches' where they held and/or could develop
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competitive advantages, and also because Sweden's free trade with Europe and its 
relatively low tariffs on imports from elsewhere enabled it to impose strong price and 
quality disciplines on its suppliers (Rhys, 1972: 205). In the early 1970s Volvo's 
imported content was between 35 and 40 per cent of total vehicle costs (Rhys, 1972: 
205).
4.4.2 The Bladen Plan and the Canada-US Auto Pact
[B]ilateralism between Canada and the United States may disappoint free
traders, but it is a great improvement upon the narrow unilateralism that can so
easily prevail.
Stubbs, 1972: 289
The relative success of Canadian automotive industry policy is of particular interest in 
comparison with Australian policy. Their industry, like the Australian industry was 
predominantly foreign owned and controlled. Their arrangements appear to be no less 
'interventionist' in form than Australia's plethora of plans. In 1961 Dean Bladen - 
constituting a one person Royal Commission - proposed a range of policy measures for 
the industry which embodied many of the themes which were a hallmark of automotive 
protectionism in Australia. As Australia was to do a few years later greater assembly 
activity would be encouraged by allowing assemblers limited volume access to imported 
components. As in Australia this effectively discriminated in favour of assemblers and 
against high local content producers who were less import intensive and so enjoyed less 
concessional treatment (Johnson, 1963, passim). The major difference between the 
Canadian and Australian local content plans was that the Canadians embraced an 
innovation which Commissioner Bladen had called 'extended content'. This permitted 
the 'local content' requirements of the plan to be met by production for export as well as 
by production for the domestic market. Because local content entitled producers to 
access to duty free imports the arrangements amount to the unilateral variant of those 
proposed by Elkan.
The US-Canada Auto Pact replaced the Bladen plan in 1965. Although some details of 
the previous plan were changed, the extended content arrangements of the earlier plan 
were essentially retained although they took on a bi-lateral form (Fuss and Waverman, 
1987: 218). In addition the producers committed to a 'safety net' for the Canadian 
industry according to which certain minimum production levels were guaranteed. Given 
that these were expressed in nominal terms (Maxcy, 1981: 246-7), inflation and 
economic growth would erode their significance as constraints. While hardly embracing 
a 'laissez faire' spirit, the arrangements did not subject firms' rationalisation programs to
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ad hoc administrative assessment. As Fuss and Waverman put it, the arrangements 
"allowed for (but did not mandate) the rationalization of North American production 
facilities" (1987: 219-20, also see Helleiner, 1981: 84). Accordingly, Canadian firms 
were free to plan cost reduction and intra-industry integration, subject to global 
constraints on the extent to which they could reduce total Canadian activity in the 
process. As Maxcy comments, "The effect on trade was spectacular" (1981: 249 see 
Table 4.1 below).
Tab le  4.1 U S-C anadian A utom otive Trade: Selected Years
1961-1975 (M illions of Canadian D ollars)
Canadian Imports 
from US
Canadian Exports Total US- 
to US Canada Trade
1961 CBUs 65.5 0.4
Components 292 8.8
Total 357.5 9.2
3 6 7
1965 CBUs 153.5 80.6
Components 797.9 150.2
Total 951.4 230.8
1 ,1 8 2
1973 CBUs 2,082 3,060
Components 3,553 2,171
Total 5,635 5,231
1 0 ,8 6 6
1975 CBUs 3,126 3,790
Components 4,522 2,045
Total 7,648 5,835
1 3 ,4 8 3
Source: Fuss and Waverman, 1987: 221
Despite criticisms of both the interventionism of the Canadian schemes and their export 
subsidy implicit in ’extended content’ (Johnson, 1963: 226), the inclusion of duty 
remission conditional on intra-industry trade appears to have significantly reduced the 
cost of what other interventions were pursued. As intra-industry trade increased 
between the two countries, from an exchange of 37,000 units in 1964 to 1,694 million 
by 1973, the firms also rationalised their production. GM, Ford and Chrysler all moved 
from producing several car-lines, to producing one (Fuss and Waverman, 1987: 222). 
Before tax, Canadian prices moved from being approximately 10 per cent above 
American prices in the early 1960s to being roughly equivalent to American prices. At 
the same time Canadian auto-workers’ wages caught up with those of their American
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counterparts (Maxcy, 1981: 249). More recent and more careful analysis has yielded a 
somewhat more pessimistic assessment. Fuss and Waverman conclude that there was a 
reduction in relative unit costs in Canada of seven per cent relative to the United States 
"due primarily to exploitation of economics of scale". On the other hand they found that 
the productivity gap between the two countries had not been closed, perhaps because of 
inadequate competitive pressure (Fuss and Waverman, 1992, 203). (Japanese imports 
were subject to voluntary export restraint while the Canadian firms were subsidiaries of 
American firms.) Even so, one may ask what would have happened without the auto 
pact. For the policy alternative in Canada at the time was not unilateral free trade in 
automobiles. While the Bladen plan and the auto pact were 'messy' and their objectives 
'protectionist' from the Canadian perspective (Fuss and Waverman, 1987: 218), the 
'extended content' arrangements common to both meant that protectionist objectives 
were achieved at what one may assume was a substantially lower cost than would 
otherwise have been the case.
4.4.3 The ASEAN Complementation Plan
In 1969 the United Nations Team Report on ASEAN proposed that ASEAN nations 
embrace 'regional complementation' or the duty free facilitation of intra-automotive- 
industry trade between member countries, a suggestion which was taken up by a meeting 
of private interests in the automotive industry within ASEAN in October 1971 (Soldium 
and Meow, 1987: 1). Proposals for an "ASEAN car" were initially given a euphoric 
reception. However, like previous attempts at regional integration between developing 
countries, they were the source of continuing disappointment. An earlier attempt at 
regional complementation under the aegis of the Latin American Free Trade Area 
(LAFTA) was already experiencing difficulties. Public officials were involved in 
managing trade liberalisation and co-ordinating the terms on which complementation 
would take place. ASEAN's original complementation scheme encountered serious 
difficulties for two reasons. Firstly the arrangements allowed for substantial 
bureaucratic oversight of the complementation decisions taken by firms, and countries 
within the scheme continued to pursue national rather than regional objectives. With 
different countries' automotive industries at different stages of development, countries 
with relatively backward automotive industries were suspicious of the extent to which 
intra-industry trade complementation might further concentrate development of the higher 
skill sectors of the industry in the more advanced countries (Hoppe, 1979: 13).
Also there was the problem of conflict between government objectives and perceptions 
and the corporate strategies of, and logistic possibilities open to, the trans-national
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corporations. The motivating vision of ASEAN complementation was provided by the 
idea of an "ASEAN car", which would require a high degree of co-ordination between 
firms which were otherwise fierce competitors. It envisaged that if, for instance, Toyota 
sought to invest in the market, it would produce (say) panels for Ford. The trans­
national corporations operating within ASEAN were far more capable of making 
arrangements involving rationalisation of activities within their own international 
networks than they were of participating in the inter-firm integration contemplated by 
ASEAN policy makers. Thus, for instance, the Philippines designated itself as a source 
for panels. This meant that, although Ford might earn credits by exporting Cortina 
panels from the Philippines, it could not use them to import complementary commercial 
vehicle panels from Thailand (Hoppe, 1979: 15). As time passed and disappointment set 
in, this 'part to part' complementation was gradually transformed into a moderately more 
successful 'brand to brand' complementation scheme which permitted intra-firm 
specialisation of various kinds, but again, generally subject to extensive bureaucratic 
oversight (Economist Intelligence Unit, 1985: 71).
4.4.4 Article 3.7 of NZAFTA
Although almost comprehensively ignored by academic economists, Elkan's work 
influenced the design of the New Zealand-Australia Free Trade Agreement (NZAFTA). 
Elkan's ideas were enshrined in Article 3.7 of NZAFTA which allowed each country to 
permit concessions on duty and quantitative restrictions to the other for cross trade 
(Templeton, 1969: 3). As Elkan had proposed, concessions were not restricted to trade 
within narrow industry categories. Nevertheless, and contrary to Elkan's proposals, 
approval was granted by government officials on a case by case basis. All the major 
Australian vehicle manufacturers participated under the arrangements. They typically 
used the concessions for trade within the automotive industry (IAC, PMVs, 1974: 213), 
however GMH was also able to use the scheme to facilitate white goods exports to 
Australia from its investments in New Zealand in return for vehicle exports from 
Australia to New Zealand (IAC, PMVs, 1974: 214).
Seventy projects had been approved by 1969, although the value of cross trade remained 
modest at an estimated NZ$6.6 million (Templeton, 1969: 3). Cross trade in automotive 
products under Article 3.7 grew strongly thereafter, to reach $22 million in 1973-4. Not 
surprisingly, given the concrete projects which could be identified as benefiting from the 
arrangement, it received the enthusiastic support of Ministers Anthony, McEwen and 
Cairns. Nevertheless correspondence on IAC files indicates that the arrangements were 
not seen by firms as providing security of market access (IAC archives 3/3/21). And as
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one might expect, on occasion Article 3.7 proved vulnerable to domestic political 
lobbying. Thus in 1980 Australian officials refused to allow concessional entry to 
aluminium wheels from New Zealand under apparent political pressure from Australian 
wheel manufacturers (AFR, 17th July, 1980: 14).
4.5 The Australian Automotive Industry and Intra-
Industry Trade Facilitation
4.5.1 Regional Complementation and Australia's Automotive 
Industry
Given the importance of economies of scale it is not surprising that multinational 
corporations in the automotive industry considered the idea of 'world-wide sourcing' as 
early as 1960 (Stubbs, 1972: 79). Ironically Stubbs' narrative of the introduction of the 
local content plans suggests that the local content scheme may have been partly in 
response to the 'threat' of imports which world wide sourcing provided (1972: 79).
The early seventies saw increasing interest in regional intra-industry trade for Ford's and 
GM's Asia-Pacific bases in Australia. In early 1971 GMH's Marketing Director, John 
Bagshaw, suggested that he did not think that a dilution of the 95 per cent local content 
requirement was necessary or desirable. "But I think this will be the area where industry 
discussions will have to take place otherwise we won't be able to maximise our exports 
into some of the developing areas" (A/M, 6th April, 1971: 6). Bagshaw commented 
further that GMH was receiving a variety of requests such as the Singaporean request for 
GMH to import more Singaporean components to earn licences to import more vehicles 
for assembly in Singapore. (Singapore was using an import/export link to give export 
orientation to its [then] protected automotive industry and to influence the sourcing 
decisions of foreign firms.) "There's going to be more and more . . . 'parts 
swapping'" commented Bagshaw (A/M, 6th April, 1971: 6). In mid 1972 it appeared 
that the ASEAN countries were exploring the possibility of participating with Australia, 
New Zealand, Taiwan and South Korea in automotive manufacture and complementation 
(AFR, 19th April, 1972: 1).
4.5.2 Ford Proposes Regional Complementation
An important participant in the development of the Australian export credit scheme was 
William (Bill) Hartigan - an Australian who had gone from customs administration to 
Ford (Australia) in 1963 and had since been an executive within Ford at various 
locations around the world. In 1971 he was Staff Director, Business Development
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within the then newly formed Ford Asia-Pacific and South Africa Inc, the Ford Motor 
Company's Australian based regional headquarters. He wrote what the trade magazine 
Automotive Industry Matters called a "very significant" paper proposing the 
establishment of a 'common market' in automotive products within the Asian region 
(26th October, 1971: 2). He suggested that "[W]ith labour intensive industries 
established in Asia, they should be given free access to the Australian market, in 
exchange for preferential access to the developing countries' markets to the extent of the 
foreign exchange generated" (Australia International, January 1971: 9). He argued that 
Australia was ideally placed to initiate action towards the implementation of such an 
approach: "[T]he circumstances and timing could not be better" {AIM, 26th October, 
1971: 2). He was proposing intra-regional intra-industry trade liberalisation via a 
regional import/export link - precisely what Elkan had suggested.
When Anthony's export credit scheme was announced at the end of 1971 (see § 2.4 
above) trade sources gave Bill Hartigan much of the credit {Automotive Industry 
Matters, 18th January 1972: 2). For the brief duration of its first incarnation - from 
1972 till 1976 - the usefulness of the new approach was profoundly retarded by the 
nature of its parentage. The administrative detail of the export credit scheme placed it 
well and truly within the tradition of Australian protectionism. The scheme expanded the 
administrators' armory of weapons to entice industry participants to increase their local 
investment at the same time as avoiding any concomitant structural adjustment within the 
industry. The export credit plan was touted as something which was "aimed at long term 
rationalisation and the maximisation of through-put from capital intensive facilities and 
the fostering of regional trade" (IAC, PMVs, 1974: Appendix Six: 26, § 8{ 1}). Yet it 
was hemmed in with the same policy intent implicit in the non-reversion rule and similar 
rules which encouraged firms to increase their local content but all but forbade them from 
ever decreasing it.38 As Michael Aiken from Automotive Industry Matters put it,
38 Credits were to be available "only to approved new export projects of a continuing beneficial nature". 
They were not available for "short-term commercial trade or for exports of an established nature" (Motor 
Vehicle Plans, Appendix Six of IAC, PMVs, 1974: 26, §8 {1}). The scheme applied to intra-industry 
trade only within the region (Martec, 1976, § 4.6: 1). Where vehicles were exported they were required 
to have an acceptable level of local content (IAC, PMVs, 1974, Appendix 6, §8 {2} {b }). Credits could 
only be used to import for the purposes of meeting local content under the 95% and 85% local content 
plans (§8 {2} {c}). The local content benefit to accrue would be limited to 10% subject to review from 
time to time (§8 {2} {d}). Proposals for export projects were required to be "set out in full detail and 
[were] to outline the resulting implications for sourcing of components and purchases from local 
suppliers" (§8 {2} {f}). Those proposals would be approved or rejected on a "case by case" basis, (§8 {2}
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"protection of the supply status quo is more important than exports . . . 
Rationalisation on an international scale is apparently viewed by the Government to be a 
rather dangerous experiment" (A/M, 30th May, 1972: 2).
4.6 Intra-Industry Trade, Intra-Industry Trade 
Facilitation and the Corpus of Normative 
Economics
Ward detects a tendency in modem 'formalist' economics to judge the merit of a 
particular piece of work by the cleverness of its technique and not the social 
value, nor even [its] intrinsic scientific value. . . . Students absorb this 
standard of professional quality and the accompanying definition of what 
constitutes a good research topic. They look for theorems, not solutions to 
problems. There is much truth in that observation. I know of no serious 
attempt to understand why it happens and how one could move to something 
better.
Robert Solow, cited in Samuels, 1980: 93
This section argues that important leads for policy were ignored by economists and 
makes some suggestions as to how this might have happened. Certainly Solow's 
observations above seem borne out. Yet even before the rise of formalism in intra­
industry trade theory in the 1980s, economic reputations were gained by those focusing 
on the classic themes of economics - particularly the free trade versus intervention 
dichotomy - even though these scholars seem to have been inattentive to the possibilities 
being presented in the empirical detail. In addition it seems that those participants in the 
debate more inclined to free trade may have suffered from 'anti-mercantilistic bias' (c/ 
§ 1.2.2 above). Peter Lloyd seems to have dismissed Elkan's proposals in large part 
because of their protectionist motivation and because Elkan's elaboration of them 
appeared to Lloyd to embrace an elementary mercantilist fallacy. As a consequence 
liberal economists such as Lloyd tended to talk past those proposing innovations. They 
thus avoided the opportunity which discussion posed for mutual adjustment - and of 
course mutual benefit. By way of introductory caveat however, it should be stressed 
that if people ignore something sufficiently comprehensively, it will often be difficult to
{e}) and would "not be approved if not insubstantial injury to established local component suppliers 
would be likely to result from such an approval" (§8 {2} {g }). These restrictions and the rule in the 
December 1971 plan revisions which prevented vehicle manufacturers from reducing the local content of 
their major (highest local content) car line meant that the benefits of the export credit scheme were 
limited to manufacturers with more than one model in local manufacture, through the option to transfer 
credits to another model" (Martec, 1972: § 3.15).
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detect from their utterances their reasons for so doing. The public record offers only a 
few clues as to why the opportunity for theorising intra-industry trade policy was not 
seized. Therefore explaining the cause of disciplinary failure can only be done much 
more tentatively than expounding what that failure was.
4.6.1 Why was Elkan Ignored?
It is nice to know that, after a delay of almost thirty years, someone has 
discovered my work. I am not writing 'rediscovered', because my paper 
attracted no attention whatever at the time. And this was the case with all my 
writings. On the whole I had no undue difficulty in getting my articles accepted 
by reputable journals, but once published they seemed to sink without trace: 
they were never quoted and never discussed, . . . [the] comment of Lloyd 
which you mentioned being the only exception known to me. . . .  I can only 
guess as to the reason why.
Peter Elkan, Personal Correspondence with the author, 14th March 1994
Elkan's proposals disappeared more because of neglect than satisfactory challenge. 
Peter Lloyd offered the only response to Elkan's proposals which appeared in the 
literature. Given the brevity of Lloyd's comments - spanning only a few sentences - it is 
a little unfair to subject him to extensive critique. Nevertheless, it is worth dwelling on 
Lloyd's few words because they provide clues as to why Elkan's proposals lacked 
appeal to his professional peers. And they provide an insight into a lost opportunity in 
economics, a vignette of the way in which, as argued in Chapter One, poor conversation 
produces poor science and poor policy. Lloyd strongly disagreed with Elkan's 
pessimism about the prospects for manufactured exports from small countries (Lloyd, 
1968: 107). In this, history has probably vindicated Lloyd. Yet Lloyd's preoccupation 
with resisting Elkan's protectionist motives foreclosed more exploratory discussion 
about how Elkan's innovations might be used for liberal purposes. Had Lloyd engaged 
less adversarially with Elkan he might have developed his own objections more fully, 
and in the process contributed to improving Elkan's ideas - and of course, his own.
Lloyd argued that Elkan's proposals were cumbersome, that their "conditional nature" 
would increase uncertainty, and that his proposals envisaged "balanced bilateral trade for 
commodity groups" (Lloyd, 1968: 117). Lloyd's points are taken in turn below. 
Australian experience with export facilitation demonstrates that, certainly in their 
unilateralist form, Elkan's proposals were not cumbersome to administer. Export 
facilitation is administratively simple - dramatically more so than traditional export 
drawback. Where traditional export drawback arrangements consume significant 
resources in policing the requirement that imports be physically incorporated into exports
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(IAC, "Concessions", 1987: 12), an import/export link operates solely on information 
available as goods pass through customs. For a large vehicle manufacturer the existing 
import/export link for the Australian automotive industry has administrative costs of 
approximately .02 per cent of revenue foregone and less than .01 per cent of turnover for 
both government administrators and major exporters.39
The regional discrimination of Elkan's principal proposals may have added to their 
complexity, although it is not clear that this would have created significant problems. In 
contemporary practice, customs services routinely, and one presumes relatively 
inexpensively, discriminate between imports depending on their country of origin to 
provide developing country preferences and to give effect to obligations under various 
international agreements such as the GATT. Elkan's proposals required customs 
services in participating countries to discriminate not only between imports from 
different origins, but also between exports to different destinations. It would be easier to 
accept Lloyd's suggestion that Elkan's arrangements were 'cumbersome' had he 
deliberated on the matter in this way and come to a reasoned conclusion.
Lloyd's argument that Elkan's proposals increased uncertainty by making duty 
remissions 'conditional' is also hard to accept. Duty drawback on exports is also 
'conditional' but it is hard to see how this conditionality increases uncertainty. Lloyd 
may have envisaged that duty remissions would be subject to administrative discretion 
which would have increased uncertainty, although this was not suggested by Elkan. 
Alternatively, Lloyd may have been considering the fact that Elkan envisaged a market 
developing in export credits. This may have generated some uncertainty, but that 
uncertainty is analogous to the price uncertainty inherent in most markets. Given that the 
market for export credits would have been relatively deep - because it operated over 
broad commodity classes - it is unlikely that it would have been intolerably volatile. As a 
matter of fact, the price of export credits under the current Australian automotive export 
facilitation scheme has been stable since the scheme was substantially deregulated in 
1991 (personal communication with officer of the AIA).
The last of Lloyd's arguments offers a casual refutation of the commonsensical naivete 
of proposing "balanced bilateral trade for commodity groups" by pointing out that 
countries and policy makers may have a legitimate interest in the state of the overall trade 
balance, but not in the balance of trade within industries. In his apparent eagerness to
39 Calculations from figures provided in personal communication with Australian Customs officials in 
the Automotive Plan Administration Section in Melbourne, and a major Australian vehicle 
manufacturer, 23rd March 1994.
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puncture the fallacy in this piece of economic naturalism, Lloyd fails to notice that Elkan 
does not advocate it. Elkan does point out that, under certain assumptions his system 
"could be expected to produce . . . pressures towards the maintenance of balance in the 
exports and imports of each member country in each major commodity class", and he 
clearly regards this as healthy in the context of the article (1965: 57 emphasis added). 
Elkan does illustrate his proposals with an example which is offered approvingly of bi­
lateral trade balance within a customs-drawback-union. But it is far from clear that he is 
advocating that balanced bilateral trade either within commodity classes or more widely 
be mandated within customs-drawback-unions.
Lloyd may have been right to have been skeptical of Elkan's concern about the potential 
of traditional trade liberalisation to generate increasing and immiserising inter-industry 
trade specialisation for small countries. He may even have been right to have interpreted 
Elkan to be advocating balanced trade within commodity classes - although I think it 
unlikely. But neither objection exhausts the relevance of Elkan's innovations. Whatever 
the motivations of their originator, the arrangements offered an administrative tool with 
which one could systematically discriminate between intra-industry and inter-industry 
trade expansion and liberalisation with a view to optimising trade creation wherever it 
was desired/possible according to the opportunities or constraints one faced. Lloyd was 
in substantial agreement with Elkan that, for small countries, "[gjains from increased 
specialisation within plants and industries when a customs union increases the size of the 
market . . . could be substantial" (Lloyd, 1968: 110). As he conceded, Elkan's 
innovations provided a means by which these gains could be enjoyed (1968: 117). And 
although Elkan's objective was to "hinder, or at least limit" inter-industry trade, as Elkan 
himself pointed out, his instruments could be tailored to operate in the presence of any 
degree of inter-industry trade (1965: 57-8).
Like a number of critiques of similar proposals to be encountered in subsequent 
chapters, Lloyd's critique offers a powerful illustration of profligacy of dialogue as 
contest. It forecloses the degree of openness which is so often necessary to grasp the 
manipulative opportunities which good science and good policy require. As Elkan was 
at some pains to demonstrate, his ideas were offered in a protean form with meliorative 
and so fluid rather than peremptory intent. But Lloyd's critique oriented itself around its 
disagreements with Elkan and so forsook the opportunities which would have been 
available from dialogue as cooperation. Lloyd appears anxious that Elkan proposed to 
introduce a constraint on trade liberalisation - namely a constraint on the extent of inter-
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industry trade liberalisation involved in a customs union; yet this is not intrinsic to the 
proposals.40
However Lloyd's concern invests Elkan's proposals with the protectionism of their 
author when this is doubly unnecessary. Firstly, it is unnecessary because, for all 
instruments of partial trade liberalisation, whether they liberalise trade sufficiently is in 
the eye of the beholder. By providing the means to administratively separate intra­
industry and inter-industry trade liberalisation, Elkan's proposals might provide the 
means to expand trade far more than would otherwise be the case - where for instance 
there were political or other obstacles to greater inter-industry trade liberalisation. 
Secondly, it is unnecessary because Elkan's proposals are essentially independent of 
inter-industry trade liberalisation which, as Elkan pointed out,41 can proceed alongside 
his proposals. Nothing prevents them being combined with greater inter-industry trade 
liberalisation by way of traditional trade liberalisation measures. Indeed Elkan devoted 
an entire section to "accommodating complementary [inter-industry] trade". Here he 
explained that his preceding exegesis of the workings and argued benefits of his 
proposals assumed that, before the customs-drawback-union was formed, "the 
composition of the mutual exports of the member countries was fairly similar and the 
problem was to prevent its becoming dissimilar in the future". As this assumption is 
relaxed, Elkan explains that the arrangements can be tailored to suit specific 
circumstances. They can be tailored to suit some members' continuing high levels of 
complementary specialisation in primary products, either on a temporary or permanent 
basis, as they can be tailored to other priorities including progressive trade liberalisation 
( 1965: 57-8).
40 As part of his critique of Elkan's proposals, Lloyd cites Balassa's criticism of customs unions in 
Latin America. The arrangements criticised by Balassa appear to have required trade to balance between 
individual members of a customs union in the interests of "reciprocity". As Balassa pointed out that 
"the emphasis on equilibrium in inter-area trade appears to be misdirected, however, since it puts an 
additional constraint on the flow of international trade. As long as each nation's balance-of-payments 
with all other countries, taken together, is in equilibrium, it matters little whether they have a surplus or 
a deficit in intra-area trade" (Balassa, 1965: 120).
41 Elkan points this out with regard to further liberalisation towards customs unions (1965: 58) as this 
was the principal subject of his paper, but the same is clearly true of further unilateral trade liberalisation 
by way of tariff cuts.
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4.6.2 Elkan Reinvented?
Export promotion may also be more efficient in permitting rapid expansion of 
profitable activities. . . .  In this view, potential export lines consist of a 
number of industrial products - girls sneakers, wigs, tennis rackets, engine 
parts, plywood, and so on - and it is as much a matter of the right entrepreneur, 
and the right specialised product, as choosing the ’right industry’ that is 
necessary for rapid growth.
Anne Krueger, 1980: 5
Elkan’s ideas were sufficiently good that it was necessary to re-invent them. Ironically 
one of the re-inventors was Peter Lloyd. Nevertheless when re-invention occurred, the 
clarity which Elkan had offered about policy design was absent. Commentators were 
more explicit about the kind of economic development they felt should be facilitated than 
they were about the actual policy instruments necessary to facilitate such an outcome. In 
1975 Grubel and Lloyd deliberated briefly on "Development Strategies" in their book on 
Intra-Industry Trade. Noting that import substitution often severely limited the size of 
the market in developing countries, they approvingly noted proposals to establish 
"regional production facilities" such that countries in a region could each host some such 
facilities which would then swap their produce assisted by "duty free access of the 
industry's output in all countries of the region" (1975: 145). They continued that the 
"concrete policies" implied by their analysis suggested that countries should develop 
capabilities in narrow product lines of specific style and performance characteristics 
"while permitting the import free, or under much lower protection, of other commodities 
of the same industries" (1975: 147). Grubel and Lloyd also suggested automotive 
industry policies which encouraged specialisation within global networks rather than the 
more usual aspirations towards domestic sectoral self sufficiency (Grubel and Lloyd, 
1975: 146-7).
Despite their promise to spell out "concrete policies" - the institutional arrangements 
which might facilitate such development and trade - Grubel and Lloyd offered nothing 
further. It is therefore unclear precisely how they proposed to realise the intra-industry 
trade facilitation of which they spoke. However the most systematic attempt to do so 
had already been offered a decade before by Elkan. His proposals offered the means 
with which to systematise - both intellectually and operationally - intra-industry trade 
facilitation/liberalisation in the presence of continuing protective arrangements. Elkan 
had shown how his own arrangements would produce precisely the kind of intra­
industry trade and specialisation to which Grubel and Lloyd were referring - indeed they 
had been devised largely with this in mind. One of his illustrative examples showed
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how his arrangements would facilitate precisely the kind of intra-industry specialisation 
in automotive production of which Grubel and Lloyd later spoke (Elkan, 1965: 55). But 
after Lloyd's dismissal of Elkan's ideas in 1968, neither Elkan's name nor his proposals 
were ever mentioned again in academic discussion, even for the purpose of disputing 
their worth (see head quotation § 4.6.1).
4.6.3 'Intra-Industry Trade Policy', Trade Liberalisation and
'Lessons' from Developing Countries
[T]he ground for the 1960s transformation to export orientation was broken 
some five to six years earlier - that is, before it could be realised how beneficial 
the transformation of policy begun with the customs rebate would prove to be. 
When the liberalisation efforts were made, no one had any inkling that a more 
prosperous growth epoch was in the making. The early efforts were not 
ideologically motivated by any clear vision of the advantages of externally 
oriented growth, and there was only a vague awareness of the benefits of 
comparative advantage. The late 1950s reform measures were adopted for a 
pragmatic reason, namely to reduce reliance on American aid and to solve the 
problems of unemployment and foreign exchange shortages.
Taiwanese Minister Li, 1988: 135
The instruments which appear to facilitate intra-industry trade and specialisation within 
industries have existed for many years. The new development literature documented the 
fact that policy to ameliorate the intra-industry trade suppressing effects of traditional 
protection was widespread in developing countries. Little et al noted the dramatic 
expansion of Taiwanese exports "based largely on imported materials" and the 
accompanying system of rebating import duties on inputs to export (1970: 254-5). 
Balassa et al documented export drawback systems in Chile, Mexico, Pakistan and the 
Philippines (1971 see index). And the Bhagwati/Krueger-directed study noted that 
import concessions under quantitative restriction regimes were frequently linked to 
export performance in a variety of ways. To the above list of countries the 
Bhagwati/Krueger study added India, South Korea, and Columbia (Bhagwati, 1978: 
24). Economists may have played some role in the origination and implementation of 
these instruments (eg see Haggard, 1990: 99), but the new approach owed much to 
exploratory and pragmatic adaptation to the exigencies of economic development in 
difficult circumstances (see head quote above).
The earlier new development literature did not stress the importance of duty drawback 
instruments. Nevertheless, by the mid 1980s the importance of 'free trade for exporters' 
had become a 'lesson' from East Asian success, and one which was strongly oriented
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around the free markets versus intervention dichotomy. Balassa argued with more 
boldness than the more qualified original studies, that Korea and Taiwan had applied a 
"free trade regime . . .  to exports" (Balassa, 1989, "Adjustment": 2 also see Krueger, 
1985: 208). This is drawing a long bow. There were plenty of exporters in both Korea 
and Taiwan who were not given duty free access to inputs (Wade, 1990: 140, Luedde- 
Neurath, 1986, Chapter Two). Nevertheless this interpretation of one theme of Korean 
and Taiwanese trade and development policies was useful in the same way and for the 
same reasons that Hicks' assumption of perfect competition was useful: the liberties it 
took with the truth may not have been too great, and if so, there were large pay-offs 
from the generalisation. Balassa's interpretation of Asian development success offers 
more general, robust and useful implications - and ones which are more easily 
accommodated into the existing economic corpus than many which emerge from 
alternative approaches. In this case, Balassa's generalisation permitted him and others 
like Krueger to argue for the importance of instruments such as duty drawback in 
allowing "ready access to the international market for whatever purchases [exporters] 
may require" (Krueger, 1985: 208).
4.6.4 Intra-Industry Trade Theory, New Development
Consensus and the Corpus of Normative Economics
A much employed, yet seldom studied instrument of international trade policy is 
export drawback.
Mark Herander, 1986: 43
Despite the recent proliferation of free trade zones little effort has been made to 
apply trade theory to this phenomenon.
Kaz Miyagiwa, 1986: 338
Chapter One argued that modern economics tends to be too polarised between 'free 
trade' in 'intervention' and that it both overvalues the benefits and undervalues the costs 
of formalism. In this context intra-industry trade 'theory' provides an illustrative 
vignette. As is the case with its disciplinary cousin, strategic trade theory, the normative 
significance of the new modelling work is frequently discussed only in terms of its 
implications for the old debate between free trade and protection (eg Greenaway, 1985). 
And when thinking about intra-industry trade moved from the suggestive informality of 
the 1970s to a burgeoning of formal modelling in the 1980s, not only was there a barren 
harvest of useful new insights for policy, some of the older insights seemed to slip 
further from view.
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In 1974 Corden embraced the conjunction of the 'optimal intervention’ and 'new 
development' literatures in arguing that subsidies were 'first best' intervention and 
commenting on the costs of the 'home market bias' associated with tariffs (see § 3.4.1 
above and 1974: 4, 24). By 1984 Corden was commenting on the difficulties which 
formalism encounters with scale economies and imperfect competition . . . "The search 
for simple general principles and for clear results that do not depend on very special 
cases is still under-way" (1984: 77). Yet in the new development literature, scale 
economies had been taken to strengthen the case against tariffs which was established in 
the first place by the principles of optimal intervention.
Greenaway's mid 1980s survey of the normative implications of the new sub-discipline 
of intra-industry trade theory is similar to its disciplinary cousin - strategic trade theory - 
in its orientation around the free trade versus 'intervention' dichotomy and its ultimate 
ambivalence about policy. Commenting that some models of intra-industry trade suggest 
that tariffs can increase welfare, Greenaway does add that generally in these instances the 
tariff is actually correcting a domestic distortion. He comments that if so, other policies - 
particularly subsidies - could usually correct the domestic distortion at lower cost (1985: 
87-8, 90). Again, this is the essential insight of the new development consensus. 
Nevertheless having made this observation Greenaway proceeds to retreat back into 
ambivalence. He warns against any generalisations, including the conclusion that 
subsidies are generally superior to tariffs (1985: 96).
Certainly the new intra-industry trade literature showed virtually no interest in 
ameliorating the intra-industry trade suppression entailed by existing protection despite 
the widespread existence of such policies. I have not found any analysis or even 
sustained discussion of the instruments of what I have called 'intra-industry trade policy' 
in this literature. The plausibility of the 'new development consensus' meliorative case 
for replacing protection with promotion was thus obscured within the rigours of the new 
formalism.
For all its persuasiveness and plausibility, the 'new development consensus' had 
virtually no impact on the disciplinary corpus of the normative economics of trade 
liberalisation. While debate raged as to whether developing country success had been 
due to the success of 'free trade', 'free markets' or 'intervention', there was much more 
limited attention to the policies which the successful countries used to expand trade. As 
Luedde-Neurath put it in 1986, a preoccupation with the polarities of the protection 
debate seemed to have come at the cost of practical advice. " [Relatively little is known 
. . . about the art of intervention in trade. Most studies condemn or support it, but
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have little practical advice to offer on how an LDC [less developed country] might gain 
the benefits and avoid the pitfalls of opting for trade controls" (1986: 181).
Many developing countries keen to participate in product cycle and intra-industry trade 
pioneered the instruments of intra-industry trade facilitation. Those instruments included 
duty drawback schemes which went beyond simple export drawback towards 
arrangements such as Elkan had suggested and also export processing zones (EPZs). 
Some fairly limited normative economic analysis of both export processing zones and 
duty drawback mechanisms exists in the economic literature (Warr, 1989; Grossman, 
1982; Herander, 1986). Other instruments, such as Elkan's import/export links have 
gone all but totally neglected. And in the corpus of normative economic theory, there 
has been little attention given to the way in which these new instruments might refine the 
specification of worthwhile trade liberalisation paths. Whilst significant attention has 
been paid to the trade restrictionism of the 'new protection' such as voluntary export 
restraints (VERs) in the West, there has been less attention given to those trade 
expanding instruments whose position on the 'free trade' versus 'intervention' spectrum 
is more ambiguous.42 In his book on The Economics of Protection, a "comprehensive 
overview of the theory of protection" (1990: xii), Neil Vousden provides elaborate 
treatment of the traditional economic analysis of protection and trade liberalisation and 
lengthy discussion of the recent innovation of VERs without so much as mentioning 
EPZs, duty drawback or import export links.
4.7 A Concluding Taxonomy of Intra-Industry
Trade Facilitation Policies
This chapter can usefully be summarised in the following table which offers a taxonomy 
of intra-industry trade liberalisation strategies. Firstly, intra-industry trade liberalisation 
can occur as a result of traditional trade liberalisation - either unilateral or regional. It can 
also be achieved on an ad hoc, sectoral basis between countries which may not otherwise 
be engaged in preferential regional trade arrangements, as Kojima and Drysdale 
suggested. And then there are the instruments of intra-industry trade liberalisation which 
operate in the presence of traditional protection. These exempt those engaging in intra-
42 Thus for instance, by the mid 1980s VERs had come under "intensive study" (Corden, 1985, p. 2). 
The "ECONLIT" Database to September 1993 lists 72 items on VERs. It lists 43 items discussing 
'export processing zones', 'duty free zones' or 'free trade zones' several of which concern free trade areas or 
customs unions between rather than within countries. It lists one article each on duty drawback, duty 
remission and import/export links (the latter is in fact an article on import/export requirements - 
Herander and Thomas, 1986).
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industry trade from duty. They include traditional instruments such as export drawback 
and more modem innovations such as EPZs. They also include import/export links as 
proposed by Elkan. It is worth noting that where the table cites actual examples of intra­
industry trade liberalisation mediated by private agents, those episodes tended to be 
successful. Where extensive administrative mediation by the state was involved, the 
success of intra-industry trade liberalisation was often limited.
Table 4.2 In tra-Industry Trade Facilitation Policies
Co-ordination Mechanism
Intra-industry trade 
liberalisation
Administrative Market mediation of
oversight of firms comparative costs
Intra-industry trade liberalisation as a consequence of traditional 
trade liberalisation
With traditional trade 
liberalisation
As part of more 
comprehensive regional 
trade liberalisation
• No examples • Tariff reduction leading to
intra-industry trade 
expansion
• No examples • Sweden's free trade
Agreement with the EEC
Variations on traditional trade liberalisation to facilitate intra­
industry trade
Traditional trade 
liberalisation targeted 
towards non-traditional 
(intra-industry) trade 
expansion
• No examples
• Kojima's suggestions for 
greater 'horizontal trade' 
between developed Asia- 
Pacific economies
• Drysdale's proposal for 
sectoral free trade between 
Japan and Australia.
Intra-industry trade liberalisation in the presence of traditional 
trade barriers
Non-traditional trade • Export credits in • Export duty drawback
liberalisation (duty 
remission)
Australian local 
content scheme • EPZs in developing countries
Unilateral/Multilateral • Some
import/export links • Elkan's footnote
in developing • Canadian 'extended
countries content', Australian export 
facilitation
Bilateral/Regional • Article 3.7 of • Elkan's proposals for
NZAFTA customs-drawback-unions.
• ASEAN • The US-Canada Auto-Pact
'part to part' 
complementation
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5 The Economics of Trade Liberalisation: 
Reform Principles, Priorities and Paths
[The] idea of a sequential order of policies of course also entails the notion of 
policy priority in the liberalisation process.
Gustav Ranis, commenting on Minister Li's description of the Taiwanese 
development experience, in Li, 1988: 23
As previous chapters have argued, economists' perspectives on trade liberalisation have 
been (and continue to be) unnecessarily constrained by a focus on the direct dismantling 
of trade restrictions and a consequent neglect of other liberalisation options, particularly 
concessional instruments. This chapter sketches out a much wider arena of 'new trade 
liberalisation' within which the economics and political economy of the new instruments 
might be considered. This allows the discussion of trade liberalisation priorities - 
something which has been largely absent from the literature. This in turn enables a 
consideration of the merits of import/export links, such as the Australian export credit 
scheme (see § 4.5.2), as trade liberalising instruments. The chapter accordingly 
concludes by discussing some of the arguments for and against the automotive export 
credits scheme in the Australian automotive industry in the early 1970s.
5.1 The Economics of Import Concessions
Another matter . . .  is the availability to domestic industries of materials and 
components at or near world prices.
IAC, 1973-74, Annual Report: 19
This and the following section sketch a canvass which incorporates the instruments of 
'concessional trade liberalisation', into orthodox economic thinking on trade 
liberalisation. In a sense the analysis has already begun with the definition of 
'concessional trade liberalisation'. One can proceed to define the archetypal concession 
as an entitlement to import which overrides existing official trade barriers. As will be 
shown below, it is possible to imagine 'concessional trade liberalisation' of a sufficiently 
'pure' form that it reduces to one of the two sanctioned reform rules, top down and 
across the board reform. And in more 'selective' forms, import concessions offer means 
of focusing trade liberalisation around particular trade expansion/liberalisation 
opportunities and priorities.
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One can imagine 'pure' import concessions of at least two kinds. A 'value concession' 
would entitle the holder to import a certain value of imports. Alternatively what will be 
called a 'duty paid concession' would stand in lieu of a certain quantum of duty paid at 
customs. Assuming that, once allocated, these concessions are transferable and that 
firms buying them are perfect competitors,43 then an expansion of concessions to the 
point at which they are in oversupply will lower their price. This produces the following 
results:
Proposition 1.1: 'Value concessions' will be used to import those goods
which, in the absence of such concessions, would be the most costly to 
import. Accordingly, where the price of such concessions falls, top 
down trade reform is the result.
Proposition 1.2: 'Duty paid concessions' will be used where they reduce
the cost of paying duty. Accordingly, where the price of such 
concessions falls, the cost of paying any given amount of tariff duty will 
fall. If all trade restrictions are tariffs, this produces equi-proportional 
across the board tariff reform.
As has been case with tariff reform generally, actual episodes of reform are 'messier' 
than any 'ideal type' of reform can generally afford to contemplate. It is possible to 
characterise the gamut of instruments of 'new trade liberalisation’ as examples of import 
concessions which have been constrained in various ways. Such constraints include:
• limitations on the imports to which concessions apply
• limitations on their transferability and/or
• requiring firms to do something - such as invest or export - in return for 
concessions.
This complicates the analysis of the effects of such instruments. Be that as it may, a 
mosaic of instruments have been used in developing countries. To many of these 
instruments it is possible to attach some trade liberalising 'rationale'. Concessional 
instruments can provide the policy maker with a menu of options which accelerate the 
trade liberalisation path in given situations in certain ways. Trade barriers discriminate 
against a wide range of identifiable entities in an economy. They discriminate against 
certain industries, export activities within industries, and certain firms and regions. 
Accordingly particular trade expansion cum development opportunities may be evident 
within firms, industries or regions. Partial import concessions can target the removal of
43 Applying the Coase Theorem, it may be assumed that the method of allocation has no effect on 
resource allocation where holders and buyers of concessions are perfect competitors and concessions are 
freely transferable. Unless otherwise specified, these assumptions are generally made throughout.
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any of these undesired effects as a priority in a trade liberalisation and development 
strategy, in each case with differing and complex effects on trade creation and trade 
diversion and so welfare.
5.2 A Taxonomy of Trade Liberalisation Paths
[P]olicymakers have something on their side. Recall that deficit spending as an 
instrument to create employment preceded the General Theory. Economists 
should be a little more cautious in assuming that policy wisdom is necessarily 
on their side. In the area of trade policy I . . . doubt whether we are 
immensely smarter than the policy-makers.
Jagdish Bhagwati commenting on North East Asian protection policies, 1973, 
cited in Kenan, 1975: 513
The table appearing below explores the deep symmetries between traditional tariff 
dismantling and 'concessional' or 'new trade liberalisation'. In the case of each possible 
path of reform (Column One) the following propositions clearly hold:
Proposition 2.1 A partial trade liberalisation measure may or may not lead 
to a net liberalisation of trade, depending on the nature of the action and 
its context.
Proposition 2.2 Where the complexity of actual economies and existing 
policies are taken into account, there are likely to be both welfare 
improving and welfare impairing aspects of most if not all available 
measures in the case of each type of partial trade liberalisation.44 (These 
ideas were explored by Viner in the customs union literature by way of 
the concepts of trade creation and trade diversion.)
Proposition 2.3 As has been done with customs unions and the direct tariff 
reduction, 'rules of thumb' can be found to indicate what reforms are 
likely to promote welfare and in what circumstances. Some rules of
44 Thus with tops down tariff reform, some of the gains from cutting assistance to the industry 
receiving the highest level of assistance will be enjoyed by the next most highly assisted industry. The 
reduced size of the rationalised industry will improve welfare (and create trade) whilst the increased size of 
the next most assisted industry will reduce welfare (and divert trade). Generally, however, the first effect 
is concentrated, whilst the second effect is diluted, producing the net gains which are usually associated 
with tops down reform. Given standard neoclassical assumptions, equi-proportional tariff reduction will 
generally produce unambiguous gross welfare gains without any gross losses (Vousden, 1990: 209). 
However the confidence with which one may assume that either of the two orthodox reform rules will 
produce unambiguous welfare gains must wane as the standard neoclassical assumptions are relaxed 
(Vousden, 1990: 210).
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thumb which could be applied to import/export links (Row Two) are 
outlined below and in Gruen (1991).
Proposition 2.4 In the case of each of the partial reform paths, it is possible 
to envisage further arrangements which would, without recourse to any of 
the other complementary instruments, take the economy completely to free 
trade (Column Five).45
Proposition 2.5 If follows from proposition 2.4 that the instruments of 
both 'traditional' and 'concessional' trade liberalisation can complement 
each other, and so, where there is uncertainty, add to the confidence with 
which a given composite reform path can be expected to lead to net trade 
liberalisation.46
Proposition 2.6 In addition to complementing each other, different 
instruments may also facilitate each other. The instruments will generally 
lower costs for the industries, regions, firms for which they liberalise 
trade. If reform cannot proceed faster than is consistent with a certain rate 
of growth, decline or level of activity within a region, firm or industry, 
then lowering its costs may increase the rate at which other liberalisation 
measures may be implemented.
The strength of propositions 2.4 and 2.5 in the argument for at least considering 
pluralistic approaches to trade liberalisation should be apparent. Proposition 2.4 drives 
home the point that the differences between the different instruments in trade 
liberalisation are differences in the path trade liberalisation takes. It also shows how 
misleading it can be to refer to the orthodox reform rules as 'first best' and heterodox 
approaches as 'second best’ by contrast. Except for the fact that reform moves do not 
liberalise trade totally and instantly - something common to moves on all reform paths
45 Note that the 'free trade' spoken of here is different for different rows. The path to free trade referred to 
in rows 1-6 is unilateral free trade, whilst the path to free trade referred to in row 7 is global free trade. 
Note also that in the case of import export links, further expanding them (as set out in the table) will 
produce freedom of trade, if one can assume that the trade balance will not change as a result of trade 
liberalisation. To produce free trade which is consistent with changes in trade balances, one could allow 
exports to qualify for more or less than their own value in imports. This would enable the country to 
run a free trade deficit or surplus of any given size.
46 Proof: Assume that a country has trade barriers. Take any of the instruments of unilateral trade
liberalisation (Rows One to Six) and move sufficiently far towards free trade that whatever 
trade barriers remain, trade creation outweighs trade diversion and so there is net trade 
liberalisation. Now repeat this step for any other instrument of unilateral trade 
liberalisation. The two instruments chosen now complement each other in liberalising 
trade.
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other than the last move - each instrument is 'second best' and reaches free trade 
according to its own properties. One distinction which remains is between 
'compensatory' reform and other approaches. For compensatory approaches may be 
able to liberalise trade, but they cannot in any practical sense complete the job of fully 
liberalising trade on their own.
Pluralism in global trade liberalisation is now well accepted {eg see Dunkel, 1993). For 
instance, as Australia and New Zealand are showing, unilateral, multilateral and regional 
trade liberalisation can be combined in trade liberalising ways (also see Johnson, 1968: 
167). In the example to be pursued below, tariff reduction and import/export links 
generally complement each other. Regional trade liberalisation is also being 
supplemented in Asia with sub-national regional trade liberalisation in the case of the 
newly fashionable growth triangles. Again, by way of example, regional trade 
integration can be combined with intra-industry trade liberalisation using Elkan's 
customs drawback union arrangements. And as several participants to IAC inquiries into 
the automotive industry argued, an import/export link in the automotive industry might 
well have raised the 'speed limits' to automotive tariff reform by lowering automotive 
manufacturing costs (see Chapter Nine below).
Each row in the table represents an 'ideal type' for the purposes of taxonomy, although 
of course the instruments mentioned have usually been used in 'messier’ ways and 
frequently in conjunction with each other, and with other assistance methods. Likewise 
as the table illustrates, different liberalisation instruments will accelerate the achievement 
of different types of 'economies of integration' at different stages of the reform process. 
For instance, import/export links will typically accelerate the achievement of economies 
of intra-industry trade and specialisation whereas tariff reduction will accelerate the 
achievement of inter-industry trade and specialisation. The 'integration economies' 
accelerated by the instruments of 'new trade liberalisation' frequently comprehend some 
or all of those in Column Three from Rows Two to Five.
Row six is a whimsical but not entirely flippant inclusion designed to illustrate the 
plenitude of ways to liberalise trade. Personal trust and affinity between relatives is 
sometimes an important engine of trade expansion. Accordingly it is possible, at least in 
principle, to design a trade liberalisation path around such a possibility. For the record, 
other capricious ways for a country to liberalise trade would be to reduce penalties on, 
'de-criminalise' and finally legalise smuggling, or to expand and make transferable the 
'duty free' concessions of international travelers.
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T a b le  5.1 A T a x o n o m y  o f T ra d e  L ib e ra lis a tio n
l 2 3 4 5
T y p e  o f  T ra d e L ib e r a l i s a t io n In te g ra t io n E x a m p le s P a th  to  F r e e
L ib e r a l i s a t io n I n s tru m e n t( s ) E c o n o m ie s T rad e
1 I n te r - in d u s t r y Q u o ta In te r - in d u s try A u s tr a l ia T a r i f f  a n d  q u o ta
t r a d e  l ib e r a l is a t io n E x p a n s io n , s p e c ia l i s a t io n N e w  Z e a la n d r e m o v a l
ta r i f f ic a t io n ,  ta r i f f  
re d u c t io n
C h i l e
2  I n t r a - in d u s tr y Im p o r t / e x p o r t In tra - in d u s try C a n a d a E x p a n d
t r a d e  l ib e r a l is a t io n l in k s . s p e c ia l i s a t io n K o re a im p o r t / e x p o r t
S in g a p o r e l in k s  a c r o s s
A u s t r a l i a  a in d u s t r i e s .
3  S u b - n a t io n a l E x p o r t A c c e le ra te d  fa c to r W id e  ra n g e  o f E x p a n d  E P Z  to
t r a d e  l ib e r a l is a t io n p ro c e s s in g  z o n e s (u s u a l ly  w a g e ) L D C s  b c o v e r  a ll
(E P Z s ) . p r ic e  e q u a l i s a t io n , d o m e s t i c  f i rm s
4  F i r m  s p e c i f ic 'B ra n d  to  b ra n d ' E c o n o m ie s  o f A S E A N E x p a n d
tr a d e  l ib e r a l is a t io n c o m p le m e n ta t io n c o m m o n c o u n t r i e s  c e l i g ib i l i ty  fo r
I g o v e rn a n c e im p o r t  p e r m i t s
5  F i r m  s p e c i f ic N e g o t ia t in g P r o d u c t  c y c le  tr a d e , J a p a n ,  K o re a , E x p a n d
t r a d e  l ib e r a l is a t io n im p o r t  r i g h ts T e c h n o lo g y T a iw a n , a n d  a c o n c e s s io n s  to
n w ith  in d iv id u a l t r a n s f e r  a n d  fo r e ig n ra n g e  o f  o th e r a ll  f i rm s
f i r m s . d ir e c t  in v e s tm e n t C o u n tr i e s  ^
6  A lp h a b e t ic a l I m p o r t  p e rm it s P e r s o n a l  a f f in i ty C o u n t r i e s  w ith E x p a n d  n a m e s
T rad e f o r  p e r s o n s  w i th s t r o n g  s y s te m s  o f e l i g ib l e  fo r
L ib e r a l i s a t io n c e r ta in  s u rn a m e s p e rs o n a l  p a tr o n a g e p e r m i t s
7  R e g io n a l  tr a d e R e g io n a l  f re e R e g io n a l  tr a d e C o u n t r i e s  o f E x p a n d  tra d e
l ib e r a l i s a t io n tra d e  a reas e x p a n s io n
• N A F T A
• C E R
• E C  &  E F T  A
b lo c k s .
Sources:
a Korea, (Luedde-Neurath, 1986: 61-2), Taiwan, (Wade, 1990: 129), Singapore, {AIM, 6th April, 
1971: 6, and See Chapter Four above). References to Australia and Canada are provided in this 
thesis.
b See Warr, 1989. In a sense both Singapore's and Hong Kong's status as entrepot ports meant 
that they identified their whole economies as 'export processing zones'. 
c The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1985: 71 and see Chapter Four above. Note also that this 
empirical example in fact operates in a regional context. 'Brand to Brand Complementation’ is 
generally available only within the ASEAN block.
a Rodrik, 1993: 18-9____________________________________________________________________
The instruments of the 'new trade liberalisation' comprehended in Rows Two to Five 
were pioneered by both developing and developed countries. In each case, as one would 
expect, the particular innovations chosen reflected the particular developmental stage of 
the countries/industries involved. Developing countries paid particular attention to 
providing their exporters with imported inputs of capital and intermediate goods and raw 
materials (Balassa, 1989, "Adjustment"; Krueger, 1985). By contrast, successful
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innovation for Canada's more mature automotive industry focused around facilitating 
intra-industry rationalisation and trade in differentiated final and intermediate automotive 
products. Similar instruments to the 'extended content' arrangements first used in 
Canada were being advocated for the Australian automotive industry. However here the 
trade to be facilitated was not just the intra-industry trade in similar goods sought for the 
Canadian industry - but also product cycle trade within the automotive industry with Asia 
with Australia as the technological leader.
5.3 'Subjective' and 'Objective' Resistances to
Trade
It is useful at this stage to refer to Drysdale's and Garnaut's proposed distinction 
between 'objective' and 'subjective' resistances to trade. 'Objective' resistances 
comprise transport and other (generally) physical obstacles to trade and official barriers 
to trade imposed by governments. 'Subjective' resistances comprise a range of social, 
psychological and institutional factors which limit the power of competitive forces to 
produce economic integration - or movement to uniform pricing of commodities - 
between different regions. Drysdale and Gamaut comment that the cost of overcoming 
trade resistances has received scant attention in the corpus of trade theory except for the 
"cameo appearance" of subjective resistances in "the theory of the product cycle". Later 
they comment that much of the dynamism of Asia-Pacific trade expansion has come from 
the "progressive reduction of subjective and objective but non-official resistances to 
trade."
The process has been driven by independent enterprises' search for more 
profitable patterns of trade, sometimes assisted by provision by 
governments of public goods that affect the operation of private markets 
(1992: 7, 10, 12 emphasis added).
Drysdale's and Garnaut's conclusion supports their opposition to discriminatory - ie 
regionally preferential - trading arrangements in Asia. However, they stop short of a 
suggestion which is more interesting for this thesis. The dramatic reduction of 
'subjective' resistances to trade in rapidly developing countries has frequently been 
underwritten by governments targeting precisely the kind of trade which Drysdale and 
Garnaut associate with the reduction of 'subjective' resistances to trade - product cycle 
trade. Developing countries have frequently sought to encourage the establishment of 
'export bases' which might find some 'niche' in the international division of labour -
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frequently within a particular industry.47 Often low income countries have found such 
niches in assembling imported components for re-export frequently with the help of 
imported capital equipment. And, to a considerable extent, the instruments of 
concessional trade liberalisation as outlined in the above table have been instrumental in 
targeting trade reform so as to capture such opportunities (eg see Mauritius as discussed 
in § 5.4 below).
5.4 'Policy Directness' and 'Real Directness'
If we could first know where we are, and whither we are tending, we could
better judge what to do, and how to do it.
The Jackson Report quoting Abraham Lincoln, 1975: ix
Assume that at free trade, a particular low wage country would be a major exporter of 
clothing, and that it currently has significant trade barriers on various inputs into clothing 
production, including textiles and capital equipment which provide apparel manufacture 
with negative assistance. Assume further, and not implausibly in a highly competitive 
international market, that international demand for clothing exports from this country 
becomes progressively more elastic as free trade is approached. Linder an orthodox 
reform path, the barriers to exports (which are most directly the barriers to the import of 
apparel inputs) would not be eliminated, but rather phased out. Here the two 
neoclassical trade reform rules would forego much beneficial trade expansion until they 
take the country relatively close to free trade.
The 'neoclassical' and 'symmetrical neoclassical' reform rules as set out in Chapter 
Three might be described as 'policy direct' in the sense that they directly address the 
policy to be removed, and/or its incentive effects. An alternative approach - 'real 
directness' - would address as a priority the most invidious effects of the unwanted 
policy on economic development and trade expansion. Where policy is constrained to 
gradualism, policy makers cannot rationally aim to 'optimise' trade creation in any 
liberalisation episode - and therefore cannot devise the best gradual trade liberalisation 
strategy - without an idea of where the pay-offs from trade liberalisation are likely to be. 
By default or design, at least until liberalisation is complete, there is an important sense 
in which such an exercise cannot escape discrimination between domestic industries - or
47 The expression 'product cycle trade' is used broadly here to include trade which flows from countries 
finding niches in the production chain of an industry including the importation of capital equipment and 
intermediate goods for the purposes of exporting finished goods. Importing textiles to export clothing 
would be a form of 'product cycle trade' according to this definition.
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as it has come to be known more colloquially, picking winners and losers. By contrast 
with 'policy directness', 'real directness' would seek to make a virtue of the necessity of 
choice in order to 'optimise' trade creation and development in each partial trade 
liberalisation episode. Real directness could be pursued with either orthodox, 
'anomalous', 'compensatory' or 'concessional' trade liberalisation depending on the 
circumstances.
Of course, where it deviates from the orthodox rules, such a strategy is probably more 
fraught with the dangers inherent in 'picking winners' - that danger being that the 
'picking' is done badly. And as a country moves closer towards free trade, the 
confidence with which policy makers could 'target' particular industries for 
'compensatory' or even concessional assistance to offset the invidious effects of existing 
trade restrictions would probably fall. But in the hypothetical country discussed above, 
the assumption that clothing exports will increase with free trade may be a safe enough 
bet. And there can be strong gains from such an approach. The hypothetical country is 
styled from the experience of Mauritius, where trade liberalisation and some other 
measures to reassure investors unleashed a torrent of beneficial trade expansion. Yet the 
extent of trade liberalisation was only moderate (Levy, 1993: 256). And it conformed 
neither with the top down nor the across the board rules nor their 'symmetrical' 
counterparts. Mauritius established an export processing zone (EPZ) and apparel 
exports boomed (Römer, 1993).
The concept of 'real directness' enables some more flesh to be put on the bones of the 
taxonomic table of trade liberalisation paths presented above. For the instruments 
represented in each row address a particular impediment to trade produced by traditional 
protection with 'real directness'. An EPZ, for instance, deals with the impediments to 
trade in a particular region within a country with real directness - it makes it a priority of 
the reform path towards free trade. If policy made the entire transition to free trade using 
the single trade reform instrument - in the Mauritian example by way of expanding the 
EPZ - other objectives of trade liberalisation would generally be addressed less directly 
and later in the reform path. Thus, for instance, were Mauritius to move further towards 
free trade it could do so by expanding its EPZ but this would discriminate against trade 
opportunities for firms which remained outside the EPZ. Traditional tariff reform might 
address their interests sooner. Where this indirectness is undesirable - where it imposes 
unnecessary and unhelpful constraints on the rate of reform and development - the 
particular instrument of trade liberalisation can be usefully supplemented with other 
kinds of trade liberalisation - for instance traditional tariff dismantling.
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5 .5  Trade Liberalisation and Export A ssistance
As will be demonstrated below in the case of Australia's automotive industry, a change 
in the form  of assistance which followed the introduction of an export credit scheme to a 
protected industry, interacted with the goal of reducing the extent of that industry's 
assistance. Although export credits would substantially reduce assistance to import 
replacement in some circumstances, they would increase assistance to exports and thus 
in some sense undermine the policy goal of reducing assistance to the industry. This 
interaction necessitated an attempt to think about the two objectives (as far as possible) 
together with a view to some 'mutual adjustment' between them. The following sections 
attempt to do this. They begin with an exploration of the economics of import/export 
links in various circumstances and in the context of trade liberalisation. Consistently 
with the methodological themes in this dissertation, no attempt is made to demonstrate 
that a particular arrangement was 'optimal'. However the discussion does demonstrate 
the substantial attractions associated with the industry's export credit proposals and so 
underlines the claim that they deserved serious consideration from economists. It will be 
evident from Chapters Seven to Nine that - as was the case with intra-industry trade 
policy more generally at the academic level - this never occurred. 'Mutual adjustment' 
was never achieved, either between the two objectives of trade reform - intra-industry 
and inter-industry trade liberalisation - or between the two parties engaged in the search 
for better policy - the economists of the IAC and the business interests of the industry. 
Indeed it was not really attempted.
5.5.1 Illustrating the Economics of Specialisation and Intra­
industry Trade
Unless otherwise specified, the following sections consider an economy which is 
neoclassically 'well behaved'. Markets are sufficiently close to being perfectly 
competitive that they are treated as perfectly competitive in the long run although 
occasionally imperfectly competitive phenomena (particularly scale economies) enter the 
analysis informally. Likewise, the focus is on economic efficiency considered as the 
output or consumption of a nation acting as a single producer/consumer. Distributional 
issues are generally not considered. Note however, that intra-industry resource 
movements often have significantly milder impact in terms of both adjustment costs and 
distributional impact than inter-industry resource movements (Grubel and Lloyd, 1975: 
127-9; also see Krugman, 1978: 15 Chen, 1995 and IAC, "Reductions", 1982: 94).
This sub-section develops a simple heuristic illustration of the economies of intra­
industry specialisation and trade. The diagram in Figure 5.1 is a simple variant of the
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usual partial equilibrium Marshallian supply and demand diagram for an importable into 
a small country. It has the traditional 'scissors' of domestic supply and demand 
schedules and a horizontal schedule representing infinitely elastic supply and demand 
around the world price. The focus is on long run partial equilibrium and on 'the 
industry' rather than a firm. The analytical foundations of the diagram come from the 
HOS world in which trade is driven by comparative factor costs. Therefore, strictly 
speaking, the diagram illustrates HOS intra-industry trade - say the simultaneous export 
of steel furniture and import of plastic furniture - rather than intra-industry trade 
reflecting product specific scale economies. Nevertheless, the welfare conclusions to 
which the diagram gives rise for HOS assumptions are suggestive of similar conclusions 
for non-HOS intra-industry trade. The following changes to the traditional diagram 
allow the illustration of intra-industry trade.
1) Instead of dealing with discrete products, an aggregative perspective is 
invoked which is akin to the mapping of macro-economic aggregate 
supply and demand schedules. The analysis focuses on aggregate long 
run supply and demand in a domestic 'industry' producing a complex 
range of products 48 which are variously 'comparatively advantaged and 
disadvantaged' against overseas producers, given their domestic factor 
costs. By analogy with their macro-economic counterparts, the axes of 
the industry diagram measure 'aggregate prices' and 'aggregate physical 
output' across the industry as measured by appropriately weighted 
indices.
2) Because of its diversity, the industry may both import and export. This 
requires two supply schedules - the supply (export) schedule (Se) and the 
supply (domestic) schedule (Sd). As the industry's production increases, 
this drives factor prices up and so both Sd and Se slope upwards. 
Exporters take the 'world import price' for their exports, but pay transport 
and tariff costs. This ensures that supply to the domestic market for any 
product within the industry commences at a lower cost than supply to 
export markets. Superimposing the supply (export) schedule onto the 
diagram and translating it sufficiently to the right to make its origin touch 
the Sd curve produces the basic diagram illustrated below. As output rises 
beyond the point of export viability, the supply curves bifurcate and there 
is 'double counting' in the diagram. In Figure 5.1, total output at free 
trade equals production for the domestic market (B) plus production for
48 The industry I have in mind is Australia's automotive industry. However it is not necessary to define 
the industry with great rigour to render the subsequent exposition coherent. There must simply be two 
sectors in the domestic economy - 'the industry' and 'other activities'.
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the export market (C-A). The quantity of goods imported equals D - B. 
As drawn here, the industry is in trade deficit as (D - B) > (C - A).
3) The diagram provides a way of representing the costs of inward 
orientation. Because of the domestic demand for variety, beyond some 
point the domestic industry cannot expand its domestic sales without 
incurring rising 'diversification costs' associated with diversifying 
production into products which it produces less competitively. After they 
become significant, 'diversification costs' rise at an increasingly rapid rate 
as output for the domestic market rises: the Sd curve becomes 
progressively steeper. The domestic industry is assumed to have a 
significantly lower market share in export markets than in the domestic 
market. Accordingly there are no incentives to diversify production for 
export any more than production is already diversified for the domestic 
market. Thus, although the Se schedule commences at a higher price/cost 
level than the Sd schedule, it does not experience progressively increasing 
'diversification costs' as is the case with the Sd schedule. By the same 
token, it is assumed that 'the world' is sufficiently large that it does not 
experience diversification costs and that accordingly, while the cost of 
producing new variants rises domestically, the cost of importing them can 
continue to be represented by the horizontal world price line whatever 
level of product diversity is reached.
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Figure 5.1
Price/
Marginal
Cost
Quantity
Note three simplifications which eliminate interdependencies between the schedules.
1) 'Diversification costs' have been made a function of output for domestic 
supply. It would be more realistic to say that diversity increases with the 
domestic industry's domestic market share.
2) Because exports use the same factors as supply to the domestic market, 
the two schedules are strictly speaking interdependent. This 
interdependency has been ignored.
3) Price changes in the domestic industry are assumed to be uniform across 
all its products.
However, in the principal illustrations and demonstrations to which the diagram is 
devoted, loosening these assumptions would complicate exposition without materially 
changing the outcome of the analysis. So doing is accordingly left to another time.
5.6 The Economics of Import/Export Links
Assume that an 'industry' - some sub-set of the economy - is assisted by a single 
protective trade barrier - a uniform tariff or quantitative restriction on imports - yielding 
the same nominal rate of assistance within the industry to all production for the domestic 
market. An import/export link within the industry will eliminate the home market bias of
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existing protection. Trade barriers give local producers privileged access to a domestic 
market in which prices have been artificially inflated. Export credits give exporters 
precisely the same privilege and so equalise the nominal rate of assistance to export and 
import replacement (cf Krueger, 1978: 293). Assuming concessions are costlessly 
transferable, which is done below unless otherwise specified, profit seeking firms will 
trade them to ensure that they go to their most highly valued uses - with firms 
specialising in importing, exporting or any mix of the two depending on their efficiency. 
An import/export link will generally not impair the transparency of trade barriers. In one 
respect it will enhance transparency. The price at which import concessions change 
hands provides a measure of the nominal assistance effects of existing trade restrictions 
and thus a measure of any 'water in the tariff.
5.6.1 Import/export Links as 'Intra-industry Trade Policy'.
Traditional import for re-export (export duty drawback) and export for re-import 
(offshore assembly) concessions are designed to alleviate the invidious effects of trade 
barriers on the production of goods part of which are traded during the production 
process. As discussed earlier, they involve substantial compliance costs associated with 
tracking the items in question to ensure that, for instance, duty free imports (exports) are 
physically incorporated in re-exports (re-imports) (IAC, "Concessions", 1987: 12 and 
see §4.6.1 above). There are also difficulties in defining what constitutes 
'embodiment' of inputs into outputs. Imported sewing machines are (presumably) an 
input into the production of Mauritian clothing exports, but they are not physically 
incorporated into that clothing. Traditional import for re-export schemes often fail to 
influence incentives throughout the production chain offering the producers of inputs to 
export little or no assistance since the producer of the final (exported) good can always 
acquire rights to import inputs duty free (Balassa, 1989: "Subsidies", 43).
Most importantly, import for re-export schemes are irredeemably partial in their capacity 
to ameliorate the costs which traditional protection imposes on intra-industry trade. Thus 
the Assistance Evaluation Branch of the IAC concluded in 1977 that duty drawback 
schemes for exporters did not "at all adequately compensate exporters for the tariff- 
inflated prices of their material inputs (Assistance Evaluation Branch, 1977: 12)". Duty 
drawback mechanisms are unsuited to facilitating the vast bulk of intra-industry 
specialisation which does not directly involve import for re-export or export for re­
import (Kol and Rayment, 1989). At a time of growing diversity in demand for both 
final and intermediate goods, a producer might wish to specialise in the production of a 
particular kind of (final or intermediate) good necessitating the importation of other
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products which are close substitutes in production in the short and medium term (Grubel 
and Lloyd, 1975: 145-6). For instance a firm might wish to achieve economies of scale 
in manufacturing a particular kind of product - such as a particular type of steel or 
automotive assembly. With short or medium term constraints on capacity this will 
necessitate the importation of other kinds of products from the same industry. Here 
imports are in some sense necessary to sustain export activity. But traditional intra­
industry trade policies do not alleviate the problem.
Providing an import/export link operates over a domain which is sufficiently broad to 
link imported inputs with exported outputs; it can provide more efficient and rational 
intra-industry trade policy than traditional (duty drawback) instruments. In addition to 
its administrative efficiency (see § 4.6.1 above), it 'backwardly integrates' export 
orientation throughout the production chain. Exporters will direct the assistance they 
receive back down their supply chain to economise on the use of valuable import 
concessions. An import/export link exempts that portion of trade which is intra-industry 
trade - the import activity in the industry which is matched by export activity - from the 
costs which barrier protection would otherwise impose on it. It accordingly facilitates 
intra-industry trade and specialisation in both intermediate and finished products, even 
where imports are not physically embodied in exports.
5.6.2 Import/export Links and Protection
The rest of this section analyses the resource allocation implications of import/export 
links in the presence of traditional protection. To clarify analysis, the 'industry' is 
assumed to be the only assisted activity in the economy and free trade is assumed to be 
best with terms of trade changes as a result of tariff changes ruled out.
5.6.2.1 Quantitative Restrictions
Assume that an import/export link is introduced into an industry protected by quotas. In 
Figure 5.2, domestic production for the domestic market and domestic consumption take 
place at B' on the Sd curve and at D' on the Dd curve respectively. These levels of 
production and consumption correspond to the domestic price level which equals the 
world import price plus unit quota rent (pw + qrl). The domestic industry also produces 
at C on its Se curve corresponding to the world import price pw.
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Figure 5.2
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Marginal
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The industry adjusts to the import/export link in two stages.
5.6.2.1.1 Stage One: Increasing Imports, Falling Prices
If the industry already exports (as is the case in the illustration above) existing exports 
will now earn import concessions increasing imports. This improves welfare in the 
same way a simple expansion of quotas would. Imports expand and prices fall to clear 
the domestic market. Price falls lower the rate of assistance and reduce domestic 
production.
5.6.2.1.2 Stage Two: Intra-industry Trade Adjustment
Once the above process has run its course the situation changes. If domestic prices have 
not yet fallen to their free trade level, quota rents are still positive and so, exports receive 
assistance from the import concessions they generate and so they expand. Export 
growth is matched by import growth under the import/export link. There is 'symmetrical 
tariff reform' within the industry. The highest cost production for the domestic market is 
liquidated, whilst lower cost production for export markets expands. Disparities of 
assistance within the industry being addressed from 'above' and 'below' (c /§  3.5). 
The industry moves down its S<j schedule and up its Se schedule. Note that as this 
'intra-industry trade adjustment' proceeds, domestic prices must fall to clear increased 
imports in the domestic market. This reduces quota rents and the rate of assistance to
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both import replacement and export accordingly falls. Intra-industry trade will expand 
until it is no longer profitable to expand intra-industry trade. This occurs - equilibrium 
emerges - when symmetrical tariff reform within the industry can go no further. The 
(rising) level of disability of export activity meets the (falling) level of disability of 
import replacement activity at the new (equilibrium) quota rent - qr(e). Production for 
the domestic market falls from B' to B", demand expands from D' to D" whilst exports 
expand from C to C" - as illustrated in Figure 5.3 below:
Figure 5.3
Price/
Marginal
Cost
Quantity
Generally speaking, the steeper both the Dd and the Sd curves, the more assistance must 
fall to allow import growth. And the flatter the Se curve, the more exports will grow 
with the new assistance they receive. Because export growth equals import growth, the 
following relationship holds.
( B ' - B M) + (D" - D') = (C" -C) (1)
Several things follow. Firstly the social cost of additional exports is strictly smaller than 
the cost savings they bring about.
Proof: The deadweight cost of the additional exports is given by the extent to 
which their production cost exceeds the revenue they produce or the horizontally 
shaded triangular shape under the Se curve below Pw + qr(e) and above Pw.
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The deadweight cost saved equals the vertically shaded trapezoid shapes beneath 
Pw + qr(l) and the Sd and Dd curves and above Pw. By inspection, the 
trapezoid shapes are both strictly larger than the rectangle given by their 
respective bases - (B' - B") and (D" - D') - and the interval qr(e). From (1), 
the area of those rectangles equals qr(e)[(B' - B") + (D" - D')] = qr(e)(C" - 
C). But by inspection, the horizontally shaded 'triangle' is contained by and so 
is smaller than the rectangle qr(e)(C" - C).49
Secondly, it will be seen that where export is already viable at Pw, as was the case with 
Australia's automotive industry, the welfare gains will be large. If the Se curve is linear 
or concave, the C - C" welfare triangle is less than or equal to half the size of the two 
rectangles qr(e)(B' - B") and qr(e)(D" - D'), which itself is significantly smaller than 
the total vertically shaded areas. The result is only likely to be different with very 
substantial degrees of convexity of Se above Pw. Thirdly, despite the fall in assistance 
rates the industry's output rises. By inspection, as intra-industry trade expands domestic 
demand rises. Thus, although domestic production for the domestic market necessarily 
falls, it does not fall by as much as export production rises. Where the constraint on 
reform is the rate at which the industry declines, this means that intra-industry trade 
adjustment can be accompanied by further traditional trade liberalisation - in this case 
quota expansion.
5 .6 .2 .2  Tariffs
Assume an import/export link is introduced into a simple uniform ad valorem tariff 
regime operating across an industry.
49 It should be noted further that the welfare conclusions derived here do not depend on the relative 
positions of these curves but rather on the weaker assumption that exports along with supply to the 
domestic market are capable of responding to assistance. Given this, by the principles of optimal 
intervention, the most efficient way of increasing industry output with assistance is with promotion 
rather than protection which only provides assistance to production for the domestic market. By 
inspection, the above proof applies where the supply (export) curve is steeper and so rises above the 
supply (domestic) curve and/or where the supply export curve begins at some point above P w but below 
P w+qrl. These geometric proofs coincide with the intuition that, where quantitative restrictions 
constrain an economy, export facilitation provides a means of relaxing those constraints and so 
improving welfare. Where there are no other tariff restrictions, the relaxation of quotas is strictly welfare 
improving (Vousden, 1990: 216-7). Although some of the gains from a relaxation of quantitative 
restrictions goes to funding exports which would not otherwise be viable, this cost is strictly smaller 
than the gain from increased imports - because the funds made from increased imports must fund the 
increase in exports.
121
Chapter Five The Economics of Trade Liberalisation
5.62.2.1 Stage One: Displacement of Tariff Revenue
Existing exporters will sell their duty free concessions to those who would otherwise 
have to pay tariffs. This displaces tariff revenue and, for as long as any remains, 
imports do not rise. This produces a simple subsidy to existing exporters.
5.6.2.22 Stage Two: Export Expansion Further Displaces Tariff 
Revenue
If existing exports are insufficient to displace all initial tariff revenue, exports increase in 
response to assistance. They continue to displace tariff revenue and, except where 
exports embody imported inputs, no significant increase in imports takes place. 
Exporting will expand to a point where the level of disability of exporting equals the 
cross-subsidy available from import concessions. If this point is reached before all tariff 
revenue is displaced, imports will not expand and exports receive assistance at the tariff 
rate. So far the import/export link has acted as a simple export subsidy. Under the 
assumptions set out above, this simply increases the assisted industry's size and so 
reduces welfare.
5.622.3 Stage Three: Intra-industry Trade Adjustment
If exports expand to displace all tariff revenue, but can expand further at the level of 
assistance provided at that point, 'intra-industry trade adjustment' then takes place in the 
same way examined for quotas. Exports and imports rise by equal amounts and prices 
fall until equilibrium is reached (see § 5.6.2.1.2 above).
5 .7  Tariff Com pensation for M anufacturers?
This section outlines some of the attractions of export assistance to the automotive 
industry - particularly by way of an import/export link- in the context of more traditional 
trade reform.
5.7.1 Intra-Industry Disparities of Assistance
Australia is a small remote country with a factor endowment atypical of the main 
trading countries, it seems natural therefore that Australia should have a 
relatively large volume of inter-industry trade. But there is room for more intra­
industry trade than we have now.
Ronald Duncan, Assistant Commissioner, IAC, 1978: 282
The IAC's traditional agenda explicitly encompassed reducing disparities of assistance, 
not only between but within industries. Providing one can reduce intra-industry
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disparities of assistance without exacerbating inter-industry disparities - a point which is 
examined below - there are several reasons for giving intra-industry disparities a higher 
policy priority than inter-industry disparities. Firstly, as Peter Lloyd argued, the 
dispersion of effective rates of assistance was frequently greater within industries than 
between them (1972: 252-3; 1975: 152). Secondly, activities within industries are 
probably more substitutable in both production and consumption - they compete more 
directly in both their input and output markets - than activities in different industries (cf 
Lloyd, 1972: 252-3) and so disparities of assistance lead to greater allocative 
inefficiencies. A third and related point is that because activities within the same industry 
generally compete in the same input market there will be a greater level of co-location and 
sector specific human and physical capital within than between industries (Krugman, 
1991). This strongly suggests that structural adjustment within an industry will 
generally have lower adjustment costs than structural adjustment between industries (see 
§ 5.5.1). In his critique of tariff compensation, Peter Lloyd suggested the strategy of 
unifying rates of assistance within industries as a worthy possibility, although he 
preferred top down reform in both manufacturing and agricultural sectors (1975: 152). 
Unlike Alan Lloyd (1975: 15), he did not focus on the merits of pursuing both strategies 
together.
Given the inward orientation of most protection for manufacturing, unifying intra­
industry rates of assistance in advance of complete tariff reform requires compensatory 
export subsidies for manufacturing. Without any corresponding adjustment to tariffs, 
export assistance will be of ambiguous value. Ceteris paribus, it will increase the 
industry's export output and therefore its total output. Tariffs may have swollen the size 
of manufacturing industries above their free trade optimum. But at the same time, they 
may nevertheless have reduced their export output below free trade levels. If this is the 
case, export expansion will improve intra-industry resource allocation whilst the 
industry's expansion will worsen it. Peter Lloyd believed that protection had reduced 
the export performance of Australia's manufacturers. He argued that much of the 
assistance to agriculture had been designed to assist agricultural exports, whereas in 
manufacturing it had been designed to raise the cost of imports to users - many of whom 
were other manufacturers (P. Lloyd, 1972: 252-3).
One might add that various governmental systems were export oriented for agricultural 
goods and inward oriented for manufacturers. Thus Australia's trade negotiating 
strategy focused much more on improving foreign market access for Australia's primary 
products than its manufacturers. Likewise Australia's regulation of domestic markets 
frequently imposed costs on both international and even interstate trade (Industry
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Commission, 1990: 163-5). In so far as this was a protectionist measure, its aim was 
(presumably) to impose costs on importers of manufactures. But by deviating from 
international norms, unique Australian specifications would have imposed additional 
costs on Australian manufacturers supplying export markets.
Although export assistance will have an ambiguous effect on resource allocation, it will 
probably enhance productivity in several ways. If there are product-specific scale 
economies, export assistance will enhance productivity by securing longer production 
runs. Also, exports may bring a hitherto predominantly inwardly oriented industry into 
closer contact with the international market, with a range of potential benefits. These 
include widening the field of international rivalry, extending the search for profitable 
market opportunities, and coming into closer contact with ’best practices' in foreign 
markets (eg see Garran, 1994).
5.7.2 Intra-Automotive-Industry Disparities of Assistance
The automotive industry exemplified these considerations. For import replacement 
alone, on Stubbs' assumptions, effective assistance ranged between several hundred per 
cent for assembly under the small volume plans, to a little over forty per cent for medium 
sized vehicles (1972: 94ff). However Stubbs calculates assistance available. The 
assistance actually used is a more complex matter. Given their dominant market share in 
the relevant sector of the market, the least assisted medium vehicle manufacturers may 
have competed away some of their available assistance with lower output prices. And 
whatever assistance was implicit in medium vehicle prices, it was only available to 
Australian manufacturers after they had discharged their onerous obligations under the 
local content plans. Those obligations could have led to component manufacturers 
'capturing' some or all of the assistance available to medium vehicle assembly. Thus 
assistance to medium vehicle assembly for the domestic market could have been quite 
low or conceivably negative. And it seems clear that automotive exports endured 
significant negative assistance (see below).
The domestic market share of Australia's automotive industry was presumably greater 
than its 'natural' free trade level. But at least until the late 1970s, given the transport 
costs to the Australian market, it seems quite possible that, after some 'infant industry' 
protection in the late 1940s, car manufacturing would have prospered at free trade in the 
late fifties and sixties (see § 2.5.2.5 above). Given this, the industry may well have 
achieved greater export output and greater export orientation at free trade than it did with 
protection. In 1977 the IAC's Assistance Evaluation Branch estimated that automotive 
protection in 1974-75 imposed negative assistance at an effective rate of minus 15 per
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cent on automotive parts exports and minus 60 per cent on exported vehicles - the latter 
figure being the second most negative of all the ASIC four digit disaggregated industry 
groups. At the more aggregated two digit level, 'transport equipment' received minus 31 
per cent assistance, the most negative of all two digit export groups. The calculation 
included the effect of the two major assistance schemes then in existence - the 
'compensatory' Export Market Development Grants Scheme and the 'concessional' duty 
drawback scheme (Assistance Evaluation Branch, 1977: 13, Table One, 3-4).
5.7.3 A 'Relative Cost' or a 'Product Variety' Shock for the
Australian Automotive Industry?
The growing domestic demand for diversity increased the costs of disparities of 
assistance within the industry. For the more diversified Australian demand became, the 
greater was the diversification cost incurred by the Australian industry in achieving any 
given market share. In terms of the diagram developed above, it is possible to 
distinguish between two kinds of trade shock. Domestic output can fall because supply 
costs in a domestic industry have risen relative to other suppliers to the world market. 
This would be illustrated by downwardly shifting world supply and/or upwardly shifting 
domestic supply schedules. But imports can rise because domestic consumers demand 
greater product variety. The increased penetration of Japanese vehicles into the 
American and Australian markets in the 1970s had elements of both kinds of trade 
shock. Japanese vehicles were increasingly price (and so, one presumes, cost) 
competitive (The Economist, 9th April, 1994: 80; IAC, PMVs, 1981: 45). However, as 
Chapter Two has shown, to a considerable extent, increasing import penetration in the 
mid 1970s represented a 'product variety' shock. Throughout the 1960s, consumer 
demands gradually changed towards smaller vehicles and more specialised derivatives of 
passenger and commercial vehicles. And the swing towards smaller cars was given 
sudden new impetus by the petrol price rises associated with the first oil shock of 1973 
(cf §§ 2.3, 8.1).
Assuming for the sake of illustration that the product variety shocks did not effect 
aggregate physical demand in the industry - only the composition of that demand - the 
change in consumer taste raises the cost faced by the domestic industry in achieving 
former levels of sales to the domestic market. This can be captured as a leftward shift of 
the upper portion of the Sd curve. Figure 5.4 below captures such a shock - see the 
changes labeled with a "1". It also illustrates the expense of an inwardly oriented 
response to a 'product variety' shock. Assuming that policy is constrained to return 
domestic production to its 'pre-shock' levels, trade barriers are introduced producing the
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changes labeled with a "2". If industry assistance were increased in a way which did not 
discriminate on the basis of the destination of output, it could return the industry to its 
previous level of output at much lower cost. This is because the industry is able to 
increase its output to pre-shock levels at much lower cost by expanding export as well as 
production for the domestic market. This is true for any non-zero export elasticity of 
supply by virtue of the principles of optimal intervention. But the illustration shows 
how increasing diversification costs raise the stakes.
Figure 5.4
Price/
Marginal
Cost
Quantity
In fact the IAC's 1977 research on the negative assistance accorded automotive exports 
suggests an even more perverse state of affairs than this. For not only was the industry 
on a quixotic march up its increasingly unrewarding Sd curve, but the protective 
instruments it used to do so - tariffs, and quantitative restrictions on both vehicles and 
components - raised domestic costs within the industry and so actively suppressed the 
industry's expansion along its much more promising Se curve. Greater export 
orientation would also have improved productivity within the Australian industry by 
facilitating higher volume production runs. Dynamic gains through the learning 
associated with new forms of international integration - like product cycle trade with Asia 
- may also have been in the offing. One would also expect greater export orientation to
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have contributed to more balanced Australian trade negotiation and domestic regulation 
strategies, as the costs of foreign and domestic market impediments to Australian export 
activity became more pronounced - particularly relative to their benefits to import 
replacement.
5.7.4 The Directness of Intra-Automotive-Industry Trade
Liberalisation
The export incentives have been vital to many companies (ourselves included), 
not so much because we needed help to develop our export strength, but 
because we needed a significant subsidy to offset:
(a) the high cost of the local content being exported
(b) the high cost of shipping cars from Australia to almost anywhere in 
the world - from Australia, the Tasman and Pacific oceans, for example 
probably represent the highest cost per mile major transport routes in the 
world.
Peter North, Leyland Australia, IAC, PMVs, 1974, Transcript: 1755-6.
In proposing an import/export link, the automotive industry was, as one would expect, 
promoting its own interests. But it was also proposing policy innovation which would 
have liberalised the rapidly growing product cycle and intra-industry automotive trade as 
a priority in trade liberalisation. The very high rates of assistance implicit in the local 
content plan and the protectionist industrial and political culture which the automotive 
industry embodied provided the policy economists of the IAC with an adversary of 
whose potency they were only too aware. But the relative technological maturity of the 
industry, its saturation of the domestic market and its strong export growth also offered 
them a challenge to produce a variant of trade liberalisation which was well suited to the 
developmental opportunities inherent in the situation.
When it came to the automotive industry, the Australian economy would have benefited 
from simultaneously tackling two of the impediments to trade entailed by existing 
protection - impediments to greater inter-industry and intra-industry trade. Yet there 
were clear constraints on the rate at which the industry could contract: that is, on the rate 
at which inter-industry trade liberalisation could proceed. And liberalising trade by tariff 
reductions alone tied the rate of intra-industry trade liberalisation to the rate at which 
inter-industry trade liberalisation was possible. Subsequent events would demonstrate 
that while there was also political resistance to rapid intra-industry trade liberalisation, it 
was insufficient to prevent intra-industry trade liberalisation being vigorously pursued, 
even by a Government which had often lacked courage in tackling tariff reform. The
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continuing disparities of assistance and restrictions on trade within the industry entailed 
by orthodox reform paths meant that policy needed to address both the level of 
assistance, and its form. This could have been achieved by converting the existing 
protection into promotion - output subsidies - and reducing those subsidies over time. 
However this was never seriously considered. The alternative was to combine a tariff- 
only reform path with the export credit scheme for which sections of the industry had 
clamoured, and would continue to clamour.
5.8 The Politics of Export Assistance to
Manufacturers
I think there can be little doubt that purely from a public relations point of view
specific positive measures such as export subsidies are helpful in bringing about
reductions in protection against imports.
Max Corden, 1980: 27.
The above sections suggest that the arguments for some kind of tariff compensation for 
Australian manufacturers may have been as strong or stronger than the arguments for 
tariff compensation for farmers. Because of its lower adjustment costs (see §§ 5.5.1, 
5.7.1 above), intra-industry trade liberalisation is likely to attract less political opposition 
than inter-industry trade liberalisation. Assuming for the sake of argument that 
'compensatory' export assistance poses some risks to the politics of trade liberalisation - 
it is hard to see that the risks posed by export assistance to manufacturers are greater than 
those posed by export assistance to agricultural producers (as discussed in § 3.4.3 
above).
Section 3.4.3 nevertheless outlined ways in which export assistance might contribute to 
the establishment and/or maintenance of a political 'virtuous cycle' in which export 
success accelerated the movement of resources into export activity - taking the economy 
closer to free trade - thus accelerating trade liberalisation at the same time as improving 
the public standing of reform and the prospects for further and faster reform. The same 
may be said of export assistance to manufacturers. However there are other ways in 
which export assistance to manufacturers may have contributed to the politics of reform. 
Had the export orientation of Australia's manufacturers increased more quickly, the 
focus of Australia's manufacturing businesses, policy makers and trade negotiators 
might more quickly have been turned away from their preoccupation with protection for 
the domestic market towards exploring ways of expanding export market penetration. 
Domestic debate on Australia's industry policy might have lost some of its 'identity bias'
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(c/§ 2.5.2.3 above) as manufacturers realised they had as much or more to lose from 
foreign governments' trade barriers as they had to gain from Australian trade barriers.
Australia's use of non-tariff barriers, which operated by raising costs of supplying the 
Australian market, might more quickly have been identified for the negative sum game 
that it was. And faster manufactured export growth might also have made it harder for 
higher cost manufacturing firms to obtain community support for more assistance. As 
Michael E. Porter puts it, "[companies often attribute the success of foreign rivals to 
'unfair' advantages. With domestic rivals there are no excuses" (AFR, 17th July, 1990: 
12). As numerous authors have suggested, in elaborating the 'new development 
consensus', export success can be crucial to galvanising domestic political support for 
liberalisation and generating a 'virtuous cycle' of trade liberalisation, success and so 
further liberalisation (Falvey and Kim, 1992: 914; Krueger, 1985: 14; Dervis and Petri, 
1987: 251-2; Levy, 1993: 247).
5.8.1 The Political Economy of 'Concessional1 Trade
Liberalisation
The logical extension of complementation is free trade.
The Australian Woolgrowers’ and Graziers' Council, 1979: 2
Where policy makers seek to maximise the scope for a political 'virtuous cycle' of 
liberalisation, 'concessional trade liberalisation' has some particular attractions over 
'compensatory trade liberalisation'. For assisting exporters with privileged concessional 
access to the benefits of liberalisation achieves several (usually) worthwhile political 
objectives. Firstly, where reform is politically difficult, the interests of exporters can be 
balanced against the interests of the beneficiaries of import restrictions. In what might be 
assumed to be the mercantilist eyes of the public, those defending domestic markets 
might find it hard to press their interests against those winning new export markets. 
Secondly, as was the case with Australia's automotive industry, it is often difficult to 
develop decisive political support for orthodox reform. Nevertheless, where the 
protected industry is protected by quantitative restrictions - as Australia's industry was 
after 1975 - an import/export link will deliver substantial intra-industry and inter-industry 
trade liberalisation on its own (eg see §§ 5.6.2.1.1, 5.6.2.1.2 and 5.6.2.2.1 and 
5.6.2.2.3 above).
Thirdly, if a particular reform move is attractive politically, it may generate political 
momentum for more of the same. Even if it is trade liberalising at the outset, beyond a 
certain point, more 'compensatory' export assistance will begin to undermine trade
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liberalisation. For compensatory reform does not satisfy proposition 2.5 above: it 
cannot, on its own, achieve free trade. 'Concessional' trade liberalisation can take the 
economy to free trade. Although - like most trade liberalisation moves - 'concessional' 
reform can provoke lobbying for welfare impairing policy, it can also help set up a 
political 'virtuous cycle' supporting progressively freer trade. The concessions 
provided in export processing zones in the Philippines, Malaysia and Korea, were 
extended to exporters outside those zones. And as these countries become more 
developed, their interest in EPZs waned and more far reaching reforms took centre stage 
(Warr, 1989: 85). Fourthly, domestic import concessions conditional on export may 
establish salutary incentives in protectionist foreign markets. For foreign firms and 
policy makers know that, to the extent that they import from a country with an 
import/export link, those imports will earn concessional access to that country's market.
As subsequent chapters demonstrate, these points were appreciated and pointed out by 
the advocates of export facilitation. The Fraser Government seized on export facilitation 
as a means of both intra-industry and inter-industry rationalisation with a vigour which it 
failed to demonstrate for many other structural reform issues. And as an IAC minute 
noted, export facilitation's capacity to reduce local content was politically "easier to 
defend with the ability to point to the explicit requirement that exports will increase" 
(Minute, 16th April 1980: 14). The Woolgrowers' and Graziers' Council saw export 
facilitation as a particular kind of free trade which could be extended (see head quote: 
also see Stubbs, 1972: 79). And Minister Anthony commented on the prospect that 
export credits might influence other countries in the region to accept more Australian 
exports because the proposed export credit scheme would give them better access to the 
Australian market (1971, Attachment: 10).
Events since the period under study have since corroborated the argument that 
concessional trade liberalisation can help promote a political 'dynamic' of liberalisation. 
Within a decade of its adoption in the early 1980s, the most vociferous opponents of 
export facilitation were largely converted to its cause, and both those with and without 
access to it have clamoured for its extension just as firms have sought entry to Asian 
EPZs. Access to import/export links has no doubt been sought for the implicit assistance 
it provides. But with an import/export link attached to the quantitative restrictions of 
quotas and the local content plan, one automotive firm's export assistance was another's 
tariff cut and the logic which this embodies was ultimately embraced by the industry. In 
the 1990 review of automotive industry policy, importers sought improved access to 
export facilitation to improve their access to the domestic market and to place them on an 
equitable footing with domestic manufacturers (Industry Commission, 1990: 106).
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Likewise, the previously trenchant opponent of export facilitation, the Federation of 
Automotive Products Manufacturers (FAPM), claimed that liberalising and extending 
export facilitation would improve its predicability and so "could result in more 
restructuring and specialisation as [it is] used to develop export markets for more highly 
competitive products replacing those less competitive with imports" (cited in Gruen, 
1990: 30, emphasis added).
Likewise when an import/export link was introduced to the Australian textiles and 
apparel sector and export growth accelerated dramatically, lobbyists for these industries 
came round to the view that their own problems could only be addressed by export 
growth, not more protection in the domestic market (The Age, 24th November 1993: 
15). Import/export links did not perform miracles with the political economy of 
assistance in these sectors. Firms continued to lobby for trade regimes according to their 
own perceptions of their own self-interest. But those perceptions changed somewhat, 
and became much less inwardly oriented, more focused on international trading 
opportunities and more tolerant of importing products which Australia was least 
competitive at manufacturing.
5.9 'Mutual Adjustment' between Intra-Industry
and Inter-Industry Reform Objectives
If the so called first-best solution will take 20 years to reach [free trade] whereas
the second-best solution will take 15 years, then first-best is really second-best.
Alan Lloyd, 1978: 16
This chapter concludes by returning briefly to the economic argument. It will be recalled 
that although both 'compensatory' and 'concessional' export assistance have their 
benefits, they can also have possible costs associated with increasing the industry's size 
and/or its level of exports above what has been assumed to be their free trade optima. To 
make progress in what Braybrooke and Lindblom call "margin dependent choice" (1963: 
83) - ie trading off the costs with the benefits of the multiple alternatives available to the 
decision maker - it becomes necessary to consider both inter-industry and intra-industry 
issues together.
One compelling way in which such tradeoffs might have been considered is as follows. 
It seems reasonable to assume that the constraint on trade reform is the rate at which the 
industry's output declines, and that the intra-industry reallocation of resources associated 
with moving from inwardly oriented protection to 'promotion' or trade neutral assistance 
produces relatively low adjustment costs. In such circumstances it will be both possible
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and desirable to introduce export assistance to remove the 'home market bias' of tariffs at 
the same time as introducing larger reductions in traditional protection than could 
otherwise take place. This replaces protection with promotion thus improving the 
efficiency with which the assistance regime achieves any given level of output. Yet it 
does so without increasing the level of output above the level which has been determined 
by political constraints (c/Garnaut, 1991: 30). In such circumstances the two forms of 
trade liberalisation illustrate propositions 2.4 and 2.5. They complement each other in 
moving the economy towards freer trade. Moreover, as will be seen from subsequent 
chapters, they also exemplify proposition 2.6; export credits may facilitate faster tariff 
reform by lowering the automotive industry's costs, thus permitting it to withstand faster 
and/or greater tariff reduction for any level of output. Whilst it is easy to quibble with 
these, or any other assumptions, I know of no alternatives which better meet the multiple 
objectives which assumptions must meet - that of simultaneously providing simplicity, 
tractability and veracity.
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6 The Emergence of the IAC, the Sending 
of the Automotive Industry Reference 
and the Scope for 'Mutual Adjustment1
In the politics of a protectionist country there is no ease. Having given certain 
industries an advantage in the home market, your protectionist is torn with 
anxiety that they will take advantage of the consumer. Hence his addiction to 
boards. Subconsciously aware that he has run a risk of high prices and slack 
service, he calls on a board of experts to guard against it.
Edward Shann, 1948: 409
The following four chapters focus on the IAC's handling of intra-industry trade and 
trade liberalisation in its inquiries into the automotive industry. Unlike the thematic and 
analytical style of previous chapters, the analysis in the following chapters is framed 
within a broadly chronological narrative. This is necessary to place the policy advice 
under discussion within its historical and political context. This style also permits 
material to be brought within the discussion which, though it does not concern intra­
industry trade as a principal issue, vividly illustrates the pitfalls of economic discourse 
introduced in Chapter One. This chapter briefly sketches the inception of the IAC as a 
bastion of economic expertise and outlines the way in which the IA C  line' grew out of 
an almost exclusive focus on allocative efficiency, a characteristic of orthodox (HOS) 
trade theory at the time. This chapter then outlines the confused circumstances which 
produced the 1973-74 inquiry into the automotive industry. As an introduction to the 
three chapters which follow, the chapter also outlines the scope which was apparent in 
the historical circumstances of the time, for 'mutual adjustment' between the perspectives 
of different participants in the policy debate. The central theme of Chapters Seven to 
Nine is the lack of engagement between the LAC and those with whom it disagreed.
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6.1 The Emergence of the I AC
In [its] last seven years the [Tariff] Board had ceased being simply an ad hoc 
operator and had undertaken all the functions given it under [its] Act. [I]t had 
increased public participation in the Government's decision-making . . . and 
developed, refined and widely publicized a more comprehensive and systematic 
approach to tariff assistance. . . .  Its [five] divisions gave uniform advice 
which paid due regard to the interests of the community.
AlfRattigan, 1986: 194
By the late 1960s Australia's protection regime was the aggregation of hundreds of ad 
hoc decisions. Rattigan's great strategic triumph against the prevailing political economy 
of Australian protectionism, was to found his revolution on the traditions of the past. 
The Tariff Board's ostensible public role was to ensure that tariffs were set so as 
somehow to 'balance' the sectoral interests of manufacturers with the public interest. 
However Governments' sympathies were typically with the manufacturers and, as 
Glezer puts it neatly, until Rattigan, the Board "oscillated between rationalizing 
government preferences and moulding them" (Glezer, 1982: 34). Rattigan came to 
emphasise the 'transparency' of the Tariff Board process of public inquiry, not just as a 
device for eliciting information and opinion from all comers. 'Transparency' was crucial 
to constraining the interference of McEwen and his department. If McEwen sought to 
direct or advise the Board, Rattigan would insist he do so in a form which could 
subsequently be published (Rattigan, 1986: 4 Iff). Transparency emerged as a crucial 
procedural safeguard of both the independence of Tariff Board advice and the protection 
of the public over well organised sectoral interests.
The other side of 'transparency' was the appeal to the Board's objectivity and technical 
competence, which Rattigan associated with professional economic expertise. From its 
inception in 1921, the Tariff Board had been intended to assist in the transition from ad 
hoc - one parliamentarian called it "happy-go-lucky" - to 'scientific' tariff setting (see 
Capling and Galligan, 1992: 81). Such aspirations had never really been achieved. 
Neither the Government, nor the Tariff Board could spell out the criteria which governed 
its recommendations and important empirical issues were often impossible to determine 
with any precision (Glezer, 1982: 29ff). Rattigan's crusade involved strengthening the 
Board's professional expertise. By the first of January 1974 when it became the IAC, 
the Tariff Board possessed formidable and, within the Australian bureaucracy, largely 
unmatched economic expertise (Warhurst, 1982: 5).
Whatever their respective motivations, Rattigan's reformism melded remarkably well 
with Whitlam's. After a generation with the ALP in opposition, Whitlam proposed the
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establishment of several public commissions to provide strategic policy advice which 
was independent of the established public service. The commissions would be 
fundamental to informing the public on and involving it in "the great national affairs and 
the great national decisions" (Whitlam, 1972: 5).
Within a few months of Whitlam's election, Rattigan proposed, and Whitlam agreed to 
establish, Sir John Crawford as a one man inquiry to advise on establishing the new 
Commission. One of Rattigan's closest colleagues within the Tariff Board - Bill 
Carmichael - provided Crawford with extensive administrative support (Rattigan, 1986: 
154-5). The Crawford Report comprised only 159 paragraphs and it embraced the 
Rattigan 'vision' with only very slight modifications.50 Crawford spoke of one criterion 
for selection of members of the commission being "general competence" and of the need 
for "[w]ell qualified people able to contribute to the elucidation of the public policy 
issues involved in assistance to industries". Crawford emphasised the importance of 
expertise to the Commission and emphasised that by this he did not mean industrial 
expertise. However, it was "of the utmost importance that the Commission be provided 
with economic analysis of the highest standard" (1973: 18, 27). Subsequently, many of 
the Commissioners and almost all of the professional staff recruited to the IAC were 
economists (Warhurst, 1982: 5).
6.2 The 'IAC Line'
At the heart of the Tariff Board/IAC's approach was the same preoccupation with 
allocative efficiency (see § 3.2.1 above) which typified the professional economic 
literature on trade at the time (Corden, 1984). The IAC Act, which Rattigan was 
instrumental in drafting (Rattigan, 1986: 161), spoke of "improving the efficiency with 
which the community's productive resources are used" (IAC Act, S22(l){b} and cf 
{a}). In its inaugural Annual Report the Commission emphasised that "'efficiency' 
includes much more than the technical efficiency with which particular production is 
undertaken" (IAC, Annual Report, 1973-4, 1974: 17). And while the IAC nowhere 
stated that it would ignore technical efficiency, it made it clear that it would focus 
"primarily" on what it called "economic or relative" - ie allocative - efficiency. Technical
50 In further defending the autonomy of the Commission and its role as guardian of protection policy, 
Rattigan argued that Crawford should also recommend against 'policy references'. Crawford obliged, 
although he fell short of Rattigan's request that he recommend that they be proscribed (Rattigan, 1986: 
158). Crawford recommended that governments be able to send policy references but that they should 
refrain from doing so unless "there are some very special reasons for doing so", in which case "these 
reasons should be fully explained publicly before the reference is sent" (Crawford, 1973: 31).
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efficiency was considered to be a matter which was up to individual entrepreneurs (IAC, 
Annual Report, 1973-4, 1974: 17).
This focus on allocative efficiency saw full employment and perfect competition 
implicitly assumed: the former assumption being reasonable in 1973, the latter being 
Hicks' assumption that the benefits of a more realistic (ie monopolistic) model of the 
economy would be outweighed by its costs (c/§ 1.2.1.1 above). Assistance to one 
activity attracted resources into it and accordingly drew them from elsewhere. Given 
such a perspective, as the Commission pointed out, "the higher the . . . assistance 
required by an Australian industry to enable it to compete . . .  the lower the relative 
efficiency with which [it] uses the community's resources (IAC, Annual Report, 73-4: 
17). The IAC's perspective on political economy was also clearly articulated. It 
approvingly quoted the Brigden committee's fear that protection could enervate 
entrepreneurial spirit as firms directed their energies towards gaining assistance rather 
than improving their efficiency (Annual Report, 1973-4: 13). The new approach 
emphasised the simple and appealing principles to which Adam Smith had given voice 
and in so doing enabled an escape from the "maze" of issues which had dogged the 
Tariff Board throughout its existence (Rattigan, 1986: 20).
The IAC's political strategy for dealing with protectionism was also summarily spelled 
out. Firstly, to minimise the cost of and opposition to adjustment, reform should occur 
gradually (Charles and Farrell, 1975: 97). Nevertheless, in the light of the experiences 
of the Tariff Board, the new Commission conceded that in the past there had been "very 
great resistance to change in high cost industries, which have a vested interest in 
maintaining the status quo". In response the Commission sought to contain the 
expansion of high cost industries to at least reduce their relative importance as low cost 
industries grew (Annual Report, 1973-4: 21).
6.3 The (Tortured) Emergence of the 1973/4
Inquiry
By February 1973, after the December 1971 changes to the plan, Nissan and Toyota 
sought entry to the local content plans (A/M, 6th February: 6, cf Rattigan, 1986: 174). 
This raised some difficult issues for government and an interdepartmental committee - 
representing the Departments of Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C), Treasury, 
Customs and Excise (the administrators of the local content plans) and the new 
Department of Secondary Industry (formerly the Department of Trade) - was duly 
convened in early 1973 to consider automotive industry policy and the entry of Toyota 
and Nissan into local manufacture.
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The Department of Secondary Industry wished to retain the local content plans but 
PM&C and Treasury wanted them replaced with a tariff-only regime at lower tariff levels 
(Warhurst, 1982: 185). The Department was strongly supported by its Minister Dr Jim 
Cairns who saw in the plans opportunities to move towards a vision of 'National 
Planning' which he had sketched out three years before (see Interview with Cairns, 
SMH,  15th December 1972: 11). For Cairns 'National Planning' was not any particular 
policy but rather an elaborate consultative policy advising apparatus which would 
'deepen' democratic policy making (1971: 13, 49). Cabinet skirmishing proceeded from 
June to August, with Cairns' Cabinet submission urging colleagues to maintain the local 
content plans and use them "to influence the multinational companies, in implementing 
our policies in respect of product rationalization, resource usage, local equity, pollution 
control etc. through close government supervision of the Plans" (Glezer, 1982: 162 also 
see § 6.4 below).
On 28th August 1973 Cairns and Whitlam jointly announced that Toyota and Nissan 
would be invited to manufacture locally should they wish but that protective 
arrangements would be reviewed after a full Tariff Board inquiry. (The Tariff Board 
became the IAC on the 1st January 1974.) The Tariff Board's terms of reference 
released the next day were not wholly consistent with the earlier press release and 
illustrated the vicissitudes of the Cabinet process. In addition to requiring advice on 
whether the industry should receive assistance and if so in which form, the reference 
required the Tariff Board to "have regard for" various government "desire[s]" most of 
which were dear to Cairns' heart. The Government desired "to maintain a viable 
automotive industry" and to improve its "technical economic efficiency". It wanted high 
local content and "product rationalization". It wanted improved labour relations and 
production techniques and "substantial Australian participation, including equity, in the 
industry". And it wanted an industry which "maintains a high level of safety in 
construction and use, with effective anti-pollution devices" which was "well located for 
social employment and environment purposes" (IAC, PMVs, 1974, Appendix One: 2).
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6.4 Australia as an Export Base: Intra-Industry
Restructuring and the Scope for 'Mutual 
Adjustment1
Australia is now a regional centre for the automotive industry, and the 
government's policy recognises that manufacturers may wish to co-ordinate 
their production with other manufacturing facilities in the Asian Pacific region. 
Manufacturers' import and export plans would therefore be related to Australian 
production.
Whitlam's and Cairns' Press Release announcing the 1973-74 Inquiry, IAC, 
PM Vs, 1974, Transcript: 2291
The press statement reflected a new economic nationalism (cfThe Age, The West 
Australian, 30 August 1973). It said that Toyota and Nissan had already agreed to 
"considerable" local equity in their Australian activities and that advice was being sought 
about using the Government Aircraft Factory to manufacture for the industry. The 
statement also implied that Australia's status as a nascent automotive export base had 
significance for assistance policy (see above quote).
The previous chapter outlined various advantages of an export credit scheme from both 
political and economic perspectives and its potential role in mediating 'mutual 
adjustment' between policy objectives and perspectives. These arguments can be 
deepened with reference to the particular context of the IAC inquiry. The export credit 
scheme had the potential to provide a policy framework for realising aspirations which 
had to that time appeared only occasionally, and then usually in a vaguely expressed 
form. And it provided equally promising scope for mediating 'mutual adjustment' 
between the objectives of various interested parties to the inquiry - including the 
Commission.
Like Elkan in 1965, by 1973 many people had sought to forge some 'middle ground' 
between protection and free trade. Cairns was one, although he was the most vague:
To work most effectively with poorer nations Australia must not join the 
attempt to simplify trade policy into line with the old market mechanisms, 
but instead must plan Australian development to co-ordinate as much of it 
as possible with theirs. This can be no accidental result of market forces 
. . . [I]t can come only from carefully selected objectives appropriate to 
increasing trade. . . . We need effective Australian nationalism, just as the 
poorer countries do, and it is in our interests to make our nationalism work 
consistently with theirs. We cannot achieve their interests, or ours, by 
playing the rules of free trade, which are the rules of the already powerful.
But equally we cannot long continue with out old haphazard hand-out 
policy of protection (1971: 26).
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Cairns never spelt out what he meant. But, inter alia, these words suggest something 
like the export credits scheme. Cairns might not have accepted that the export credits 
should be 'deregulated' into the liberal import/export link analysed in Chapter Five 
above. But his sentiments suggest support for amending the administration of the 
existing export credit scheme to permit much greater restructuring and intra-industry 
trade with developing countries. The Tariff Board's terms of reference sought advice on 
developing this agenda, requiring the Board to "give consideration to all measures which 
might be effective in implementing the goals set out elsewhere in [the reference] noting 
that the government considers that neither tariffs alone, nor policies akin to the present 
motor vehicle plans would be effective in implementing all these goals" (IAC, PMVs, 
1974, Appendix One: 2).
Others were of a similar mind to Cairns. David SyCip, an Australian businessman 
involved in the Filipino automotive industry, had made similar points about integrating 
respective economic 'nationalisms'. He proposed 'regional complementation' as a 
means of cutting through the mutually conflicting nationalisms of developed and 
developing countries. "The answer would seem to lie in dis-aggregated industries, for 
both developing and developed counties, so that the work of producing finished 
manufactured goods may be shared. Instead of nationally integrated industries there 
should be inter-nationally integrated industries" (SyCip, 1970: 9-10, emphasis in 
original). Hartnett's comments on the need for intra-industry restructuring from the mid 
1960s have already been mentioned (see § 2.5.2.2 above). The Managing Director of 
Leyland Australia, Peter North sought to avoid free trade but, nevertheless to replace 
protectionism with a "practical course" which "could steer that fine line between the 
madness of economic nationalism, and the daring of aggressive, but sound, industrial 
entrepreneurialism". The task of integrating the Australian industry with the global 
automotive industry had been profoundly retarded by the sixties' emphasis on 
progressively higher cost import replacement.
Had we faced this task ten years ago, we could have been on the way today 
to a market served by a combination, of unique Australian products selling 
in the domestic market beside built up imports coming through lower tariff 
barriers, and in export markets with the strength of Australian design, 
instead of the weakness of higher cost, mirror image versions of cars created 
in Europe and America (Martec Seminar, May 1973, Transcript:. N5).
Manufactures' export growth had obvious and broadly based political attractions. In 
addition to what one might presume was its popular (mercantilistic) appeal, Whitlam had 
always spoken of the importance of manufactured exports (see § 2.5.2.1 above) and 
Cairns' advisors were saying similar things. Brian Brogan, "one of the only economists
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in whom Cairns had any faith" (Rattigan, 1986: 211-2), commented to an industry 
seminar that the Government's response to the IAC report would consider "ways of 
making the export of automotive products . . . more attractive". Brogan added in 
sympathy with the emerging IAC line that "the previous government was perhaps too 
concerned about the interests of the manufacturers. We will take a slightly broader 
view". Interestingly, despite Cairns' hostility to multinational companies, Brogan 
commented that the Labor Government appreciated that there was "no realistic 
alternative" to foreign domination in the industry and that as a consequence "the 
government will . . .  be rather attracted to the plans that the vehicle manufacturers 
might have for integrating their Australian plants with their plants abroad. I think there 
are advantages for all of us if the Australian economy is opened up to international 
competition, but I think we also believe that the Australian automotive industry has 
something very important to contribute to Australia" (Martec Seminar, May, 1974, 
Transcript: F5).
These perspectives might have offered the scope for forging common ground between 
protectionists and free traders, and between sectional interests and the IAC representing 
the public interest. Certainly there were some active partisans of the tariff debate who 
were interested in testing how far they might be able to find common ground with their 
adversaries. In 1971 Bert Kelly wrote in his diary that, to his surprise, a meeting with 
Australia's arch protectionists - including Sir Charles McGrath of Repco, senior Liberal 
Party figure and one of the architects of the local content plans - did not comply with the 
usual formula.
I expected that we would spend the first half hour trading platitudes and the 
last two or three trading insults. But, to my surprise, everybody tackled 
their work in a most responsible way and then we came to agreement 
without, I'm certain, giving away any of the principles by which we stand. 
Evidently they are beginning to realise, these high protectionists, they can't 
afford to be stupid in their arguments and expose themselves to ridicule 
(Kelly, 19th March, 1971).
It would be naive to believe that much common ground between McGrath and the trade 
liberalisers was even in the offing at this stage. Yet Kelly was not without his successes 
in at least in reducing the areas of disagreement between himself and his protectionist 
adversaries. In late 1973 he was able to get:
the manager of GMH [to] agree . . . with my general thesis that if we had 
not fragmented the car industry as we had and let it develop naturally we 
would probably have one, or at the most two, manufacturers of cars and 
wouldn't have to put any requirement on them to have a certain percentage 
of Australian content. We would have more people making cars, cheaper
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cars and have less high tariff protection against imported cars (Kelly, 24th 
October 1973).
The philosopher Allan Gibbard comments that "the norms of accommodation" between 
those who have abandoned the search for the best outcome are "norms of the second 
best" (1989: 183). Of course in this context this is an apposite, though unintended pun. 
For it turns out that what imbues export credits with their capacity to 'offer something' to 
the industry - their capacity to both facilitate and assist exports - is what gives them their 
'second best' appearance to the trade liberalisers. Yet export credits provided a 
promising arena within which the industry and trade liberalisers might have searched for 
some mutual adjustment and accommodation. Participants extolling the virtues of export 
growth may or may not have been embracing mercantilist logic. But as almost all the 
comments quoted in this sub-section show, they also accepted the benefits of greater 
import competition. It is this latter effect which provided the potential payoff for the 
trade liberalisers in exploring the attractions of export credits.
It will be recalled from Chapter Three's discussion of the tariff compensation debate, that 
what came close to an 'in-principle' objection to 'second best' policies arose largely from 
the Commission's misgivings about their potential to exacerbate the politics of 
protectionism. But here the 'second bestness' of the export credit scheme offered the 
potential to do the opposite. As Chapter Five has argued, in a range of circumstances, a 
sufficiently liberal export credit scheme on its own would have improved intra-industry 
resource allocation and productivity as well as reduced the effective assistance available 
to the industry. And if policy constraints were imposed by the Government's 
requirement that the Tariff Board make recommendations consistent with a "desire" to 
ensure the industry's prosperity, the export expansion and prosperity of the most 
competitive sections of the industry offered potential for accelerating the rationalisation 
of the least competitive parts of the industry. Baranson of the World Bank had already 
spelt out the appropriate considerations commonsensically enough:
The analysis in this study develops what economists would call a 'second 
best' solution. The study starts with the question, given a determination to 
develop an automotive industry, how may sector efficiency be maximized at 
successive levels of resource commitment? Stated another way, 
manufacturing and marketing strategies are sought which should permit the 
industry to operate in the range of maximum comparative advantage (1969:
5).
Of course these considerations apply mutatis mutandis to the determination of any long 
term assistance program, and so to any gradual trade liberalisation regime which 
contemplates protection for substantial time. In fact, as the following three chapters
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demonstrate, during the course of both major inquiries into the industry, the 
Commission never seriously engaged with these issue. In writing its 1974 report, the 
Commission failed to engage largely because of its very considerable neglect of 
automotive exports (see Chapter Seven below). When challenged after the publication of 
the 1974 report, the Commission held fast to the conclusions in its report, despite being 
provided with an alternative perspective which raised the 'second best' issues and 
despite emerging evidence that its expectations about the state of the market could be 
seriously awry. It avoided engagement with those proffering an alternative view by 
imposing upon them a burden of proof in the argument which was inappropriately heavy 
in the circumstances and which the Commission itself could not have met in defence of 
its own views (see Chapter Eight below). And despite the issue being raised quite 
specifically in the terms of reference for the 1979-81 inquiry and by participants, the 
Commission again failed to engage with those who suggested alternative views (see 
Chapter Nine below), again by imposing upon them a burden of proof which it was 
impossible for them to meet. In each case the Commission's technical achievements 
were part of the reason for its failure to engage.
6.5 The 1974 Report as a Showcase of Economic
Expertise
[The] authority which the Board accumulated and exercised . . . depended on 
formulating knowledge. What gave the Board added standing among the tariff 
public was the legitimacy it could appeal to on the basis of its intellectual 
superiority. The symbols surrounding its independence - its impartiality and its 
effect on the process of decision-making through its emphasis on public 
scrutiny - were bolstered by its claim to superior understanding of the wider 
economic effects of tariff-making, an understanding the Board had in the past 
claimed with much less assurance. Knowledge - or what was widely accepted 
to be knowledge - added stature, and persuasiveness, to the Board's 
preferences.
Leon Glezer, 1982: 110
The automotive inquiry was an opportunity for Rattigan to deploy the expertise which he 
had so assiduously built since the late 1960s. When it was fully underway in December 
1973, permanent staff at the Tariff Board had increased from 105 in 1967 to 388 
(Warhurst, 1978: 2). The newly formed Industry Economics Division (IED) contributed 
two major pieces of quantitative research - one on vehicle demand, the other on 
economies of scale in the industry. Warhurst comments:
The models were developed . . .  in consultation with outside experts. . . . 
Academic seminars were convened to discuss the models. IED was
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confident in the expertise it had built up. . . . This was however the first 
occasion in which [its] methodology had been fully utilized. The [Tariff 
Board] decided that this research would be exemplary and devoted its best 
professional resources to achieving such a result (1982: 189).
The studies provided useful, but very partial insights into the problems which the Tariff 
Board/IAC had been set. In one sense they contributed to the 'rigour' of the IAC's 
ultimate report. The material presented in the studies had been lovingly worked over. 
But in contrast to the technical skill which the Commission brought to its task, its 
'integrative' skill in applying those techniques in pertinent ways and in integrating the 
perspectives which were coming before it into its work proved inadequate. There was a 
lack of attention not just to the opportunities for mutual adjustment explored in the 
previous section but even to the phenomenon of automotive exports itself. Judging from 
their output, the technical focus of the Commission's economists detracted from their 
own appreciation of the 'second bestness' of the policy making situation in which they 
were placed and indeed the 'second bestness' of their own recommendations. And even 
in their own terms, the studies of future vehicle demand and scale economies and the use 
to which they were put provide textbook illustrations of the pitfalls of technical expertise 
which is applied with insufficient thoughtfulness.
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[A good education in economics] means tolerance of unconventional ideas . . .
Australian economics in the past had a fairly good record in its willingness to
test new ideas with critical scrutiny and to embrace at least some of the views of
the non-specialist.
Groenewegen and McFarlane, 1990: 234
This chapter analyses the Commission's 1973-74 report on the industry. After briefly 
outlining the major themes of the report (§§ 7.1, 7.2 below), the chapter outlines the 
many ways in which the Commission's view of the industry appears 'shoehorned' into 
the analytic categories of the HOS framework (§ 7.3 below). In fact, as recorded 
above, the Commission devoted considerable effort to quantifying scale economies in the 
industry, and scale economies are strictly inconsistent with an HOS world. However, 
except in so far as they reinforced its anti-protectionist message, the Commission 
remained largely insensitive to the policy implications of scale economies. The analysis 
of scale economies brought forth no reflection on what Elkan, Drysdale and Peter Lloyd, 
as well as many of the industrialists appearing before the Commission, thought followed 
directly from their existence - the degree to which exports might provide a small 
manufacturing country with access to more economic production volumes.
Likewise, and again despite prompting from the industrialists appearing before it, the 
Commission remained largely insensitive to the economic implications of product 
differentiation in the industry. As well, but partly because of this, the Commission was 
probably unduly pessimistic about the competitiveness of the industry and its prospects 
in the domestic and export markets, particularly in areas where it enjoyed the advantages 
of product differentiation (§ 7.4 below). One of the most striking things about the 
report is its lack of interest in automotive exports and their prospects; the HOS 
framework on which the Commission largely relied had no room at all for exports from 
an industry which was a net importer (§ 7.5 below). Not surprisingly in such 
circumstances the Commission showed little interest in the scope for intra-industry trade 
policy (§ 7.6 below).
The excellent work of scholars such as Linder, Elkan and Vernon would have helped the 
Commission better appreciate the issues before it. But by the mid 1970s, Vernon was 
far from centre stage and Linder and Elkan had been marginalised in the academic 
corpus. This is lamentable enough in itself. But it is too easy to blame this fact for the 
Commission's failures of vision. The issues which had been theorised by Linder, Elkan
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and Vernon did come before the Commission. Participants to the inquiry raised them 
clearly and commonsensically enough and important insights about product 
differentiation made cameo appearances in working papers. But the Commission 
remained largely resistant to them all.
7.1 The Commission's Major Themes
The Commission's report arrived in July 1974, somewhat to the chagrin of officers in 
PM&C who had implored the Commission to report before deteriorating economic 
circumstances swung the political pendulum against reform (Warhurst, 1982: 189-90). 
It was an unprecedented 218 page tour deforce  of analysis and comment not counting 
several substantial appendices. As Davidson and Stewardson approvingly put it, the 
report confirmed "the broad analysis which economic first principles would suggest" 
(1979: 183). The report offered a telling indictment of the waste inherent in the local 
content plans. Since the vehicle plans had been introduced, the industry had enjoyed 
approximately $1,500 million or more than half its wage bill as the 'subsidy equivalent' 
of the tariff and of tariff revenue foregone as a result of by-law concessions. And far 
from nurturing infant industries, protection, particularly the local content plans, had 
"tended to encourage small scale inefficient production at the expense of large scale more 
efficient production" (IAC, PMVs, 1974: 132, 135). Largely because of its lack of 
access to scale economies, the industry faced higher costs than the automotive industries 
of most major developed countries (IAC, PMVs, 1974: 1).
The IAC recommended the new broom of a tariff-only regime. It proposed to 
discontinue the local content plans immediately replacing them with a 35 per cent tariff 
on vehicles and components with the tariff phasing down to a "long term" rate of 25 per 
cent over the next seven years (IAC, PMVs, 1974: 6). The Commission argued that its 
recommendations would see significant rationalisation of the sub-sectors of the industry 
manufacturing components and light vehicles. But it anticipated no loss of market share 
in the most substantial and competitive part of the industry: medium - Holden 
Kingswood - sized cars, their derivatives, and those large light vehicles which shared 
significant components with them - six cylinder Toranas and Cortinas. Its demand 
forecasts suggested that demand would continue to swing towards smaller vehicles but at
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a sufficiently slow rate to ensure continued albeit slow demand growth for medium sized 
vehicles (IAC, PMVs, 1974: 165, 73).51
7.2 'A Number of Specific Issues'
[The larger companies in Australia seem] to regard labour as a commodity to be 
bought as any other commodity, and fail . . .  to recognise the importance of 
having workers identify with the company. In this regard the management 
attitude of companies in Japan and Germany provides a contrast. In these 
countries there is a belief that the enterprise should be concerned with the 
interest of the employees and employees concerned with the interests of the 
enterprise.
IAC Working Paper, "Assistance": 27
Rattigan sought, unsuccessfully, to prevent the reference from including issues which 
were outside the Tariff Board's usual purview of industry assistance (Rattigan, 1986: 
176-8). They were largely marginalised in the Commission's report (Warhurst, 1982: 
189). It handled them all in a section which was structurally, if not formally, a 
postscript to the report 'proper'. The Commission may have done its best on these 
matters, and some of its suggestions were helpful and sensible applications of economic 
'first principles', though they were not explored in any detail.52
However much of the chapter was little more than reportage. The Commission's 
contributions were summary and showed little interest in the economics of the industry 
outside its traditional assistance framework. Thus the Commission observed that Borg- 
Warner's single-union factory at Albury had fewer disputes than its factory in Fairfield 
but offered no analysis on whether or not this phenomenon was generally observable, 
and if so, what its policy implications might be. Its discussion of labour relations, 
concluded by observing the Government's "desire to maintain a viable automotive 
industry" and calling for it to "take positive and decisive steps" to encourage "Australian 
research and experimentation in the field of labour relations in the passenger vehicle 
industry" (IAC, PMVs, 1974: 184, 201). The Commission reported on Volvo's 
experiments in the area of labour management (IAC, PMVs, 1974: 200). But despite
51 This is a simplification of the Commission's comments, which suggested a surge of growth in 1974 
followed by small declines in the market from 1975 to 1977 followed by renewed slow growth after 
1978.
52 Thus the Commission suggested for instance that "where anti-pollution devices can be offered as 
optional extras on motor vehicles, it seems unnecessary for people operating vehicles primarily in 
country areas to be forced by registration requirements to install them" (IAC, PMVs, 1974: 195).
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observations in working papers noting higher labour productivity in Japan and possible 
links between this and a more collaborative relationship between labour and 
management, the Japanese industry was not mentioned in the section on "Labour 
Relations". Working papers had raised profit sharing as a possible prospect, but this did 
not find its way into the report (Working Paper, "Assistance": 4, 27ff).
Whilst the Commission could not reasonably have dealt comprehensively with all of the 
'non-assistance' matters raised in the terms of reference, it's published discussion 
offered little of use to the Government or the industry. And some of the issues arranged 
in this section of the Commission's report, particularly export credit arrangements, were 
clearly assistance matters. Considering them in this section of the report prejudged the 
possibility of assessing them according to the assistance criteria which the Tariff 
Board/IAC had developed over the preceding six years.
7.3 An HOS view of the Industry
Presiding Member: Generally, it seems to be argued by economists that the 
minimum economic scale for production of body stampings is a much higher 
figure than the minimum economic scale for the production of engines, so you 
are tending to argue against an accepted doctrine in this area?
Witness — I have found very few economists who know anything about the 
automotive industry . . . [Economists . . . tend to generalise, and think 
there is one solution to all problems in any industry.
Peter North, Managing Director of Leyland Australia, IAC, PMVs, 1974, 
Transcript: 1802
Warhurst comments that the Commission was ill-equipped to deal with what he calls 
'non-economic' issues raised in the references (1982: 189). But there were major 
weaknesses in its handling of the normative micro-economics of assistance to the 
industry - the Commission's bread and butter. Those weaknesses appear to have been 
directly related to the preponderance of economic expertise within the inquiry team and 
the absence of familiarity with the industry. The IAC's 'experts' included no experts on 
the automotive industry itself (personal communication with a staff member of the 
inquiry). Automotive industry consultants Martec came to play a significant role in the 
debate in late 1974. They offered their services to the Tariff Board in September 1973 
but it rejected the offer, Martec claimed later "without giving it serious consideration" 
(Martec, 1976: 3.14.3). As Chapter Eight argues, the skills and perspectives of Martec 
and the Commission were almost perfectly complementary. But the value of this 
complementarity was never realised.
147
Chapter Seven The 1973/4 Report
The Commission's understanding of the industry is recognisably structured by the HOS 
framework, so dominant in the 1950s and 60s and from which the technical apparatus of 
the Commission's assistance evaluation methodology sprang. The metaphors used to 
describe the industry are almost invariably static ones, with a fundamental preoccupation 
being the 'degree of disability' of the industry and its different sub-sectors vis-a-vis 
different countries. The implication of treating comparative costs as the sole or 
overwhelmingly determining competitive factor in the market, is that the market is 
essentially perfectly competitive - that product differentiation does not influence the 
prices at which suppliers can sell.
In addition, as this chapter outlines, this preoccupation with cost disability as a measure 
of market competitiveness actually hampered the IAC in throwing off its protectionist 
heritage. From its very anti-protectionist vantage point, the Commission implicitly 
assumed something which had been a foundation stone of Australian protectionism - that 
in the absence of some special factor - whether it be natural or government induced 
protection or some other advantage - Australian manufacturing was unlikely to be 
competitive in domestic or export markets. Such a perspective kept both the IAC's and 
protectionists' focus largely on the question of how much protection was necessary for 
the industry's survival in the local market - even if the answer they gave differed. This 
was an inauspicious perspective from which to appreciate issues other than the 
industry's survival - particularly the prospects for it to prosper in world markets (see 
§ 7.4ff below).
7.3.1 Assembly and Manufacture
The CKD pack is one of the last remaining vestiges of economic colonialism. It
costs more to build and ship a CKD pack, than it does to build and ship a
complete car. Before you take into account the cost of assembling it locally.
Mr Peter North, Managing Director of Leyland Australia, Martec, Industry
Seminar, May 1973, Transcript: N6
The Commission oriented much of its thinking around what it called a "fundamental 
relationship": cost disabilities . . . "decrease with increasing scale of operation, but 
increase with the level of local content attained" (IAC, PMVs, 1974: 145). This 
downplays an important phenomenon which had been evident for some time. In 1964 
Lawrence Hartnett had told the Tariff Board that local assembly of imported components 
was almost invariably uneconomic (Tariff Board, 1965, Transcript: 47A). By 1974, car 
assembly under protection was well represented in the effective protection literature as an 
example of 'negative value added' (Corden, 1971: 51). This point appears in the nooks
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and crannies of the Commission's 1974 report. Thus in an appendix the Commission 
cited a contemporary World Bank study of the industry in developing countries, which 
commented that "vehicles assembled overseas from CKD units are more costly (3 to 10 
per cent more) than completely built up units from the exporting country" (IAC, PMVs, 
1974, Appendix 8: 27). The reason was that "special handling and packaging costs 
more than offset slight savings in assembly costs" (Baranson, 1969: 39).
Australia's experience was similar. GMH, Ford and Chrysler had each withdrawn from 
decentralised (multi-state) vehicle assembly in the 1960s and 1970s, sometimes despite 
the withdrawal of state preferences.53 The IAC's evidence suggested that CKD packs 
did not even enjoy much of a sea freight advantage over built up imports (Working Paper 
B 11:4, c f  IAC, PMVs, 1974: 149). The Commission concluded correctly that the 
location of assembly and component production were clearly related (IAC, PMVs, 1974: 
49, 150). Assembly and component production were 'locational complements' with 
each activity lowering costs for the other where they share the same location. Yet the 
Commission's handling of the issue was unfortunately partial. For such a relationship 
implies at least three things. As the Commission pointed out, it gave a "degree of local 
advantage" to firms supplying components to Australian vehicle assemblers (IAC, 
PMVs, 1974: 150). However, the Commission did not fully appreciate that locational 
complementarity imposed a significant disadvantage on assembly activity in Australia 
where this involved the assembly of imported components. Importing vehicles in pieces 
was a particularly inefficient way of importing vehicles into Australia. As local content 
approached 100 per cent, diversification costs would rise steeply and outweigh any 
advantages of local component manufacture and assembly. However the most 
competitively manufactured Australian vehicles were nevertheless likely to have 
reasonably high local content.
53 Thus GMH closed down Western Australian assembly facilities at Mosman Park in 1972 (IAC, 
PMVs, 1974, Transcript: 88), whilst Ford had done the same ten years before (The West Australian, 6th 
June 1972: 4). Chrysler had given notice that it would close down a Port Melbourne assembly plant in 
April 1972 (The Australian, 5th April, 1972: 1). GMH was expecting to lose its state preferences from 
the Western Australian Government when it closed its Western Australian plant, but this had not 
happened to Ford ten years before (The West Australian, 6th June 1972: 4). The dispersal of GMH's 
plants had been one of the terms of its original agreement with the Australian Government for the 
production of an 'all Australian' vehicle and its major competitors may well have felt some pressure to 
bear a similar cross. By the end of the 1950s, GMH was taking steps towards greater centralisation of 
production (Bennett, 1994: 17-8).
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In fact - although the Commission did not highlight this phenomenon - its adherence to 
'economic first principles' in recommending a tariff-only regime meant that its 
recommendations in 1974 would have put paid to uneconomic CKD assembly 
operations. It would be less lucky in 1981, when it failed more fully to grasp the issue 
(see § 9.7.2 below). Even in 1974, however, the Commission suggested that under its 
proposed tariff-only regime, manufacturers of small light vehicles "should be able to 
operate profitably at low levels of local content" (IAC, PM Vs, 1974: 9, and see 159). 
Likewise it commented that under its recommendations "most assembly operations 
[would be] undertaken at low levels of local content" (IAC, PM Vs, 1974: 160), without 
apparently appreciating what it had said elsewhere, that without special government 
assistance to assembly it was significantly more expensive to assemble a vehicle locally 
than to import it CBU.
7.4 The lAC's Pessimism about the Industry's
Competitiveness
The relevance of the Commission's implicit HOS framework (and within this context its 
pessimism about the industry’s cost competitiveness) was captured in its assertion that 
"Australian products which require very high protection against imports" could not "be 
at the same time a force in export markets" (IAC, "Martec", 1974, Appendix 2: 3). The 
reasoning and analysis upon which the Commission based its conclusions of 
uncompetitiveness is thus worthy of scrutiny. This section argues that what analysis the 
IAC did leaves significant room for believing that it may have overestimated the cost 
disadvantages facing medium sized car manufacture in Australia by about 15 per cent. It 
also suggests that there were possible opportunities on the export side which went all but 
wholly unexplored by the Commission.
It is not necessary to argue that the Australian industry or any section of it was world 
competitive without assistance in order to cast doubt on the IAC's recommendations for 
the industry. Those recommendations were predicated on the government's desire to 
maintain the industry as mandated in the reference and accordingly involved substantial 
assistance for a prolonged period. The motivation behind exploring the potential export 
competitiveness of the industry is thus to explore the prospect that, by extending 
assistance to exports, the Commission might have recommended policy which met the 
constraints set out in its terms of reference at lower economic cost.
In the mid seventies the IAC offered several views of the industry's competitiveness. 
One emerged from the HOS inspired inter-industry factor and trade intensity studies in 
its Annual Report. Others emerged in its 1974 report on the automotive industry. These
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studies are briefly explored in turn. The section then considers the competitiveness of 
the industry in the presence of product differentiation - a subject which was largely 
neglected by the Commission.
7.4.1 Analysis of Factor, Import and Export Intensities
In its inaugural Annual Report, the IAC did not explicitly identify the automotive 
industry as uncompetitive. The industry did however self-identify along with the textiles 
clothing and footwear industries as a 'high cost' industry which, given the local content 
plans, it undoubtedly was. And 'high cost' industries were clearly associated with 
uncompetitiveness in the Commission's first Annual Report (see § 6.2 above, and 
Annual Report, 1973-4: 17).
7.4.1.1 Factor Intensities and Export Competitiveness
In addition to its association of high assistance rates with high costs, the IAC’s first 
Annual Report explored the characteristics of Australia's most competitive manufacturing 
industries, and concluded that the manufacturing industries with the greatest export 
intensity were typically capital intensive, high wage, high labour productivity industries 
(IAC, PMVs, 1974: 16). According to the informal HOS framework to which this 
reasoning appealed, the clothing industry was clearly unsuited to the comparative 
advantage of a high wage country such as Australia. When compared with other 
manufacturing it was less than one quarter as export oriented and capital intensive, had 
less than half the labour productivity and paid wages of about two thirds the 
manufacturing average. The automotive industry offered a much less neat fit. It had 
higher wages and labour productivity than manufacturing generally. Its capital intensity 
was 10 per cent lower than general manufacturing, although most value-added in the 
industry was added by vehicle assembly which had higher capital intensity than 
manufacturing generally (IAC, Annual Report, 1973-74, Appendix 4.1 and see 
Statistical Appendix Tables A6.1, A6.2).
7.4.1.2 Export and Import Intensities
The Commission's first Annual Report also made some play of export and import 
intensities of the automotive industry. Given that the summary table in the Annual 
Report reported the industry as having a lower export intensity and higher import 
intensity than the manufacturing average, some cautionary comments are offered. 
'Manufacturing' for the Commission's purposes here included lightly processed foods, 
fibres and minerals such as 'meat and abattoir by-products', (ASIC 2111) 'scoured and 
carbonised wool' (ASIC 2312) and 'Basic Metal Products' (ASIC 291) including
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pelletised, metallised iron ore (ASIC 2911). These 'manufacturing' industries faced 
favourable factor cost prices and so had very high export and low import intensities. If 
one allows for this by excluding 'primary based' manufacturing industries, according to 
the Industry Commission's current methodology, one finds the automotive industry 
outperforming elaborately transformed manufacturers in export intensity in the early and 
mid 1970s. Given the simultaneous growth in imports, the automotive industry's import 
and intra-industry trade intensity were also greater than other elaborately transformed 
manufacturers (see Statistical Appendix, Tables A7.3, to A7.5). Automotive imports 
would have been reduced by the industry's heavy protection, although the next sub­
section suggests that import penetration was also greatly affected by changes in domestic 
demand. The industry's export and intra-industry trade performance was the more 
notable for the trade restrictiveness of the local content plans and the negative assistance 
protection heaped upon automotive exports (see § 5.7.2).
7.4.2 Disparities of Competitiveness within the industry as
Measured by Market Share
After 1968, imported vehicles and those assembled from predominantly imported 
components occupied a steadily growing share of the small and large light vehicle 
market, rising to about 70 per cent in 1973. Of those vehicles manufactured in Australia, 
very few were exported. On the other hand, Australian medium vehicles captured over 
95 per cent medium car domestic market share right through the sixties and seventies 
(IAC, PMVs, 1974, Appendix Seven: 18, Table A7.15 and see Chapter Two above). In 
this part of the market, the Australian industry's export intensity was over 15 and 12 per
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cent in volume and value terms respectively. This was well over its import intensity. In 
medium vehicles Australia was a net exporter.54
7.4.3 Costs, Prices, Product Differentiation and
Competitiveness
I am sorry to say this but there is no minimum scale, it depends upon the 
conditions and the competitiveness. In Japan our lowest volume production 
engine is only 3,000 per month and our biggest volume production is 40,000 
per month. Many can be possible.
Mr Tamura, Toyota, IAC, PM Vs, 1974, Transcript: 406
The Commission was undoubtedly correct in finding very high degrees of cost disability 
in local manufacture of light vehicles when compared with imports. Beyond this, its 
attempt to measure the competitiveness of the industry was fraught with difficulty and 
frustration. It probably overestimated the degree of cost disability of local manufacture 
of medium sized cars. Whether or not it did, its implicit framework abstracted from the 
marketing possibilities presented by product differentiation.
7.4.3.1 The Vicissitudes of Measurement
The report's comment that "several firms" refused the Commission access to information 
on overseas costs (IAC, PMVs, 1974: 98) was something of an understatement. The
54 The 95 per cent market share to domestic manufacturers is calculated in terms of volumes (units of 
vehicles), but the figures do not change much when measured in terms of value. The main assembled 
and/or imported vehicles occupying this sector were Toyota Crowns and Datsun 260Cs, each of which 
retailed in Australia for approximately 10 to 20 per cent more than standard model Holden and Falcons 
(Modern Motor, April 1974.). If this were the case uniformly within the sector, it would lift the import 
share as measured by value marginally - from approximately five to approximately six per cent. This 
contrasts with an export intensity by value of more than double this.
Exports of Medium Vehicles as a Proportion of Production
1 9 7 1 1 9 7 2
By V o lu m e By V a lue By V o lu m e By V a lu e
E x p o r t s / P r o d n 1 7 . 3 % 1 2 . 2 % 2 0 . 8 % 1 6 . 5 %
Source: Working Documents "Production" and "Export Sales". Data source: Evidence. NB. 
Ford, Leyland and Chrysler supplied incomplete information - ie values without volumes or vice 
versa. These figures were estimated by using plausible comparisons with data from other firms, 
which was complete. Figures for 1973 appear to show a substantial increase in export intensity, 
but were supplied in very incomplete form and have accordingly been omitted._________________
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Commission had the cost profiles of only two overseas vehicles. One was a small 
vehicle from a Japanese company and the other was a European medium sized vehicle 
(Working Paper A2: 5). In addition the Commission's detailed local cost information 
was also problematic. As the author of much of the cost analysis in working papers 
"A2" and "B7" lamented " [comparisons of production costs between individual local 
producers and between local and overseas manufacturers" had been "severely hampered 
by a lack of uniformity by different companies in the basis of allocation of costs to the 
standard categories in the Commission's costing schedule" (Working Paper A2: 5). The 
component pack from which one vehicle was assembled cost much less than comparable 
vehicles. "The costing appears deficient in several overhead items, and is in total much 
lower than the cost to make and sell all other vehicles" (Working Paper A2: 6). Some 
cost information for locally manufactured vehicles suggested that manufacturing costs 
rose with increased scale - something which was paradoxical to say the least, given the 
Commission's focus on scale as a major explanation of Australian cost disabilities. 
Indeed, it was also belied by reported profit performances (Working Paper A2: 7).
These difficulties drove the Commission towards primary reliance on price rather than 
cost comparisons. Whilst it gathered some figures on the retail prices of vehicles in 
overseas countries (Working Paper B7), the Commission placed far more weight on 
comparisons with the import prices it obtained from various operators in the Australian 
market (Working Paper "Assistance": 2; IAC, PMVs, 1974: 81). This raised an obvious 
problem. For several reasons, in many countries, export prices were often below 
domestic prices. Firstly exporters generally enjoyed some degree of protection in their 
domestic markets by way of transport costs and/or trade barriers, whilst in foreign 
markets the opposite was the case. In the presence of some monopoly power, by the 
principles of 'spatial competition', the exporting firm can be expected to price 
discriminate in favour of customers who are more costly to service (Greenhut, 1970: 
318-25). Secondly Australian tariffs based on stated export prices gave exporters to 
Australia an incentive to understate their export (and so import) prices. Particularly 
where the importing firm in Australia was a subsidiary of the exporting firm offshore, 
any resulting paper losses from underpriced exports could be recouped as higher 
margins by the importing subsidiary.
After previous 'dumping' scandals (Stubbs, 1972: 92-3), Australian Customs had 
established minimum export f.o.b. prices designed to prevent dumping by Japanese and 
Italian vehicles. The Commission took these minimum prices without satisfying itself as 
to Customs' methodology (Working Paper, "Assistance": 2). And its report spoke of 
the "the understatement of value" with respect to imported upper medium vehicles from
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Europe (IAC, PM Vs, 1974: 83) - some of which originated in Italy (Working Paper A2: 
3). Whilst the Commission calculated corrected disabilities for the industry using 
adjustments to allow for "apparent dumping margins" for the imports from some 
European countries (Working Paper A2: 3), and published them in its report, (IAC, 
PMVs, 1974: 83), it used the unadjusted figures in its table of price disabilities (IAC, 
PMVs, 1974: 82). In the upshot, the IAC figures on cost disabilities were problematic 
on their face. There were wide disparities in price competitiveness, even where 
comparisons were broken down into vehicle classes and competitor countries. The 
Commission offered two quantifications of the industry's competitiveness - the "price 
disadvantages for locally produced vehicles" and the "cost disadvantages" of local 
manufacture. "Price disadvantages" were generated from staff calculations from import 
prices rounded to the nearest five per cent (cf Working Paper A2, Table Two).55
Table 7.1 "Price Disadvantages" of 
Local Vehicles in the Australian 
Market
Category Japan Europe
Small light 40-65 (a) - 40
Large light 2 5 -5 0 5 - 2 5
Medium 20-35 (a) - 20
Upper Medium (b) 4 0 - 8 5
Light Commercial 55-75 (b)
Source: IAC, PMVs, 1974: 82, Ultimate source: Evidence.
(a) advantage
(b) not available______________________________________
The IAC's figures on "cost disadvantages" were generated by adding back freight plus 
an adjustment to correct for the possibility that Australian vehicle selling prices had been 
artificially depressed to minimise liabilities for sales tax. The Commission calculated 
'nominal' selling prices for Australian vehicles which would yield a 10 per cent return on 
assets for the Australian manufacturers. This added 18 per cent to the price of small and 
large light cars and 12 per cent to medium cars. Thus the Commission was vigilant to 
allow for the possibility that Australian manufacturers had a financial incentive to report 
unrealistically low prices, but less vigilant about the prospect that exporters to Australia 
faced similar incentives. The Commission's estimates of "cost disability" were much 
greater than their estimates of "price disability".
55 No figures were presented corresponding to American vehicles presumably because the Commission 
was unable to obtain American export prices to Australia for any appropriate vehicles.
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Table 7.2 "Cost Disability" of Australian 
Vehicles against Imports
Category_________ Japan______ Europe______USA_______
Small light 70-100+ "about 25"
Large light 80-85
Medium "approx 45" 40-50
Upper Medium 
Light Commercial
Source: IAC, PMVs, 1974: 98.5 _^________________________________
The fragmentary nature of this information is notable. The conclusion of a summary 
working paper apparently completed by a senior staff member after the original working 
papers, was that "we must concede that our estimates of the total cost disadvantage may 
be too high. The quality of the data was suspect and the methodology employed to 
arrive at estimates of cost disadvantages is far from ideal". "Nevertheless", the 
document continued, "all the information we have points to disadvantages of the same 
high order" (Working Paper, "Assistance": 4). This was not quite true.
7.4.3.2 The Cost Competitiveness of Medium Car
Manufacture in Australia
All the Commission's evidence pointed to high cost disabilities in the manufacture of 
small vehicles against those of the Japanese industry. As it reported, the Commission's 
data suggested cost disadvantages, but much lower ones in the production of medium 
sized cars. Even this information was not unambiguous. The only detailed cost 
breakdown the Commission had of medium car manufacture indicated that a European 
unit was produced at between five and fourteen per cent higher cost than the three 
Australian medium vehicles, although the European vehicle had relatively more luxurious 
appointments (see Working Paper B7, Table Three).57 Likewise GMH's evidence 
indicated that (ex-tax), Australian Holden prices were significantly less than the roughly 
comparable vehicles GM manufactured in Germany (IAC, PMVs, 1974, Transcript: 
58C), and about the same as prices in Britain for (roughly) comparable cars. These 
figures were broadly corroborated in the Commission's comparative domestic price
56 The figures for Japan correspond with Table 2: 3 of "Assistance to the Passenger Motor Vehicle 
Industry" and on inspection it will be seen that these figures are generated from the figures from Working 
Paper A2, Table 2.
57 Comparably 'optioning' the Australian cars would have added a little over 10 per cent to the cost of 
the Australian vehicles although this does not allow for the European vehicles' smaller dimensions and 
engine capacity (see Working Paper B7, Table 3).
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studies (Working Paper B7: 2 of Table Two; Working Paper A2: 3 of Table One and 
Table Five). The Commission's table on price disabilities in the Australian market noted 
that in some cases the Australian industry apparently enjoyed a price advantage over 
European medium vehicles (see above). However, perhaps for reasons of 
confidentiality, it failed to quantify the level of advantage. More importantly, the 
Commission gave the impression that this price advantage was only available in the 
Australian market - counting transport costs for European cars to Australia - whereas its 
evidence suggested that, in some comparisons, Australian vehicles had a price advantage 
over comparable European ones in their respective domestic markets (Working Paper 
B7, Table One: 2).
The first sentence of the report finessed these complications by reporting that the 
Commission had found that costs of production were "significantly higher" than costs in 
"Japan, North America and most European countries" (IAC, PMVs, 1974: 1, emphasis 
added). Yet the tone of the report, and the central 'message' it carried, was one of 
generalised if not uniform uncompetitiveness. The heterogeneity accommodated by the 
IAC's initial words rapidly fell from view in both the Commission's thinking (see 
below) and its subsequent contributions to the debate. In public correspondence with the 
bureaucracy after the report's release, Rattigan wrote that "the Commission found that 
the local industry, in its present form, was at a high level of cost disadvantage against 
overseas producers, ranging from about 45 per cent on medium cars to over 100 per cent 
on small light cars (Rattigan to Steele: 1). No allowances were made for the possibility 
that there might be substantial sections of the Australian industry which were much less 
uncompetitive and which may have enjoyed some competitive advantages over other 
producers.58
Against both Japanese and American medium cars, Australian vehicles were probably at 
a cost disadvantage although the extent of this disadvantage was probably overestimated 
by the Commission. The Commission's estimates of Japanese vehicles' cost 
competitiveness was based on the import price of CBUs which suggested disabilities of 
between 20 and 30 per cent against the Japanese, which were then extended to 45-57 per 
cent by adding back freight and the adjustment for understatement of domestic ex-factory 
prices (Working Paper, "Assistance": 3). Although it allowed for the possibility that 
Australian vehicle prices were artificially depressed, it did not investigate the possibility
58 The central message of the report is recounted by Rattigan twenty two years later in his memoirs 
with the reservations removed. As Rattigan has it "the costs of production were considerably higher in 
Australia than in Japan, North America and the European countries" (1986: 213).
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that Japanese export prices were likewise depressed. Certainly the Commission's study 
of comparable retail prices of Japanese and Australian medium vehicles - ex-tax in their 
respective domestic markets and including tariffs and tax in one Asian market - indicated 
a disability of between 27 and 33 per cent (Working Paper B7, Table One: 3; Working 
Paper A 10: 61).
It seems that the USA figures were calculated from the Commission's information on 
American domestic vehicle prices. Yet the figuring of the working papers had these 
vehicles at a respective domestic price advantage of approximately 30 per cent against 
comparable Australian domestic prices (Working Paper B7, Table One: 3). I am unsure 
how the Commission arrived at its 40-50 per cent price disability from these figures, and 
can only surmise that it did so by adding its allowance for artificial (sales tax induced) 
deflation of Australian prices. Yet it is hard to justify such a practice because in this 
instance the price comparison was between ex-tax retail prices. For as the Commission 
explained the issue, the modus operandi of any understatement of prices to avoid tax 
involved the manufacturers understating their wholesale prices. This was done with a 
view to recouping any consequent loss of wholesale revenue in higher handling margins 
effectively restoring the retail price to the price it would have had if the wholesale price 
not been understated - less the presumably very small margin of wholesale tax avoidance 
(IAC, PMVs, 1974: 57).
7.4.3.3 Comparative Costs and Product Differentiation
Let GMH and Ford fight for [number one] position with the Japanese. We will 
be happy where we are, or to slightly improve our share [of 1.5 per cent of the 
domestic market].
Manager of Volvo Australia, The Financial Australian, 1st August, 1980: 8
The Commission expended considerable effort attempting to discover the cost structure 
of the industry compared with industries offshore. But it showed much less interest in 
other issues which are typically unproblematic in a perfectly competitive environment but 
which loom much larger in the presence of product differentiation and imperfect 
competition. There were occasional comments in working papers such as the following: 
[M]arkups on some imported vehicles, particularly those described as 
'luxury cars' cannot be explained in terms of freight etc. costs and duty.
. . .  It may be misleading to draw general conclusions from the practice of 
these cars, as they supply a small and distinguished sector of the market in 
which demand schedules . . .  are relatively price inelastic (Working Paper, 
"Assistance": 11).
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The Commission's report noted considerable evidence that product differentiation - as
%
provided for instance by the 'optioning up' of cars - was capable of extracting premiums 
in the market which bore little or no relation to the costs of supply (Working Paper B7: 
4; also see IAC, PMVs, 1974: 81). Yet whilst the Commission's examination of 
competitiveness provided useful information, it was both insensitive to the possibilities 
which product differentiation held out for the Australian industry and crucially influenced 
by its focus on the domestic market. There was little soul searching about which cars to 
compare with which in the Commission's cost and price studies. And the Commission 
expended virtually no effort investigating the extent to which product differentiation 
could influence elasticity of demand and the implications which this might have for its 
cost/price comparisons and for the competitive potential of the Australian automotive 
industry in domestic and export markets.
One working paper commented that "[c]ars of similar specifications can be readily 
grouped into particular price brackets" (Working Paper B7: 1). In fact different vehicles 
appeared in different groupings depending upon which market was under inspection. 
For instance a range of two litre family sedans comprised a discernible vehicle 'class' in 
England's retail market selling for about £2,000. These vehicles consistently undercut 
six cylinder family sedan prices in England, which began at about £2,300. European 
exporters to Australia recovered at least some of their tariff and transport costs and 
accordingly, in Australia, European two litre family sedans sold at a price premium to the 
local six cylinder family sedans.
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Table 7.3 Prices for Similar cars in Australia and England 
mid 1974
Australian
Price
English
Price
Engine
Power
Displacement Wheelbase
4  C y l i n d e r s
Volvo 144 DL $4,975 £2,195 90BHP 1,986 cc 8’ 7"
Volvo 144 GL na £2,850 135 BHP 1,986 cc 8' 7"
Peugeot 504 $4,598 £1,976 98BHP 1,971 cc 9' 0"
Peugeot 504 $5,198 £2,195 110 BHP 1,971 cc 9' 0"
6 +  c y l i n d e r s
)|(
Holden Kingswood $3,094 na 129 BHP 3,313 cc 9’ 3"
Holden Premier $3,660 na 135 BHP 3,313 cc 9' 3"
Holden Statesman $4,095 na 135 BHP 3,313 cc 9' 6"
Ford Falcon $2,825 na 130 BHP 3,280 cc 9' 3”
Ford Fairmont $3,950 £3,125** 230 BHP 4,945 cc 9' 3"
Ford Fairlane $3,970 £3,793 250 BHP 5,752 cc 9’ 8"
Vauxhall Ventura na £2,331 122 BHP 3,294 cc 8’ 9"
Ford Granada XL na £2,393 138 BHP 2,994 cc 9' 1"
Ford Granada GXL Ghia na £3,157 138 BHP 2,994 cc 9' 1"
Holden medium cars are all 'optioned' to the 202 cubic inch six cylinder engine
Fairmonts and Fairlanes sold in England were more 'optioned up' than those sold in 
Australia. In England the vehicles were supplied with V8 engines whereas the Australian price 
quoted is for six cylinder vehicles.____________________________________________________
Source: English Prices - Autocar Magazine, 20th July 1974: 2-3. Australian Prices, Modern 
Motor, April 1974. Vehicle Specifications: Autocar Magazine, 20th July 1974: 68ff - with the 
exception of Holden and Falcon vehicle specifications obtained from Modem Motor, September 
1971: 60-1; October 1971: 4-5; August 1972: 12; and Motor Manual, December 1972._______
The Commission's analysis of competitiveness did not consider these issues. When a 
working paper commented that "comparisons have been made only for those vehicles 
which are close to competitors in the market" (Working Paper, "Assistance": 2), "the 
market" meant the Australian market. Classifications were taken from ADAPS - a 
private organisation which collected and published market information relating to the 
industry. Yet in some areas where it was considered that ADAPS classification did not 
"accurately place vehicles in market categories", classifications were changed. Thus, for 
instance the Renault 12 was moved from 'small light' to 'large light' and the Peugeot 
504 was moved from 'medium' to 'upper medium' to reflect their price in Australia, 
notwithstanding the fact that the ADAPS classifications were, in these cases at least, a 
better reflection of the technical specifications of the vehicles in question (Working Paper
160
Chapter Seven The 1973/4 Report
A2: 2).59 Thus whilst the IAC generally compared vehicles which were technically 
similar, it also frequently 'promoted' imported vehicles from lower priced classes to 
higher ones because of their higher price in Australia.
Because Australia's major competition in smaller vehicle classes was from similarly 
sized and priced Japanese cars, and because there was little effective import competition 
in medium cars, these problems were not large in these sectors. But the problems were 
acute in the case of upper medium vehicles. The Commission's cost/price comparisons 
of Australia's 'upper medium' vehicles compared the competitiveness of current 
Australian production of 'upper medium' vehicles with the list prices of similar vehicles 
as CBU exports from their home country. However the Australian production chosen in 
these comparisons was European 'upper medium' vehicles assembled in Australia from 
CKD packs. This yielded disabilities of between 40 and 85 per cent, or between 12 and 
70 per cent assuming that export prices had been understated (Working Paper A2: 3; also 
see IAC, PMVs, 1974: 83). It seems that the Commission was observing the 
inefficiencies of low volume offshore assembly as much as any particularly Australian 
inadequacies in the production of 'upper medium' vehicles (see Working Paper A2: 3-4 
of Table One).
The Commission could have compared the domestic ex-tax price or cost of one of 
GMH's, Ford's or Chrysler's luxury optioned medium sized sedans, or their long wheel 
base offerings in the 'upper medium' sub-sector of the Australian market, with the 
European 'upper medium' offerings. Certainly some European vehicles were more 
technically sophisticated, yet some were not (see § 7.5.2.1 below). And the Australian 
vehicles were both larger and more powerful than the European ones.60 Such a 
comparison would have produced estimates of competitiveness within a wide band given 
the diversity of product offerings both in Australia and overseas. But at the more 
'optimistic' end of that band from Australia's perspective, the disability it measured in 
the 'upper medium' segment of the market would have been a price disadvantage of 
approximately 10 per cent (with local and overseas vehicles measured at their ex-factory 
prices in their home market) or, with freight to Australia included, a duty free advantage
9^ As the name suggests, the Renault 12 was competing in the 1200 cc class whilst the Peugeot 504 
was competing in the two litre class (The actual engine displacements were 1,289 and 1,971 ccs 
respectively [Autocar Magazine, 20th July 1974: 72]).
60 Whilst the Commission sought to ensure that Australian vehicles had the same options as imported 
vehicles it did not do the same in the other direction. No allowance was made for the much greater size 
and power of the Australian products over European 'upper medium' offerings.
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in the Australian market. This ex-tax domestic retail price advantage to Europe would 
have largely evaporated had the Australian vehicles been compared with six cylinder 
European vehicles (which would still have been smaller than the Australian vehicles) 
rather than their more frugal two litre European competitors.
7 .5 A u to m o tiv e  E x p o rts
7.5.1 The Neglect of Exports
There was strikingly little on the issue of Australian automotive exports in the report. 
The 18 page report "Summary" did not mention exports (pp. 1-18). Of the 
Commission's 218 page report, just over three pages were devoted to sustained 
discussion of automotive exports and their prospects. This discussion comprised the 
Commission's treatment of "Overseas Markets" a sub-section in Section Five of the 
report dealing with "The Market". In examining 'future export prospects' the 
Commission offered reportage. Although relatively non-committal, its tone was both 
passive and rather pessimistic. Australian manufacturers had been expanding their 
market share in New Zealand. The Commission did not seek to investigate the extent to 
which exports were currently dependent upon trade preferences in the New Zealand 
market. And it did not attribute the expansion of Australian market share to any 
increases in the level of Australian trade preferences in New Zealand. Nevertheless it 
concluded that future export prospects to New Zealand would "depend on the 
continuation of the preferential tariff on vehicles and the nature of restrictions on imports 
in New Zealand". Likewise in South Africa, expected increases in exports were thought 
to be probably "only marginal" because GMH and Ford had recently been displaced as 
market leaders by the Japanese and because of South African protectionism (IAC, 
PM Vs, 1974: 96).
South Africa and New Zealand together represented 75 per cent of Australia's export 
trade (IAC, PMVs, 1974, Table, A 7.17, Appendix Seven: 21). Yet the market for 
exports to developing Asian countries had been growing strongly. Between 1971-72 
and 1973-4, exports to "Developing Asia" grew from just under one eighth to over one 
fifth of all automotive exports (Industries Assistance Commission, 1981: A 84). 
Commission staff prepared a page or so of notes on export markets such as the 
Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and Korea (Working Paper A 10: 
57-62). The report summarised this work by commenting that prospects for further 
export market expansion in these low income markets was "limited" (IAC, PMVs, 1974: 
97).
162
Chapter Seven The 1973/4 Report
By 1974, automotive exports to Japan had quadrupled their share of Australian 
automotive exports in four years although, given that this was from a minuscule base, 
they still comprised only about one per cent of total automotive exports in 1974 
(Industries Assistance Commission, 1981: A 84). But the fact that Australia was 
exporting - admittedly in relatively small numbers - to high income countries including 
the major automotive producing and consuming countries was neither reported nor 
considered. Neither were the ideas of Drysdale, Kojima, Elkan or David Sycip (see 
Chapter Four and § 6.4 above). Throughout the IAC's discussion, no comment was 
made on the extent to which the Australian industry or Government might be able to 
enhance the industry's performance in export markets. And whilst the Commission's 
brief discussion noted the frustration of Australian automotive exports resulting from 
foreign trade barriers, the Commission did not suggest that this be considered in 
Australia's trade negotiating strategy.
7.5.2 Product Differentiation and Exports
Commissioner — When you say there is no place in the world to buy a Holden 
kind of car except Australia, what is so different about a car like that. . . ?
Peter North [Managing Director of Leyland Australia] — My point was not a 
kind of car like a Holden. You cannot buy a Holden. There are many cars of 
varying kinds available, but when one carries its own brand name, this is going 
to establish its rightful position in terms of market forces, not in terms of 
economics. Take for example the marketing role of a Rover and a Jaguar. It is 
different in England from the marketing role of those two cars in this country.
In this country they are substantially luxuries, but in their own country they are 
moderate luxuries.
IAC, PMVs, 1974, Transcript: 1757
Where discussion in the 1974 Report deviated from simple reportage, the analysis 
offered was of an 'in-principle' kind without supporting quantitative illustration or 
analysis. The Commission suggested that the industry's success could be attributed to:
• cost advantages in countries which consumed right hand drive vehicles,
• its relative competitiveness in supplying six and eight cylinder vehicles,
• the preferences it enjoyed in New Zealand and
• Australian export incentives (IAC, PMVs, 1974: 95) which amounted to 
$6.1 million dollars for the industry for 1972-73 (IAC, PMVs, 1974: 
147).
These factors are significant by virtue of their exclusive reference to the concept of the 
supply cost (duty paid into the export market). The Commission had informally invoked
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something of Linder's model in its inaugural Annual Report by observing that Australian 
manufacturers might expect to develop exports where their products were based on 
"skill, innovation, or design" (IAC, Annual Report, 1973-4: 18). But there was little of 
this in the report on the automotive industry. There was virtually nothing about 
innovation or the prospective future 'evolution' of the industry and nothing on the price 
elasticity of demand in the presence of product differentiation.
And while the IAC's first two points cited above refer to scale economies and 
indivisibilities in production, they do so implicitly and from a 'negative' perspective: that 
is, they focused on possibilities for the industry to make the best of a bad (ie 
uncompetitive) situation. The prospect of the industry currently, or in the future, 
enjoying competitive advantages other than by way of some form of protection - for 
example by way of transport costs, its domestic manufacture of right hand drive 
vehicles, or government mandated assistance - was absent. The other side of this coin 
was that export markets were generally considered as a 'vent for surplus', not a field of 
opportunity which might permit Australia not only to ameliorate its weaknesses - by 
increasing its otherwise suboptimal scale of production - but to optimise dynamically its 
strengths. For all the effort and sophistication of their study of scale economies, the 
IAC's economists remained silent on the role which exports might play in achieving 
economies of scale at the plant or industry level (IAC, PMVs, 1974, Chapter Six). 
Instead the discussion was couched in terms of the scale of production of various 
components which "the Australian market could support" (eg IAC, PMVs, 1974: 106, 
108, 113, emphasis added).
Reflecting Australia's relative strength and Japan's relative weakness in 'medium' and 
large sized vehicle manufacture, GMH had just begun exporting Statesman vehicles to 
GM's sister company in Japan, Isuzu (Working Paper A10: 46). Likewise, Ford was 
exporting to the other major developed right hand drive automotive market - England. It 
was exporting Australian manufactured Fairmonts, Fairlanes and Falcon GTs as well as 
large American manufactured luxury vehicles - the Landau and the LTD (Autocar, 20th 
July 1974: 2) - which were assembled and then re-exported with right hand drive in 
Australia (Source: Bill Hartigan, 1991). Yet the IAC offered no comment on the 
Japanese or English markets, or on the kinds of difficulties which Australian automotive 
exporters faced there. A reader of the IAC report and all its attachments would never 
have learnt that GMF1 had built a left hand drive car in the late sixties which contributed 
about 10 per cent of its export earnings, and that other manufacturers had considered 
doing the same (see Chapter Two above).
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The Leyland representative had associated the product differentiation of the Mini-Moke - 
its indigenous design evolution - with its export success (IAC, PMVs, 1974, Transcript: 
1831). The Commission briefly addressed this issue from an inwardly oriented 
perspective, observing that the proliferation of overseas designed models in the domestic 
market led to fragmentation in component production (IAC, PMVs, 1974: 137). And 
while the matter was not elaborated on in any working papers on exports or export 
incentives, a working paper on vehicle pricing noted that "the only vehicles exported 
were of indigenous design, eg Holden and Torana, Falcon and Valiant" (Working Paper 
B7: 3). But the implications of these kinds of considerations for export markets were 
nowhere explored in the report or its attachments. Probably the most 'product 
differentiated' Australian vehicle was the Mini Moke. There were no close substitutes at 
least in the Australian market. In the early 1970s the Mini-Moke consistently exported 
over 40 per cent of its output by volume and in one year the figure was over 50 per cent 
(personal communication with JRA executives, 1983). But this was nowhere in the 
report. Even in the working papers the production and export figures for each car line, 
or by vehicle class were nowhere compiled in a single series.
Nor would the reader have learnt of GMH's extensive technical assistance to the 
automotive industry of Korea and other Asian countries (IAC, PMVs, 1974, Transcript: 
100) or of Ford Australia's attempts to imitate Leyland's Mini Moke by coordinating the 
development of the low cost "Fiera" for Asian markets (see § 2.5.2.5.1 above). This 
was despite its lengthy treatment in hearings, discussion in working papers and Stubbs' 
contemporary description of the Fiera project as "potentially one of the most significant 
developments of the 1970s for the Australian industry" (Working Paper A 10: 47, 
Stubbs, 1972: 295). In fact, the Commission's four point 'thumbnail' sketch of the 
economics of exporting set out above would have led one to consider most of the 
developments referred to in this sub-section as unlikely. Stubbs had commented that "it 
can be seen that the prospects for export depend very heavily on the decision of the 
vehicle companies to select certain countries as centres for their export efforts" (1972: 
295). Yet despite some cursory mention of the fact in some working documents (eg see 
Working Paper A 10: 47), the reader would have been hard pressed to learn from a 
reading of the entire report and attachments, what many in the industry, the Government 
and members of the ALP caucus evidently considered to be of considerable significance, 
that Australia was becoming an automotive 'export hub' for Asia (see § 6.4 and 
Warhurst, 1979: 21).
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7.5.2.1 Domestic Mass Marketing: Export Niche Marketing
[A] very substantial portion of [the Volvo's] total volume is exported. The vast 
majority is never exported as a bread and butter motor car, it is exported as a 
luxury motor car. It is a bread and butter car in its home country and a luxury 
car in these other countries.
Peter North, IAC, PMVs, 1974, Transcript: 1751
From an initial belief that the car [a Volvo 164] would prove to be vastly 
superior to most other vehicles I was gradually affected by a feeling of 
disillusionment.
Reviewer, Motor Manual, August, 1972: 44
Recall Linder's model of intra-industry trade, in which firms mass market at home and 
'niche' market elsewhere (§ 2.5.2.4). It is possible to enrich this perspective by noting 
that the economics of niche and mass marketing can be quite different. Because of 
transport costs, producers almost invariably enjoy greater market share in domestic than 
in export markets. Transport costs also enable the exporting firm to price discriminate in 
favour of the export market without fear of arbitrage. Mass marketing at home and niche 
marketing in export markets was evident amongst European automotive firms in the 
1970s as it is today.
The six cylinder Jaguar XJ6 sold in England for slightly less than twice the price of mass 
marketed six cylinder vehicles such as the Vauxhall Ventura and the Ford Granada XL. 
In Australia it sold for well over three times the price of a standard Holden Kingswood 
or Falcon and a little under three times the price of their luxury variants, the Premier and 
the Fairmont. The comparison was starker still for the V12 Jaguar selling in England for 
just over twice the price of the Vauxhall Ventura and in Australia for nearly five times the 
value of the standard Australian sixes.61
61 The 'luxury' market seemed to exhibit this relative price inelasticity more than other segments. The 
Commission's estimates indicated that, between 1951 and 1973, quality adjusted prices in Australia had 
risen by 41 per cent and 19 per cent for small and medium cars respectively but by 240 per cent in the 
case of luxury cars (IAC, 1974: 79-81).
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Table 7.4 Medium Sized Vehicles in Australia and the United 
Kingdom
Car Australian
Price
English
Price
Engine Power Displacement Wheelbase
Holden Kingswood $3,094 na 129 BHP 3,313 cc 9' 3"
Holden Premier $3,660 na 135 BHP 3,313 cc 9' 3”
Holden Statesman $4,095 na 135 BHP 3,313 cc 9’ 6"
Ford Falcon $2,825 na 130 BHP 3,280 cc 9' 3"
Ford Fairmont $3,950 £3,125** 230 BHP 4,945 cc 9’ 3"
Ford Fairlane $3,970 £3,793 250 BHP 5,752 cc 9' 8"
Vauxhall Ventura na £2,331 122 BHP 3,294 cc 8' 9"
Ford Granada XL na £2,393 138 BHP 2,994 cc 9' 1"
Volvo 164 $7,175 £3,450 175 BHP 2,980 cc 8' 9"
Jaguar XJ6 $9,700 £4,405 170 BHP 4,235 cc 9’ 1"
Jaguar XJ12 $15,000 £5,367 250 BHP 5,343 cc 9' 4.6"
Holden medium cars are all 'optioned' to the 202 cubic inch six cylinder engine
j|{ jjc
Fairmonts and Fairlanes sold in England were more 'optioned up' than those sold in Australia. In 
England the vehicles were supplied with V8 engines whereas the Australian price quoted is for six 
cylinder vehicles.______________________________________________________________________
Sources: English Prices - Autocar Magazine, 20th July 1974: 2-3. Australian Prices, Modern 
Motor, April 1974. Vehicle Specifications: Autocar Magazine, 20th July 1974: 68ff - with the 
exception of Holden and Falcon vehicle specifications obtained from Modem Motor, September 
1971: 60-1, October 1971: 4-5, August 1972: 12 and Motor Manual, December 1972.____________
The price premiums achieved by many European vehicles, particularly from Germany 
and Italy, were frequently associated with the hallmarks of technical sophistication such 
as overhead camshafts and fully independent suspension (.Autocar, July 20, 1974: 68ff). 
But other successful European vehicles were not particularly sophisticated. Volvos for 
instance had conventional in-line overhead valve engines and live coil suspended rear 
axles, as did the Holden Kingswood (Autocar, July 20, 1974: 74-5; Modern Motor, 
September 1971: 102). And Volvo's most luxurious offering, the six cylinder 164, 
shared most of the much cheaper four cylinder 144's panel work and mechanical 
equipment. It was differentiated from the 144 with a stretched wheelbase, a larger but 
similarly unsophisticated engine and some reworking of the front outer panels in much 
the same tradition as the stretched wheelbase Australian 'Fairlane' and 'Statesman' 
variants on the Falcon and Holden. One Australian reviewer commented that its 
suspension seemed "almost archaic" compared with some European rivals, and that twin 
carburetors had spared the engine a "tendency towards a plodding, agricultural 
performance" {Motor Manual, August, 1972: 44-5). Yet despite significant price 
premiums against technically comparable indeed frequently superior but mass marketed,
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six cylinder vehicles,62 Volvo cheerfully occupied a global market niche which, though 
it was small for the globe, was not so small for Volvo.
What were the prospects for Australian automotive manufacturers imitating the 
Europeans by mass marketing at home and niche marketing for export? Certainly the 
relative prices of the respective vehicles in the Australian market reassured Australian 
consumers that European vehicles were of higher quality than their competitors either 
Japanese or Australian. In fact independent assessments of the respective 'build quality' 
of the various vehicles collected in 1984 (the earliest date available to me) indicates that 
Australian vehicles did suffer from worse build quality than European vehicles - but that 
the quality leader was Japanese vehicles - not European ones.63 Likewise safety 
marketing and high prices may not have indicated safer cars. Current data published by 
the Monash Accident Research Centre indicates that the Holden Statesman fares only 
very slightly worse in fatalities per 100 accidents than the most expensive Volvo '700 
series'. And the Falcon EB sedan performs comparably with luxury marques including 
those with a particular focus on safety such as Volvo, Saab and Mercedes (Vic Roads, 
1992: 7, 8, 11).
Whilst the Australian vehicles did not have technical sophistication to offer they did have 
their size, their power, their sturdiness and, against equally unsophisticated vehicles 
such as the Volvo 164, their price - even into the European market. The Ford Fairmont 
was sold in England for about 10 per cent less than the Volvo 164 - the larger but 
similarly appointed Fairlane for about 10 per cent more (see Table 7.4 above). Both 
were larger and more powerful than the Volvo 164. But the point cannot be made 
sensibly without admitting the possibility that such a strategy would very probably have
62 See table above. The Ford Granada, for instance, boasted independent rear suspension unlike any of 
the Volvo sedans (Autocar, July 20, 1974: 68ff).
63 Vehicle Quality (Faults per Vehicle)
Average reported faults per vehicle 1984 1985
Australian vehicles 2.8 2.7
Japanese imports to Australia (max) 1.7 1.7
Japanese imports to Australia (min) 1.2 1.1
European Imports to Australia 2.0 2.2
Source. Automotive Research and Marketing Services, 
Australian New Car Buyer Survey, supplied by Paul 
Sexton of the AIA.
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changed the developmental 'trajectory' of the vehicles themselves. Had Australian 
manufacturers sought to capture a small share of the European or world market for large 
cars and limousines for instance, Australian vehicle exporters would have had an interest 
in investing in equipping them with the necessary technical features to prosper in such 
markets. One might speculate that the maintenance if not the inception of the 'luxury' 
characteristics of many European vehicles - the build quality of the Mercedes, the 
'safety' features and marketing of the Volvo, for instance - had as much to do with those 
firms' export marketing to the affluent of the world as it did with the quality and safety 
consciousness of their own home markets.
The above normal profits earned on 'optioned up' vehicles (see above) raised the 
prospect of marketing more highly 'optioned' vehicles into less profitable export markets 
whilst still covering marginal cost. Yet, whilst the possibility of marginal cost pricing in 
export markets was discussed in a working paper on "Export Incentives" (Working 
Paper B 13: 4), there was little discussion of this option or of the way in which it might 
affect Australian firms' export strategies. The potential for mixing mass marketing at 
home with 'niche' marketing offshore and policy arrangements which might facilitate it 
were nowhere explored in the Commission's report or working papers. Although the 
Commission's report commented on the particular similarity of the Swedish automotive 
industry to Australia (IAC, PMVs, 1974: 25), it was rarely mentioned again. There was 
no information let alone analysis of the differences between prices of Australian products 
and other non-Australian imports into export markets, even though the Commission 
observed that the f.o.b. prices of European 'upper medium' vehicles to Australia "were 
generally below the stated current domestic values" (p. 83).
7.6 The IAC and Intra-Industry Trade Facilitation
The IAC's preparedness to recommend long term assistance for the industry raised the 
issue of the extent to which trade might be facilitated notwithstanding this assistance. 
Tariffs would directly impede inter-industry trade where they directly imposed costs on 
exporters from other industries such as agriculture and they would directly impede intra­
industry trade by taxing automotive imports and directly raising the cost of automotive 
exports with imported content. The IAC showed surprisingly little interest even in inter­
industry trade facilitation. Rural interests argued for lower tariffs on four wheel drive 
vehicles because they were an input to exports (IAC, PMVs, 1974, Transcript: 2308, 
2216). The Commission responded summarily that it could "see no justification for the 
separate treatment of such vehicles" (IAC, PMVs, 1974: 177).
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The facilitation of intra-industry trade received similarly short shrift. Between 1968-69 
and 1972-73 intra-industry trade went from 27 per cent of Australian automotive trade to 
60 per cent before falling to 48 per cent in 1973-74. This took the intra-industry trade 
intensity of automotive trade from 82 per cent to 136 per cent of the average intra­
industry trade intensity for elaborately transformed manufactures over the period (see 
Statistical Appendix, Table A7.4). As noted in Chapter Five above, by the early 1970s 
two pieces of 'intra-industry trade facilitation policy' were in place: Article 3.7 of 
NZAFTA and the automotive export credit scheme. Because of its potentially greater 
importance, the focus of this section is primarily upon the latter of these two schemes. 
The Commission gave very little attention to either scheme, but almost all the attention it 
did give went to the NZAFTA arrangements.
7.6.1 The Functioning of the Export Credit Scheme
We see no merit in making a further substantial investment in engine plant and 
associated foundry facilities for a 4-cylinder engine. In fact, we believe that 4- 
cylinder engines would be an appropriate balancing factor for the trade created 
with the export from Australia. . . to industrially developing countries in the 
Asian region. Our current planning demonstrates that the 4-cylinder engine is a 
logical item to be used in the development of component complementation, and 
Government endorsement of such an import policy would be a means of 
achieving true rationalisation and complementation between Australia and 
neighboring developing countries.
GMH to the Commission. IAC, PMVs, 1974, Transcript: 101
By December 1973 the export credit scheme was two years old. But the major 
companies were mystified by its operation. GMH had been told that an export credit, 
once earned on an approved export program, would earn an import entitlement which 
was relatively free of restrictions (IAC, PMVs, 1974, Transcript: 125). Yet despite 
numerous applications, neither GMH nor Chrysler had been granted access to the 
scheme.64 The Department had told Chrysler that access to the scheme was only 
available where it was entering "a new market with a new model". In 1972 Chrysler 
began exporting sedans to South Africa, but because it had previously exported some 
station wagon panels to South Africa it was denied export credits (IAC, PMVs, 1974, 
Transcript: 1355). By April 1974 one car line with fairly minor exports had earned 
export credits (Working Paper B 13: 2). But even so, the usefulness of these credits was
64 Indeed in mid 1975 GMH officials were still unaware of the status of their applications under the 
scheme, the Department of Trade and Industry not having responded to their correspondence (IAC, 1975, 
Transcript: 122, 1355).
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profoundly compromised by constraints such as the 'non-reversion rule' (IAC, PM Vs, 
1974, Transcript: 1566 and see § 2.4 above). Credits were of little, if indeed any use 
where they could not be used to displace less competitive domestic manufactures with 
imports. As with its applications for export credit earnings, GMH submitted several 
proposals for 'reversion' to the department starting in April 1972. Over a year and a half 
later it had received no decision (IAC, PMVs, 1974: 142). As GMH confessed to the 
Commission:
We have managed to develop the new exports but we have been unable to 
develop any reciprocal trade to date. Of course you understand that the 
concession is only approved by the government provided the reciprocal 
trade does not harm or affect the Australian industry. In most cases we get 
the impression that the sort of goods we should like to import would in fact 
be considered by the component industry as harmful and therefore our 
application might not be approved. . . . There is also this 'no-reversion* rule 
(IAC, PMVs, 1974, Transcript: 69).
7.6.2 The Politics of the Export Credit Scheme
Within the limits proposed for export content incentives the government should 
let individual companies devise the best economic arrangements with a 
minimum of economic restrictions.
Ford to the IAC, IAC, PMVs, 1974, Transcript: 1586
The squeamishness about adjustment which had typified the local content and export 
credit schemes profoundly influenced the politics of export credits. Although export 
credits could loosen the constraints of the local content scheme, the constraints on using 
export credits to 'revert' to imported components meant that the advantages of the export 
credit scheme would be enjoyed predominantly by newcomers. As Chrysler explained, 
the existing scheme would provide:
disproportionate benefits to new manufacturers entering the Australian 
market. These new companies commencing with no exports from Australia 
would have access to any market and would therefore be able to acquire 
permanent, in built advantages over the existing manufacturers, who have 
already created export markets in many areas (IAC, PMVs, 1974, 
Transcript: 1354 c/Ford: 1566, GMH: 1986).
Industry consultants Martec explained that the Japanese companies could minimise their 
Australian investment by sourcing relatively few components in Australia for domestic 
assembly and for export so as to earn the right to import their other components (MIP , 
February, 1972: 6). Chrysler conceded its fear that the Japanese firms would import "a 
new line of presses to produce a limited number of inner body panels . . .  by imported 
steel, and then export the packs or the panels to a high usage area like Japan" (IAC,
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PMVs, 1974, Transcript: 135 5).65 There is some evidence that the Japanese firms were 
thinking along these lines (eg see Toyota, IAC, PMVs, 1974, Transcript: 362). 
Likewise the Japanese academic Takeshi Mori commented on the major Japanese firms' 
apparent ambitions for complementation in Asia and added that Australia was one of the 
most important countries both as a market and as a manufacturing base. This was 
particularly the case for companies such as Toyota and Nissan, which had previously 
invested in facilities in Korea and Taiwan which they had been forced to close. At the 
time, Korea and Taiwan and Australia were the only Asian countries outside Japan 
where skilled labour was available in abundance. Mori suggested Japanese firms were 
addressing "the possibility of using Australia as a useful foothold in their global logistics 
plan" (1974: 31-2).
Whilst (not surprisingly), strongly supporting all other export incentives, Chrysler 
requested the termination of export credits (IAC, PMVs, 1974, Transcript: 1354, 1359). 
Ford, which had sponsored the original scheme to accommodate their growing Asia- 
Pacific aspirations and even requested the Commission to recommend liberalising the 
administration of the scheme (see quote at head of section), nevertheless requested that 
export credits be limited to five per cent of local content (IAC, PMVs, 1974, Transcript: 
1583). And although GMH requested a more liberal export credit scheme than the other 
established manufacturers, it also proposed to protect its interests against newcomers 
with a 'hurdle' of 90 per cent local content to qualify for the scheme (IAC, PMVs, 1974, 
Transcript: 1987).
7.6.3 The IAC and the Economics of Intra-Industry Trade
Facilitation
[Export credits] can easily be made to sound virtuous and Adam-Smithian.
How far the motor industry arrangements are trade-creating and how far trade 
diverting, or how far they will improve Australia's allocation of resources, is 
less easy to assess.
Davidson and Stewardson, 1974: 164
The above quotation provides an exemplary professional response to intra-industry trade 
facilitation policy. Given its origins in the politics of protectionism the response is pre-
65 The scenario of greatest concern to Chrysler involved inner body panels because these are relatively 
low value added and require little attention to finish (IAC, PMVs, 1974, Transcript: 1355). Chrysler 
was speaking from experience. In 1973 Chrysler exported nearly 24,300 sets of car panels whilst total 
production of built up cars was 47,500. (Source: Correspondence with Chrysler).
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eminently skeptical. Both Harry Johnson and Gerald Helleiner had a similarly jaundiced 
view of Canada's 'extended content' arrangements, with Johnson highlighting their 
potential as an export subsidy (1963: 226) and Helleiner commenting wryly on the way 
in which business interests had ensured free trade for themselves whilst keeping it out of 
the dangerous hands of consumers (1981: 84). However, the authors of the above 
passage suggest that the ultimate judgment must be founded on an assessment of 
expected empirical costs and benefits. They proceed to outline a simple framework for 
so doing. Nothing like this was even hinted at in the Commission's report.
The Commission's comments on the policy merits of export credits were largely 
inscrutable. The report offered no substantive evaluation of Australia's existing export 
credit scheme. There were occasional comments on 'complementation'. Yet they often 
suggested that the Commission was focusing on it as something occurring largely 
offshore and within firms rather than at the level of government policy. The report's one 
paragraph discussion of "existing complementation schemes in South East Asia/Pacific" 
appeared to comment on the extent to which Australia might benefit from the policies of 
companies or national governments offshore, without any comment about the export 
credit scheme (IAC, PMVs, 1974: 213). Throughout both the Commission's internal 
Working Papers and its published report, there was virtually no discussion of the extent 
to which such plans might either have implications for - or be affected by - trade policy 
instruments in Australia. Indeed, the export credit arrangements received their only 
mention - one paragraph of reportage - in a five page Working Paper on "Export 
Incentives" (Working Paper B13).
The Commission offered glimpses of some of the potential benefits and costs of 
complementation. Outlining the operation of Article 3.7 of NZAFTA it commented 
approvingly that "co-operation between manufacturers" was "an obvious way of 
extending the size of the market available to them" (IAC, PMVs, 1974: 178 also see 
Working Paper B16: 9). It likewise observed that regional complementation more 
generally represented "a way in which greater economies of scale and specialisation 
could be achieved" (IAC, PMVs, 1974: 214). Flagging the potential for government 
complementation schemes to divert rather than create trade, it commented on the 
importance of basing such schemes on the principles of efficient sourcing (IAC, PMVs, 
1974: 214). However the Commission made no attempt to evaluate the respective 
potential costs and benefits of complementation within Australia or offshore within any 
coherent framework. This meant that, like Lloyd and Grubel's comments on the policy 
implications of intra-industry trade (§ 4.6.2 above), the Commission offered no
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concrete advice on how to facilitate cost reducing intra-industry trade in the presence of 
trade barriers or of the likely welfare effects of so doing.
The Commission concluded that its tariff-only proposals would "tend to encourage 
participation by local manufacturers in regional complementation schemes and 
government intervention should not be necessary" (IAC, PMVs, 1974: 214). The 
reference to regional complementation appears to refer to other countries' 
complementation schemes. However the Commission did not explain why its proposed 
tariff-only regime would facilitate Australian participation in regional complementation 
arrangements offshore significantly more than the existing local content scheme - 
particularly with the export credit facility. And, although in important ways 
import/export links are liberalising (c/Chapter Five above), the Commission’s implicit 
suggestion that they were additional interventions was a portent of its deliberation on 
import/export links when it was required to assess the export facilitation scheme in 1979 
(see Chapter Nine below).
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8 From the First to the Second Inquiry
Formal operations relying on one framework of interpretation cannot 
demonstrate a proposition to persons who rely on another framework. Its 
advocates may not even succeed in getting a hearing from these, since they must 
first teach them a new language, and no one can learn a new language unless he 
first trusts that it means something.
Michael Polanyi, cited in Loasby, 1976: 193
This chapter focuses on the debate which occurred after the release of the 1974 report. 
In this the IAC had a variety of critics including manufacturers and unions. But the IAC 
focused its defence of its report on two critics, the South Australian Government and a 
report commissioned by the Federal bureaucracy from the automotive consultant Martec 
Pty Ltd. Despite their pronounced weaknesses, both these critiques made important 
contributions. Both warned plausibly, and as it turned out correctly, that the 
Commission's predictions about the future disregarded emerging signs that its 
assumptions were wrong. Martec brought something more to the discussion - a 
knowledge of and 'feel' for the automotive industry and its development. The material 
discussed in this chapter provides textbook illustrations of the vices of over-reliance on 
technical expertise (as explored in § 1.3 above). As stated previously, Martec’s and the 
Commission's skills and perspectives were highly complementary. Either could have 
trawled through the other's contribution for ways to improve their own, and for the 
common ground which emerged when considering both perspectives, as far as possible, 
together (cf § 1.3.2.1). This chapter illustrates how comprehensively the opportunity 
for such dialogue and mutual benefit was passed up and the inadequate policy outcomes 
to which this led.
8.1 The Aftermath of the IAC Report
[A]s the energy crisis deepens and the local economy falters, the second quarter 
is likely to see a tapering off [of demand] leading to a sizable fall-off in the final 
half in 1974. The drop will be particularly evident in the medium-car sector 
which is dominated by Holden, Falcon and Valiant.
Trevor Dawson Grove, AFR, 27th December, 1973: 5
The 1974 automotive report was the Commission's greatest challenge to that date and (as 
is the way with such things) its chances of success were always uncertain. In the event, 
however, the IAC's timing was remarkably unlucky. As its research gathered
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momentum, economic storm clouds gathered (see above quote). The causes of the 
macro-economic downturn, which began at about the time of the report's release 
(Rattigan, 1986: 207-8), had disproportionately ill effects for manufacturing. On top of 
falling aggregate demand, Australia's manufacturers faced wage and energy cost 
increases. The expansion of Australian mineral and energy exports meant that it was 
some time before the rise in Australian producer costs found its way into currency 
devaluation (see § 8.2.1). Things were particularly difficult for automotive 
manufacturers. Increasing petrol prices accelerated the previously gradual swing in 
consumer demand towards smaller vehicles (c/§ 2.3 above).
During the Tariff Board hearings, both GMH and Ford were at full capacity (IAC, 
PMVs, 1974, Transcript: 1548). However, from late 1973 some were predicting a 
recession with particular difficulties for the automotive industry (see quote at head of 
section). By late 1973, both Leyland and Chrysler were making losses, whilst in 1972, 
the hitherto most profitable firm, GMH, had recorded earnings which were nearly 20 per 
cent lower than its 1971 results and 50 per cent lower than those of 1970 (IAC, PMVs, 
1974, Transcript: 61). In a portent of things to come, less than a month before the 
release of the IAC's report, Leyland retrenched 1,000 workers. Ten days later Lucas, an 
electrical component supplier to the motor vehicle industry, dismissed 80 employees. 
Both Lucas and Leyland foreshadowed further dismissals (Rattigan, 1986: 208-9). Two 
weeks before the automotive report was released, a regular three monthly survey which 
had previously reported product shortages and optimism showed that business sentiment 
had turned sharply negative (Rattigan, 1986: 207-8).
And the relative productivity of Australian vehicle production fell against other countries 
not just because Australia's productivity fell with the fragmentation of Australian 
production but also because the productivity of other automotive producers - particularly 
Japan - rose strongly. As the seventies wore on, the magnitude of the Japanese 
achievement gradually revealed itself. Earlier 'Fordist' or 'Taylorist' production systems 
had focused on command and control strategies, and so frequently constructed 
adversarial relationships within the industry between employers and employees and 
between suppliers and assemblers. By contrast in the new Japanese production system, 
vehicle manufacturers devolved more control to employees and to suppliers and 
encouraged them to collaborate in continuously improving product and process design 
and so the productivity with which they worked together (Womack et al, 1990, Chapters 
Two and Three; The Economist, May, 14th 1994: 75 and see § 9.3.1 below for figures 
on Japanese productivity and price performance over the 1970s). The net export 
intensity of Australia's automotive industry ([Exports - Importsj/Turnover) fell fourteen
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percentage points between 1972-73 and 1974-75 whilst the net export intensity of 
elaborately transformed manufacturers fell nine percentage points (Statistical Appendix, 
Table A8.1).
8.2 The Bureaucracy Looks for Options: The IAC
enters the Fray
The bureaucratic and political melee which greeted the ambitious IAC recommendations 
and the difficulty of the circumstances into which they were cast (Warhurst, 1982: 193- 
200), provided an opportunity for the IAC to take the debate to its critics in defence of its 
own work. The major bureaucratic participants were the Department of Prime Minister 
and Cabinet (PM&C) and the Standing Interdepartmental Committee on Assistance to 
Industry (SIDCAI) which comprised PM&C in the chair, and the Departments of the 
Treasury, Manufacturing Industry, Urban and Regional Development, Overseas Trade 
and Customs and Excise (Warhurst, 1982: 195). Through its PM&C representatives, 
SIDCAI wrote several times to the LAC seeking further information in an effort to assess 
the report and possible alternatives. In many ways the IAC was now achetypically living 
out the role which Rattigan had sought for it, as the expert 'arms length' adviser to 
government with its own claims and opponents' counterclaims being exposed to public 
scrutiny. Yet the ensuing set pieces of question and answer, claim and counter claim 
illustrate the costs of dialogue as contest. The IAC conceded virtually nothing to its 
opponents and in the process foreclosed what prospects there were for productive 
dialogue and mutual adjustment and through it, mutual gain.
8.2.1 Diagnosis Dire: Outlook Optimistic?
At the end of 1971 the . . . largest selling import . . . was the Mazda 1600 
Capella. Its price . . . was . . . around about $150 cheaper than a 
Kingswood Holden. Today a Kingswood . . . Holden costs . . . around 
$550-600 [more than the Mazda] - a dramatic change in competitive relationship 
between models and between sources of production.
Rob O'Connell, Martec Seminar, May 1974: 03-4
There was an essential tension between the IAC's findings about the industry's 
uncompetitiveness and its recommendations. The IAC's findings of uncompetitiveness 
helped it establish the urgency of reform by highlighting the costs of protection. On the 
other hand the more uncompetitive the IAC found an industry, the more disastrous 
would be the expected result of tariff reform. Some important shortcomings in the report 
appear to spring from this tension. The Commission found that the cost disability
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against Japan of medium and large light vehicles was 45 and 80-85 per cent respectively. 
Nevertheless it concluded that under its recommended 25 per cent tariff-only regime, 
Australian made medium vehicles would maintain their existing 95 per cent share of the 
domestic market, and that if market demand swung more strongly towards light vehicles 
than the Commission had predicted, the major local manufacturers could be expected to 
occupy "a significant place in that market" (IAC, PMVs, 1974: 160). The following two 
subsections explore these tensions between the IAC's findings and its predictions.
Before proceeding it is worth noting that the previous chapter’s critique of the IAC's 
cost/price analyses was based on the IAC's own data which was collected in late 1973 
and early 1974. The cost competitiveness of the industry was deteriorating fast at the 
time (IAC, PMVs, 1974, Transcript: 1784), and had changed still more by the time the 
IAC's report was debated in late 1974. GMH raised its prices by 22 per cent during 
Calendar year 1974 (excluding an additional price rise of about eight per cent for a new 
model), a figure which was typical of the major Australian manufacturers (AFR, 21st 
May 1975: 7). And while the Government devalued in September 1974, the Australian 
dollar had risen by more than this against the yen since August 1973 (Reserve Bank 
Bulletin, Table F9). Ironically, what were probably overly pessimistic analyses of the 
earlier data may have been about right by late 1974!
8.2.1.1 The Viability of Medium Car Manufacture
If medium car manufacture was 45 per cent more costly in Australia than in Japan or the 
United States (IAC, PMVs, 1974: 98), a 25 per cent tariff would combine with 
approximately 15 per cent transport costs to leave the Australian industry at a five per 
cent cost disadvantage against imports. The Commission replied to SIDCAI questioning 
along these lines that advantages of local presence and freedom from the constraints of 
the local content scheme would see producers "at some advantage over North America" 
(Rattigan to Steele, Attachment One: 15), something which is not apparent from the 
argument or from any exploration of the issue in the report. The Commission envisaged 
that the medium car manufacturers would face lower costs because, in the absence of the 
local content scheme they would reduce their local content from over 95 per cent local 
content (IAC, PMVs, 1974, Appendix Seven: 22, Table A7.18) to about 85 to 90 per 
cent (IAC, PMVs, 1974: 162). It should be noted by way of an aside, that an important 
summary working paper concluded shortly before the report's completion that they 
would not reduce their level of local content (Working Paper "Assistance": 19). Even 
accepting the Commission’s ultimately published view, a change in sourcing of about 10 
per cent local content seems highly unlikely to provide the needed five per cent reduction
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in costs to meet the cost of imports.66 For products designed in Australia, as virtually all 
of the Holden and most of the Falcon then were (personal communication with GMH 
and Ford), this is a tall order indeed and nowhere justified in the Commission's report or 
supporting documents. Perhaps the Commission envisaged that the remaining local 
content would also be cheaper, but it did not elaborate or quantify this line of reasoning.
Given the locational complementarity between component manufacture and assembly the 
Commission's appeal to the advantages of local production seems reasonable where the 
question relates to the production of components for assembly in Australia and/or where 
the major source of competition comes from vehicles assembled from CKD packs. But 
the 45 per cent figure compared Australian manufactured vehicles with CBU imports. 
Clearly CBU importing involves some disadvantages in terms of inventory holdings and 
response times to customer preferences. But it is not clear what these disadvantages are 
worth and whether, for instance they offset or outweighed any marketing advantages 
which might have been associated with the mystique and higher quality of imports at the 
time. In such circumstances, if the Commission's estimate of current cost disability was 
accurate, its prediction that in the medium to long term Australian medium vehicles 
would retain their 95 per cent domestic market share against lower cost CBU imports 
surely stretches credulity (IAC, PMVs, 1974: 159).
8.2 .1 .2  The Viability of Light Car Manufacture
There was a similar tension between the Commission's pessimism about the 
competitiveness of Australian light car manufacture and the Commission's description of 
its prospects under the report's recommendations. The light car market comprised small 
and large light segments as well as a new six cylinder segment which typically involved 
'shoehoming' a medium car six cylinder engine into a smaller vehicle ordinarily powered 
by a four cylinder engine. GMH led the pack in 1969 with a Torana powered by a 
Holden Kingswood six cylinder engine. Both Leyland and Ford had followed suit with 
six cylinder Marina and Cortina ranges and by 1973 these vehicles occupied eight per 
cent of the light vehicle market (IAC, PMVs, "Papers", 1974, Volume 3, § 2.4.6.3). 
The IAC measured the cost disability of the light car segment (excluding the six cylinder 
sub-segment) at 80-85 per cent for large light and more for small light cars (c/§  7.4.3.1
66 For a change in sourcing of (say) 10 per cent of total content to improve cost structures by 5 per 
cent, it would be necessary for imported components plus transport costs and 25 per cent duty to be 50 
per cent cheaper than locally supplied components. (In fact this does not account for the imported 
content which was already in the vehicles which was currently being imported duty free and which, under 
the Commission's recommendations, would have attracted a duty of 25 per cent).
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above). This would clearly swamp a 40 per cent cost impost from tariffs and transport 
costs without huge local productivity improvements. The light car market was also more 
fragmented than the medium car market. Apart from the brief time when the Leyland 
P 76 made four, the big three American firms occupied over 95 per cent of the medium 
car market with locally manufactured vehicles. By contrast, in the light car market, 
competition took place on much more equal terms between the big three Americans, 
Leyland and various Japanese assemblers and importers (Working Document, 
"Production" and see IAC, PMVs, 1974, Appendix Seven: 22-3).
The report concluded that the six cylinder large light market would continue to grow 
strongly "with the major part of this market being held by local manufacturers" (IAC, 
PMVs, 1974: 159). This prediction was problematic because the local manufacturers' 
six cylinder light vehicles depended on the availability of light vehicles into which the 
manufacturers' six cylinder engines could be fitted and, as the previous paragraph 
argues, it is hard to see how the local manufacture of light vehicles could have survived 
the Commission's recommendations. The report commented that the substantial growth 
in the market for light vehicles other than the six cylinder light vehicles would be met 
"mainly by imports" (IAC, PMVs, 1974: 159). It then went on to comment (and 
reiterated against its critics later),67 that:
The assistance recommended by the Commission should encourage the 
existing high content manufacturers to concentrate their production in the 
large light and medium car categories and maintain market coverage by 
sourcing CBU or CKD light vehicles from the low cost plants of associate 
companies. . . . However, if over the long term the market swing to light 
cars should become more pronounced than presently forecast, the 
Commission would expect the major local manufacturers to occupy a 
significant place in that market with locally produced vehicles (IAC, PMVs,
1974: 160).
Yet the Commission had not solved the problems of fragmentation in the large light 
market. Indeed its internal documents indicate that even if it had, Australian large light 
car production would still have been at a significant, if smaller, disadvantage. Shortly 
before the report's finalisation, a minute (apparently from a senior staff member) warned 
that the Commission's intention of recommending against special arrangements to 
facilitate the manufacture of Australian light cars might be badly received. The minute 
surmised that six cylinder large light vehicles might occupy about 15 per cent of a 
projected light car market of about 350,000 by 1980. The predicted absence of
67 Rattigan to Steele, 21st October, 1974: 4, Comments on the South Australian Committee Report, 
Attachment: 12, IAC, "Martec", 1974: 2.
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Australian manufacturers from the rest of the light vehicle market led the minute's author 
to consider "the possibility of Australian manufacturers mounting a combined venture to 
produce one light car which each would market". He had in mind the possibility of a 
jointly produced light vehicle occupying 50 per cent of the 300,000 light vehicle market 
not already occupied by six cylinder light cars. The minute proposed that the 
Commission "at least canvass the idea explicitly" in its report (Undated Minute, 
"Effects": 2).
The author conceded that the issue had not been fully researched, but set out the 
following rough calculations:
Table  8.1 Cost D isability  
V e h ic le s
of Australian Large Light
Item Calculated Disability
1 Total Current Cost Disability 80%
2 (a) Attributed to Scale 35%
(b) Scale disability at 150,000 per annum 5-10%
Total Reduced Cost Disadvantage 50-55%
Tariff (25%) + freight costs 40-45%
Balance [of disability] 10%
Source. U ndated  M inute, "Effects": 2 .
The minute concluded that "with our reservations about the basic data we would be hard 
pressed to conclude with confidence that this venture would be uneconomic" (Undated 
Minute, "Effects": 1-2). The analysis underpinning the above calculation was carried 
through to the final report, which had large light vehicles at a cost disability of 80-85 per 
cent (IAC, PMVs, 1974: 98), and lack of scale economies accounting for "about half of 
the assessed cost disadvantage against Japanese producers" (IAC, PMVs, 1974: 125). 
But the Commission's assessment that Australian manufacture would emerge if the 
market swung towards such vehicles (quoted above) somehow defied this analysis.
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8.2.2 Debates on Long Term Demand
There is scarcely any question in economics which might not be advanced by 
bringing to bear on it (i) a knowledge of what statistics have to say combined 
with (ii) a knowledge of what statistics can't be made to tell, but which has to 
be reckoned for in a realistic solution, (i) without (ii) seems to me to be so 
dangerous that on the whole it is more likely to do harm than good.
Alfred Marshall, cited in Pigou, 1925: 424
The Commission believed that its recommendations would bring about relatively modest 
- though not necessarily smooth or predictable - structural change (IAC, PMVs, 1974: 
168). To a large extent its view was founded on projections of long term future medium 
car demand which, although they were broadly consistent with the industry's 
expectations during the inquiry, turned out to be very over-optimistic. To use the 
terminology introduced in Chapter One, the Commission neglected to exercise the 
'integrative skill' necessary to assess the likelihood that, for all the 'technical skill' 
embodied in its long term demand projections, they might nevertheless be seriously 
wrong.
Peter Dixon has commented on the failure of economic projections during this time: 
Because the historical record up to the time of the shock had no examples 
of large oil-price movements, the predominantly statistical models 
underestimated the impact of this event in influencing the future course of 
the world economy (1993: 5).
Given this one can not be too hard on those whose projections turned out to be wrong. 
The real methodological vice exhibited by the IAC's economists was not that they were 
wrong, but that they were so sure they were right! It is hardly a fine point of philosophy 
or economic methodology to observe that the more one is forced to extrapolate from 
events which have actually taken place to those which have not, the more one must 
assume and so the more likely one is to be wrong. Economists of the IAC should have 
appreciated at the time, and made it clear in their report and subsequent public comments 
that their best estimates might not have been very robust at a time of huge and 
unprecedented structural change - not to say upheaval. Econometrics - and all science 
for that matter - can easily be worse than useless if it does not come with some 
understanding of the robustness of its claims.
Where it has initially been poorly exercised, 'integrative skill' is frequently developed 
after the event in discussion with others who probe the weaknesses of a piece of 
technical work bringing different perspectives and concerns to bear. However, the 
Commission's adversarial stance in public debate ensured that despite the warnings of
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others, it never came to assess carefully the confidence which might be put in its 
projections. In addition to vigorous industry and union lobbying, the South Australian 
Committee report and the Martec report roused the IAC to direct - and to onlookers 
somewhat irregular (Warhurst, 1982: 204) - public intervention in the debate. The 
debate on demand projections can usefully be separated into three constituent projections 
- those for
• the total Australian demand for vehicles,
• the demand for medium vehicles within that total demand and
• export demand for Australian vehicles.
This subsection deals with the first two of these points and the IAC's response to them, 
while the subsequent section deals with the latter point in the context of a more extensive 
consideration of Martec's contribution and the IAC's response.
The South Australian Committee argued that the IAC had overestimated both the total 
demand for cars and the proportion of that demand which would be for medium sized 
vehicles. Martec defended the IAC's projections of total demand, only to suggest that 
the composition of demand would swing even more strongly against medium sized cars 
than the South Australians had suggested. Where the IAC projected that small vehicles 
would satisfy 56 per cent of the total market for cars in 1980, the South Australians 
projected that the figure would be 62 per cent (IAC, "Evaluation", 1974, Attachment: 10) 
and Martec suggested, somewhat sensationally, that the figure would be "closer to 80 
per cent" (MIP, October, 1974: 7). Whilst the IAC conceded some uncertainty about the 
future, it disparaged the contributions of those it took to be its major antagonists as 
essentially useless on account of their technical inferiority (IAC, "Evaluation", 1974: 2). 
But as will be seen, whatever their technical prowess, the IAC's critics raised legitimate 
questions about the plausibility of the IAC's forecasts.
While the IAC's projections lay roughly within the middle of the range of projections 
offered by the industry in evidence some months before - a point which the IAC rarely 
failed to use in its defence (Rattigan to Steele, Attachment One: 4; IAC "Evaluation", 
1974, Attachment: 10) - the South Australian projections on the future market share of 
medium sized vehicles were not as pessimistic as the most pessimistic of the vehicle 
manufacturers (IAC "Evaluation", 1974, Attachment: 10). This suggested that the South 
Australians' projections were plausible and by no means outlandish. This was 
reinforced by the rapid emergence of news on cost competitiveness (see § 8.2.1 above) 
and demand changes (this section below) which gave greater grounds for pessimism 
than the news available to the Commission as it drafted its report. But the central thrust 
of the South Australians' submission was hardly that theirs was the best model for
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predicting future vehicle demand. It was rather that the Commission was or might be 
wrong. Around this point there was no real engagement. At no time did the 
Commission focus on assessing the likelihood that its projections were wrong and the 
risks which this might entail. It focused instead on its reasons for believing that it was 
more likely to be right than the South Australians - on the "evidence available" which 
would cause it to "revise its projections" (Rattigan to Steele, Attachment One: 6). This 
boiled down to various demonstrations that the IAC's critics' methods were "inferior in 
predictive performance to the Commission's model" when compared with the history of 
Australian vehicle demand (from which the Commission's model had been derived) 
(IAC "Evaluation", 1974, Attachment: 7).
Throughout the debate there was little acknowledgment by the IAC of the inherent 
difficulty of predicting demand six years into the future at a time of substantial micro-and 
macro-economic upheaval. Martec expected the circumstances of the energy crisis to 
produce discontinuities in past patterns of demand. It accordingly focused on gleaning 
clues to the future from trends emerging at the time, including those emerging after the 
IAC had reported, in contrast to the longer term historical focus of the IAC's 
econometrics. Martec's report to PM&C noted that in the few months since the IAC 
report had been released, small car market share had risen from the 47 per cent reported 
in the IAC report (IAC, PMVs, 1974: Appendix Seven: 18), to 53 per cent, just three 
percentage points short of the market share the Commission had projected for 1980. It 
suggested further that the Sydney automotive market represented as good a guide to the 
future as was available, because Sydney's heavy traffic congestion and high level of car 
ownership resembled the future and had anticipated future trends in the past. In Sydney 
small car market share was already above 56 per cent (IAC, "Martec", 1974: 14-15).
The IAC did not assess the likelihood that Martec was right that there was an historical 
discontinuity in market demand. Nor did it address the question of how one might 
assess likely future trends if there were such a discontinuity emerging. The Commission 
argued that Martec's evidence was "insufficient to support" its conclusions of 
discontinuities (IAC, "Martec", 1974: 15). The IAC protested that "in a period affected 
by industrial disputes and supply shortages, there could be little confidence that 
movements over such a short period would have any value as indications of long term 
trends" (IAC, "Martec", 1974, Attachment One: 15). One need not disagree with this. 
Observed irregularities may represent fundamental discontinuities or mere disturbances, 
and the earlier the assessment the more necessarily speculative it will be. But the 
Commission's fastidiousness towards its opponents was nowhere turned upon itself. If 
one should have "little confidence" in Martec's methodology, the Commission never
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explained how much confidence one should have in its own methodology. In the 
circumstances, Martec's suggestion of a discontinuity was far from outlandish and 
worthy of careful consideration. With Martec as with the South Australians, the 
Commission dealt with its critics by effectively imposing the onus of proof upon them 
rather than meeting their criticism directly or indeed discharging that onus of proof itself 
as the Crawford report had suggested (Crawford, 1973: 27):
The Commission cannot accept the argument that, for longer term 
projections, a discontinuous change in the Australian motor vehicle market 
can be interpreted from the last few months registration data (IAC, "Martec",
1974: 22).
The data did foreshadow a discontinuity.
8.3 Martec, Exports and an Intra-Industry Trade
Led Recovery of the Industry?
Flew to Sydney to attend a most interesting seminar arranged by Martec 
Limited. First class it was. An officer of the Department of Secondary 
Industry, Denis Ives, gave a first class talk, also Robin O'Connell of Martec 
was good. There were some very interesting people there. I admire the 
frankness with which their problems were analysed and admitted. It makes you 
realise how much . . . sense you can get out of secondary industry if only 
they would cease treating you as a simpleton.
Bert Kelly, Personal Diary, 29th November 1973
The organisation which became Martec was formed in 1966 by Michael Aiken, a 
Bachelor of Commerce from Melbourne University. At that stage Aiken was a 
consulting economist to BIS Shrapnel, which provided consultancy services to the 
automotive industry. Aiken was joined in 1969 by Rob O'Connell and by the early 
1970s, Martec was the major consultancy firm in the automotive industry, providing 
services to all sectors of the industry. The two partners ran seminars every six months 
on the progress of the industry, offered analyses of various aspects of the operating 
environment of their clients in the industry, published bulletins between conferences and 
had an interest in the industry newsletter Automotive Industry Matters (Martec, 1971). 
From the outset Martec's style was suited to its commercial milieu. Its analysis of the 
industry was frequently peppered with self advertisement and salesmanship; its prose 
reflected a tension between the demands of arresting expression and English grammar 
(see below). Nevertheless Martec's partners were young, entrepreneurial and extremely 
familiar with the industry. Their contribution was highly complementary to the IAC's. 
The Commission's technical strengths certainly compensated for Martec's relative
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technical weakness. But where the Commission's approach frequently reflected an 
awkward reliance on the economic textbook, Martec's approach to its material reflected 
the protean opportunism of a market operator.
As discussed in Chapter One, the Commission sought to measure minimum efficient 
scale (MES) using a textbook definition without apparently realising the wholly arbitrary 
nature of the definition it was using (IAC, PMVs, 1974: 100). For the relevant policy 
question required some appreciation of market circumstances - the scope for product 
differentiation to raise demand and/or lower its price elasticity. The Commission 
proceeded to assess the level of competitive disability of the industry without reference to 
the opportunities provided by product differentiation (c/§ 7.4.3 above). And it sought 
to glean emerging responses to major and unprecedented economic shocks with 
econometric modelling which relied on data from the distant past.
On all these issues Martec offered valuable insights, as for instance when it suggested 
that the Sydney market offered a useful window on emerging market trends (§ 8.2.2 
above). And on some issues, the pictures sketched by Martec's examples were worth a 
thousand of the Commission's words. Martec searched for enlightening analogies - 
comparisons of 'rather like' and 'rather like'. And the examples it chose were tailored to 
illustrating the Australian policy problem at hand. The scholarly studies and examples 
cited by the IAC on the significance of scale economies related to large developed 
markets where MES as defined in the economics textbooks could be reached and where 
economists had focused their econometric analyses. By contrast Martec focused on the 
'niche' players in the world industry such as Volvo and BMW in Europe and Isuzu in 
Japan (A/M, October, 1974: 13). No econometric studies had been done on them. Yet 
they provided a potential role model for the Australian industry - particularly in export 
markets. And in contrast to the IAC's static perspective, Martec asked "where [should] 
the automotive industry in Australia be persuaded to evolve in the last two decades of the 
twentieth century?" (A/M, 24th July, 1974: 9)
8.3.1 Martec and Intra-Automotive-Industry Trade and
Specialisation
Why a limit? Why place a limit on a good idea?
Michael Aiken, on export credits, A/M, 30th May, 1972: 2
Michael Aiken was sympathetic to the 'economistic' critique of the local content plans 
and frequently quoted economist Gary Purcell's scathing attack on the local content plans 
(eg see AFR,  19th September, 1968: 29). Writing well before the cost of Australian
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protection and the competitive achievements of the Japanese had become fully apparent, 
Pursell had pointed to the importance of scale economies and deplored the neglect of 
their significance amongst policy makers and "even in the various reports of the Tariff 
Board" (1968: 2). He argued that there was little wrong with the economic fundamentals 
of Australian automotive manufacture except that Australian policy makers had gone "out 
of their way" to weaken and fragment the industry with high protection:
The local producer should be able and should be encouraged to export on 
a large scale. The single Swedish producer Volvo exports over 60 per cent 
of its production. If . . .  a net export surplus could be achieved - as it is by 
the main European manufacturing countries and Japan - the level of activity 
and the scope of car and component manufacturing would be greater than 
under any conceivable alternative plan (1968: 2).
Although critical of the local content plans and sympathetic towards gradual tariff reform 
(Martec, 1972: 3.14; M /P, September/October 1972: 6, April, 1973: 5), Martec was 
rather like a political party in opposition: more explicit as a critic of existing policy than 
in proposing concrete alternatives.68 Nevertheless by early 1972 Martec was setting out 
its own vision in which automotive industry policy would facilitate the integration of the 
Australian industry and the automotive industries offshore. "If we must have Plans" 
Martec opined, why not promote an Australian industry which "locally manufactures a 
few, a very few, models completely, but also produces some other vehicle components 
both for export and for domestic use within a relatively competitive vehicle assembly 
environment. . . . Australia has a strong domestic market preference traditionally for 
medium sized cars" (Martec, 1972: 1.8). This perspective led Martec to identify the 
export credit scheme announced in December 1971 as "the major new step in the plans" 
(.M I P , February, 1972: 6). Before its services were contracted by PM&C, Martec raised 
these issues in its published response to the IAC report, commenting that "vertical 
disintegration of manufacture, is conspicuously absent from the IAC blue print for the 
future" (A/M, 24th July, 1974: 9).
8.3.1.1 Martec's 'Appreciation' of the IAC report
Martec produced two documents for PM&C: one evaluating the IAC's demand 
projections, the other proposing future policy. Martec argued that under the IAC's 
recommendations exports would collapse. It pointed out that since the IAC had
68 After quoting selected extracts from a variety of sources (including some of their own material) all of 
which were generally sympathetic to tariff reduction, the Martec bulletin Motor Industry Prospects 
distanced itself from tariff reform. "We might not like these things being said, but it is Martec's 
responsibility to draw our subscriber's attention to these undercurrents" (MIP, February, 1973: 6-7).
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completed its report, New Zealand had increased sales tax differentially on medium sized 
vehicles as a fuel economy measure (M /P, October 1974: 6). It commented further on 
what it saw as the long term strategic significance of exclusive reliance on inwardly 
oriented protection such as the Commission had recommended. Multinational car 
producers would "progressively exclude Australia as a source in their . . . approach to 
world wide design and complementation" (M/P, October 1974: 7 c /p . 11). Martec 
concurred with the IAC's basic diagnosis of the industry's woes. Production was 
fragmented and producers had inadequate access to economies of scale. But it parted 
company with the IAC when it came to solutions (M/P, October, 1974: 12). Martec 
argued that the Commission's recommendations were inconsistent with its terms of 
reference which called for a viable, high local content industry utilising a high degree of 
indigenous technological capability which nevertheless recognised consumer choice. 
Martec came to the view that under the Commission's recommendations, vehicle 
manufacturing would be dramatically wound back as the domestic market swung 
towards smaller cars and exports contracted.
8.3.1.2 Martec's Alternative: an Intra-Industry Trade Led
Recovery
Martec criticised the Commission's proposals as unintentionally "negative or destructive" 
(M/P, October, 1974: 12). It proposed 'intra-industry trade facilitation policy' instead. 
As Grubel and Lloyd would do the following year (see § 4.6.2 above), Martec argued 
that intra-industry trade could and should be facilitated, and suggested concessional 
treatment under existing protective arrangements without explaining clearly how such a 
scheme might operate. Martec called for an approach which would allow for automotive 
exports of components and/or vehicles "to exceed significantly, (and eventually exceed 
several-fold), the level of domestic sales . . . The quid prod quo in this complementary 
international trading and automotive sourcing pattern should be CBU importation into 
Australia. Anything less farsighted than this will accentuate and guarantee continuation 
o f today's problems in the industry" {MIP, October, 1974: 13).69 Much of Martec's 
thinking revolved around its appreciation of the continuing growth of intra-industry trade 
including product cycle trade in Asia with Australia as a potential 'technology leader' 
(M/P, October, 1974: 14). It called for assistance arrangements which encouraged 
global automotive companies to "see Australian production facilities, Australian
69 Unless otherwise indicated all emphases in the text are Martec's and conveyed in the form Martec 
conveyed them - in italics, underlining, or capitals with little apparent rationale for the choice between 
them.
188
Chapter Eight From the First to the Second Inquiry
management and technological resources, and the Australian market as a worthwhile part 
of the increasingly integrated world wide industry. The alternative is for Australia to 
become an automotive backwater" (M/P, October, 1974: 15).
Martec's proposals to facilitate intra-industry trade and specialisation are of particular 
interest from the perspective of this study. But it should also be noted that they were 
embedded in a set of proposals which responded to the difficulties then faced by the 
industry in a highly protective and unnecessarily interventionist way. Martec proposed 
two alternative approaches. One involved the Commission's tariff-only regime with a 
variety of improvisations which unambiguously increased protection. These included 
higher tariffs on some components as well as quantitative restrictions on CBUs and 
outright prohibition of some imports such as transmissions. This alternative also 
involved subsidies for export and for research and development (M/P, October, 1974:
18). It is not clear whether Martec felt that its most protective recommendations were 
good policy or whether it felt them necessary to meet the I AC's terms of reference. In 
any case it is hard to justify Martec's proposals for quotas or prohibitions on imports. 
For instance, Martec failed to explain why it was necessary to provide Australian 
producers with a share of the domestic market which was guaranteed - to 100 per cent in 
the case of transmissions - to ensure production in Australia. Nevertheless, Martec did 
warn that it felt that the total subsidy bill and the risk of miscalculating the right mix of all 
measures was high with this approach.
Martec's alternative approach was a rationalised local content plan. Here it suggested 
that plan administration be made more transparent and accountable with the scrapping of 
the 'non-reversion' rule, company averaging of local content with firms encouraged to 
participate in overseas complementation plans "through Australian export activity 
generating credits for additional duty free admissions". Encouragement should also be 
given to "the export of such automotive services as tooling, design, technological 
assistance, financing, and management expertise". The local content plan would operate 
behind a "sufficiently high tariff barrier to encourage plan participation by a reasonable 
number". Martec pointed out that additional objectives set out in the Commission's 
reference would require further programs some of which would require "possible 
subsidy" (M/P, October, 1974: 20-21).
8.3.2 Exports, Intra-Industry Trade Facilitation and the I AC
As the previous chapter demonstrated, the Commission's rejection of export assistance 
for the automotive industry took place much more by default than design. The 
Commission did address the issues slightly more directly when it subsequently defended
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its report. Responding to SIDCAI's inclusion of export credits in some of its options, 
Rattigan claimed that:
Policies to stimulate export demand were . . . rejected as a major element of 
any solution.70 The likely gains in market volume seemed small and the 
cost to the Australian taxpayer of subsidising the purchase of cars by 
foreign consumers outweighed the benefits the Australian consumer would 
gain from lower unit costs made possible by greater volume of production 
(Rattigan to Steele: 2).
Rattigan's defence of the IAC's refusal to recommend export assistance was similar in 
form to the 'in-principle' case against tariff compensation - made possible by eliding the 
strengths of the opposing case. An objection to tariff compensation 'in-principle' could 
only be made by ignoring the strengths of the tariff compensation argument - indeed its 
essence - which centred on the constrained nature of the policy making situation and the 
contribution one might make to reform by doing several things simultaneously. The 'in­
principle' case against tariff compensation was built on replacing this conception of the 
policy making situation with an expurgated one in which it was imagined that policy 
makers could choose between first and second best alternatives (c/§ 3.4.2; 3.4.3 
above). Rattigan's comments above likewise treat the case for export assistance as one 
to be determined essentially in isolation from other policies. In such a context it was 
unsurprisingly rejected. But just as the case for tariff compensation could only be 
comprehended in the context of continuing tariff assistance, the interesting questions 
here emerge by reference to analogous considerations - namely the widely accepted need 
for continuing automotive tariff assistance into the long term. Why did the IAC 
recommend long term 25 per cent nominal assistance rates to import replacement and 
none to export? If this level of assistance might have underwritten new investment in 
light car manufacture as the IAC seemed to think it might, would greater export activity 
not be possible at lower cost? Might more exports have met the political constraints 
embodied in the terms of reference at lower rates of assistance? These questions were 
never addressed.
Of four options being considered by SIDCAI, 'Option Two' was more complex than the 
IAC's proposals but involved a similar rate of assistance. As the IAC put it, "The most 
significant difference" between the two was the former's inclusion of an export credit
70 I have been unable to find any clear reference to the usefulness or otherwise of export assistance in the 
Commission's working papers or report. By contrast the Commission paid considerable attention to 
developing a range of alternatives to its eventual recommendations, all of which would have extended 
inwardly oriented assistance beyond the level offered by the Commission's preferred tariff only regime 
(Working Paper A12: 27ff; and see Working Paper "Tariff Proposal, Mark II").
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scheme. Rattigan's response to this was to claim that such assistance could provide 
those local manufacturers able to make export sales with opportunities to earn "a much 
higher level of profits" (Rattigan to Steele, Attachment Two: 9). This response with 
something of a portent of the Commission's response to export facilitation a few years 
later. It focused on one possible risk associated with the alternative without seriously 
assessing either the potential benefits from the proposal, or even the seriousness of the 
risk. It drew attention to the unattractive initial effect of export assistance in swelling 
producers' profits. But it ignored what its own framework would have predicted would 
be the two likely attractive second round effects: increased export activity and/or price 
reductions to consumers arising from competition between exporters earning 
supernormal returns. As would be the case in its subsequent inquiry into the industry, it 
analysed export credits according to an implicitly short term perspective. Those who 
opposed the 25 per cent tariff cut argued that it would swell the profits of importers 
rather than reduce prices. In the short term this argument probably had some merit. But 
supporters of tariff reform tended to focus on the scope for importers to compete their 
newly won profits away in the medium to long term (interview with F. H. Gruen).
The Commission's response to Martec's proposals for export assistance was somewhat 
more extensive. It focused tellingly on the inconsistencies between Martec's advocacy 
of intra-industry trade and specialisation and its more protectionist proposals which 
would implicitly penalise specialisation (IAC, "Martec", 1974, Attachment Two: 3). But 
the Commission's fundamental rhetorical strategy was to place the onus of proof on its 
critic rather than meet the strengths of Martec's argument. On the matter of export 
demand the Commission softened the language with which it described its predictions 
whilst failing to concede anything of substance. It "did not wish to minimise the 
difficulties" likely to be experienced on export markets in the future but added, "Martec 
has not produced any evidence that this present level of exports could not be at least 
maintained in the long term" (IAC, "Martec", 1974: 6).
In fact as discussed above, Martec had presented some, albeit fragmentary, evidence to 
this effect. But the Commission had failed the very same burden of proof which it now 
imposed on Martec. As Martec pointed out, the Commission did not substantiate its own 
claim that exports could be maintained (IAC, "Martec", 1974: 11). The Commission 
downplayed those specific matters which Martec had itemised. "Other than the sales tax 
measures (discriminating against medium cars) introduced in New Zealand recently, [it 
was] not aware of any other development which would alter its assumption [s/c] of 
exports being maintained at about their present level in the longer term (IAC, "Martec", 
1974: 5, emphasis added). The Commission conceded that the recent New Zealand
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measures would adversely affect medium car exports but commented that "insufficient is 
known of the price elasticity of demand in New Zealand to judge their effect" (IAC, 
"Martec", 1974: 5). New Zealand accounted for 50 per cent of all Australian automotive 
exports. In ignorance, the Commission gave itself the benefit of the doubt.
8.3.3 Contradiction without Engagement
The Commission was less than searching on the fundamental issues of the design of 
assistance in the presence of intra-industry trade and specialisation. Martec's focus on 
the threats and opportunities posed by world wide sourcing and the resulting 
'complementation' arrangements were given short shrift, with the IAC arguing that its 
own recommendations would "provide the necessary flexibility" for local manufacturers 
to participate in any complementation scheme where there was "mutual advantage" (LAC, 
"Martec", 1974: 5). Yet, as the Commission itself commented in a later discussion paper 
about export facilitation, the local content scheme placed a "constraint on a manufacturer 
wishing to participate in a complementation scheme" because of the costs it imposed on 
"the extra imports of components which might be part of a complementation 
arrangement" (IAC, "EF Discussion", 1979: 3-4). Mutatis mutandis, the same 
arguments apply to a tariff-only regime. As the Commission conceded in its comparative 
table of the various options being considered by SIDCAI, the "export credit scheme 
could facilitate regional complementation" (Rattigan to Steele, Attachment Two: p. 4 of 
Chart One).
The extent to which the discussion took place without reference to the changes taking 
place in the Australian economy is also remarkable. There was virtually no discussion of 
the rapid deterioration in the position of vehicle manufacturers which was taking place 
when the IAC was collecting its information. Leyland indicated for instance in late 1973 
that the revaluations of the Australian dollar had led to a cessation of exports to Hong 
Kong (IAC, PMVs, 1974, Transcript: 1784). Things got progressively worse as 
inflation accelerated through 1974 (see § 8.2.1 above). Three weeks before it finished 
its report, a letter from an importer of small cars commented that "the energy crisis has 
shocked the industry to the core and caused a major change of attitude, as to the concept 
of vehicle best suited for the motorists for today and tomorrow" (Letter, 24th June 
1974).
The encounter between the IAC and its opponents after the IAC had reported and 
accordingly had something to defend certainly provided an inauspicious setting for 
cooperative dialogue. Nevertheless the Commission's defensiveness ensured that the 
debate never narrowed differences or refined positions. The Commission ended its
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critique of the Martec report by arguing that a number of charges made by Martec were 
"untrue". It had not, as Martec alleged, totally ignored the foreign domination of the 
industry, regional complementation, exports of components and services or the 
economic evolution of the industry. The Commission cited a (small) number of page 
references to prove each point (IAC, "Martec", 1974, Attachment Two: 8-9). This was 
contradiction without engagement. As the previous chapter has demonstrated, Martec's 
claims were essentially correct. What mention the Commission made on those matters it 
made in passing and seemingly for the sake of completeness. More often than not the 
issues it noted did not enter its thinking in an important way.
The most substantial point made by Martec was that Commission's recommendations 
took insufficient account of specialisation in production. Here the Commission 
commented indignantly that specialisation of production was "discussed throughout 
. . . and is one of the central features of the report" (IAC, "Martec", 1974, Attachment 
Two: 9). But the Commission failed to acknowledge - perhaps it did not appreciate - that 
its analysis of the economics of the automotive industry largely ignored product 
differentiation between vehicles of similar technical specifications (see § 7.4.3.3 above). 
This crucial field of specialisation was a central feature of Martec's report. Likewise, 
although it accepted in an appendix to one of its interdepartmental letters that export 
credits could facilitate regional complementation (see above), its comments on its own 
proposals failed to concede that export credits offered a way of facilitating specialisation 
which was qualitatively superior to its own tariff only recommendations (see Chapter 
Five above).
8.4 The Aftermath of the 1974 Report
The decision on the 1974 report came after months of political infighting - involving 
extensive involvement in lobbying and decision making by automotive firms, unions, the 
Whitlam Ministry and the ALP Caucus. It was a rout for the IAC. Fairly soon after the 
release of the IAC report, PM&C came to the view that the IAC report was politically 
untenable. It rapidly became disenchanted with the IAC's report. PM&C saw the report 
as unhelpful to those like itself who were unprepared to implement the report's central 
recommendations, but wished nevertheless to salvage something from the political 
wreckage which threatened (Warhurst, 1982: 194).71 The subsequent IAC contributions
71 The Commission did include a short section in its report providing an option for the Government 
should it regard itself as bound by the commitment of the previous Minister, Mr Anthony to extend the 
local content plans till 1979. The option however was essentially to delay the implementation of the
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likewise provided little to assist policy makers develop policy priorities based on 
contemporary developments in the industry and an appreciation of what was worst about 
existing arrangements. There was a tension between the Commission's self styled role 
as the provider of objective transparent information, and its championing of one 
particular approach to policy.
Rattigan had previously objected to a reference seeking advice from the Tariff Board on 
policy options for colour television manufacture in Australia. The Government had 
contemplated sending a reference requesting the Board to advise on policy options to 
achieve Australian manufacture of colour televisions at low, medium and high local 
content respectively. Rattigan resisted this because he considered that it restricted the 
Tariff Board's independence. Amongst other things Rattigan argued that the reference 
might "force the Board to carry out some work which it might regard as unnecessary" 
(1986: 150-1). But it is hard to see how such a reference is not consistent with the 
framework for which Rattigan had striven - namely one where the Commission gave 
objective and transparent policy advice to governments on the cost and benefits of policy 
alternatives with governments themselves determining policy in the light of that advice.72
The Commission's calculations of implicit subsidy equivalents for the four options under 
active consideration by SEDCAI indicated that Option Two was vastly superior to the 
alternatives. The assistance it offered was "basically similar to that projected under the 
Commission's recommendations" though component, assembly and exports did better 
than they would have under the IAC's recommendations (Rattigan to Steele, Attachment 
Two: 9). Yet the Commission expended little effort highlighting this or offering its 
conditional support for Option Two in the event its own recommendations were rejected
report until 1979 (IAC, PMVs, 1974: 171-2). Short of this, there was little guidance for those looking 
for useful reform options to the IAC's approach.
72 David McBride,- a Commissioner during Rattigan's Chairmanship - had a similar aversion to 
'information' reports - reports without policy recommendations - although he had no problem with "the 
odd information report".
There was a danger with the introduction of information reports because for 
many years some senior public servants had attempted to change the IAC into a 
body that just did the analyses and calculations. These had to be handed over to 
others who would make the recommendations. If every report became an 
information report it would be the end of public scrutiny, transparency and 
independent disinterested policy advice (McBride, 1994: 19).
Without advocating a move toward more information reports, it is far from clear why constraining the 
adviser to providing information and analysis would be the end of public scrutiny, transparency and 
independent disinterested policy advice.
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in the deteriorating economic and political circumstances. Given this, and with the 
IACs recommendations out of contention, SIDCAI turned to the industry for advice and 
the decision gradually converged on SIDCAI's most protectionist option - Option One 
(Warhurst, 1982: 196-7).73
As the IAC conceded, even Option One involved significant, if not spectacular structural 
adjustment within the industry (Rattigan to Steele, Attachment Two: 1). It rationalised 
the existing multiplicity of local content schemes into one scheme which required 
participating firms to achieve 85 per cent local content averaged across their whole 
production. And, it provided that, upon achieving 85 per cent local content, firms would 
only qualify for 10 of the remaining 15 per cent imported content duty free, the other five 
per cent of imported content attracting full rates of duty. Tariffs on built up vehicles 
were to rise to 35 per cent subject to a 'trigger-tariff of 45 per cent in the event that CBU 
imports occupied more than 20 per cent of the market. The complementation program 
would continue. Although it would continue to be constrained to a limit of five per cent 
of local content, the IACs comparative 'chart' of options suggested that it might be 
administered more liberally than it had been previously. In addition the 'non-reversion' 
rule would be removed (Rattigan to Steele, Attachment Two, Chart).
As Option One passed through the chaotic decision making processes of the Whitlam 
Government, it took on progressively more protectionist baggage. Against Whitlam’s 
wishes, some changes were made to improve the position of specific component 
producers such as Borg-Wamer in Albury and Repco Bearing Company in Launceston. 
The Prime Minister's press statement announcing the new arrangements also baulked at 
limiting vehicle manufacturers access to duty free components commenting that they had 
"yet to be finally determined" (Whitlam, 1974: 2, 3). And the 'non-reversion' rule - a 
monument if ever there was one to the 'straight-jacket' of Australian post war 
protectionism - was resurrected in caucus on the motion of Joe Riordan and a young 
ALP backbencher, Paul Keating (Warhurst, 1982: 205).
8.4.1 The lAC's Projections in Retrospect
If the government decision was a rout for the IAC, so too was the way events treated its 
projections. All of its major projections concerning the extent of total domestic and
73 The IAC estimated the subsidy equivalent of Option One at $2,900 million per annum. By contrast 
the IACs proposed regime involved a subsidy equivalent of $1,400 million per annum. The next most 
protectionist option after Option One was Option Four which the IAC estimated as providing assistance 
of $2,200 million in subsidy equivalent terms (Rattigan to Steele, Attachment II: 5 of Chart).
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export demand for vehicles, the composition of that demand and the consequent 
employment implications were disastrously wrong. The forecasting performance of the 
IAC's critics was not in all respects better than the IAC.74 Nevertheless the pessimistic 
burden of the IAC's critics' message was comprehensively borne out. Total demand for 
cars collapsed in an unprecedented way both domestically and on the export market and 
demand swung much more decisively towards small vehicles than the IAC forecasts 
envisaged. The annual domestic car market fell by 10 per cent from 476,000 to 430,000 
units between 1974 and 1977 (IAC, PMVs, 1981: 15). The IAC had projected that sales 
of new cars would rise by between 29 and 35 per cent to between 612,000 and 642,000 
by 1980 and had stuck to its forecast when challenged by SIDCAI in October 1974 
(Rattigan to Steele, Attachment One: 1). In fact sales in 1980 were still some six per cent 
below the 1974 figures at 446,000 with no signs of an upturn at the time of the IAC's 
next major inquiry report in 1981 (IAC, PMVs, 1981: 34).
In 1973 medium, upper medium and luxury vehicles occupied 53 per cent of the car 
market (IAC, PMVs, 1974, Appendix Seven: 18). The IAC had predicted that, by 1980 
the domestic market share of medium and luxury vehicles would have declined to 44 per 
cent. The Commission said that it "could not agree" with the South Australians, who 
had argued that the car market was moving towards a situation in which the three major 
vehicle classes - small light, large light and medium - would each occupy approximately 
one third of the market, with medium and luxury vehicles occupying 38 per cent of the 
market (IAC, "Evaluation", 1974, Attachment One: 9). In fact in the first four months of 
1975, large light models took 36 per cent of the market, small light cars took 25 per cent 
of the market with medium sized vehicles taking almost exactly one third of the market. 
The combined market share of medium, upper medium and luxury cars was 39.4 per 
cent (The Melbourne Herald, 17th July 1975: 4).
Martec's and the industry's prediction that exports would collapse was also borne out by 
events. In current prices, exports fell from $170 million in 1973 to stagnate at $73 
million in each of the three years from 1976 to 1978 before recovering to $124 million 
by 1980 (IAC, PMVs, 1981: 243). Given that vehicle prices rose by nearly 100 per cent
74 Given that their predictions were more pessimistic than their adversary and that the market was going 
into a lengthy downturn, the IAC's critics were generally more accurate than the IAC. However their 
pessimism sometimes 'overshot' the mark to such a degree that their predictions were further from the 
ultimate outcome - in a pessimistic direction - than the IAC's were off the mark in an optimistic 
direction. Thus for instance, Martec's prediction that small cars would occupy "closer to 80 per cent" of 
the market was incorrect. The small car share in 1980 was much higher than the IAC had predicted, but 
it was a little closer to the IAC's prediction than it was to 80 per cent (see below).
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during the period (IAC, PMVs, 1981, "Draft": 43), the real value of exports would have 
fallen against their 1973 level by about three quarters by 1978 and by significantly more 
than half by 1980. The consequent fall in Australian automotive production had 
significant effects on employment. Little more than a month after the Government had 
announced its decision on the IACs 1974 report, the 'big three' vehicle manufacturers 
announced that between seven and a half and eight and a half thousand workers would 
be retrenched (IAC, PMVs, 1975: 1-2). Productivity improvement and continuing poor 
sales saw employment continue to fall. Where the Commission had predicted a fall in 
employment between 1974 and 1980 of 2,000 comprising the removal of 15,000 jobs 
and the growth of 13,000 new ones (IAC, PMVs, 1974: 165), employment actually fell 
by nearly 15,000 from 90,500 to 76,000 between 1973-74 and 1979-80 (IAC, PMVs, 
1981: 53).75
7  ^ In some respects it can be argued that the Government's failure to implement the IAC's 
recommendations deleteriously affected the accuracy of the IAC's projections. This is most true of the 
IAC's prediction of the total Australian domestic demand for vehicles. Given that the Government's 
regime would have led to higher prices, total Australian vehicle demand would have been greater under 
the IAC's recommendations. Nevertheless in 1981 the Commission attributed the decline in 
registrations to "factors such as generally depressed economic conditions and increases in petrol prices" 
(IAC, PMVs, 1981: 34), neither of which were affected by automotive industry policy.
The Commission's model assumed 4.6 per cent annual GNP growth in the years from 1975 to 1980 
(IAC, PMVs, 1974, Papers, Volume 3, §2.5.2.1), whilst the economy managed just over 3 per cent 
(ABS, National Accounts, 1989-90). Failure to adopt the Commission's recommendations would 
probably have reduced the extent of the swing towards light cars. Because quotas were imposed on the 
volume rather than the value of automotive imports, they produced disproportionate increases in small 
car prices (IAC, PMVs, 1981: 90, 159). The Commission's recommendations might have provided 
exporters with greater flexibility to increase imported content than the plan which was imposed, 
although, as has been argued, IAC working documents indicate some uncertainty about whether the 
imported content of medium cars would have increased under the Commission's proposals. The effect, if 
it existed would have been small in any case (see § 8.2.1.1 above). As a matter of fact medium cars 
continued to be assembled at about 95 per cent local content for many years, notwithstanding the ability 
of companies to move towards a company average of 85 per cent local content (personal communication 
with Ford and GMH). One could argue that the IAC recommendations would have imposed greater price 
disciplines on Australian medium vehicles than the Whitlam Government's plan and that this would have 
stimulated demand for Australian vehicles sufficiently to actually increase employment. But it seems 
much more likely that the IAC's recommendations would have led to greater automotive labour shedding 
than the more protective arrangements which were adopted.
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8.4.2 The IAC Revisits the Scene: Export Credits are
Abolished
The announcement of over seven thousand prospective retrenchments in the industry in 
December 1974 led the government to impose quotas on imports to apply from February 
1975 (IAC, PMVs, 1975: 1). In that year in July the Government sent the IAC a 
reference for report in less than four months requesting advice on "whether import 
restrictions . . . should be continued, and if so at which level and for [how long]" 
(IAC, PMVs, 1975: Appendix 1). The report was both brief and modest in its reformist 
ambitions. Although it reiterated the Commission's in-principle objections to quotas 
(IAC, PMVs, 1975: 77), it nevertheless recommended that quotas remain in place at the 
then current levels until the end of 1976. It recommended that 45 per cent tariffs should 
continue to apply after that time until the end of 1977 whereupon the 'trigger tariff 
mechanism should be allowed to come back into operation in the (now unlikely) event 
that domestic manufacturers regained sufficient domestic market share (IAC, PMVs, 
1975: 80).
Of particular interest here, however, is that the Commission ventured somewhat outside 
the wording of its terms of reference to offer some suggestions for incremental reform of 
the administration of the local content plan. The Commission recommended that the 
non-reversion provisions of the current plan be removed (IAC, PMVs, 1975: 47). Its 
comments on complementation were, as they had been just over a year before, 
maddeningly ambiguous. The earlier export credit plan had been replaced by one which 
was only marginally less intensively supervised by the industry department,76 and which 
was also limited to five per cent of local content although it was to be reviewed in 1976 
and every two years thereafter "with a view to possible increase" (IAC, PMVs, 1975, 
Appendix Six: 7). The Commission noted most producers' criticism of the uncertainties 
to which the plan's multiple criteria gave rise and added that "not all complementation 
arrangements are necessarily in Australia's best interests. Some may merely be 
disguised export subsidies". The Commission concluded that there was, 
" [consequently . . . some justification for a case-by-case approach to determining
76 Replacing the pre-1974 export credit arrangements were new ones which required that 
complementation arrangements satisfy a range of criteria in advance in order to qualify for export credits. 
Complementation concessions would be provided where they increased economies of scale, promoted 
specialisation in component production, encouraged common sourcing of components and improved the 
prospects of continuing reciprocal trade. Nevertheless, like the old plan, the new plan required those 
seeking complementation concessions to ensure that employment changes took place in a "manageable 
way" (IAC, PMVs, 1975: 36-7).
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eligibility for concessions" (IAC, PMVs, 1975: 47). (The scheme was already 
administered on a case-by-case basis although not necessarily according to criteria of 
which the Commission would have approved.) The Commission's next sentence 
appears to be a non-sequitur:
To overcome the problem of uncertainty, yet to retain the facility to 
encourage complementation that can be shown to be in the nation's interest, 
the Commission suggests that full duty concessions be available under the 
plan without the need to pursue complementation arrangements (IAC,
PMVs, 1975: 47).
This proposal abolishes the export credit scheme. At the same time, it lowers the costs of 
assemblers which as the Commission conceded increased effective assistance to vehicle 
manufacturing for the domestic market. The proposal transfers some of the assistance 
otherwise available to exporters to assembly activities which were at the margin of 
viability under the previous arrangements - those requiring over 60 per cent effective 
assistance to remain viable (IAC, PMVs, 1975 : 48).77 And although the Commission 
did not acknowledge it, an export credit scheme on its own would have been welfare 
improving given the quantitative restrictions on vehicle and component imports (see 
§ 5.6.2.1 above).
Again the I AC's treatment of these issues was a portent of its approach six years later, 
when it showed itself prepared to bid up the level of assistance to import replacement so 
as to avoid subsidising exports. Yet immediately following its proposal to effectively 
abolish the complementation scheme, the Commission commented that "[t]he existing 
policy on complementation could be maintained with the added condition that one of the 
tests of desirability of any complementation proposal must be its likely effect on the 
overall viability of the manufacturing plan" (IAC, PMVs, 1975: 47). In the context of 
the Commission's discussion it is not clear what it had in mind. Be that as it may, when 
the Fraser Government came to act on the Commission's report some five months later,
77 The Commission calculated that its proposals would increase effective assistance to locally produced 
vehicles supplied to the domestic market from 61 per cent to 64 per cent assuming that tariffs were at 45 
per cent. In fact the current level of assistance was higher than this because of quantitative restrictions 
on CBU imports and the amount by which the changes would have increased that figure would have been 
correspondingly larger had the Commission based its estimates on the existing quota constrained 
situation. Note however that the proposal unambiguously reduces assistance to component suppliers, 
who lose what assistance they may have received from export credits, but face the same level of potential 
import competition as if the assemblers were fully utilising their 5 per cent export credit entitlement. 
The Commission also proposed to rectify some administrative procedures within the local content plan 
which operated in a very discriminatory way against exports (IAC, Passenger motor vehicles, 1975: 49).
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it "accepted the IAC recommendations that duty concessions be available under the plan 
without the need to pursue complementation arrangements, that is, existing 
manufacturers basic by-law concession under the plan be increased to 15%". It added 
that given this extension of access to imported content "complementation concessions 
will no longer be available" (Cotton, 1976: 8-9).
The extension of access to imported components also helped dig the local industry 
deeper into absurd production patterns. The established manufacturers continued to 
manufacture medium sized vehicles at levels significantly above the company average 
requirement of 85 per cent, which enabled them to assemble small vehicles and remain 
within their 85 per cent local content company average (IAC, PMVs, 1981: 55). But 
they were not permitted to import fully built up vehicles with their surplus content. 
Accordingly, they 'spent' their surplus local content assembling imported component 
packs. As described above (see § 7.3.1), the packs frequently cost the manufacturers 
about as much (and sometimes more) to import duty free as the equivalent built up 
vehicles did (personal communication with Ford and GMH). Thus the relative 
profitability of the most efficient activities in the industry - the manufacture of medium 
vehicles - came to cross subsidise the least efficient activity - adding little (or sometimes 
negative) value to imported components by assembling them into vehicles.
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What, in 1979, the past having been what it so deplorably was, is the correct 
policy for the government to apply to the Australian motor industry? We may 
perhaps be content to acknowledge that we cannot at all easily answer the 
question. Perhaps after all there is some place for the point of view that the 
countryman came to after trying so hard to answer the visitor's inquiry how to 
get to X: 'If I wanted to get to X, I wouldn't start from here'. In other words:
'Your guess may be as good as mine'.
Davidson and Stewardson, 1979: 192
Where the IAC had largely overlooked the issues arising from intra-industry trade in the 
mid 1970s, by 1979 there were strong disciplines requiring it to examine the 
microeconomics of intra-industry trade facilitation. Firstly, having decided to introduce 
an export credit scheme, the government required the Commission to make 
recommendations on the operation and possible extension of the scheme. Secondly, and 
not surprisingly, inquiry participants themselves sketched compelling analyses of the 
microeconomics of export credits and of ways in which export credits could complement 
traditional trade liberalisation through tariff reform. Thirdly, in the wake of the hostility 
to the Commission arising from the disappointments of the mid 1970s, the Fraser 
Government introduced S 23A of the IAC Act. This pressed the Commission to 
provide analysis of a range of issues in each of its inquiries. The Commission had 
typically focused on ways of bringing the industry within the fold of manufacturing 
industries enjoying more normal levels of assistance and it had pointed out along the way 
how tariff-only assistance would improve allocative efficiency within the industry. But 
S23A(c) now explicitly required the Commission to consider the 'meliorative theme' of 
"whether . . .  the structure of the industry can be improved and, if so, the manner in 
which, and the measures by which, the improvement can be achieved and the 
consequences of such improvement".
As this chapter demonstrates, notwithstanding all this, the Commission failed to engage 
seriously with the issue of intra-industry trade facilitation policy or with the views of 
those who had proposed a means of mutually accommodating the need for both inter­
industry and intra-industry trade liberalisation. Sections 9.1 and 9.2 introduce the 
unusual circumstances of the inquiry. The 1979-81 inquiry lasted nearly three times the 
10 months taken by the previous inquiry. Nevertheless, as section 9.3 outlines, the 
latter inquiry actually fell short of the - albeit limited - level of microeconomic 
understanding which the 1973-74 inquiry had achieved. This failure of micro-economic
201
Chapter Nine The 1979-81 Inquiry
vision and analysis went hand in hand with increasing emphasis on quantitative general 
equilibrium modelling despite concerns within the Commission regarding its relevance 
and accuracy. Sections 9.4 - 9.6 explain how the Commission decided against non- 
traditional methods of trade liberalisation (including export credits) largely by imposing 
upon them a burden of proof which it was impossible for them to meet.
The last section shows a few chickens coming home to roost and so provides a fitting 
conclusion to this chapter and the three which precede it. The Commission's failure to 
understand properly the implications of the locational complementarity between assembly 
and manufacture led it to make recommendations which would have perpetuated 
assembly within Australia at near infinite rates of assistance. Also, since the difficulties 
of the mid 1970s, the Commission had been successful in engineering a change in 
institutional arrangements whereby it would publish a draft report for public comment 
before its final report. Where it changed its recommendations between the draft and the 
final reports as it did in this case, its own priorities at the margin - the tradeoffs it made 
between competing values - were made manifest. On deciding to increase the level of 
assistance provided in response to industry doomsaying about its draft report, it chose to 
recommend an increase in assistance to import replacement but it did not revisit its 
recommendations on export facilitation. This was despite evidence that had export 
facilitation been extended, lower automotive tariffs might well have been possible.
9.1 Introduction
After the 1975 report and the consequent 1976 changes to the plan (see § 8.4.2 above), 
there were several other IAC reports on the industry in the late 1970s (IAC, PMVs, 
1981, "Draft": 12). Like the 1975 inquiry however, they were typically focused on 
relatively minor matters relating to the administration of the local content plan and the 
quota system. The 'trigger tariff mechanism introduced in late 1974 increased tariffs by 
10 percentage points to 45 per cent. It proved unable to ensure a hoped for 80 per cent 
market share for domestic manufacturers and so quotas were imposed in February 1975. 
They remained in force - except for six months following the 1976 devaluation - until the 
1979-81 inquiry and, as it turned out, beyond it (IAC, PMVs, "Draft": 67). In the 1978 
Budget, the Federal Government helped itself to some of the rents now being earned on 
quota entitlements by increasing the tariff on built up cars by 12.5 percentage points to 
57.5 per cent. Even so, import penetration did not fall below the 20 per cent of the 
domestic market mandated by the quota system (IAC, PMVs, "Draft", 1981: 72).
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9.1.1 The Coming of the 'World Car'
The achievement of the benefits from the 'world car' concept will depend on the 
ability of the manufacturer to convince governments in the subsidiary countries 
to remove or modify any protective barriers which induced the establishment of 
that manufacture in the first place.
The IAC, PM Vs - EF, 1979: 9
By the late 1970s the American automotive manufacturers had decentralised production 
and design to their major subsidiaries. Accordingly, wherever scale permitted, local 
subsidiaries tended to design and build their own vehicles at high levels of local content. 
GM, and Ford had very different model ranges in Europe and America (Automobile 
Club of Italy, 1979: passim), and since the early seventies their major car lines in 
Australia had been predominantly locally designed and manufactured at over 95 per cent 
local content (IAC, PMVs, 1974, Appendix Seven: 22). Then, in an effort to respond to 
the Japanese threat, both firms were pioneers in the 'globalisation' of production. By 
the late 1970s the European Ford Fiesta was a study in 'regional complementation'. Its 
engine blocks were made in the United Kingdom, its transmissions and axles in France, 
its carburetors and distributors in Northern Ireland and its body panels in West 
Germany. Its engines were assembled in Spain (IAC, PMVs, 1981: 26).
The principles of 'world car' manufacture were those of 'regional complementation', 
except that complementation took place across the entire globe. Participating affiliates 
would accordingly specialise in the design and/or production of some components at 
world scale. If they were assembling for domestic or regional markets they would also 
import a significant amount of their components from other affiliates who would 
likewise be manufacturing at world scale. GM announced its first major 'world car' - 
code named 'J-car' - in late 1979 (AFR, 3rd, September, 1979: 10). It was aimed at the 
large light market in which the Japanese had been so successful. It was to be co­
designed by GM in the United States and its subsidiaries and affiliates around the world, 
which would also participate in the manufacture of the vehicle. Ford followed suit 
announcing something similar one year later.
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9.1.2 Export Credits Again
The Government, for its part, is convinced that, given the small domestic 
market for motor vehicles in Australia, the only real and effective way that the 
industry can improve its cost structure is through closer integration with the 
world industry and, of course, the export opportunities . . . this will provide. 
International developments involving the production of world cars are providing 
major export opportunities which Australia cannot afford to let slip and which 
must be grasped now.
The Industry Minister Philip Lynch introducing the export facilitation scheme,
22nd February 1979, IAC, PM Vs, 1981: 83
Between April and June 1978, both Chrysler and Nissan urged the Government to 
introduce an export credit scheme within the local content plan. Anxious to avoid further 
significant changes to the plan until it had run its course by the end of 1984, the 
Government rebuffed them. Nevertheless the proposals were developed further within 
government and in October some possibilities were considered by Cabinet, although no 
immediate changes were made to the plan. There followed an overseas trip by the then 
Industry Minister, Philip Lynch, who returned from discussions with a range of 'parent' 
companies of Australian vehicle producers enthusiastic about the possibility of 
Australia's participation in major 'world car' projects (AFR, 3rd September, 1979: 10). 
The pace of events quickened as Lynch received what was in effect an ultimatum. GMH 
proposed to build an Australian plant to manufacture four cylinder engines for the J-car. 
Because it would power a 'world car', the engine would be produced at world economic 
scale of 250,000 units per year, and because the domestic market could absorb less than 
half of these engines, the remainder would be exported to GM affiliates around the 
world. GMH claimed that the investment could not proceed without some export credit 
plan similar to the previously existing scheme (AFR, 3rd, September, 1979: 10). Early 
in the new year GMH gave the Government a deadline of the 28th of February for a 
decision (AFR, 16th February 1979: 5).
On the 22nd of February the Government announced a rationalised export credit scheme 
called export facilitation. In place of the previous labyrinth of restrictions, the new 
scheme specified that export credits of up to five per cent of local content could be earned 
and used by any vehicle manufacturer without restriction (IAC, PMVs, "Draft": 70-71). 
The Government warned that despite its benefits, the new arrangements "could lead to a 
reduction in the range of components presently produced" as increased exports led to 
increased imports (IAC, PMVs, 1981: 83). One month later the Government sent a 
complex reference to the IAC requiring two separate reports. The first, due in six
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months, would explore the administration and possible extension of export facilitation 
beyond the five per cent limit. This gave the Commission the freedom to recommend 
against extensions to the scheme, but not against the scheme altogether. The second 
report, due within twelve months, was to report on 'Post 84' assistance arrangements 
for the whole automotive industry (IAC, PMVs, 1981: 187-8).
9.2 The Inquiry
As ever, this was not to be a 'normal' inquiry. It occurred whilst the decline of the 
industry was dramatically manifesting itself. After half a decade of stagnation, 1980 saw 
a significant downturn in domestic demand (IAC, PMVs, "Draft", 1981: 35) setting off 
significant labour shedding within the industry (AFR, 19th March 1980: 1-4). The most 
notable industry rationalisations were the closure of GMH's assembly plant at Pagewood 
in Sydney (IAC, PMVs, 1981: 55) and the collapse of Chrysler Australia. Chrysler was 
taken over, but significantly scaled down by Mitsubishi (The Age, 13th August, 1980). 
This, the politically charged circumstances of the original reference, and the structural 
change which export facilitation threatened to wreak, ensured that the whole inquiry was 
charged with political campaigning and intrigue. While the IAC conducted its inquiry, 
the industry continued its lobbying and the Government continued its attempts to craft 
the plan to stimulate investment in the industry (eg see AFR, 20th February 1980: 1, 2, 
5; 8th March 1980: 9, 16).
In late 1979 the Commission's interim report on export facilitation recommended against 
extending export facilitation beyond five per cent and recommended against component 
suppliers participating except as suppliers to the vehicle manufacturers. The 
Commission also requested and was granted a nine month extension of time for the final 
'Post 84' report to improve its data and deepen its analysis. Implicitly rejecting some of 
the Commission's interim advice to constrain export facilitation, the Government 
announced an extension of export facilitation from five to 7.5 per cent of manufacturers' 
turnover, and required a further interim report on options for allowing specialist 
component manufacturers to participate in export facilitation (IAC, PMVs, 1981: 189). 
Required, against its earlier advice, to recommend arrangements which would allow 
component producers access to export facilitation, the Commission recommended 
component suppliers have access to the scheme without limit on their own account, and 
that trade in export credits be allowed. Each of the Commission's interim reports were 
preceded by draft interim reports and there were only fairly minor changes between the 
drafts and the final interim reports.
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The draft report on '"Post '84' Assistance Arrangements" considered the introduction of 
a tariff-only regime desirable in the long term. However, to mitigate the cost of duty on 
components to vehicle manufacturers, the Commission proposed a medium term tariff 
regime which permitted vehicle manufacturers to import 10 per cent of the value of their 
production duty free. The draft report recommended that the new regime be introduced 
immediately the old plan expired in January 1985 with tariffs set at 60 per cent falling in 
annual five per cent drops to 35 per cent by 1990 (IAC, PMVs, "Draft", 1981: 154). 
Following howls of protest, the IAC moderated these proposals in its final report. It 
proposed that the starting tariff for 1985 remain the same at 60 per cent, but that the 1990 
'medium term' target - which by this stage was still nearly nine years away - be changed 
to 50 per cent tariffs (IAC, PMVs, 1981: 144).
9.3 The Micro-economics of the Industry
One of the weakest areas of the report is likely to be the treatment of the 
probable consequences of implementation of the Commission's proposals.
Minute, 21st May, 1980: 8
It is hard to be sure what industry structure would evolve from the 
Commission's recommendations.
IAC, PMVs, 1981: 133
The following sections explore two distinct but related issues:
1) how little the Commission knew, and how well it understood the fact of 
its own ignorance and
2) how, in such circumstances the Commission went about designing and 
arguing the case for a preferred reform option.
The 1979-81 inquiry replicated many of what Chapters Seven and Eight argued were its 
1974 predecessor's weaknesses of micro-economic vision. As with the earlier report, 
the later report gave the reader little sense of the likely future industrial evolution of the 
Australian industry. There was some reportage concerning globalisation of automotive 
production and the increasing prominence of Japan, the entry of Nissan and Toyota in 
the 85 per cent local content plan and major events such as the closure of Pagewood 
(IAC, PMVs, 1981: 55, 81). However, as with the report's 1974 predecessor, there 
was virtually no exploration of the scope for beneficial product differentiation for the 
Australian industry, either domestically or offshore.
The latter report devoted a smaller proportion of its energies to the analysis of economies 
of scale than the 1974 report. Nevertheless it persisted in the earlier report's focus on
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the highest levels of scale possible in larger markets (IAC, PM Vs, 1981: 22-3), rather 
than any analysis of scale economies which was pertinent to the Australian context. It 
likewise used a concept of "optimal scale of output" which had been arbitrarily defined 
within the economics profession - that is without reference to the particular context in 
which the Commission was now using it (IAC, PMVs, 1981: 61-65). Like their 1974 
predecessor, the 1979-81 reports mentioned in passing but did not focus on those 
examples in the world industry - most notably the Swedish and Canadian industries - 
which might have provided particular insights into the issues facing the Australian 
industry. At that time SAAB was viable in both domestic and export markets despite an 
annual volume of about 82,000 units - well below the Holden's volume from the 50s to 
the late 70s and a only a little above it in the early 80s (IAC, PMVs, 1981: 22-3, 5, 64; 
FAPM, Letter to the IAC 27th April 1981: 4).
In addition, despite their greater size and time in preparation, the latter reports provided 
significantly less insight into the structure of the industry than their predecessor. Where 
the 1974 report showed some appreciation of the locational interdependence between 
assembly and component manufacture, the later report comprehensively mishandled the 
issue (§ 9.7.2 below). And the earlier report analysed the vehicle building sector as 
essentially five sub-sectors - small light, large light, medium, upper medium and luxury 
- each with its own level of cost competitiveness against imports. The earlier report 
described the likely effect of its recommendations as being substantial rationalisation of 
both vehicle building and component manufacturing sectors, in each case sketching how 
it thought each sector would be affected (IAC, PMVs, 1974: 167).
Although I have criticised its inaccuracy and inadequacy in important respects, the 
information the earlier report provided was nevertheless important and useful to public 
policy making and, it seems reasonable to assume, integral to the Commission's 
determination of its own proposals. By contrast the 1981 report failed even to provide 
its readers with a record of the relative changes in the Australian industry's market share 
in the various vehicle classes in the recent past (c/IAC, PMVs, 1974, Appendix Seven: 
18). And, as far as assessing the relative competitiveness of different sectors of the 
industry was concerned, the 1981 report failed to proceed very far at all beyond a frank 
confession of its own bemusement. "It is difficult to resolve the question of the relative 
disadvantages of various automotive production activities" (IAC, PMVs, 1981: 97).78
78 The Commission did mention in an appendix that evidence indicated that competitiveness improved 
with vehicle size (IAC, PMVs, 1981: 302). But this plays little role in the Commission's analysis of 
the industry or of its analysis of the effects of its recommendations.
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9.3.1 What Kind of Competitiveness Shock?
Under existing measures, competitiveness of domestic automotive production
declined alarmingly in the 1970s.
The I AC, PM Vs, 1981: 6
There were other important motes in the Commission's eye, not because of its inability 
to answer questions it had put to itself but because of its failure to conceive the 
questions. The extent to which the industry's falling market share reflected a 'relative 
cost' or a 'product variety' shock was a question of considerable policy significance, 
particularly given the necessity to report on export facilitation. For the more the 
industry's worsening performance could be attributed to a 'product variety' shock, the 
more compelling became the case for pursuing intra and inter industry trade liberalisation 
simultaneously (see § 5.7.3 above). As the 1973-74 inquiry made clear, the industry 
was most competitive in the manufacture of medium vehicles. Since then, demand had 
swung strongly towards smaller vehicles in both domestic and export markets, and the 
industry's market share had declined in both markets accordingly. In its 1979-81 
inquiry the Commission did not seriously explore this issue. However, in the absence 
of any explanation to the contrary, its frequent references to declining domestic 
competitiveness appear intended to refer to the relative supply cost and quality of 
Australian production (IAC, PMVs, 1981: 6, 49).
One can confidently conclude that the falling market share of the industry was, to a 
considerable, if not necessarily exclusive extent, the result of a 'product variety' shock. 
Some evidence suggests that the cost competitiveness of medium car manufacture in 
Australia had not changed substantially since 1974. The market share of Australian 
medium vehicles in 1979-81 had not fallen below the 95 per cent market share enjoyed in 
1974, and indeed had not fallen below this figure many years later under significantly 
lower levels of (near tariff-only) assistance (Martec, 1979, Unnumbered Chart, "Six 
Cylinder Cars"; Automotive Industry Authority, 1989: 16). This had occurred even 
though market sharing tended to favour the import of high value (generally larger) 
vehicles over low value vehicles (IAC, PMVs, 1981: 90).
One important piece of GMH evidence the Commission published in 1981 compared the 
cost of a German and an Australian six cylinder sedan which indicated that the Australian 
vehicle enjoyed a 23 per cent cost advantage over the German vehicle - a figure which 
suggests some continuity with, and if anything, improvement since, the earlier report 
(see § 7.4.3.2 and IAC, PMVs, 1974; Working Paper B7, Table Three - where the 
corresponding figure for the mid 1970s was a cost advantage to Australia against Europe
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of about 10 per cent before correcting for differences in specifications). And there was 
clearly potential in the industry for substantial export expansion at relatively low levels of 
cost disability (see below § 9.5.3.1). On the other hand, there are some reasons to 
suspect that, over the 1970s, the cost competitiveness of Australian medium vehicles 
continued to decline against Japan, where labour productivity within the industry had 
doubled (The Economist, 9th April, 1994: 80) and the real price of cars had fallen by 
nearly 40 per cent (IAC, PMVs, 1981: 45). However, because Japanese policy 
discriminated strongly against the domestic sale of larger vehicles, Japan was still 
concentrating its energies almost exclusively in the area of vehicles which were smaller 
than Australian medium sized vehicles (Automobile Club of Italy, 1979, "Japan").
9.3.2 Computable General Equilibrium Modelling and the
Microeconomics of the Industry
The analyses which are feasible would only serve to demonstrate the workings 
of the ORANI model, and their results would have only a tenuous relationship 
to projections of the effects of the [Commission's] proposals. Finally, the 
capacity to rectify these deficiencies seems limited. It may be possible to further 
disaggregate the model's treatment of the industry. However, even if detailed 
cost disadvantage data are made available by witnesses, it is doubtful that any 
acceptable evaluation of assistance would be possible.
Minute circa. October 1979: 6
The lion's share of quantitative analysis of the state of the industry and its likely 
prospects under the Commission's recommendations, was done within the framework of 
the computable general equilibrium model of the Australian economy, ORANI. ORANI 
was itself part of the larger Commission-sponsored IMPACT project with headquarters 
at Monash University. The issues as they arose in the 1979-81 inquiry comprise a small 
part of a larger story about how the Commission’s pioneering of computable general 
equilibrium modelling affected its capacity to understand and model economic 
developments at the industry level.
General equilibrium modelling allowed the Commission to tell the important story about 
the way in which - given certain assumptions - contraction of uncompetitive activities led 
to expansion elsewhere in the economy (eg see IAC, PMVs, 1981: 158). On the other 
hand the inherent difficulty of the modelling task raised questions about the realism of 
the model and the accuracy of its parameters. And ORANI contributed little to modelling 
what was happening within industries although, with sufficient effort, micro-modelling 
of structural change within industries could be grafted onto ORANI (Powell, 1979: 14). 
Given this, and the fact that ORANI was an import to the Commission from academia,
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its introduction generated major controversy both inside and outside the Commission. 
Those hostile to heavy reliance on ORANI argued (amongst other things) that it:
• was frequently used in methodologically invalid ways given the issues it 
was required to elucidate, its structure and the way in which it was 
configured for individual exercises
• operated at such high levels of aggregation, and on sufficiently outdated 
input/output tables, that it was frequently misleading in its conclusions
• operated with a parameter file which was biased in favour of free trade - 
with implausibly low elasticities of import substitution and implausibly 
high elasticities of export demand and supply (Cronin, 1979).
Accordingly, the inquiry took place at a time of internal tension within the Commission. 
That tension erupted into a series of angry minutes to the Chairman in late June 1979. At 
issue was the extent to which ORANI was useful in simulating the effects of the current 
assistance regime and its proposed alternatives. The consensus reached within the 
Commission was that ORANI was inadequate for the task of analysing responses within 
the automotive industry to different assistance scenarios - or at least added nothing to 
what a more partial ad hoc intra-industry analysis might accomplish (see Minutes dated 
26th, 27th, 28th June and 4th, and 5th of July 1979). In this atmosphere, it appears that 
Commission staff responsible for quantitative work were anxious to place on the record 
their reservations about the difficulties they faced.
A working note was skeptical not just of predicting the future, but even of analysing the 
present. Firstly, sufficiently reliable and disaggregated data was impossible to come by. 
The cost structure of component manufacturers was "of major interest". Yet there was 
hardly any data available. Secondly, even if data were available, it was "doubtful that 
. . .  the Commission would have the information or analytic capacity to model the 
evolution of the structure of the industry". The note concluded that "the most intractable 
and important problem" was evaluating the current assistance arrangements:
It seems that the complexities of the package, and the interaction between 
the effects of market sharing and [the] local content plan largely defy 
analysis. . . .  in the absence of any capacity to model the effects of the 
proposals within the industry, the remaining approaches offer very little 
towards meeting the [analytic] objectives presented above (Working Note,
Approx October 1979: 3-4,).79
79 The Commission attributed its modelling difficulties to the fact that the protection arrangements 
comprised two interacting systems of quantitative restrictions - market sharing for vehicles and a local 
content scheme for components. Clearly this complicated the theoretical and empirical problems of 
determining who got what levels of assistance from the package. Where one is seeking to determine the
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The decision to proceed produced an internal minute with the flavour of a bureaucratic 
'note for file', apparently motivated to place certain matters 'on the record' in the event 
of future misunderstandings or recriminations:
Commissioners consider that a quantitative answer must be provided for the 
reporting requirement. You consider that it would not be acceptable for the 
Commission to claim that it had too little information to allow a useful 
quantitative answer to be provided with any confidence, even if this were 
your judgment (Minute, 9th October 1979: 1).
The minute proposed, and as the various reports show, Commissioners agreed, that 
published simulations should be based on "best estimates but with appropriate 
qualification" (Minute, 9th October 1979: 1). A subsequent minute sent about a month 
later was if anything, even more skeptical of the scope for ORANI in its current form to 
model the changes the Commission was contemplating. Noting that ORANI required 
estimates of the changes in assistance associated with any recommendations the minute 
commented: "At the moment I have no idea of what assistance is afforded by the various 
assistance measures applying to the industry and I can provide no best guess of the 
changes in assistance implied in any proposed recommendations". The minute continued 
that ORANI modelling would fail to take into account the disparities of disability within 
the component producing sector (it did not mention the disparities of disability in the 
vehicle manufacturing sector) and that it took no account of economies of scale. The 
relevant section concluded "This approach to measurement of effects does not, in my 
view, meet the requirements of the Act. Also, it provides answers which may be quite 
misleading" (Minute, 2nd November, 1979: 2).
The Commission's public modelling of the effects of its recommendations was done in 
essentially the way against which this minute warned. It would have been possible to 
have grafted a model similar to the implicit model used in the 1974 report into the 
ORANI model for the purposes of the 1979-81 inquiry. Had this been done the industry 
would have been modelled as at least three sub-sectors of vehicle manufacture and one or
maximum protective effect at the margin of viability, it is clearly more straightforward to do this with 
tariffs than with quantitative restrictions. Also it is easier to estimate the protective effect of a single 
instrument rather than two interacting ones. Yet the essence of the problem was the non-uniformity of 
the incidence of protection - many firms used much less assistance than the industry's protection made 
available at the margin (IAC, PMVs, 1981: 95). The Commission would have faced essentially the 
same problems had the industry been protected by - say - an 80 per cent tariff only regime. Without 
measuring the competitiveness of each major activity in the industry, it would have been virtually 
impossible to know the distribution of the incidence of such a tariff on different activities within the 
industry.
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more of component manufacture, each with its own level of competitiveness. However, 
this was not done. The industry was modelled according to categories which seem to 
have more to do with the Commonwealth Statistician's classifications for its industry 
production series than on any judgment about where it was most fruitful to distinguish 
between different activities for the purposes of the modelling exercise at hand. The three 
sub-industries used for modelling were 'vehicle assembly', 'component manufacture', 
and 'other' products not under reference (IAC, PMVs, 1981: 155, 325).80
Thus the commitment to the econometric sophistication embodied in ORANI went hand 
in hand with an unusually crude evaluation of the effects of policy alternatives on the 
industry. The 1974 report had based its assessment of the effects of its 
recommendations - and presumably the recommendations themselves - on a loose 
commonsensical empiricism oriented around the estimated approximate cost 
competitiveness of the industry's various sub-sectors. By contrast the later report 
worked with a picture of the industry which was both much vaguer and much more 
aggregated. As the report explained plaintively:
[T]o operate the model, an estimate of the expected change in the price of 
competing imports attributable to the recommendations is required. This 
estimate serves as the initial disturbance from which the effects flow. To 
determine this change, estimates are required, for both motor vehicles and 
. . . components, of the proportion by which the landed duty paid price of 
imports is increased by the existing and recommended assistance 
arrangements. As stated earlier, this is a formidable task, particularly for the 
components industry. To represent this situation by a single 'average' is an 
unfortunate but unavoidable simplification (IAC, PMVs, 1981: 156).
The 1974 report's estimates of cost disability could be used to suggest critical points at 
which the various sub-sectors of the industry would face substantial rationalisation as 
assistance was withdrawn. By contrast the modelling in the 1981 report assumed that 
vehicles and components were each produced at uniform levels of cost disability against 
imports, and that the elasticity of substitution of imports for domestic production was 
uniform at all levels of import penetration. With the elasticity of import substitution, the 
initial level of import penetration and the change in import prices each specified, ORANI 
would then generate the predicted change in import penetration by way of a simple linear 
relation between the three parameters (Bureau of Industry Economics, 1981: 3).
8  ^The two categories under reference correspond with ASIC 3211 and 3214 whilst 'other' corresponds 
well with 3212 and 3213. The method of disaggregation of the industry is explained at greater length in 
Hagan et al 1980, however I have been unable to obtain a copy.
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Thus, within the model there was no possibility that, despite its 95 per cent domestic 
market share and strong price competition from smaller vehicles, the Australian medium 
car manufacturing sub-sector might have competed away a substantial proportion of its 
tariff assistance. And there was no allowance for the possibility that the substitutability 
of imports for domestic production might be different in different sub-sectors of the 
market. Yet this flew in the face of intuition. Toyota made Corollas in Australia - and 
higher quality Corollas in Japan! Something similar could be said for most of the 
Australian manufactured and assembled small and large light vehicles. The Falcon and 
the Holden on the other hand, were much less comparable with any imports to 
A ustralia.81 Assuming that these vehicles were also more cost competitive than 
Australia's light vehicles, the elasticity of import substitution emerges as a function of 
import penetration.82
9.4 Burdens of Proof: Recommending Policy under
Uncertainty
Some domestic component production appropriates considerable assistance 
through the Plan - implied nominal rates of the order of hundreds of per cent at 
the margin of existing local content requirements according to some evidence. 
However the Commission does not know who gets what or how much.
Minute, 21st May, 1980: 3
Given its ignorance, the Commission was required to design a reform program with 
relatively little idea of its consequences - a particularly invidious position given the 
Fraser Government's demonstrated timidity concerning tariff reform and the consequent 
requirement in the Commission's terms of reference to avoid "undue disruption" (IAC, 
PM Vs, 1981: 187) and to report extensively on the likely effects of its recommendations. 
The Commission decided that the Government’s desire to avoid 'undue disruption' 
necessitated considerable gradualism in approaching the ultimate objective of a tariff-only 
regime for the industry at rates similar to other manufacturing industries. It accordingly
81 No imported vehicle offerings had the same designs as the Australian medium vehicles and those 
offered at competitive prices - the Toyota Crown and Nissan 280 C were each significantly smaller in 
body dimension and engine displacement (Motor Manual, May, 1981: 17).
82 In principle the aggregate 'industry' elasticity parameter would, if properly estimated, aggregate the 
elasticities of substitution within the various sub-sectors. Nevertheless the conditions under which such 
a procedure might be regarded as methodologically valid are discussed in Cronin, (1979: 4). They include 
the requirement that import penetration is similar in all sectors of the market - a condition which is 
egregiously violated in this case.
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decided upon recommending a 'transitional' regime to last until 1990 with a view to 
further reform subsequently (Minute to Commissioners, 21st May, 1980: 2). Yet what 
form should the transitional arrangements take? A staff minute completed at the end of 
November 1979 set out three broad strategies towards achieving lower and more 
uniform levels of assistance:
A a direct move to tariffs - a tariff-only or near tariff-only regime - at 
relatively high rates which would be subject to subsequent review and 
reduction;
B phasing out local content provisions; and
C increasing export facilitation (Note, 21st December, 1979: 1).
Option A was attractive to the Commission because it was "an explicit move in the right 
direction away from too much government intervention and rules. Levels of assistance 
would be explicit and measurable". Yet as the minute commented, there were difficulties 
in implementing Option A in a sufficiently gradualist way to meet the terms of reference 
and the political exigencies of the day. A tariff-only solution would appear to be a "big 
change in assistance and indeed might be" (Note, 21st December, 1979: 1). If Option A 
met the Commission's predilections, Options B and C probably better met the 
Commission's terms of reference. Option B would have been better equipped to avoid 
"undue disruption" (see below). And Option C involved greater neutrality of assistance 
between domestic and export markets and so more efficiently met the reference's call for 
policies to "attain greater competitiveness in both domestic and export markets" (IAC, 
PMVs, 1981: 187) and 23A of the IAC Act's requirement to determine means of 
improving industry efficiency. As argued in the next section, Option C might also have 
permitted faster tariff reform.
However, in effect the Commission required options B and C to satisfy a 'burden of 
proof if it were to displace Option A. The following sections argue that, in both cases, 
the very possibility that such a burden might have been discharged was effectively 
foreclosed. Option C was the first to be eliminated and accordingly is dealt with first.
9.5 Export facilitation
I find the idea of a Japanese car manufacturer importing components from
Australia rather revolutionary.
Mr Seear, IAC Commissioner on 1979-81 inquiry, Transcript: 471
After outlining some of the potential attractions and dangers of export facilitation in 
1979, this section explores the Commission's 'in-principle' objection to the scheme.
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Chapters Six to Eight above have documented the Commission's failure to engage with 
those who it saw as tainted with protectionism and special pleading. In the 1979-81 
inquiry the Commission failed to engage with traditional allies whose special interest as 
inquiry participants came only from their shared desire with the Commission to reduce 
automotive protection. Two submissions from rural groups strongly supported export 
facilitation in the context of tariff reform in essentially the terms set out in Chapter Five 
above. But, beyond its in-principle objections, there was little, if any response from the 
Commission.
9.5.1 A Sword for or a Shield against Structural Reform?
[Option C] could really hit the component boys. . . .  It clearly encourages
restructuring although how far this would be sensible depends upon our ability
to produce low cost exports.
Note, 21st December, 1979: 2
The Commission knew it faced an uphill battle in achieving significant structural reform 
in the industry. A May 1980 Minute to Commissioners commented concerning one 
possible incarnation of Option A, that it was "very similar" to the unsuccessful 
recommendations of "the 1974 report" which were "reiterated . . .  in the various later 
reports with a singular lack of success". Even if the Commission's analysis improved 
and the Government was more aware of the pitfalls of local content schemes than it had 
been before, "the chances of success are probably still not too high. . . .  It is also 
likely that the Commission will be criticised for its apparently 'hard' line on motor 
vehicles and components in comparison to its 'soft' line on TCF . . .  Of course, if the 
Government rejects a relatively 'soft' TCF report, where that would leave a 'hard' motor 
vehicle . . . report is anyone's guess" (Minute, 21st May, 1980, 2). In this context 
Option C had strong attractions. It had the various benefits in political economy 
explored in § 5.8.1 above.
Like ORANI, but in a more concrete way, export facilitation provided a response to that 
protectionist rally cry - "where are the new jobs coming from?". For, as an IAC minute 
noted, increasing imports were generated by increasing exports which could be 
specifically identified (see passage cited in § 5.8.1). And as an IAC minute pointed out, 
it had "the benefit of appearing to be a government preferred option" (Note, 21st 
December, 1979: 2). A Government generally timid about structural change had been 
forceful in its support of export facilitation and frank about its capacity to rationalise the 
industry notwithstanding strong resistance from component suppliers and the Labor 
Opposition (IAC, PMVs, 1981: 83, AFR, 16th November, 1979: 15 The Australian,
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14th February 1980: 3).83 Indeed, one Commission minute suggested that by extending 
export facilitation to 7.5 per cent of turnover, the Government had gone about as far as 
public opinion would permit in reducing the local content of the 'Australian car' (IAC, 
Minute and Note, 16th April 1980: 14).
The promising politics of Option C were well underscored by the fact that while the local 
manufacturing industry was united in its opposition to Option A, there was significant 
support within the industry for Option C. GMH, Nissan and Chrysler supported 
structural change through export facilitation (AF R , 16th February 1979: 5). The 
Federation of Automotive Products Manufacturers (FAPM) - the component industry's 
lobbying association - had characterised export facilitation as a "prescription for disaster" 
in the hands of the vehicle manufacturers. Nevertheless when the Government initiated 
the second interim report from the IAC, well over half FAPM's members voted in favour 
of extending export facilitation to specialist component manufacturers (AFR,  18th 
March, 1980: 5). In addition to the contribution it could make - along with tariff reform 
- to improving allocative efficiency, export facilitation satisfied the political logic of 
divide and conquer. While tariff reform set the most efficient industries against the least 
efficient, export facilitation had a similar effect within the industry. The most efficient 
manufacturers would be able to gain at the expense of the least efficient.
Judging from these comments in Commission documents, and by the Fraser 
Government's actions, export facilitation was probably the most politically 
implementable means of securing substantial structural adjustment within the industry. It 
also possessed prophylactic qualities. For if quantitative restrictions on imports 
remained or were reimposed in the future, export facilitation would prevent such 
measures leading to the massively costly diversification of production to which they had 
led in the 1970s. GMH's engine plant illustrated that, whether or not Australia would 
ever become competitive at free trade, automotive products could be exported in large 
volumes and at relatively low levels of disability (see § 9.5.3.1 below). Accordingly, in 
the event that quantitative restrictions were imposed, the additional assistance they 
accorded could be captured by relatively low cost exporters, with the credits thus earned 
being used to supply the domestic market with imports. Given that several 
manufacturers were in a position to expand exports at relatively low cost (see § 9.5.3.1 
below), one could expect that domestic competition between them would see most of the
83 As Richard Johns put it recently, "FAPM and powerful member companies such as Repco had been 
instrumental in achieving local content provisions in earlier plans but they could not stop export 
facilitation" (1994: 195).
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gains available through export facilitation being passed on to consumers (see IAC, 
PM Vs - EF, 1979: 13; IAC, PMVs, 1981: 95).
9.5.2 The Commission's Approach to Export Facilitation
Export facilitation will increase Government involvement in the industry and
add to the complexity of the package.
IAC, PMVs, 1981:5
Given the Commission's ultimate goal of a tariff-only regime, and its knowledge that 
even GMH's world scale engines would require some level of export subsidy (IAC, 
PMVs, 1981: 102), the Commission was intuitively hostile to export facilitation. 
Whatever its economic justification, export facilitation also loomed as a dangerous 
experiment in political economy. An internal minute commented that export facilitation 
raised "the issue of whether government would, in practice be 'locked in' to continuing 
responsibility for the support of the industry" (Draft, 9th October 1979: 8.17). The 
Commission also saw export facilitation as inextricably part of the 'interventionism' of 
the plan. As an early draft of the final 'Post 84' report commented, the objective of 
export facilitation was international integration and this was incompatible with the inward 
orientation of the local content scheme. Export facilitation was seen as "second best" 
tinkering with the existing package of assistance (Draft, 9th October 1979: 8.17).
The Commission realised the merit of export facilitation in the presence of quantitative 
restrictions because export credits increased import penetration. But within the tariff- 
only regime towards which it was striving, export facilitation on its own could operate as 
a pure export subsidy (see § 5.6.2.2.2 above). Yet it was not necessary to conclude 
from this that export facilitation was inextricably tied to a local content plan. It is just as 
administratively easy to attach export facilitation to a tariff regime as it is to attach it to a 
local content scheme. And as various participants pointed out (see below § 9.5.3), 
where export facilitation on its own implied increased assistance, the appropriate 
response was to lower assistance with further tariff cuts rather than abandon a scheme 
which had attractions for as long as protection - in any form - remained (see § 9.5.3 
below).
Ultimately, the Commission justified its hostility to export facilitation on the grounds that 
it could see "no reason why" exports from the automotive industry should have . . .  "a 
greater claim on community assistance than is provided to exports generally" (IAC, 
PMVs, 1981: 9). As was the case with the 'in-principle' case against tariff 
compensation and with Rattigan's depreciation of the export credits in SIDCAI's Option
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Two in 1974 (see §§ 3.4.1 and 8.3.2 above), the argument is wholly unobjectionable as 
a consideration - a meliorative theme. As the ultimate reason for rejecting export 
facilitation it is as irredeemably partial as any 'in-principle' rejection of tariff 
compensation.
Indeed it is largely arbitrary even on its face. For there are any number of plausible 
'benchmarks' against which one could compare the level of assistance to automotive 
exports - zero, assistance available to other exports, to manufacturing generally or to the 
automotive industry. Each of these, and other benchmarks besides, could claim some 
support from the principles of economics and/or of political economy. Certainly, when 
the Tariff Board was faced with a similar requirement to make recommendations 
consistent with the prosperity of an industry in its 1971 shipbuilding report, it had seen 
the appeal of applying export assistance to match the rate available to import replacement 
(see § 3.3.1 above). And as one increases the proposed level of assistance to 
automotive import replacement, as the Commission did, the appeal of the first and 
second benchmarks above fades, or at least requires more thorough defence. It becomes 
progressively harder to explain why one would want to discriminate against 
developmental and adjustment opportunities within the industry which involve export as 
opposed to import replacement.
9.5.3 The Interim Report on Export Facilitation
The NFF views an export facilitation scheme as not only a means of increasing 
the competitiveness of the industry but also a mechanism which facilitates the 
lowering of general levels of protection enjoyed by the automotive industry.
A. J. Robb, National Farmer's Federation, IAC, PMVs, 1981, Transcript: 137
The material presented in this chapter suggests that, without the constraints imposed by 
its terms of reference, the Commission would have recommended against the export 
facilitation scheme altogether. Constrained by the reference however, it set out the 
criteria against which it would determine its recommendations on export facilitation. 
They were:
1) efficiency in resource use
2) avoidance of undue disruption
3) practicability of administration
4) consistency with the current local content plan and
5) equitable treatment between members of the industry (IAC, PMVs - EF, 
1979: 15).
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As it had insisted in its 1974 correspondence with SIDCAI, the IAC was preeminently 
concerned with the first of these criteria - the efficiency of resource use - particularly in 
the medium to long term (Warhurst, 1982: 203-4). This was true in the 1979-81 inquiry 
as well, and the circumstances surrounding the 1979 inquiry and the terms of reference 
suggested that the government wanted similar advice on the long term efficiency 
implications of export facilitation - if not in the interim report, then certainly in the suite 
of reports of which it was a part. Yet, as this sub-section shows, the first criterion 
received short shrift. The Commission justified its recommendations on export 
facilitation by reference to the other four criteria.
An appealing response to the multiple dilemmas raised by these criteria was supplied by 
two submissions from economists representing two rural groups, Ian Wearing, from the 
Australian Woolgrowers' and Graziers' Council and Andrew Robb of the National 
Farmers Federation (NFF). Both were sympathetic to the Commission and whilst their 
free trading bona fides might have been compromised in Commission inquiries into 
agricultural assistance, in this inquiry their sectoral interest in rationalising the 
automotive industry and reducing its assistance, was wholly coincident with the 
Commission's objectives. Both submissions ran to just a few pages and sketched what 
Schumpeter might call an intellectual 'vision' of export facilitation and its potential role in 
trade liberalisation - an intuitive 'pre-analytic' grasping of relations and inter-relations the 
details and possible logical structure of which had yet to be carefully 'worked over' and 
subjected to theoretical scrutiny (Schumpeter, 1954: 41).
Both were strongly supportive of export facilitation in the context of tariff reform 
arguing that whether or not it was the least cost means of improving the automotive 
industry's competitiveness, it offered "a unique opportunity for the local industry to 
become better integrated with the world industry and thus reverse the inward looking 
approach" which had "plagued [it] for decades" (IAC, PMVs, 1981, Transcript: 132-7). 
The "desirable principles" were identifiable. "The limit [on the scheme] should be 
gradually extended to ensure that all opportunities for achieving economies of 
. . . specialisation may be encouraged" (IAC, PMVs, 1981, Transcript: 132-7). And 
both submissions insisted that the scheme should not be considered as an alternative to 
tariff reform but as its complement (IAC, PMVs, 1981, Transcript: 132-7; Australian 
Woolgrowers' and Graziers' Council, [hereinafter "Australian Woolgrowers"], 1979: 1, 
3). Despite its brevity, the Woolgrowers' submission showed how, provided the 
possibility that export facilitation would increase assistance was met with complementary 
tariff cuts, all the major administrative and equity issues could be adroitly dealt with by 
extending and liberalising the scheme. To this end the submission argued against all
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arbitrary restrictions on the earning, use and transferability of credits, although it 
conceded some possible limit where resulting change might be disruptive (Australian 
Woolgrowers, 1979: 1, 3).
Perhaps partly because of the short six month time it had to complete the first interim 
report,84 the Commission expressed itself tentatively. It was "reluctant to recommend 
extension of the scheme" outside the context of its more general inquiry into the industry 
(IAC, PMVs - EF, 1979: 16). These instincts took the Commission in the opposite 
direction to that taken by the rural interest groups. With a few exceptions it 
recommended restricting the scheme as far as possible to the scope that had already been 
mandated by government decision. It recommended that upon their introduction, export 
credits only be earned for exports which were additional to each vehicle manufacturer's 
previous export performance, as measured against a proposed 'base year' of 1979. As 
the Woolgrower's submission implicitly pointed out, this recommendation clearly 
discriminated against those firms which were already most export-oriented:
After all, one objective of this exercise should be to see that greater rewards 
go to the more efficient producers. They are more likely to be the ones 
that are already exporting (1979: 2).
Likewise the Commission recommended confining the scheme to the five per cent limit 
previously set by Government. And it recommended against vehicle importers and 
specialist component producers being given direct access to the scheme. (Specialist 
component manufacturers could however manufacture products for export by the vehicle 
manufacturers who would in turn qualify for export credits for those exports.) The draft 
interim report recommended that only exported components be eligible to earn export 
credits and that those credits only be eligible to import components duty free. The 
justification for doing this was the largely unargued assertion that "exports of CBU 
vehicles are not likely to increase significantly as a proportion of total vehicle production. 
Hence their inclusion would not greatly assist the achievement of the scheme’s 
objectives" (IAC, PMVs - EF, "Draft" 1979: 14). It is unclear why it should be 
necessary for built up exports to "greatly assist" the scheme's objectives to qualify for 
inclusion.
84 After the disappointment of its 1974 automotive report, the Commission had taken to publishing a 
draft report for public comment before issuing its final report. This meant that its draft report on export 
facilitation would have taken shape within two or three months from the time receiving the reference. 
This timetable would obviously have left much less time for research, thought and re-drafting than the 
Commission had taken in its 1973-4 inquiry. The reference required the Commission to publish draft 
reports of each of the reports it requested (IAC, PMVs - EF, 1979, Appendix 1).
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The final report partly relented, conceding that "[i]n general, to encourage efficiency 
gains, export credits should be able to be used as best suits the participants in the 
scheme". As the rural submissions had shown, as this kind of reasoning is extended it 
argues for further liberalisation not only of the earning of export credits but of their use, 
and beyond that to the gradual dismantling of export facilitation either through 
complementary tariff reform or through extension of the scheme to other industries. As 
the Woolgrowers put it, free trade was the "logical extension" of complementation 
(1979: 2). Nevertheless the Commission invoked the fourth and fifth of the criteria set 
out above to prevent the further extension of these arguments. It continued to argue that 
importing built up vehicles under export facilitation would be "inconsistent with the 
plan" and accordingly inequitable towards other importers who were required to pay 
tariffs and qualify for quota (IAC, PMVs - EF, 1979: 20). The Woolgrowers' 
submission had shown how extending and liberalising export facilitation could deal with 
many of the problems of consistency, efficiency and equity, arguing that the price of 
export credits would "rise to the point where windfall gains from importing CBU 
vehicles would just be eroded":
Furthermore, such transferability would greatly increase the probability of 
complementation credits leading to the optimum mix of [imported and/or 
exported] components and CBU vehicles from the point of view of industry 
efficiency, and promoting maximum benefit to the industry as a whole 
(Australian Woolgrowers, 1979: 3).
The Commission made little mention of transferability in its interim report. However in 
discussing whether or not component manufacturers should be allowed access to the 
scheme, it did consider permitting component manufacturers to earn and trade in export 
credits subject to their being ultimately used by manufacturers. (The Commission could 
not otherwise devise arrangements which limited the extent of the scheme to that 
mandated in its terms of reference - five per cent of vehicle manufacturers' turnover.) 
The IAC commented that it could see "no objection in principle to such arrangements as 
they should further encourage specialisation. However, in the short run, this facility 
may lead to an unacceptable rate of reversion from local to imported components in Plan 
vehicles" (IAC, PMVs - EF, 1979: 25). It accordingly recommended against specialist 
component manufacturers being able to earn or to transfer export credits.
9.5.3.1 Fastidiousness without Engagement
In effect, the multiple criteria by which the Commission justified limitations on export 
facilitation displaced the IAC's traditional central concern with the medium to long term 
allocative efficiency. The Commission failed to focus on allocative efficiency in its
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evaluation of export facilitation. What quantitative work it did was directed towards 
estimating the disruption to which export facilitation might lead. The "very rough" 
estimates made by the Commission indicated that the first five per cent of export 
facilitation would produce a net loss of between about 1,300 and 2,200 jobs. Because 
Nissan and Toyota were entering the local content plans at this time, this job loss would 
in fact be outweighed by their local expansion (IAC, PMVs - EF, 1979: 35-7). In the 
'Post 84' report, the Commission opined that whatever rate of structural change would 
constitute undue disruption was "largely subjective" (IAC, PMVs, 1981: 141). But it 
took a different view in its interim report on export facilitation arguing that "although the 
effects of the scheme, even in its minimum form, are uncertain, the disruption to 
employment could be significant" and that accordingly there should be no increase in the 
limit before 1984 (IAC, PMVs - EF, 1979: 17). The Commission’s fear of "undue 
disruption" in this case - a re-distribution of up to 2,000 jobs within the industry from 
1980 to 1984 - contrasts with scenarios in its draft 'Post 84' report which envisaged the 
loss of between 14,000 and 16,000 jobs in the industry from 1985 to 1990 as a result of 
the Commission's recommendations.85
The Commission was not only leaning heavily on criteria which were traditionally 
invoked by protectionists and advocates of tariff compensation - those of avoiding 
'undue' disruption, consistency with other arrangements and equity between sectoral 
interests. Its reasoning moved decisively away from a form in which the costs and 
benefits, risks and opportunities of policy alternatives would be argued, estimated and/or 
weighed, even in principle. In its place was analysis in which the burden of the 
argument was carried rhetorically as it were, with an onus of proof being imposed upon 
export facilitation.
The Commission noted that export facilitation would only improve resource use if the 
export activities it generated were "relatively efficient. To replace high cost domestic 
component activity with high cost export component activity would bring little gain to the 
community" (IAC, PMVs - EF, 1979: 13). In fact the Commission was presented with 
strong evidence, which it accepted, that the opposite was the case: ie that exports could 
be achieved at relatively low disabilities and that under export facilitation they would
85 These figures are based on the percentage employment changes in tables 9.1 and 9.2 in the draft report 
(IAC, PMVs, "Draft", 1981: 139, 143), and the breakdown of 20,000 employees in vehicle assembly 
and 45,000 in component manufacture provided in the final report (IAC, PMVs, 1981: 54). The draft 
report does not provide a satisfactory breakdown of employment in the two sub-sectors. In any event, if 
it did, the total job losses calculated would be slightly larger because industry employment fell between 
the publication of the draft and the final report.
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displace much less competitive activity. GMH, Nissan and Chrysler all proposed 
exporting items with relatively low levels of disability given existing arrangements. In 
addition to GMH's world scale engine plant, Chrysler and Nissan intended to move 
towards greater utilisation of their existing capacity, suggesting that the marginal cost of 
such exports would have been low. Thus, although these projects might require some 
assistance, the Commission observed that they were all "consistent with the objectives" 
of the scheme (IAC, PMVs - EF, 1979: 13). And in reporting that exports would 
require assistance, the Commission did not consider the negative assistance which 
automotive protection would have provided automotive exports under the existing 
arrangements - or those proposed by the Commission (see § 5.7.2 above).
On the other hand, although "very little information was available" on the disabilities of 
component manufacture for the domestic market, the Commission commented that "at 
the margin of local content requirements, it appears they are quite high". GMH 
proposed to export from a world scale plant and claimed that full access to export 
facilitation would enable it to reduce the cost of building a car by $1,000 or over 10 per 
cent. This suggested that the incremental export production induced would be of much 
lower disability than the production for the domestic market it displaced. The 
Commission went on to quote evidence from GMH and Chrysler which had components 
varying in price disability from 21 per cent to 207 per cent (IAC, PMVs - EF, 1979: 2, 
13, 11).
The Commission concluded from this that "the scheme will at least encourage a 
movement of resources in the right direction". Yet it went on to argue that "the total cost 
of assistance may be high relative to the net benefits . . . obtained. In some instances 
the scheme may attract resources into high cost exporting activities" (emphasis added). 
(The Commission's recommendations to restrict the transfer of credits substantially 
increased the likelihood of this happening). Concerning the potential of export 
facilitation to help rationalise the industry, the Commission commented that it was "not 
necessarily the most appropriate means of achieving" international competitiveness for 
the industry (IAC, PMVs - EF, 1979: 13-14; emphasis added). On the question of 
facilitating international intra-industry integration in the context of protection, the 
Commission concluded equally evasively:
It is not clear whether the most appropriate method to facilitate 
participation in world car production is to modify the arrangements of the 
local content plan and whether the export facilitation scheme, in 
conjunction with other assistance measures which currently apply to the 
industry, will encourage resource movements in the direction of greatest 
possible efficiency gains (IAC, PMVs - EF, 1979: 16 emphasis added).
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This was what the Government had requested the Commission to make clear.
9.5.4 Quantitative Analysis and Export Facilitation
A minute of late June 1979 indicated that an ORANI run had simulated the effects of 
export facilitation. It had simulated an increase in investment in engine manufacturing 
facilities and in engine production and a decrease in component production. The cost 
reductions which export facilitation would have generated were reflected within ORANI 
as a fall in the prices of Australian produced vehicles. The minute concluded that the 
model was working well and that technically, the results were at least superficially 
encouraging. However it continued:
I suspect that the magnitude of the effects will not be regarded as credible.
For example, the simulations show that GMH's engine production will 
provide about 7,000 new jobs in the economy. Even GMH does not claim 
this. A more accurate data base may overcome this problem to some extent 
(Minute, 26th June 1979: 1).
Whether or not the simulation was reasonable, GMH's failure to claim more for its 
investment was hardly surprising. GMH's claims were based on simple estimates of the 
jobs their engine project would create within GMH and its suppliers and the jobs which 
would be displaced by the resulting increased imports under export facilitation. Far from 
being a general equilibrium study which might trace the benefits from lower vehicle 
prices, ä la ORANI, the GMH study did not even use input/output multipliers (IAC, 
PMVs, 1981, Transcript: 177). Yet because of the strong intra-industry labour 
productivity gains produced in the simulation - which were also reported in the interim 
report (IAC, PMVs - EF, 1979: 37) - lower prices to consumers of motor vehicles are 
likely to have been the major determinant of the ORANI result.86 However the 
Commission published an ORANI simulation of export facilitation which had been 
changed since this early version.
The Commission's published ORANI analysis of export facilitation was short run 
modelling. In its usual short run mode ORANI was still capable of capturing important 
economy wide gains from the intra-industry productivity improvements offered by 
export facilitation. The typical short run simulation ruled out changes in industries' 
capital stock but nevertheless assumed that cost changes produced price changes to 
which firms and consumers responded which in turn affected the labour market (Dixon 
et al, 1982: 39, 65 cf IAC, "Concessions", 1987: E - 10, 22). However the simulation
86 The original ORANI simulations themselves are not in the archived records relating to the inquiry. If 
they exist I have not found them.
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of export facilitation which the Commission published in its interim report allowed no 
markets to respond to the productivity improvement generated by export facilitation and 
so simply generated about 2,000 job losses with no other modelled gain to the 
community (IAC, PMVs - EF, 1979: 37). This was ORANI in ultra short run mode. 
Indeed, since ORANI was built to illustrate relationships between markets and no such 
relationships were illustrated, one might wonder about the extent to which this could be 
regarded as an ORANI simulation at all.
Generally speaking, the shorter run the simulation, the less it takes account of the 
benefits of trade liberalisation. For as discussed in earlier chapters, within the classical 
and neoclassical tradition generally and within ORANI, the benefits of structural change 
come precisely from the short term costs which it entails. Resources initially devoted to 
high cost activity cannot find their way to low cost activities until they are dislodged. 
The longer run the ORANI simulation, the more fully resources - in particular capital and 
labour - can move to their most productive uses. The ultra-short ORANI run of the first 
interim report on export facilitation - the only modelling of export facilitation the 
Commission ever published - provided a quantitative estimate of the losses from reform, 
in the form of displaced labour, but remained silent on all its potential benefits.87
9.5.5 The Interim Report on Export Facilitation for
Specialist Component Producers
In its second interim report, the Commission did not disguise its misgivings about export 
facilitation. And it continued to recommend against importing built up vehicles under the 
scheme (IAC, "Components", 1980: 23). Nevertheless it appreciated that, should 
component manufacturers be given access to export facilitation, limitations on that access 
could have perverse effects. Limits expressed in terms of firm turnover or domestic 
sales would "penalise a more export oriented producer with a low level of domestic 
sales, relative to a largely domestically oriented producer which makes only marginal 
exports". Allowing transferability of credits also recommended itself in these 
circumstances as the component manufacturer best suited to achieving export sales was
87 In a sense the modelling measured one benefit of export facilitation - namely the productivity 
improvement which led to the job losses in the first place. However, in ultra-short run mode these 
'productivity improvements' were not productivity improvements at all from an economy wide 
perspective. For they entailed reducing the productivity of labour from low levels to the zero levels 
implied by idleness. This was precisely the argument against which the IAC laboured in the years after 
growth stalled in the mid 1970s. Opponents of tariff reform argued that dis-employment created by tariff 
reform would not lead to re-employment elsewhere in the economy.
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not necessarily the firm with the greatest need for the resulting duty free imports (IAC, 
"Components", 1980: 21-2).
Of course, as the Woolgrowers' submission had implied, the same arguments applied to 
vehicle manufacturers. At the time the export facilitation scheme was introduced and for 
a long while after that, Toyota and Nissan had very little export capability, although they 
were able to 'buy in' some components from Australian component suppliers for export 
(personal communication with Toyota and Nissan, 1983). But in addition to being more 
obviously specialised than the vehicle manufacturers, specialist component 
manufacturers were also more numerous. And as the number of participants in the 
export facilitation scheme grew, it would probably become progressively less easy to 
detect and/or prevent commercial arrangements designed to subvert any limits which the 
Government might place on the earning or the use of export credits. If for instance, a 
component manufacturer had reached its limit, it could sell products to another 
component manufacturer to enable it to export them and thus qualify for export credits.
For these reasons, and against the requests of most specialist component producers 
themselves, the Commission favoured free transferability of credits between component 
producers and between component producers and plan participants. It also preferred 
unlimited export facilitation for component producers. If a limit were felt to be 
appropriate, the Commission favoured a high one - such as 50 per cent of individual 
component manufacturers' turnover. Yet having gone this far against the spirit of the 
restrictions on the scheme it had originally endorsed, the Commission was unprepared to 
recommend against its letter by recommending that credits be made fully transferable. It 
retained the original proscription on the transferability of export credits between vehicle 
manufacturers without offering any further discussion (IAC, "Components", 1980: 21, 
22, 31).
9.6 Phasing out Quantitative Restrictions
It is clear that in the longer term we want to reduce the Government involvement 
and get to a tariff-only solution for motor vehicles and components with lower 
and more uniform levels of assistance and with components treated more in 
relation to similar production activities and less in relation to end use. The $64 
question is how to get there.
IAC Note, 21st December, 1979.
Given its ignorance, the Commission found it much easier to deliberate on its preferred 
ultimate assistance regime than to design a way of getting there. As one minute 
explained, the problem with phasing out the local content plan by gradually expanding
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imported content under the plan was the target at which to aim. "The Commission does 
not even have the information required to determine a single company disadvantage 
curve at present. Thus, we can only guess at an end point for local content in the 
transition period, with little chance that this is anything more than an arbitrary target". 
Yet the problems with moving immediately to a tariff based regime were the obverse of 
these. "[N]ow we are unsure of the starting point in the transition period" (Note, 16th 
April 1980: 4, 8), and, one should add, at what point to end the 'transitional' regime. In 
other words, how far could one go in the decade to 1990 before encountering the 
political trip-wire which, in the terms of reference, went by the euphemism of "undue 
disruption".
Given the Commission's ignorance, the requirement to avoid 'undue disruption' would 
seem to argue for phasing out the local content scheme, even if other, contrary 
considerations might ultimately prevail. For gradual relaxation of quantitative 
restrictions would constrain disruption by constraining the expansion of imports during 
any short period. As an internal minute put it:
Which approach is preferred [phasing out the local content plan or moving 
immediately to tariff-only regime] depends as much on the judgments 
made about such matters as the importance of reducing Government 
involvement in the industry or whether the immediate move to a tariff-only 
regime might jeopardise the acceptance of the long term recommendations 
if it cannot be convincingly shown that [the Commission's 
recommendations] will not create undue disruption (Note, 16th April 1980:
14).
The Commission decided against phasing out the local content plan in favour of 
introducing a tariff regime the effects of which it was largely ignorant (see head quotes to 
§ 9.3 above). It did so "mainly because" phasing out the local content scheme "would 
still mean considerable Government involvement in the industry and inappropriate 
signals (local content, etc)" (Minute, 21st May, 1980: 2). However, by the time it came 
to make this decision, the Commission's ignorance of the industry had come to count 
against phasing out the local content scheme . . . "because the Commission doesn't 
have enough information (on distribution of assistance and competitiveness of domestic 
production in the period to 1984) to design a transition package which would clearly give 
a preferred adjustment path" (Minute, 21st May, 1980: 2). As noted above, given the 
Commission's ignorance, Option B did offer a "preferred adjustment path" in its ability 
to contain "undue disruption". But in the way the Commission now posed the question, 
its own ignorance appears to prevent meaningful comparison between options. In such 
comparisons, Option B was just as incapable of demonstrating its superiority over
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Option A as Option A was of demonstrating its superiority over Option B. By imposing 
a 'burden of proof against options it was intuitively hostile towards, the Commission's 
ultimate choice of policy alternatives came down to little more than an assertion of its 
own 'in-principle' preferences.
9 .7  Tow ards the 'Post 84' Report
The Commission was aware that it had given relatively short shrift to export facilitation 
in its interim reports. Drafts completed at the end of November 1979 came with a 
covering minute which called for "a lot more thought and analysis . . . especially on 
the [tariff] rates and how to deal with the export facilitation requirement" (Minute, 30 
November, 1979: 1). Yet about a year later, with the draft report close to publication, a 
minute commented that "the present discussion of export facilitation in Chapter Six is 
relatively vague" (Minute, Approx November 1980 to January 1981: 3). After the first 
interim report, expanded export facilitation remained ostensibly under consideration as 
Option C (Note, 21st December, 1979: 1). Yet it rapidly fell out of view after late 1979 
in drafts of the Commission's report. Like the option to phase our quantitative 
restrictions, it seems to have fallen by the wayside more by default than because of any 
clear case mounted against it. Few if any traces were left on the written records of the 
Commission as to why it was eliminated from serious consideration, but by April 1980, 
a paper discussing options for the draft final report did not mention Option C (Paper 
Attached to Note, 16th April 1980).
9.7.1 Trading Substance for Form
[F]or us to say which kind of duty rate should be applicable we must know
whether we can revert; we must know what kind of complementation we have.
These are two very basic items. They're essential and if we can't do this then
certainly the duty rate has to be higher.
GMH representative, IAC, PMVs, 1974, Transcript: 124.
It is said that everything has its price. Certainly when recommending tariff based 
assistance and probably when recommending against export facilitation, the Commission 
consistently erred on the side of providing a higher rate of assistance as the price for 
achieving its desired form. As a minute to Commissioners explained in November 
1980, "a conservative approach" would be "taken on both undue disruption grounds and 
the fact that moving the industry away from close Government intervention to a tariff- 
only regime is a big step in the right direction" (Notes, 21st November 1980: 7). Other 
things being equal one can understand the Commission's preference for tariff-only
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regimes over quantitative restrictions. But other things were not equal. The minute took 
the tradeoff between the form and rate of assistance for granted. It did not explain why 
achieving substantially lower rates of assistance within an assistance regime with a more 
'interventionist' form might not be a bigger step in the right direction. In late 1979, it 
had been hoped that the tariff regime might commence at 45 per cent and phase down to 
30 per cent (Notes accompanying Minute, 2nd November, 1979: 8). By the time of the 
draft report, the Commission proposed to introduce the tariff regime at 60 per cent and 
phase it down to 35 per cent.
The trade-off between form and substance emerged more sharply as the Commission 
changed its recommendations following responses to its draft report (IAC, PMVs, 1981: 
143). Confronted by claims that automotive manufacturing would virtually cease under 
the draft report proposals (eg see GMH, IAC, PMVs, 1981, Draft Report Hearings 
Transcript: 11-12), the Commission increased the level of medium term assistance it 
would recommend. It was explicit about trading substance for form in its final report:
The Commission is faced with a dilemma. The recommended changes in 
assistance must be sufficient to induce the necessary changes in industry 
structure while at the same time avoid undue disruption. In terms of 
encouraging improved competitiveness . . . the Commission reiterates the 
importance of changing the existing inappropriate forms of assistance. . . .
Given the reference requirement to avoid undue disruption and the 
uncertainties about the likely effects, the Commission has chosen to slow 
down the recommended changes in the levels of tariff protection (IAC,
PMVs, 1981: 143, also see 33).
Accordingly, in its final report the Commission changed its recommended medium term 
tariff from 35 per cent to 50 per cent. The Commission considered tariffs to be a 
superior form of assistance to quantitative restrictions because they placed a ceiling on 
the rate of assistance the industry received. Yet given the Commission's ignorance not 
only of the current competitiveness of the industry but also its likely competitiveness in 
the future (given changes in the industry and elsewhere in the economy), tariffs at too 
high a level might actually retard achievable structural change. The new 
recommendations risked providing significantly too much assistance in 1990 to secure 
the political acceptability of its recommendations in 1981. Other comments in the final 
report suggest the Commission was unsure of whether increased assistance would be 
necessary to avoid undue disruption (IAC, PMVs, 1981: 143 and see § 9.7.3 below). 
Recommending Option B - the steady relaxation of quantitative restrictions - at least for 
the first few years of a reform regime, would have allowed policy makers to target much
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more closely the extent of industry rationalisation they considered politically acceptable 
with a view to moving towards a tariff only regime later in the reform path.88
In fact, notwithstanding the increase in the recommended long term tariff rate, the IAC 
recommendations were regarded as unimplementable by the government of the day. Yet 
as events transpired, the IAC recommendations would almost certainly have retarded 
what tariff reduction was achievable after 1986 when real exchange rate falls saw quota 
protection proving redundant, with 57.5 per cent tariffs restricting imports to just over 
15 per cent of the market (Automotive Industry Authority, 1987: 52 and see § 10.1.3.2 
below)! By 1990, under the 'Button Plan' (which resembled both Options B and C), 
tariffs were ten percentage points below the Commission's recommendation of 50 per 
cent (IC, PM Vs, 1991: 191, 183).89
Perhaps more tellingly still, when the Commission chose to increase the recommended 
medium term rate of assistance to the industry, its earlier recommendations to restrict 
export assistance to the level mandated by government remained intact. The higher 
recommended tariff rate would have increased the assistance rate available to those 
exports which qualified under the (then) 7.5 per cent ceiling for export facilitation. But 
beyond this point, while assistance was being substantially expanded for import 
replacement, exports would not have benefited from the changes to the draft report. Yet 
expanding access to export credits was one way to facilitate the introduction of more 
ambitious (lower) assistance rates. Even before the draft report was finalised, the 
Commission's Assistance Evaluation staff had concluded that, even within the proposed 
7.5 per cent limit, the export facilitation scheme would have "a major impact on the 
competitiveness of local production" (Notes, 21st November, 1980: 4-5). But the 
Commission does not appear to have considered extending export facilitation as one 
possible means of 'softening' its draft recommendations to avoid "undue disruption".
88 The hybrid 'tariff quota' arrangements actually adopted by both the Lynch Plan of 1981 and the more 
ambitious Button Plan of 1984 combined quota expansion with a steadily declining 'penalty tariff 
applicable to imports in excess of quota entitlements. Depending on the settings of both quantitative 
restrictions and penalty tariffs, such arrangements can generate results which are either more or less 
ambitious than any given tariff based reform path. What they can do, however, is to provide a much 
more certain rate of import expansion and, to phase towards a tariff only solution. In addition, as 
penalty tariffs decline from high levels, policy makers acquire important information about the current 
competitiveness of the domestic industry and the effective assistance implicit in quantitative restrictions.
89 This slightly overstates the difference between the two programs, however, as the Button Plan 
allowed vehicle manufacturers access to 15 per cent imported content duty free. The IAC sought to 
restrict this to 10 per cent.
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And it continued to propose, as it had in the draft report, that the export facilitation 
scheme the automotive reference had forced it to recommend, be discontinued after the 
Commission's recommended medium term regime had concluded in 1990 (IAC, PM Vs, 
1981, "Draft" and "Final": 9). It made no similar suggestion with regard to assistance to 
import replacement.
9.7.2 Assembly and Manufacture
[C]an I take you back to mandatory assembly. That throws me a little. What
do you mean by that?
Presiding Commissioner, Hearings, IAC, PMVs, 1981, Transcript: 642; c f
Martec Submission to 1979-81 IAC Inquiry, § 3.2: 7
The 1974 report had explained the locational complementarity of assembly and 
component manufacture, even if it had not provided a clear focus on the massive 
inefficiency usually inherent in Australian assembly of imported component packs. The 
latter issue was explicitly addressed in Martec's submission and participation in hearings 
in the later inquiry (see above quotation). By then the issue was no small matter. The 
volume which Ford and GMH were able to achieve on their high local content medium 
vehicles meant that they had sufficient 'excess content' to enable substantial assembly 
operations. GMH assembled 30,000 Gemini's per annum, largely from Japanese 
component packs (IAC, PMVs, 1981: 282). Ford was tooling up for a similar operation 
assembling the Mazda-based Laser {Newcastle Herald, 4th March 1981: 5).
The Commission noted that Ford's assembly of a small vehicle took place at cost 
disabilities of 200 per cent against the world industry, and that assembly of GMH's six 
cylinder sedan was markedly more competitive without exploring the locational 
complementarity between component manufacture and vehicle assembly or the costs of 
assembly within the plan (IAC, PMVs, 1981: 96, 304). And the Commission explicitly 
deliberated on the feature of the plan which was driving these inefficiencies - the 
requirement that vehicle manufacturers take up their duty free entitlements under the 
export facilitation and local content schemes in the form of components rather than built 
up vehicles. The Commission argued against any relaxation of this requirement within 
the export facilitation scheme in its first interim report on the grounds that it would be 
inconsistent with existing restrictions on the local content scheme and inequitable to other 
vehicle importers to allow vehicle manufacturers to import CBUs under their imported 
content entitlements (§ 9.5.3). Given that each of these considerations related to equity 
with other assistance arrangements, it was appropriate that the issue be revisited in major 
report on 'Post '84' arrangements. However this did not occur.
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Indeed far from exploring the problem, the IAC proposed (one presumes inadvertently) 
to perpetuate it. To ameliorate the potentially disruptive effect of recommended tariffs at 
relatively high levels, the Commission proposed that vehicle manufacturers receive ten 
percentage points of their (then) current fifteen per cent entitlement to imports duty free - 
provided they imported components and not cars. The Commission was recommending 
that 60,000 odd cars be assembled in Australia at rates of effective protection 
approaching infinity!
9.7.3 Reformulation without Engagement: The Changed
Econometrics of the Final Report
Lindblom's injunction concerning the importance of "skillful incompleteness" as 
opposed to the practical alternative of "accidental incompleteness" has been well 
illustrated so far by the Commission's use of quantitative general equilibrium modelling. 
It became more evident still when, notwithstanding the formal complexity and rigour of 
ORANI, the Commission gave the impression of casual improvisation as it changed 
parameters and assumptions following attacks on the modelling presented in its draft 
report. Thus in the final report the Commission conceded that while it did not accept 
"witnesses dire predictions" participants reactions had "changed [its] perception of the 
possibilities of disruption" (IAC, PMVs, 1981: 143; emphasis added).
In addition to the 'dire predictions' from the industry, the Bureau of Industry Economics 
(BIE) published a scathing attack on the methodology of the IAC's ORANI work. In 
addition to attacking the model's level of aggregation, it argued amongst other things 
that:
• the elasticity of import substitution within the industry - which governed 
the immediate effect of tariff reform on the industry - was the previously 
published estimate of the short term elasticity of substitution. Where the 
short term parameter had previously been estimated at five, the long term 
parameter estimated by the econometric project of which ORANI was a 
part was ten;
• the elasticities of supply and demand for the export industries - which was 
where the gains from reform largely came - were "extreme", "often 
outside the credible range" and they "invariably lean[t] towards 
overstating the likely increase in exports"; and
• "Either the IAC [had] made a computational error, or it [had] used data at 
variance with the numbers put forward in its own report" (BIE, 1981: 3, 
16ff, especially 21, 24).
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The effect of these alleged inadequacies was generally to overstate the benefits and 
understate the costs of traditional tariff reform. In its 'base case' simulation in its draft 
report, the Commission had its recommendations producing an economy-wide fall in 
prices of 0.9 per cent leading to a 5.7 per cent increase in exports. This expansion in 
exports was sufficient to drive a significant improvement in the balance of trade and so, 
within the model, expansion in gross national output and employment (BIE, 1981: 22, 
IAC, PMVs, "Draft", 1981: 139). The Commission's other simulation assumed, 
without any serious justification, a 10 per cent productivity improvement in the vehicle 
industry to "illustrate" the effects of developments exogenous to the model such as 
economies of scale (IAC, PMVs, "Draft", 1981: 143). This produced a price fall of 1.3 
per cent which generated a favourable and remarkably large five percentage point change 
in the whole economy's balance of trade (IAC, PMVs, "Draft", 1981: 143)! 90 In the 
Commission's defence it must be said that despite its optimistic message, it reported its 
ORANI results guardedly in its draft report claiming that they supported the proposition 
that tariff reform in the automotive industry would "create sufficient job opportunities to 
offset those lost within the motor vehicles and components industry" (IAC, PMVs, 
"Draft", 1981: 154; also see IAC, PMVs, 1981: 155).
In 1974, attack had been the best means of defence against those who could not 
technically match the Commission. In 1981 the Commission again failed to engage, but 
in this case faced with critics who could match it technically, it did so by backing away 
from controversy. The Commission's final report made no mention the BIE critique, but 
commented that further econometric work had estimated the elasticity of substitution 
between domestic and imported motor vehicles as between five and ten. The final report 
accordingly raised the five per cent draft report figure to 7.5 (IAC, PMVs, 1981: 326, 
335). "As no information was available on the import substitution elasticity for 
components", the Commission explained, "this too has been set at 7.5" (IAC, PMVs, 
1981: 326-7). The Commission revised some of the export demand elasticities - in each 
case in the direction suggested by the BIE critique - downwards. And the method of 
closure of the model was changed. Where the balance of payments and aggregate 
employment results had each been controversial in the draft report simulation, the new 
method of closure assumed both to be fixed. The report justified this change without
9  ^ Note these are general equilibrium results and on that account all the more dramatic. In other words 
they allow for first round (partial equilibrium) effects to be offset by second round (general equilibrium) 
effects. In this case expansion of exports and increased employment in the relevant industry would give 
rise to wage rises and so rises in the cost of inputs which offset the expansionary first round effects on 
the balance of trade.
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further explanation as "more appropriately reflecting] the longer term consequences of 
assistance changes for macroeconomic aggregates" (IAC, PMVs, 1981: 157). One of 
the fundamental aims of the ORANI model - to demonstrate that jobs lost in one sector of 
the economy would nevertheless be created elsewhere in the economy - was now an 
assumption.
The final report also contained extensive testing of the sensitivity of the various 
parameters. ORANI was run many times with alternative parameterisations. Yet given 
the extent of what was not known, and the assumptions which remained implicit in these 
experiments - such as the uniformity of intra-industry elasticity of import substitution - 
the question must surely arise as to the extent to which the ORANI could improve on 
educated guesswork. In addition each of the experiments was discrete and unrelated to 
others. The Commission explained that "[a]part from being in accordance with standard 
sensitivity procedure, this enables the computing costs of the exercise to be kept within 
reasonable limits" (IAC, PMVs, 1981: 335). The BIE critique had recalculated the 
Commission's ORANI simulations of the effects of the draft report recommendations to 
arrive at a contraction in component manufacturing output of 79 per cent (BIE, 1981: 8). 
The draft report had initially estimated the figure to be 28 per cent (IAC, PMVs, "Draft", 
1981: 139). The appendix presenting the sensitivity tests in the Commission's final 
report indicated that with the new assumptions, the draft report proposals would have 
generated a fall in component output of 67 per cent (IAC, PMVs, 1981: 334).
9.8 Postscript
Like the 1974 report, the 1981 report came at a very difficult time for both the industry 
and the economy more generally. And as with the 1974 report, the 1981 report provided 
little guidance for a government unprepared to follow its recommendations and introduce 
a near tariff-only regime. And like the 1974 report - and for similar reasons - the 1981 
report was ultimately rejected by the Government of the day which preferred the safety 
of a relatively protectionist version of Options B and C combined. The "Lynch Plan" 
continued market sharing allowing an increase in imported market share of the order of 
one percent per annum.91 To address concerns under the GATT, the quota system was
91 The formula allowed for four per cent volume growth in imports per annum or five per cent if the 
total market grew by over two per cent. Given 20 per cent market share initially going to imports and 
just under 2 per cent per annum market growth, the market share of imports would grow by 
approximately .4 per cent per annum with most volume growth still reserved for domestic suppliers. At 
three per cent market growth the formula produces approximately the same growth of market share for 
imports.
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to be converted to a tariff-quota system with imports allowed over quota entitlements - 
but at a prohibitive penalty tariff of 150 per cent phasing down to 125 per cent by 1992. 
Export facilitation was to expand to 15 percentage points of local content (Moore and 
Lynch, 1981). Approximately 60,000 vehicles per annum would be assembled within 
the plan at infinite or near rates of assistance.
1983 saw the election of a government with a commitment to reform which as history 
would show was genuine though not quixotic. The new Government found an industry 
in disarray. On the subject of automotive industry policy there was little consensus 
either within industry or outside it about what to do. Component manufacturers were 
fighting vehicle manufacturers and both were fighting vehicle importers. Whilst some of 
this conflict was the inevitable consequence of the various parties' differing interests, 
there was virtually no common search for the most felicitous ways of accommodating the 
interests of all these parties at the same time as satisfying the national interest in reduced 
automotive industry protection. At such a time those advising the incoming Government 
turned to the IAC's reports, and its officers for counsel on how and where to make the 
most felicitous compromises, given that compromises were inevitable. They learned to 
their dismay that the LAC could offer little constructive advice. But it makes sense to end 
the story here. For beyond this time, it cannot be told by this author without the 
discomfort of occasional lapses into autobiography.
235
10 Some Concluding Speculations
[M]odem science['s] methodological procedure is exclusive and intolerant, and 
rightly so. It fixes attention on a definite group of abstractions, neglects 
everything else, and elicits every scrap of information and theory which is 
relevant to what it has retained. The method is triumphant provided the 
abstractions are judicious. But however triumphant, the triumph is within 
limits. The neglect of these limits leads to disastrous oversights. . . . The 
methodology of reasoning requires the limitations involved in the abstract. 
Accordingly, the true rationalism must always transcend itself by recurrence to 
the concrete in search of inspiration. A self-satisfied rationalism is in effect a 
form of anti-rationalism. It means an arbitrary halt at a particular set of 
abstractions.
Alfred North Whitehead, 1925: 200
This dissertation has sought to illustrate the mishandling of certain issues relating to 
intra-industry trade and trade liberalisation by the economics profession in general and 
the IAC in particular. This chapter's title - 'concluding speculations' - is offered 
advisedly. In particular, where earlier chapters sought to persuade even a potentially 
hostile reader, this conclusion assumes a degree of agreement with the basic themes of 
the dissertation in an attempt to take things further. The chapter speculates on some of 
the deeper dynamics of the discipline and on some of the possibilities - both historical 
and intellectual - which were, and continue to be foregone because of the difficulty the 
discipline has in dealing with 'second best' issues and meliorative themes. Whilst 
numerous examples are offered to illustrate the points made in this chapter, its 
speculations are sufficiently ambitious that to offer more comprehensive persuasion 
would require several works of the length of this dissertation.
Section 10.1 argues that 'first best' and 'second best' principles considered together 
posed a particularly acute form of dissonance for those who felt compelled to choose 
between them. First best principles offered clarity, but the theory of the second best 
suggested that in many circumstances first best principles were an insufficient theoretical 
foundation for policy formulation. Sub section 10.1.1 argues that this insufficiency of 
theory has led to a radical break between theory and practice - a phenomenon which I call 
'discursive collapse’. To avoid repetition, further elaboration is kept to the sub-section 
itself. Sub-section 10.1.2 argues that the Commission's reasoning about second best 
issues also suffered from discursive collapse, and explores some parallels with inquiries 
other than those into the automotive industry. Section 10.2 gazes into the imaginary
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territory which 'might have been' had economists engaged more productively in dialogue 
and mutual adjustment with other participants in the debate.
10.1 Dangerous Supplements for the IAC
The Commission's revealed strategy on the conundrums which faced it may be described 
by reference to modern psychological literature on human cognition and decision 
making. The study of 'cognitive dissonance' has attested to people's tendency to avoid 
feelings of discomfort arising from the confrontation of seemingly contradictory ideas 
(also see Akerlof and Dickens, 1982). Far from being new to modern psychology this 
insight is a commonplace wisdom explored in literature and expressed in such sayings as 
'There's none so blind as those who will not see'. The phenomenon is captured by 
Nietzsche with aphoristic humour. '"I have done that' says my memory. 'I cannot have 
done that' - says my pride, and remains adamant. At last memory yields" (1886, § 68: 
72). As Nietzsche suggests, the phenomenon is often most powerfully at work in 
situations where one or both of the competing ideas are infused with some moral or 
normative significance.
'Second best' issues disclosed cognitive dissonances of the kind just described. They 
led what might otherwise have been a compellingly coherent and simple political and 
intellectual program into a minefield of complications. The 'second best' issue did not 
just raise a 'special case' to be dealt with on its merits. It could be (and, in the 
community of economists, was) seen as providing a fundamental choice between two 
distinctly different approaches to reform each of which could claim legitimacy from 
economic theory {cf §§ 3.4.2, 3.4.3 above). The apparent choice between 
'compensating' and 'eliminating' provided a case of 'normative dissonance'. One 
approach sought gradually to lower assistance where possible and to resist pressures for 
more assistance wherever they arose. Over time the aggregation of such actions might 
take the economy as close as politically possible to free trade. The alternative approach 
involved accepting the implications of piecemeal, gradual reform and accordingly 
seeking to balance the demands of each case on its merits with the overarching desire to 
move as rapidly as possible towards freer trade (A. Lloyd, 1975: 10).
Even though in practice they could co-exist in transition, as we have seen, in principle 
tariff compensation was a dangerous supplement to tariff elimination. In the event the 
IAC forswore the possibility of engagement with these difficult issues by clinging to an 
'in-principle' rejection of tariff compensation in particular and 'second best' 
considerations more generally. Some Commissioners, like Alan Lloyd, forced it to 
compromise on occasions by recommending the maintenance of existing levels of
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assistance for some low cost industries {eg Industries Assistance Commission, 1975, 
personal communication from Alan Lloyd). But with a few small exceptions, any 
measure, or indeed instrument which partook in some sense of the dangerous 
supplement - in tariff compensation rather than tariff elimination (or as will be seen 
below, even of facilitation  of exports in the presence of tariffs) - was at risk. It was 
disparaged both for the 'uncertainty' of its affects on resource allocation and because it 
might help entrench a 'mendicant mentality' amongst business. Frequently this was 
despite strong evidence that, either on its own, or alongside other measures, the 
particular measure under reference would improve resource allocation, enhance 
productivity growth and strengthen the position of low cost exporters at the expense of 
higher cost import replacers. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the Commission's 
apprehension of both economic and political threats and possibilities had more to do with 
a certain 'aesthetic' in political economy than with careful assessment of likely risks, 
costs and benefits.
10.1.1 Coping with the Insufficiency of Theory: The 
Phenomenon of 'Discursive Collapse'
The 'dangerousness' of tariff compensation underscored the allure of dealing with it as a 
matter o f principle - by way of peremptory rule - rather than on the merits of individual 
cases. In this context the IAC adopted, consciously or not, a policy of exclusion rather 
than serious engagement with important material which came before it. As the demands 
for engagement became more insistent, the steadfastness of its refusal to engage 
degenerated into what is described in this sub-section as 'discursive collapse'.
10.1.1.1 Discursive Collapse in Economics: The Case of the 
Pareto Criterion
If the incomparability of utility to different individuals is strictly pressed, not 
only are the prescriptions of the welfare school ruled out, but all prescriptions 
whatever.
Harrod, quoted in Linder, 1961: 23
Chapter One (§ 1.3.2.4) drew attention to Phillip Mirowski's comment that modern 
economic discourse has been intolerant of discussion which offers little promise of 
definitive conclusion (1986: 192). Take, for example, the discipline's search for 
normative foundations upon which to base claims about economic welfare and 
efficiency. Here, economists' search for an analytical foundation or "apex value" 
(Lindblom, 1990: 42) to free economics from contention and value judgment, and so
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prepare the way for definitive closure, drove them to the Pareto criterion of welfare 
comparison. According to that criterion, the economic welfare of a group of people can 
be said to improve if the economic welfare (generally income or wealth) of some of them 
improves whilst the situation of none of them deteriorates. In many, but not all 
circumstances,92 the criterion is both harmless and useful as a sufficient condition for 
demonstrating a welfare improvement - although it does not avoid value judgment. But, 
lured by the putative uncontentiousness of the Pareto criterion, the discipline has 
gravitated towards using it more strongly, as something which is both necessary and 
sufficient for welfare improvement.
It is evident that such a fastidious criterion provides a debilitating limitation on welfare 
claims about the empirical world. Virtually any significant economic development or 
policy involves losses for some. Given this difficulty, makeshifts have been constructed 
around the idea of 'winners' compensating 'losers' to transform a situation which does 
not meet the criterion into one that does. The fastidiousness of the Pareto criterion is 
thus met. Alas this is 'in theory', but not in practice where administrative limitations, 
adverse selection, moral hazard, imperfect information, and political exigencies combine 
to ensure the virtual impossibility of compensation systems capable of delivering actual 
Pareto improvements.
Since the original purpose of this procedure is to forestall contention around competing 
values, there can be no reason for relaxing it at any stage in one's reasoning from theory 
to practice in a particular policy situation. To do so later in the process is to raise the 
question of why one proceeded with such fastidiousness earlier. And raising the 
possibility of less fastidious foundations of welfare comparison is to raise the prospect 
that the analytic method of welfare economics - its construction from a (nearly) 
uncontentious foundation - may be of very limited use: that to be useful the skills of the 
welfare economist might need to be more modestly focused around what Self has called 
"the genuine rationalist role of clarifying issues and narrowing areas of disagreement" 
( 1975: 24).
This is not, however, what has occurred. Instead the fundamentals of welfare 
economics have moved from the fruitful difficulties and turmoil associated with 
establishing and developing the Pareto criterion in the first half of this century to an 
unwholesome equilibrium. Debate about the theoretical underpinnings of concepts such
92 There are plenty of people who would object to a situation in which the poor get relatively poorer 
even if they do not get absolutely poorer. A very different example would be provided by the example of 
the community's access to pornography. It is not clear that more is better.
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as welfare and efficiency has gradually subsided while practice has oriented itself around 
one particular set of theoretical foundations which increasingly go unexamined and even 
unacknowledged. As Mishan complains:
The innocent layman might reasonably suppose that on so fundamental a 
concept as the criterion of economic efficiency there would be either basic 
agreement within the profession or else raging controversy, for unless such 
criterion can claim legitimacy the conclusions reached by economists in this 
vital area . . . cannot be taken seriously. In fact there is neither - only some 
desultory sniping from time to time. Among the many writers who have 
recourse to a criterion for ranking alternative organizations, few give much 
thought to the question of [the criterion's] legitimacy (1986: 88; also see 
Mirowski, 1986: 183).
This is the phenomenon which is here called 'discursive collapse'. The discipline seeks, 
by way of various makeshifts, to deal with the radical insufficiency of its own theoretical 
foundations and techniques for generating compelling conclusions about the empirical 
world. In so doing, certain shortcuts are taken and the consequence is frequently some 
travesty of the original intentions. Thus in a recent discussion, one economist comments 
on policies which "could lead to a true Pareto improvement - one in which at least some 
sections of the community could be made better off but in which no (or few) sections 
were made worse off" (Dee, 1994: 38). In this example the Pareto criterion now applies 
to sections of the community, and it applies give or take a few sections. The great bulk 
of welfare economics is now done by modelling the welfare of a community as a single 
consumer or by reference to an efficiency criterion based on 'potential Pareto 
improvement', each of which is analogous to defining welfare as gross wealth 
aggregated across individuals. Such work has valuable uses, but producing conclusions 
which do not depend on interpersonal comparisons is not one of them. Aggregating 
wealth across individuals is precisely the concept which the Pareto criterion offered to 
move beyond in its assessment of welfare!
Largely as a result of the fastidiousness of the Pareto criterion, when economists come to 
the inevitable questions concerning the respective interests of 'winners' and 'losers', 
they find themselves untutored by their discipline. Thus, ironically, it is the practitioners 
of a discipline which is underpinned by a fastidious commitment to avoiding 
interpersonal welfare comparisons who are so often in the vanguard of those urging 
sacrifices on some, in the interests of the 'greater good'.
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10.1.1.2 Discursive Collapse and the Aesthetic of First Best
Why is the world so full of trimmers who prefer a compromised second best to
a well defined first best?
Congdon, 1993: 32
Discursive collapse threatens 'second best' reasoning in economics in very similar ways. 
Lipsey's and Lancaster's 'general theory of the second best' illustrated the radical 
insufficiency of existing normative economic theory by demonstrating that, where just 
one of the conditions for an optimum was violated, the other conditions of the optimum 
could no longer be assumed to be desirable (1956-57: 11). Given that in any actual 
economy there are endless violations of Pareto optimality conditions, Mishan's concern 
that the new theory might represent a new "impossibility theorem" - in the tradition of 
Arrow - was understandable. The new theory initiated a vigorous debate about when 
one might still warrantably use 'first best' principles in admittedly 'second best' 
situations, notwithstanding the corrosive implications of the theory of the second best 
(Mishan, 1962: 205 and passim). If, from this point, the discipline was to move 
forward with theoretical integrity, it would have to have been by way of the development 
of this literature which was true to the theoretical foundations of neoclassical economics.
Today however the careful considerations explored in that literature are rarely confronted 
in contemporary discussions of policy problems to which the theory of the second best is 
relevant. In their place has arisen a more summary 'aesthetic' of the first best. Here, 
amidst disdain for the "messy world of the second best" (Harberler, 1988: 49), the 
impression is frequently given that policy makers may choose between 'first' and 
'second best' policies - when the burden of the theory is to suggest that in second best 
situations, what looks like first best policy will generally be third best. In this way the 
theory of the second best emerges not as a caveat about the appropriateness of 'first best' 
principles, but rather as a problem to be somehow avoided. And so, as was the case 
with the Pareto criterion, courtesy of some logical shortcuts which depart momentarily 
from otherwise fastidious standards of rigour, a means of avoiding the problems 
emerges. Thus, again and again, economists excuse themselves from the difficulties of 
second best considerations by way of the assertion that sufficiently thoroughgoing 
liberalisation is capable of "the immediate removal of all distortions" (Vousden, 1990: 
203) - a spectacular logical leap given the myriad 'distortions' endemic to any economic 
system which remain after any liberalisation (also see Krueger, in Krause and Kilwan,
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1991: 48).93 Certainly there are few persuasive empirical or theoretical reasons for 
supposing that economic theory indicates that instant and total liberalisation is 
beneficial.94
By such means the significance of the impossibility theorem is transformed into 
something which elides the very difficulties of complexity, engagement and transition 
which it sought to confront. And, as was the case with the Pareto criterion, this shortcut 
threatens a travesty of the implications of the original theoretical work. Just as there was 
'discursive collapse' in welfare economics around the fastidiousness of the Pareto 
criterion, here there is a discursive collapse around the one possibility which remains 
beyond the corrosive reach of the theory of the second best - instant and total 
liberalisation. A theorem which initially cast doubt on 'first best’ principles is thus 
transformed into a spur for more radical and thoroughgoing commitment to the same 
'first best' principles.
10.1.1.3 Discursive Coiiapse in Political Economy: The 
Mutually Reinforcing Aesthetics of 'First Best'
Policies and Politically Unconstrained Policy 
Making
Frequently the leaps in economic logic outlined above are reinforced by a parallel 
political aesthetic in which the processes of politics appear as an unwelcome and 
essentially alien influence on economic policy making. This view of politics is itself 
frequently an exercise in precisely the kind of non-engagement with the complications of 
the empirical world, which can produce discursive collapse. The proposition may be
93 Note that Krueger does not assert that instant and total liberalisation is best, but she does make it a 
fundamental assumption of her analysis. Another example is provided by Bottini - an economist writing 
for the daily press:
[A]n efficient allocation of resources cannot be achieved unless all markets are 
liberalised: a distortion in the flow of any one of the factors of production 
inevitably creates a distortion in the flow of the others and deregulation thus 
fails to deliver (1993: 28).
94 There is scant empirical support for the proposition since instant and total liberalisation has not been 
attempted by any country and there are very few examples of actual reform which are tolerably close to 
it. The objection to taking neoclassical theory to support such a course is twofold. Firstly the standard 
neoclassical theory, which is taken to support instant and total liberalisation, makes a range of 
unrealistic assumptions. This point is logically equivalent to the point made above - that 'distortions' 
remain in a thoroughly liberalised economy the assumptions of neoclassical theory notwithstanding. 
Secondly the 'comparative static' method of neoclassical theory abstracts from the very problem at issue - 
transition.
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illustrated initially by the case of economists' support for uniform tariffs. Many 
economists have argued for uniformity in tariff setting over the last few decades on both 
economic and political grounds. Uniformity of tariffs is an attractive way of seeking 
greater uniformity of effective protection rates, but flies in the face of the principles of 
Ramsay taxation which dictate that taxes should fall most heavily where they influence 
behaviour least. Thus, where consumption effects are considered, uniform tariffs can 
generally be improved upon by selective changes to tariffs (Panagariya and Rodrik, 
1993: 686).
Panagariya and Rodrik (1993: 686) comment that, as a result of the shakiness of the 
economic case for uniform tariffs, "policy advisers have lately begun to rely more 
heavily on administrative simplicity and the political context as arguments for tariff 
uniformity". Panagariya's and Rodrik's language seems to suggest that rather than 
being the driving force of assessments of the worth of alternative policies, policy 
rationales are sometimes called upon after the event - to justify policies which have 
already been arrived at according to some deeper intuition. Note also the scant kind of 
political analysis upon which economists are said to have relied. As Panagariya and 
Rodrik put it "[w]ith the exception of brief, verbal discussions . . . political economy 
arguments for a uniform tariff have simply not been spelled out. This is all the more 
surprising since in recent years the literature on the political economy of trade policy has 
grown rapidly" (1993: 687). In the terminology developed here, notwithstanding 
theoretical work which undermined the case for uniform tariffs, there appears to have 
been 'discursive collapse' around uniform tariffs, with the motive being a particular 
political strategy which was no less influential for being largely unexplored.
One view of the economists' relationship to politics is captured in much of the modem 
'political economy' or 'public choice' literature. In it, political forces determine or 
constrain policy making and so, not surprisingly, operate to obstruct economically 
optimal policy making. In this context, political alternatives are often modelled as 
alternative constitutional rules which constrain politics. In such a framework, 
constitutional constraints on politics can remove political constraints on policy. Note that 
this comparison of the relative economic attractiveness of alternative constitutional rules 
does not model at all closely the political problem as it typically arises for political actors. 
For they are typically not in a position to influence their constitutional environment.
The way in which the difficulties confronting actual politicians and policy makers are 
elided in this tradition is closely analogous to the way in which second best issues have 
been elided in much modern economics. In economic discourse, an in-principle
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injunction to policy makers to prefer 'first best' over 'second best' policies obscures the 
importance of the policy making context. For if the policy making situation is a second 
best one economic theory tells us the choices are not between first and second best but 
between second best and something worse. Likewise in the 'constitutional politics' 
genre, in place of the difficult choices confronting actual policy makers, there is 
substituted a subtly expurgated, and conveniently simplified problem of working out the 
rules by which it would be desirable to constrain policy making - or if you like, the 
situation the policy maker would most prefer to find themselves in!
This is not to deride such approaches. Constitutions are established or revised from time 
to time. And there are occasions when political behaviour today can acquire some 
constitutional significance by influencing institutional evolution or political precedent. 
For instance, advice to developing countries to tarifficate or auction quotas which are 
currently allocated administratively may, if it can be done, be very useful in reducing the 
scope for subsequent rent seeking. But where this kind of institutional engineering is 
very difficult or impossible, a hankering to constrain politics can be useless or worse. 
The constraint envisaged may involve compromises with what is economically best in a 
given situation, as can be the case with uniform tariffs for instance or the Commission's 
trading of the substance of lower protection for the form of a (near) tariff-only regime. 
And acting, or forbearing from acting as if there were a constraint, may help establish a 
constraint. But it may not. It may simply be quixotic. Such an approach can lead the 
practitioner away from an appreciation of the inevitability of engaging with the 'messy' 
world of politics and the consequent need to handle it with what skill one has. And skill 
in the political medium is skill in compromise and skill in making the best of what is 
given and/or what is possible - in short, skill in negotiating the world of the second best. 
Where it lacks those skills, economics risks becoming a discipline which, instead of 
seeking some felicitous conjunction with politics, becomes bemused by, hostile to and 
squeamish about the political medium through which economic policy is ultimately 
determined.
10.1.2 The Commission, the Second Best and Discursive
Collapse
The story told in earlier chapters about the Commission's approach to export facilitation 
was one of discursive collapse. For as has been shown - despite being directed to the 
very issue by both its terms of reference and the circumstances in which the Government 
had placed it - the Commission never took up Alan Lloyd's injunction to refute the case 
for second best assistance on its merits in individual circumstances. It never really
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engaged with the economic case for export facilitation and so its case against it remained 
unpersuasive. And, as was the case with uniform tariffs, certain intuitions about the 
politics  of the issue were a major consideration and yet there was almost no 
consideration or discussion of those intuitions. With the exception of a few brief and 
scattered passages, the Commission failed to engage explicitly with the politics of second 
best assistance, either for tariff compensation or export facilitation in the automotive 
industry. The politics of export facilitation was hardly mentioned in its 1979-81 reports. 
One might speculate that the Commission felt it could not be too explicit about political 
pressures on government in its report. Yet references to the politics of export facilitation 
were very rare even in its working papers. Consistent with the framework outlined 
above, it seems that the economics and the politics of the second best took on the 
presence of a kind of 'shadow'. An intuitive hostility to the political and economic risks 
entailed by export facilitation was implicit in much of the Commission's reasoning but 
rarely if ever confronted directly, thought through, or carefully argued for.
Although, like all other reform options, it entailed risks, the politics of 'concessional 
trade liberalisation' offered significant promise - particularly given the practical 
impossibility of rapid tariff reform (see § 5.8.1 above). The Commission's fear of 
governments becoming 'locked in' to export facilitation was legitimate enough (see 
§ 9.5.2 above). But one could not seriously engage with the issue without considering 
some of the political benefits of export facilitation - the scope for others to seek the 
extension and liberalisation of the scheme with potentially trade liberalising effects, and 
the extent to which assistance through duty remission might attract greater scrutiny and 
discipline from Governments through its impact on the budget. This is not to mention 
the political costs of not implementing export facilitation - which the Commission seems 
to have understood to be higher rates of assistance for import replacement than might 
otherwise prove necessary (§ 9.7.1 above). Would the Government be any less 'locked 
in' to higher levels of investment for import replacement than for export? It is hard to 
see why, particularly since assistance provided to relatively low cost exporters seems 
more likely to have encouraged activity which might one day be competitive at low or 
zero assistance than activity which shelters under higher rates of assistance to import 
replacement.
The Commission's reports on the automotive industry were part of a larger pattern in 
which the Commission became progressively more fastidious about reform which 
smacked of the 'dangerous supplement' of the second best.
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10.1.2.1 Shipbuilding
The (then) Tariff Board's recommendation to extend the shipbuilding bounty to exports 
in 1971 on 'optimal intervention' grounds will be recalled (see § 3.3.1 above). In a 
shipbuilding report five years later the IAC stepped back from its earlier position but was 
nevertheless relatively open minded on the issue. It noted that smaller shipyards had 
been both successful and "relatively efficient by world standards" and proposed further 
investigation into their circumstances for the purposes of making recommendations. It 
suggested that if, in the meantime, the viability of these small yards were threatened, the 
Government "give consideration to providing temporary assistance" by way of an export 
subsidy in addition to existing bounty assistance for import replacement (Industries 
Assistance Commission, 1976: 86).
After 1976 the Commission became more antagonistic to this approach, using the 
rhetorical form which would feature in its 1979-81 automotive reports - that it could see 
no reason for extending more assistance to exported ships than other exports received. 
In 1979 the Commission suggested that, in the light of more general export assistance 
provisions, the industry's bounty be confined to production for domestic markets. 
Although the Tariff Board's 1971 recommendation to extend the bounty to exports was 
not implemented at the time, this policy was introduced in 1984. In its 1988 
Shipbuilding report the Commission noted the significant expansion of exports under the 
bounty and recommended phasing it out over three years at the same time as retaining the 
bounty for import replacement. It commented:
Continuation of the export bounty would provide assistance additional to 
that available for exporters of boats, and to most other exporting activities. 
Although providing bounty for domestic sales but not for exports would 
discriminate between end-use, such discrimination is inherent in the tariff- 
assisted environment for manufacturing in Australia (Industries Assistance 
Commission, 1988: 46).
Assuming, not unreasonably, that the aim of assistance to shipbuilding was to increase 
domestic output of ships, the Commission proposed that the Government move from a 
means of achieving its objectives which was 'first best' - or most direct by the principles 
of 'optimal intervention' - to one which was discriminatory in the way it achieved those 
objectives and so was 'second best' (Corden, 1974: 29). Its choice was justified by 
reference to its continuity with Australia's protectionist past.
10.1.2.2 Assisting and/or Facilitating Exports
A similar story can be told of the Commission's approach to export incentives more 
generally. Although it used the level of general export assistance as the 'benchmark'
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from which to argue for the elimination of special export assistance schemes to particular 
industries, the benchmark by which it assessed the appropriate level of general export 
assistance went from a pragmatic one oriented around the theme of industrial transition, 
to an 'in-principle' appeal to the benchmark of zero assistance. That change itself might 
well have been an appropriate response to economic transition if only it had not taken 
place before that transition had actually taken place. For the benchmark by which the 
Commission continued to assess the appropriate level of assistance to import replacement 
remained altogether more compromising.
In 1980 Peter Sheehan was able to write that there was a broad consensus amongst 
Australian policy commentators not just in favour of tariff reduction but also for some 
export assistance - at least for a period of transition - although there were differences in 
emphasis with the IAC stressing the centrality of tariff reduction (1980: 213-4). The 
Commission's 1977 report considered existing industry wide export assistance schemes 
- mainly focused on export marketing - and was "satisfied that these schemes provide 
assistance primarily to low cost activities in all sectors of the economy with beneficial 
effects on resource allocation". The Commission also believed that "a case can be made 
for providing additional assistance to exporters for a period but not on a long term 
continuing basis". In commenting that this "may be an important means of giving effect 
to the implementation of the Government's long term policy of gradually lowering high 
levels of assistance" the Commission appears to endorse the idea that export assistance 
might play a useful role in facilitating tariff reform. Given the lack of progress on tariff 
reform in 1977, the Commission forbore from recommending export assistance. 
Nevertheless in an appendix it outlined the design of export assistance schemes "which 
the Government may wish to consider as part of an overall approach to meeting its long 
term objectives" (Industries Assistance Commission, 1977: 5-7).
In the years after this report, unemployment remained high and the political climate for 
trade liberalisation remained poor. The Government made strong commitments to trade 
liberalisation in principle in its 1977 White Paper on Manufacturing Industry, but made 
little practical progress. Average effective rates of assistance actually rose slightly 
(Industry Commission, Annual Report, 1990-91: 2). By the time the next review of 
export incentives reported in early 1982, however, the Commission was also reporting 
on options for achieving general reductions in protection. In addition to the existing 
Export Markets Development Grants Scheme the Government had also introduced 
Export Expansion Grants (which owed something to the proposals developed in the 
Commission's 1977 report).
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The 1982 export incentives report conceded the 'second best' case for export assistance 
to reduce the home market bias otherwise produced by tariffs and, despite some 
problems of administration concluded, nevertheless, that the two existing export 
assistance schemes had probably produced net benefits. It reiterated its opposition to 
maintaining the schemes in the long term, but, in view of their current contribution to 
allocative efficiency, indicated it was "reluctant to propose" their removal "unless there is 
evidence that this would lead to some longer term gain". At this point the Commission 
pointed to its current inquiry into general reductions in protection and argued that if 
general tariff reform were pursued, the termination of the export marketing and 
expansion grants schemes "would be consistent with the longer term interests of the 
community". Although it had previously referred to export assistance as an "important 
means" of achieving tariff reform (see above) this new perspective implicitly cast export 
assistance and tariff reform as alternatives. The Commission proposed phasing out both 
export schemes within three years. This was despite finding that removing the schemes 
would worsen resource allocation and "hence" lead to "some decrease in economic 
welfare" (Industries Assistance Commission, 1982: 1-2, 59). Two days later the 
Commission reported on general reductions in protection. Yet the most ambitious of the 
options proposed involved reducing average tariffs to a ceiling of twenty per cent over 
ten years (see below). This meant that, apart from possibly facilitating tariff reform, 
export assistance would be likely to produce allocative efficiency gains throughout such 
a period.
In 1987 the Commission's hostility was extended even to duty drawback for inputs to 
export. The Commission made no mention of the role such schemes had played in 
successful Asian development. It recommended that the existing duty drawback 
schemes be abolished although it did make a 'fallback' proposal to improve scheme 
administration if its principal advice was rejected. The Commission repeated a range of 
objections to partial trade reform. It observed that duty drawback tended to be enjoyed 
mostly by manufacturers some of whom were highly assisted and that the schemes 
involved high compliance costs. It went on to deploy against duty drawback an 
impossibly heavy burden of proof:
[E]ven if it were possible to constrain export concessions to lightly assisted 
activities, there could be no guarantee that the longer term outcome would 
be an improved industry structure. The encouragement given to some 
lowly assisted exporting activities might be at the expense of other efficient 
activities - not all lightly assisted activities export and not all exporting 
activities use imported inputs to the same extent. Hence attempts to confine 
them to lightly assisted activities which export could lead to some decline in
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other equally or more efficient activities (IAC, "Concessions", 1987: 43, 
emphases added).
In these circumstances the Commission argued that the concessions were a very partial 
and unsystematic way of alleviating the problems created by protectionism. But its 
deprecation of concessional treatment to inputs for exports from highly assisted activities 
obscured the fact that exports from highly assisted industries often suffered from the 
greatest degree of negative assistance - even with concessional treatment. This point had 
emerged with some force in the 1977 Export Incentives report (1977: 86). What 
modelling the Commission did do in 1987 indicated that export concessions improved 
allocative efficiency.95
Consistent with the framework outlined above, the Commission deployed its traditional 
juxtaposition of the politics and economics of first and second best reform strategies as 
alternatives. The Commission took the unusual step of highlighting the contribution of 
one of its inquiry participants over those of others. It placed a quotation from the 
National Bank's submission to the inquiry in italics at the head of its concluding chapter. 
The quotation offered a familiar tilt at the commonsensical fallacy of protection all round 
arguing that "[a] nation has a choice" between "promoting exports and protecting 
domestic producers from import competition":
Measures serving one end, directly and indirectly oppose the other. A 
system that appears to both promote exports and protect domestic 
producers against competition, in reality does neither (IAC, "Concessions",
1987: 61).
The point is of course legitimate. But it fails - as the Commission also did in its report - 
to tackle the more pressing problems of amelioration, priority and transition. Indeed the 
passage damns the Commission's revealed preference for tariffs over alternative 
mechanisms during the transition to free trade as much as any other gradual trade 
liberalisation strategy. The Commission concluded by asserting the choice between first 
and second best approaches to reform: "[I]f the government wishes to reduce the costs
95 The Commission called these 'short run' projections, but the short run to which the Commission 
referred lasted about two years and incorporated a range of general equilibrium effects including inflation 
and labour market responses to increased demand for inputs to expanding exports of manufacturers and 
consequent contractions of export industries like meat, petroleum and coal which imported few of their 
inputs [IAC, 1987, Appendix E: E - 10, 22]. I cannot explain why the Commission did not provide 
longer run estimates with greater capital mobility between sectors. However as a rule, the longer run the 
analysis, the greater the gains from reform because of the scope for capital investment to respond to 
relative changes in profitability [see § 9.5.4 above].
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imposed by tariffs and other charges on exporters and efficient industries generally, it 
should do so directly" (IAC, "Concessions", 1987: 62). And the Commission's 
complementary political aesthetic of first best reform was summarily deployed against 
the concessions. "The relief the concessions provide can reduce pressure for the 
development of a more neutral and consistent approach to industry assistance" (IAC, 
"Concessions", 1987: 61, emphasis added). The Commission provided no evidence that 
this had occurred, nor did it explore any of the alternative perspectives. One might 
argue, for instance, that refusing to facilitate export growth with duty drawback would 
constrain the expansion of exporters who would thus be similarly constrained in their 
capacity to exert pressure for further liberalisation.
10.1.3 Multiple Objectives and the Escape from Marginalism
[I]f the standard for efficiency is taken to be operation on the hypothetical 
[production possibility] frontier, all production choices made in the real world 
must be judged inefficient. This is so because, in actuality, decision makers 
face a variety of binding constraints in addition to those considered by . . . 
theory. Thus, the effective opportunity set always lies inside the hypothetical 
frontier, and the most any producer can do is to reach the boundary of the 
effective set. On this view, efficiency results when all of the operative 
constraints are recognized and the conditions for constrained maximisation are 
met.
Eirik Furubotn , 1990: 229, emphasis added.
The theorem of the second best demonstrated the radical insufficiency of neoclassical 
theory for generating useful normative conclusions about policy in a richly constrained 
world. One might argue that the theorem pointed directly to the need for decision makers 
to recognise the constraints they faced, with a view to making the most felicitous 
tradeoffs possible. Such an approach underlay the importance which Braybrooke and 
Lindblom gave to 'margin dependent comparison' between alternative policies and their 
emphasis on the need for plurality in policy analysis. As they put it, '"[t]he [policy] 
problem' is in fact a cluster of interlocked problems with interdependent solutions" 
(1963: 54). Braybrooke and Lindblom were preoccupied with social policy but the 
material from this study shows the relevance of their approach to economic policy 
making under constraints. For although economics is paradigmatically oriented around 
the concept of change at the margin, the marginalism of economics operates as an engine 
of closure not exploration. Marginalism in economics operates within the framework of 
optimisation and optimisation is only possible within well defined frameworks. This
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sub-section explores the many ways in which economists failed to make the 'margin 
dependent comparisons' necessary to shed new light on the problems they encountered.
The arguments for a pilot school dental service discussed in Chapter One (§ 1.3.2.2.3) 
were founded on the "cluster of interlocked problems" relevant in that instance, and 
particularly on the complementarities between existing institutions and emerging needs 
and opportunities. In economic terms existing institutions represent sunk costs, and so 
adapting them to multiple objectives (the school conducting a dental survey for instance) 
may frequently present a lower cost response to emerging needs and opportunities than 
the establishment of new institutions. But this kind of ameliorative adaptation comes 
from taking something as 'given' and making the most of it. It is 'second best' - like 
Baranson was when he asked how to improve automotive protection, accepting that the 
policy objectives underpinning Latin American protectionism would, rightly or wrongly, 
continue (see § 6.4 above). However this is the dangerous supplement to 'first best' 
thinking in which there is an efficient instrument for each objective sought and a range of 
practical problems are assumed away, particularly the fact that virtually all policy 
instruments, and many market transactions, are not costless and meet their objectives 
imperfectly.
The problem which intra-industry trade posed for the Commission was embedded within 
a cluster of problems relating to the economics and politics of trade liberalisation. From 
the perspective set out in this dissertation, even the objective of trade liberalisation itself 
comprised multiple objectives. For it comprehended both inter-industry and intra­
industry trade liberalisation, and tradeoffs between the two were implicitly made 
whenever policy makers made choices between different strategies and different 
instruments of trade liberalisation. Further, inter-industry trade liberalisation via tariff 
reduction and intra-industry trade liberalisation via import/export links interacted with 
each other at both economic and political levels. From an economic perspective, 
traditional tariff reform directly reduced inter-industry disparities of assistance but it also 
indirectly reduced intra-industry disparities of assistance. Import/export links directly 
reduced intra-industry disparities of assistance but in so doing they could also reduce - or 
increase - inter-industry disparities of assistance (§§ 5.2, 5.4). From a political 
perspective, as GMH argued in both the 1973-74 and 1979-81 inquiries, and as the 
Commission seemed to accept in the latter one (§ 9.7.1), assistance to low cost exports 
could probably be traded off for reduced assistance to the highest cost import 
replacements. But economists generally - and the Commission in particular - showed 
little interest in the scope for tradeoffs at the margin between different forms of 
assistance. For the comparison could only be made once the adaptive, 'second best'
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question had been put: "While assistance is being reduced, can one improve what 
assistance remains?"
Although its quantitative modelling could have yielded worthwhile insights and 
disciplined the difficult process of weighing alternatives, the IAC did not subject export 
facilitation to any margin dependent comparison with alternatives - including the 
alternative it ultimately endorsed of higher tariff assistance. Within the economics 
profession more generally, greater adaptiveness was shown in forging the new 
development consensus from economic theory and emerging evidence (§ 3.3.1). 
Within economic theory however, economists expended enormous effort in exploring 
the implications of scale economies for trade policies in the unrewarding intricacies of 
strategic trade theory (§ 1.3.3). But they made surprisingly little progress in thinking 
through some of the relatively straightforward implications of scale economies and intra­
industry trade for trade policy reform (§ 4.6.3). That is, they made little progress in 
considering the 'second best' problem of how one might ameliorate trade policies which, 
it could be widely agreed, were not optimal.
10.1.3.1 Tradeoffs between Simplicity and
Comprehensiveness: Ceteris Paribus and 'First
Best' Thinking
[G]ood policy generally requires one measure for each objective.
Gary Banks, Industry Commissioner, 1994: 7
Some economists concede that monetary policy can influence both prices and 
output, but worry that one objective will be pursued at the expense of the other.
The mechanical formulation of this argument is that one instrument cannot 
achieve two objectives. But multiple objectives are routinely pursued - and 
satisfactorily met - in all walks of life. The issue, therefore, should not be 
settled by any mechanistic dismissal of the possibility.
Bemie Fraser, Governor of the Reserve Bank, 1994: 18
That more rigorously 'margin dependent comparisons' were not made between tariffs 
and export assistance is striking, given that the two matters were closely related. What 
of the opportunities for margin dependent comparison and mutual adjustment between 
more disparate economic phenomena? Economists evinced a strong desire to keep 
different matters in their (separate) intellectual places.
Chapter Three has already outlined the way in which Alan Lloyd and the 1974 Green 
Paper argued that the case for tariff compensation might be stronger where it met equity 
as well as efficiency objectives. It is easy to understand Peter Lloyd's hostility to
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assessing the worth of tariff compensation according to multiple criteria. He regarded 
any systematic policy of tariff compensation as unworkably complex even when 
evaluated against the single criterion of economic efficiency. He was also appealing to 
the virtue of keeping things in their intellectual place. Economists are inured to this kind 
of pigeonholing in both positive and normative economics. In positive economics it 
occurs routinely by way of the ceteris paribus assumption. This enables economists to 
investigate the logic of a single phenomenon within the economy by imagining 
(logically) extraneous factors to remain unchanged. In normative economics the 
assignment of particular instruments as the appropriate or 'first best' means of achieving 
certain objectives and the implicit deprecation of using other ('worse') instruments to 
achieve those objectives fulfills a similar function. Both techniques are indispensable 
analytical tools, but they are invitations to fallacy where their partiality is insufficiently 
appreciated.
Peter Lloyd would have felt justified in insisting that things be kept in their place because 
ignoring equity considerations in setting industry assistance does not mean ignoring 
equity. Other policies - like welfare and tax policy - can typically deal with equity 
objectives more efficiently than industry assistance policy. But even the most efficient 
instruments for enhancing equity are neither perfectly effective nor costless. Thus any 
tariff compensation which met both efficiency and equity objectives would lower the cost 
of achieving any given level of equity with other instruments and these benefits have 
their logical place in any evaluation of the worth of tariff compensation. Peter Lloyd's 
injunction to ignore the equity implications of tariff compensation may have been well 
judged advice. But that is because it appealed to the administrative and political virtue of 
simplicity and the need for 'rules of thumb' to guide decision making, not because there 
is any intrinsic logical merit in turning a blind eye to some effects of policies because 
their principal purpose lies elsewhere.
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10.1.3.2 Other Fields of Mutual Adjustment: Assistance 
Reform and Economic Conditions, the Real 
Exchange Rate and Discrimination between 
Industries
It was one of the few times when you had over-full employment, a current account 
surplus and foreign reserves which had risen dramatically. . . .  I just happened to 
be in a position where I could whisper in the prince's ear that we should cut 
protection. . . . [S]ome people thought it was better to appreciate to bear down on 
inflation . . . whereas it seemed to me there was an opportunity to do things that 
favoured both macro and micro objectives.
Fred Gruen on the 1973 25 per cent tariff cut. In McTaggart et al, 1992: 457-8.
There were other crucial matters to be considered in designing assistance reform. The 
macroeconomic context in which reform was pursued - particularly the rate of economic 
growth, the exchange rate and the balance of payments - each had considerable influence 
on both the economically desirable and the politically achievable rate at which assistance 
reform could be pursued. So too did the extent to which reform conformed to the 
orthodox top down and across the board rules. Before criticising the Commission's 
treatment of these issues, it must be conceded that it was in a particularly difficult 
institutional position to deal with them. Actually relating assistance reform to the 
economy's capacity to adjust was a tall order in any event. But this was particularly so 
for the Commission because - except in its annual reports - it did not provide a steady 
stream of advice to government as government departments could do. Instead its advice 
on specific industries was provided in response to terms of reference which were 
dictated by governments from time to time. Having succeeded in attracting the 1973 
reference on the automotive industry, the Commission was unable to conduct a 
comprehensive review and offer new recommendations until it received the 1979 
reference.
Whatever institutional difficulties the Commission faced, its removal from the day to day 
advising role of departments did provide it with the opportunity to consider the issues 
carefully and to deliberate on their significance both for its own advice and for 
governments more generally. In its annual reports the Commission gave substantial 
attention to the issue of relating reform to the economy's capacity to adjust. 
Unfortunately however its thinking failed to develop satisfactorily, for it never engaged 
in any searching 'mutual adjustment’ between the available alternatives.
My principal purpose here is not to advocate one particular approach to matching reform 
with the economy’s capacity to adjust, although some of my sympathies are evident.
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Rather I argue, firstly, that this was an important area of deliberation which could not be 
solved except by 'margin dependent comparison' and 'mutual adjustment' between 
competing values and objectives. Secondly, I argue that, while the Commission 
agonised about several of these issues, its unpreparedness to engage in 'mutual 
adjustment' once again led to important choices being made largely by default rather than 
design. In each case the Commission proffered plausible reasons for its views, which 
drew on 'first best' principles. But its reasons were rendered plausible by its failure to 
engage with uncomfortable (second best) issues. In the upshot, the chance for 
assistance reform to be more felicitously tailored to the economic and political scope for 
reform was lost.
The options of ad hoc, 'opportunistic' reform and reform according to pre-determined 
schedules are set out in the head quotation above. As Max Corden had explained in 
1966, trade liberalisation might be particularly apposite where the balance of payments 
was in surplus and inflationary' pressures were strong (cited in Vines, 1994). Here tariff 
reduction could meet its traditional microeconomic objectives whilst simultaneously 
contributing to the macroeconomic objectives of reducing a trade surplus and inflationary 
pressure. Moreover where inflation was driven by excess demand, adjustment costs 
would be minimal as there would be excess demand for factors of production - including 
labour. Here the benefits of tariff reform would be magnified and its costs minimised.
If the economy had ever been predictable enough to allow the rate of tariff reform to be 
tailored to economic circumstances by way of fixed schedules set many years in 
advance, that time had passed by the Commission's inception. By then the Bretton 
Woods exchange rate arrangements had broken down, Australia had just engineered a 
dramatic 'opportunistic' 25 per cent tariff cut in just the kind of circumstances Corden 
had foreshadowed, and the economy had begun its long, painful and unpredictable 
adjustment to the first oil shock. As Rattigan recorded in his memoirs, his Chairmanship 
of the Committee which recommended the twenty five per cent tariff cut "posed an 
interesting problem" (1986: 164). For the 'opportunistic' reform being contemplated 
stood in sharp contrast to the emphasis on careful deliberation, and transparent process 
and advice which Rattigan had so trenchantly and successfully established as a bulwark 
against protectionist opportunism (c/Glezer, 1982: 120).
In its second annual report in the wake of an economic downturn, the Commission drew 
particular attention to the need to relate assistance reform to macroeconomic 
circumstances, but it proposed to do so based on well researched "judgements about 
such matters as they arise in the course o f inquiries" (emphasis added): that is before it
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could be known what economic circumstances might emerge some years later. As if to 
acknowledge the problem which this posed the Commission emphasised:
An aspect of fundamental importance in the Commission's approach is that 
no pre-determined time profile for change has been implied or specified by 
the Commission (1974-75: 10).
It is hard to know what to make of such a comment given the Commission's proposal of 
a fixed reform timetable for the automotive industry (reported two pages earlier in the 
same Annual Report) and its hostility to changing this timetable as economic 
circumstances deteriorated after its report's publication. Shortly after its 1974 
automotive report was rejected by the Whitlam Government, the Commission sought, as 
Glezer puts it, to "bend with the wind". Rattigan proposed to Whitlam that since "the 
present . . .  is not a suitable time for implementing structural changes" Commission 
inquiries could include short term recommendations which "would not add to existing 
short-term employment difficulties in the industry concerned" (Glezer, 1982: 130).96 
This did not really solve the problem, for it did not address the situation in which 
economic conditions and accordingly the political scope for reform unexpectedly 
deteriorated during the course of a reform program. Whitlam, a progressively lonelier 
champion of tariff reform within an increasingly nervous party (see Bert Kelly, Diary, 
20/9/74), responded curtly:
1 understood from the approach to high cost industries outlined in the 
Commission's Annual Report for 1973-74 that the Commission would relate 
its recommendations to the economy's capacity to sustain the changes 
involved, but I welcome your reassurance that this is to be the case (Glezer,
1982: 130).
After a period of largely unproductive soul-searching in its first few annual reports, the 
Commission's thinking on the issue collapsed into an uneasy reliance on fixed timetables 
for assistance reform either within industries or - when it got the opportunity in 1982 - 
more generally. Temporary assistance and temporary slackening of the pace of pre-set 
reform programs offered means of achieving 'mutual adjustment' between assistance 
reform and macroeconomic conditions (see eg IAC, Annual Report, 1973-74: 21), with 
each option involving both benefits and costs. Some of the Commission's statements 
occasionally contemplated the possibility of such measures. However the Commission 
consistently deprecated them, both in principle (Annual Report, 1977-78: 40-41) and
96 In its 1975-76 Annual Report, the Commission also contemplated the possibility that lower 
assistance for high cost industries might be "deferred or phased in because of temporary or short term 
conditions" (1975-76: 7), although in this passage the Commission is not advocating such action.
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when provided with the circumstances in which such measures might be contemplated 
(see eg Annual Report, 1975-76: 13 and Glezer, 1982: \55ff).
In the Commission's exposition, macroeconomic objectives were neatly paired with 
appropriate instruments and assistance policy was an inappropriate instrument with 
which to address macroeconomic difficulties (Annual Report, 1975-76: 14). This 
rehearsal of the principles of 'first best' policy making was unexceptionable:
Considerations of equity and resource use efficiency seem to require that 
general economic problems should be dealt with by general measures (such 
as fiscal, monetary and exchange rate adjustments) that do not discriminate 
between industries (Annual Report, 1975-76: 14).
But however reasonable, these words did not extricate policy makers from the fact that 
some instruments and some macroeconomic circumstances intensify the economic and 
political constraints on assistance reform while others relax them. The Commission's 
approach might have been useful in establishing the case for maintaining reform 
throughout periods of 'general economic problems'. The Commission feared that 
flexibility in the rate of tariff reduction would stall reform during difficult times and that 
the momentum of reform might never be recovered. "[Tjhere will always be seemingly 
persuasive arguments as to why the present time is inappropriate for reducing assistance" 
(Annual Report, 1977-78: 41). In fact reform did stall in the late 1970s despite the 
Commission's protestations and it recovered along with economic activity in the 1980s 
despite the Commission's fears that it would not. And of course pre-commitment was a 
doubled edged sword. However much the Commission disliked the escalating political 
hostility to reform during economic downturns, the fluctuating political constraints on 
reform could not be wished away. And the consequence of sticking to reform schedules 
which turned out to be overambitious was often - as it was here - the wholesale rejection 
of the Commission's recommendations. In the meantime, the corollary of the 
Commission's adherence to pre-commitment where substantial tariff reduction was 
involved was that when unforeseen economic developments after the Commission's 
inquiries were not exposing the Commission's recommendations as too ambitious, they 
often exposed them as too timid!
The Commission's recommendations for the automotive industry in both 1974 and 1981 
were fairly ambitious even when they were formulated. But in each case, economic 
conditions deteriorated within a few months of publication, rendering both reports 
politically impossible to implement and the IAC's analysis and proposals marginal to the 
political outcome. In its third Annual Report the Commission had commented on the
257
Chapter Ten Some Concluding Speculations
contradictions which would arise if it were to tailor its ambitions in individual inquiries 
to the changing macroeconomic circumstances:
Those industries which happened to be reviewed during a period of short 
term economic problems should not have their long term assistance assessed 
on the basis of different factors from those reviewed in boom conditions 
(1975-76: 7).
Yet the Commission did change the ambitiousness of its medium to long term reform 
aspirations as circumstances changed. The disappointments associated with the 
slowdown of the late 1970s and early 1980s led to a timidity which, though it may have 
seemed justified at the time, was then frozen into the Commission's recommendations by 
virtue of its penchant for pre-commitment. Again, the Commission's automotive reports 
exemplify the problems. Between its 1974 and 1981 automotive reports, the 
Commission's proposed 'medium term' tariff for the industry doubled from 25 to 50 per 
cent. Likewise the Commission's 1982 recommendations for a ten year program of 
general tariff reductions were modest compared with what they would probably have 
been had they been offered in early 1974 and certainly compared with what turned out to 
be economically and politically possible six years later (see below).
Real exchange rate movements also interacted with both the political feasibility and 
economic desirability of tariff reform. For when Australia's real exchange rate fell - as it 
did precipitately in the mid 1980s - the international competitiveness of Australia's traded 
goods and services sector improved and this lowered the economic and political costs of 
tariff reform. At the same time, the inflation unleashed by devaluation made the anti- 
inflationary effect which tariff reform offered more urgent. The effect was so strong in 
the mid 1980s that import penetration fell sharply despite pre-set tariff reform programs 
which had been considered relatively ambitious when originally formulated. The 1984 
'Button Plan' sought to liberalise automotive trade by reducing 'penalty tariffs' on 
vehicle imports in excess of quota allocations from 150 to 57.5 per cent over eight years. 
The end point in this plan offered only a little more protection and was similar in form to 
the Commission's 1981 proposals. However, the collapse of the Australian dollar in 
1986 swamped the effect of falling tariffs. Vehicle imports were halved between 1985 
and 1986 (AIA, 1987: 20)! (Something similar would have happened under the 
Commission's proposals.) In these circumstances 'mutual adjustment' between trade 
liberalisation and other objectives argued for a dramatic acceleration of the tariff reform 
programme.97
97 These problems were not addressed until two years later - by which time the exchange rate had begun 
to rise! Note also that admitting the possibility of some sensitivity to context in the tariff reform
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Figure 10.1
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Source: Reserve Bank; see Statistical Appendix, Table A 10.1.
In its early Annual Reports the Commission pointed out that the recent move towards 
more flexible exchange rates provided increased scope to address balance of payments 
issues by means other than protection (1973-74: 11, 1974-75: 26). But beyond 
suggesting that this increased the scope for trade liberalisation, the idea that there might 
be some 'mutual adjustment' between trade liberalisation objectives and real exchange 
rate movement in the sense suggested above does not appear to have been canvassed by 
the Commission. The Commission insisted instead that "an assistance program
program can be 'mutually adjusted' with other objectives. In circumstances in which there was general 
support for fixed tariff reduction schedules and the need to force some minimum rate of reform whatever 
the circumstances, the following proposal was put to the Industry Commission in its automotive inquiry 
of 1990:
When the currency falls, so too should tariffs. When it rises tariffs should rise 
again, though if the policy is to be pursued in a trade liberalising context for a 
relatively heavily protected sector, it may be appropriate to prevent tariffs rising 
above a pre-specified tariff reduction regime. It is not envisaged that the rate of 
tariff reduction be varied in an ad hoc way in the future, but rather that the logic 
set out here be embodied in a pre-set and politically incontestable formula which 
would not be altered for the duration of the reform program to be established in 
the current review process (Gruen, 1990: 38-9).
The proposal appeared in a major submission to the Commission which had the broad support of most 
of the firms in the industry, and the 'mutual adjustment' it embodied was designed to address all the 
major concerns of the Commission, providing flexibility to intensify the pace of tariff reform if the 
circumstances warranted, without giving away pre-commitment to some minimum level of tariff reform. 
However, the Commission offered no comment on it (Industry Commission, 1990).
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predicated on preceding changes in relative prices (including exchange rates) being 
maintained would be highly vulnerable" (IAC, Annual Report, 1986-7: 5). This was a 
plausible argument - but one which was presumably as telling against its own proposals 
for reform according to fixed tariff reform schedules as those proposals against which it 
was intended as a critique. The Commission made either explicit or implicit exchange 
rate assumptions whenever it sought to tailor its recommendations to the economy's 
capacity to adjust and whenever it modelled of discussed the effects of its 
recommendations (see eg IAC, "Reductions", 1982: 95, 125). In its hearings, and in its 
reports the Commission generally tended to take the then current exchange rate as 
'given'. Participants protested that the level of assistance they 'needed' in the future 
could not be sensibly discussed without some knowledge of exchange rates at the time 
(eg see IAC, PM Vs, 1974, Transcript: 81, 157, 1984).98
Although the Commission's agenda was very much in the ascendant by the late 1980s, it 
is worth noting that none of the major reductions in protection involved the 
implementation of IAC recommendations. Each was brought about by governments 
seizing certain opportunities for trade liberalisation as they presented themselves. The 
most important piece of tariff reform of the 1970s was the 25 per cent across the board 
tariff cut. Rattigan agreed to the proposal, but agonised about its consistency with the 
IAC line he was developing (Rattigan, 1986: 164ff). The major top down reductions of 
assistance to the automotive and apparel industries were each crafted by the Government 
after it substantially rejected IAC recommendations for the same industries (IAC, Annual 
Report, 1986-87, Appendix 5).
One might argue that the IAC reports came to be seen as a 'benchmark' of ambition or 
'ambit claim' for structural reform from which Governments could retreat in negotiations 
with industry and still manage significant reform. However, in the case study presented 
here what looked like an ambitious benchmarks in 1974 and 1981 rapidly became 
politically untenable as events unfolded. Although the IAC reports may have had some 
political usefulness as a high water mark of ambition, they offered those needing to make
98 Elsewhere there were occasional references to exchange rates though again, discussion focused on 
what assumptions to make for the future rather than the scope for mutual adjustment between assistance 
reform and exchange rate movement:
Since the inquiry began there have been significant changes in exchange rates 
and the prices of some imports - and also in local costs - with the result that 
apparent price disadvantages on some products have varied considerably from 
time to time. Assessments of price disadvantages set out in the sectional reports 
reflect the latest price and cost data available to the Commission, and except 
where considered inappropriate, recent exchange rates (LAC, "Glass", 1974: 4).
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the compromises between the IAC's preferences and the dictates of necessity, very little 
guidance about how to do so (§§ 8.4, 9.8). And with hindsight, many of the reports of 
the 1980s were too timid as high water marks. In the automotive industry and elsewhere 
- for instance in the case of textiles, clothing and footwear (Industries Assistance 
Commission, 1986) and general reductions in protection (Industries Assistance 
Commission, 1982) - reports of the early and mid 1980s were exposed as too timid well 
within the decade-long period their recommendations comprehended. Although the 
Commission's report on textiles, clothing and footwear (TCF) was released in May 
1986, after the dollar had fallen dramatically, its report contains almost no serious 
discussion of these circumstances. The Commission's 1986 TCF report proposed the 
removal of quotas and top down reform to a ceiling of 50 per cent by 1996. The 50 per 
cent ceiling was also chosen by the Commission for the automotive industry - but this 
was five years previously when the real exchange rate was nearly 30 per cent higher (see 
Figure 10.1 above and Statistical Appendix Table A 10.1 below). Less than six years 
later, in 1991, the Government announced a program which, by 1993 would go below 
the 50 per cent target set by the IAC for 1996. The Government's plan reduced the 
highest TCF tariffs to 37 per cent by 1996 and to 25 per cent by the year 2000 (Textiles, 
Clothing and Footwear Development Authority, 1991: 27).
In 1982 the IAC released a report proposing various top down and across the board 
options for general reductions in protection (IAC, "Reductions", 1982: 88). The 
preferred top down option in 1982 contemplated reform 'down' to 20 per cent over ten 
years. Six years later, in the wake of stronger economic growth and currency 
depreciation, the Hawke Government announced a tariff reform program which reduced 
tariffs to a ceiling of 15 per cent, excluding automotive and apparel industries over a 
period of just four years (IAC, Annual Report, 1987-88: 33). Thus the most ambitious 
targets set in the 1982 report were substantially exceeded within the ten year period 
despite their being essentially ignored for the first six years! The 1988 announcement, 
was made at a time which was propitious for reform. Growth was reasonably strong 
and the exchange rate was well below the levels of the seventies and early eighties. 
Circumstances were less propitious in 1991 when government announced a further tariff 
reform program. Real exchange rates were somewhat higher (see Statistical Appendix 
Table A 10.1) - though they were still below their levels in the late 70s and early 1980s - 
and Australia was experiencing what policy makers (wrongly) expected to be a relatively 
short lived recession. Nevertheless the politics of assistance reform appeared to have 
changed. The 1991 reform program reduced tariffs other than automotive and apparel 
related items to five per cent by 1996.
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In addition to the more propitious timing of at least the first of the two announcements, it 
seems plausible to suggest that the Government's preparedness to deviate from top down 
and across the board tariff reform was also instrumental in achieving the extent of reform 
that it did. The Commission had counselled against such deviations in its 1982 report on 
General Reductions in Protection. Significantly, it made the point in its 1982 report by 
commenting that a 20 per cent ceiling for tariffs without exceptions was better than a 20 
per cent ceiling with exceptions (1982: 1). But this comparison illuminates little more 
than the idea that more reform is better than less. It is not a 'margin dependent 
comparison' in Braybrooke and Lindblom's sense because it does not illuminate whether 
the possible costs of deviating from orthodox reform might have yielded some other 
benefits. The appropriate 'margin dependent comparison' might have juxtaposed a 
reform target of a uniform 20 per cent tariff ceiling with a 10 per cent tariff ceiling with 
exceptions where they were politically necessary as they seemed to be for automotive 
and apparel industries.
The ambitiousness of both its 1988 and 1991 statements suggest that the Government 
made precisely this kind of tradeoff. To take advantage of the improved scope for 
reform in 1988, the Government accelerated its sector specific reform strategies in the 
highly assisted automotive and apparel industries but it nevertheless proposed to remain 
within the political 'speed limits' to reform in those industries. This left it free to pursue 
more rapid tariff reform elsewhere. Without such an approach the whole tariff reform 
agenda would have been politically hostage to the political power of the most highly 
assisted sectors. Thus it seems plausible that, by offending against the letter of the two 
neoclassical reform rules, reform was accelerated. Form was sacrificed fo r substance.
10.2 The Extinguished Prospect of Dialogue and
'Mutual Adjustment' between Perspectives
My problem with this paper is that while most economists will read it as a 
confirmation of their views, it does not go very far on engaging the debate with 
those who hold different but reasonable views and are prepared to debate them 
in relation to evidence.
Vince FitzGerald commenting on a defence of 'economic rationalism', King and 
Lloyd, 1993: 127
As Ross Gamaut has colourfully put it, the unprecedented success of Asian development 
has provided economists and historians with "a rich new set of data" on the important 
questions: "To the economist whose discipline is a social science, the emergence of this 
new case . . .  is as great a gift as a new hemisphere to an astronomer" (1990: 4-5).
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The early 1970s, the beginning of the period under study here, saw a good deal of 
collective disciplinary puzzlement about how the successful developing countries might 
have achieved what they did, and the extent to which their experience entailed lessons for 
others. Where the focus was on trade policy, Hong Kong and Singapore showed that 
success was certainly not inconsistent with free trade. However the relatively heavy 
state intervention in trade and in other ways in Japan, Korea and Taiwan and these 
countries' latter day followers - such as Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia - raised the 
prospect that, at least in the context of existing protection, outward oriented assistance 
and what I have called intra-industry trade facilitation policy may have made important 
contributions to development and so to economic welfare.
Although it appears to have been relatively sympathetic to free trade, the new 
development consensus of the 1970s was not primarily preoccupied with advocating 
'free trade' instead of 'protection'. It argued instead that where protection was offered, 
it could be improved by making it less discriminatory against exports. This 
accommodated the export assistance provided by successful developing countries at the 
same time as weaving the commonsensical theoretical principles of optimal intervention 
into the story. Section 3.2.4 quoted Jagdish Bhagwati musing more boldly that the 
'key' to the development success of countries like Korea and Taiwan might not be their 
lack of intervention, but rather the energy with which their intervention moved from one 
developmental priority to a subsequent one - in this case from import replacement to 
export.
Having, as they did, an essentially dynamic conception of economic development, these 
observations were consistent not only with the themes of economists like Schumpeter in 
the 1930s and forties, but also with themes which were re-emerging within economics 
after the heavy over-emphasis on perfectly competitive perspectives of the 1950s and 
sixties. From the late 1950s through till the 1970s, a variety of relatively new 
perspectives came to suggest that the allocative efficiencies at the heart of traditional 
economic analysis were only a part - and possibly quite a small part - of the productive 
benefits of market competition and trade. These perspectives raised the prospect that the 
greatest gains from trade liberalisation might come from X-efficiencies, scale economies, 
lower rent seeking expenditure and dynamic economies associated with knowledge 
creation through learning by doing and research and development (Abramovitz, 1956; 
Solow, 1957; Linder, 1961; Arrow, 1962; Leibenstein, 1966; Vernon, 1966, Krueger, 
1974).
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Section 1.3.2.1 discussed the means by which multiple perspectives could be 
incorporated into the search for better policy. Where differing perspectives each 
highlight similar phenomena as having either positive or normative significance, this 
adds to the confidence the practitioner can have in their significance. As Findlay put it, 
the disciplinary strength of the new development consensus of the 1970s arose from 
precisely this kind of integrative approach. It built bridges - provided some mutual 
adjustment - between the evidence and a range of theoretical considerations. The 
perspectives to which the new approach appealed included not just the perfectly 
competitive frameworks of economic orthodoxy in which free trade was best and 
'optimal intervention' was non-discriminatory, but also the "murky but relevant waters 
of such concepts as X-efficiency and 'learning-by-doing'" (Findlay, in Hong and 
Krause, 1981: 31).
One can understand that a suggestion such as Bhagwati's could be disquieting to a 
profession which was uneasy about both the political and economic implications of 
intervention - and particularly wary of interventions to compensate for other 
interventions. If Bhagwati's suggestion is right, the extent to which the successful 
Asian countries moved towards free trade might have been largely a sideshow, the 
central story being the extent to which their policies supported and/or accelerated the 
evolution of individual industries and firms from import replacement to export. Yet this 
does not exhaust the potential relevance of Bhagwati's suggestion. For Australian policy 
of the 1970s, some 'mutual adjustment' between Bhagwati's perspective and the more 
prosaic 'optimal intervention' story to which the new development consensus appealed 
raised the spectre of seeking the best of the two perspectives whilst avoiding their major 
dangers.
This dissertation has shown how frequently the IAC was presented with the opportunity 
to develop an approach to trade liberalisation which melded something of the Asian 
approach to trade, trade liberalisation and development, with the traditional normative 
economics of trade liberalisation and the principles of optimal intervention. The need for 
gradualism in trade liberalisation was not then challenged within the mainstream of 
economic policy thinking, and was certainly not challenged by the IAC. This raised the 
prospect of symmetrical top down and bottom up reform involving traditional tariff 
reductions together with some transitional assistance to export without losing sight of the 
ultimate goal of freer (or preferably free) trade. As has been suggested above, this is not 
far from the Australian 'policy consensus' of the mid to late 1970s in which the IAC had 
participated. But it was not long before the Commission was pitting itself against that
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consensus and arguing against any extension of assistance to exports - and, towards the 
end of the 1980s, even the continuation of tariff concessions to exports (§ 10.1.2.2).
A latter day apostle of the reform consensus of the late 1970s was John Button. He was 
not the first industry minister of the post war era to proselytise the merits of tariff 
reform, and industrial rationalisation, but he was the first to both preach and practice the 
new creed. At the same time he spoke of the importance of what he called 'positive' 
assistance which would be available to directly assist the processes of industrial 
transition particularly by assisting those activities at the forefront of industrial 
development - particularly export, research and development. The IAC supported 
policies "which were positively directed towards improving the mobility and quality of 
resources" such as adjustment assistance and other measures which were "factor oriented 
and general in application rather than specific to particular industries" including 
assistance to research and development (IAC, 1973-74, Annual Report: 22, § 147).
Button also developed a range of 'plans' for specific industries. Those for the 
automotive, textile, apparel and steel industries were adaptations of existing high cost 
industry-specific assistance schemes. Each 'plan' sought to use what assistance was 
provided to help the industry restructure at the same time as gradually reducing the 
assistance available - bringing it closer to average levels of assistance for manufacturing. 
With hindsight these plans may be judged relatively successful in this aim. But in taking 
the existing high cost industry schemes as starting points and then seeking to improve 
them and make them more supportive of desirable restructuring, the formulation of the 
Button plans was an exercise in melioration and 'mutual adjustment' between what was 
given, what was possible, and what seemed desirable. Other plans implemented by 
Button offered what, by the standards of Australia's tariff assistance, were generally 
moderate to low levels of assistance for industries judged to be potential 'growth' 
industries of the future." One need not support all, or indeed any of the initiatives thus 
justified to still believe that the economists of the IAC could usefully have participated in 
the discussion within which this approach was developed.
Instead the Commission deployed its peremptory rules against 'second best' and 
'industry-specific' policy making against all these schemes. "Alternative assistance
"  For instance the 'Factor F' scheme for pharmaceuticals subsidised approximately 20 per cent of the 
expansion of activity in the pharmaceutical industry which took place during its first five years (Bureau 
of Industry Economics, 1991: 76). Given that the scheme offered subsidies of between 8 and 25 per cent 
on increases in value added in various kinds of activities, the rate of assistance which it provided to value 
adding in the industry as a whole would have been well under these figures.
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measures are not the answer" declaimed the headline of one section of a Commission 
Annual Report (1989-90: 15; also see IAC, Annual Report, 1988-89: 4). The more 
reputable of those promoting such measures - including the Commission in the 1970s - 
had only ever argued that they might be part of the answer and, to quote the 
Commission's 1977 report on export assistance, that they "may be an important means 
of giving effect to" another part of the answer - tariff reform (see § 10.1.2.2 above). 
But in place of engagement, whether it be by way of well considered theoretical support, 
development, scrutiny or critique, and whether offered at the 'in-principle' level or on a 
'case by case' basis, the IAC fell back on the strained dichotomies which expressed its 
squeamishness about the compromises inherent in gradual policy transition:
Administrative and institutional settings need to recognise that the economy 
operates as one system; that the creation of separate environments for 
selected industries tends to impede the growth of others; and therefore that 
policy towards particular industries should be driven by the objective for 
the whole economy. In this light, removing impediments to a more 
competitive economy is 'positive'; action to selectively promote or sustain 
the competitive position of particular industries is 'negative' (IAC, Annual 
Report, 1986-87: iv, cf IAC, Annual Report, 1988-89: 4).
In such pronouncements the IAC implicitly turned a blind eye to the way in which its 
own recommendations violated the same injunctions. For in their gradualism, the 
Commission's own proposals for the automotive industry were inevitably industry- 
specific. The 1981 report proposed arrangements which deviated from tariff-only 
assistance to meet certain transitional difficulties which faced the Commission - though 
as it turned out in a disastrously inefficient way (§ 9.7.2). And both its 1974 and 1981 
reports proposed assistance to the automotive industry at relatively high and so 
’industry-specific' rates in each case into the next decade. Given the unacknowledged 
contradictions in its own approach, the IAC's position came to accord an implicitly 
privileged status to tariff assistance, on occasion even bidding the rate of assistance up, 
as it sought to determine the minimum level of tariff assistance consistent with the 
various requirements written into its terms of references to ensure the 'prosperity' of the 
industry and avoid 'undue disruption'.
Without necessarily arguing that more 'positive' assistance was warranted in all, or even 
any of the cases in which the IAC opposed it, one might argue that its rejection in 
principle was a travesty of economic science itself. For the greatest contribution the 
discipline of economics brings to the public policy debate is its 'equilibrium' perspective 
- its capacity to assess simultaneously multiple, interacting effects and so engage with the 
economy as a system. It is in defence of such an approach that economists can be heard
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insisting that public policy should never assume that a single objective of policy has an 
absolute value - whether it is protecting the environment, reducing road deaths or 
increasing exports: that rather, policies should be assessed according to their likely 
benefits and costs. As Braybrooke and Lindblom put it, "an analyst says little of worth - 
even to clarify his own mind - if he declares that he values full employment. He must 
also specify how much . . .  of various other values he would be willing to forego" 
(Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1963: 30-1). Yet whenever any degree of plurality entered 
the analysis, the rigours of marginalism - which form the proud foundation of modern 
economics - were discarded. In the cases discussed in this dissertation, economists 
sought to reject policies containing any element of tariff compensation, on account of 
their perceived and/or potential costs, with scant, if any consideration of their potential 
benefits.
10.2.1 An Australian Adaptation of 'New Trade Liberalisation'
[T]he complexity of our environment is far beyond our capacity for logical 
analysis. It is this permanent threat of the unknown that creates the need for 
judgment. . . . Competitive advantage . . . cannot be preserved by 
exploiting proprietary technology or a superior concept of strategy, which are 
depreciating assets; it requires a continuing capability for making and 
implementing good judgments, on which both proprietary technology and 
superior strategy depend.
Brian Loasby, paraphrasing Mark Casson, in Loasby, 1991: 647
Cairncross once distinguished between theorists seeking to trap the inner secrets of the 
economy in their models, and the practitioners who live in a world of action where "time 
is precious, understanding is limited, nothing is certain, and non-economic 
considerations are always important and often decisive" (in Henderson, 1986: 105). In 
the spirit of Loasby's summary of Casson above one might suggest that economic policy 
can make its greatest contribution to growth, development and welfare where it responds 
to threats and opportunities emerging in the environment with policies and strategies 
which embody 'good judgment'. Good judgment will involve 'margin dependent 
comparisons' and tradeoffs between what is important, and what is desirable but, by 
comparison, of lower priority.
Peremptory rule making is typically context independent and so, in many ways the 
enemy of the development and exercise of good judgment. And as contemporary 
management theories stressing 'continuous improvement' have emphasised, peremptory 
rules profoundly obstruct the evolution of adaptations to emerging circumstances. They 
thus obstruct the discovery and realisation of complementarities between existing and
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possible objectives and institutions; it has become fashionable to call these 'synergies'. 
The peremptory rules around which the IAC developed its trade liberalisation program 
even constrained its capacity to adapt towards instruments which had the sanction of 
economic orthodoxy at the time. Thus after 1971, it generally opposed removing the 
inward orientation of the shipbuilding bounty because this would be 'industry-specific' 
(§ 10.1.2.1). It likewise deprecated ameliorating the export suppressing effect of tariffs 
with duty drawback because of the 'second best' and/or unsystematic and so 'industry- 
specific' nature of its possible consequences (see § 10.1.2.2 above). It takes little 
imagination to see how peremptory rules against both 'second best' and 'industry- 
specific' policy making, might profoundly retard any capacity to explore ameliorative 
possibilities - if necessary by small scale experiments - and so find one's way in the real 
world described by Cairncross.
Elsewhere, it seemed that the policy makers of East Asia were making 'good judgments' 
about what was most important in trade reform. In their attempts to address the 
immediate imperatives of development - particularly the need to improve their external 
accounts - they built their export drive around a range of improvised policy innovations 
and adaptations (§ 4.7.3). As interpreted by the architects of the new development 
consensus, the export drive then became an engine of discovery, priority setting and 
adaptation by which participants in private enterprise and public policy searched to 
discover and remedy impediments to better performance. In this context to a significant 
extent, trade liberalisation and wider reform priorities appear to have emerged as an 
endogenous product of the export drive. Krueger describes the Koreans' "pragmatic" 
approach to export expansion thus:
[W]hen export performance was deemed satisfactory, policies were left 
unaltered; when however it appeared that export growth was faltering, 
changes were instituted until satisfactory performance was again observed.
. . . The means chosen [to encourage exports] varied pragmatically in 
accordance with the degree of success then being achieved. . . .  As those 
urged to export protested at various disabilities or disadvantages, means 
were found for removing such disadvantages; when exports lagged, new 
incentives were introduced or the value of existing incentives increased in 
order to spur export performance (1979: 85, 92-4).
Had Australian policy grasped the opportunities for some synthesis between its own 
trade liberalisation objectives and the lessons from Asia, it might likewise have embarked 
much earlier upon the reform tasks which it ultimately embraced. Australia's taxation, 
labour relations, and transport systems emerged as central planks in Australia's 
'microeconomic reform' agenda in the mid to late 1980s as falling tariffs and increasing 
export orientation drove the search for cost reduction. The IAC played an important role
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in exposing these issues to public view towards the end of the 1980s. It had 
occasionally anticipated some elements of the 'microeconomic reform' agenda earlier 
(see eg Annual Report 1980-81, Chapter Two) but its focus remained overwhelmingly 
on traditional assistance issues until 1988 when it noted that the Government had "placed 
a new emphasis on microeconomic reform" (1987-88 Annual Report: iii). Australian 
businesses' and policy makers' eagerness to identify means of cost reduction and 
productivity growth might have taken hold much earlier had there been a more 
collaborative relationship between economists, business and consumers. The I AC's 
automotive inquiries provided it with suggestive evidence on a range of matters which 
later became central to the microeconomic reform agenda. As has been seen, in its 1974 
report the Commission offered little comment on Japan's emerging labour productivity 
revolution despite direct reference to the labour issues in the terms of reference (§ 7.2). 
The same may be said of transport cost issues, despite the complaints of automotive 
exporters in the 1970s and indeed throughout the 1960s.100 It is not surprising that 
automotive exporters were the ones to mention these matters, as they were the ones at the 
vanguard of change and development in a hitherto cosseted and inwardly oriented 
industry. They bore the brunt of domestic protection in export markets which did not 
compensate them for their high costs. Likewise as early as 1973, it was Australia's 
largest automotive exporter, GMH who called for Australia to move away from payroll 
and sales taxes towards value added taxation so as to better integrate Australia's trade 
and taxation systems and remove particular burdens on Australia's traded sector (IAC, 
PM Vs, 1974, Transcript: 105).
It is perhaps unwise to dwell too long on what might have been. Nevertheless 
participants in good dialogue can usually each expect to gain. In this case the 
economists' gain would have been the greater relevance of their discipline to emerging 
problems of economic transition. Australia's industry structure and its circumstances in 
the 1960s and seventies were 'rather like' those of Asian countries in certain important 
respects - particularly Australia's existing inward orientation and its potential for export 
orientation. In response to those circumstances, a range of people including 
industrialists, economists, politicians and participants in IAC inquiries were suggesting 
the same kind of policy instruments which had already been tried - with some apparent 
success - in Asia and documented in the early works of the 'new development 
consensus'. Had the culture of the economics profession been more focused on the
100 por the 1960s see AFR, 26th January, 1961: 15; CPD, 20th October, 1966: 2011; for the 1973-4 
inquiry see Ford, Folder 3, Box 3, Report 21; Leyland at IAC, PMVs, 1974, Transcript: 1785, GMH at 
p. 1398. For component manufacturers see eg Rubery Owen at p.1424.
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concrete problems of adaptation, amelioration and transition, had it been more 'outward 
looking’ in its attempts to absorb those issues to which business people drew attention, 
these ideas might have been taken more seriously within the economic corpus. 
Economists might have scrutinised both their weaknesses and strengths in an effort to 
develop a more coherent understanding of - and so consensus about - when heterodox 
trade liberalisation options might offer benefits.
Australians had previously made important contributions to economics by thinking 
through the economic circumstances of their own country in an original way. 
Groenewegen and McFarlane's comment on Australian economists' historical 
"willingness to test new ideas with critical scrutiny" (see head quotation of Chapter 
Seven above) is probably most notably exemplified by the Brigden Committee's 
anticipation of the Hecksher/ Ohlin/Samuelson 'factor proportions' theory of trade. Tom 
FitzGerald spoke of the episode as an inspiration to Australian economists:
What is inspiring . . .  is the example of Australian economists who arrived at 
independent conclusions contrary to the world orthodoxy, who invited 
criticism from the most eminent upholders of that orthodoxy, and, on being 
rejected, put their argument in an international forum, to gain ultimately a 
large measure of acceptance for their initial heresy. Today they are far 
better remembered and admired by an eminent American economist, the 
Nobel Prize winner Paul Samuelson, than by any Australian counterparts.
. . . Professor Samuelson has recently referred to them as 'my-down-under- 
heroes' (1990: 41; also see the debate between Manger (1981) and 
Samuelson (1981) on the extent of the Brigden Committee's innovation).
This dissertation has argued that there was scope for Australians to make a similar, 
though perhaps more modest contribution by developing the normative economics of 
symmetrical top down and bottom up tariff reform. Integrating instruments such as 
export credits into the neoclassical corpus could have produced large payoffs. Australian 
economists might have helped forge an adaptation of Asian 'concessional trade 
liberalisation' which was consistent also with Australia's circumstances and its Western 
liberal administrative traditions. This is because in Asia - and when they were first 
introduced in Australia - concessional trade liberalisation measures operated with 
extensive and highly discretionary bureaucratic supervision, which often frustrated or 
foreclosed their trade liberalising potential and ensured that they would continue to be 
both used and seen as instruments of mercantilism. Australian economists might have 
shown how liberalising existing concessional import schemes could play a useful role in 
initiating and deepening trade reform and the circumstances in which so doing might 
make an important contribution to trade liberalisation either in the presence of, or without 
more traditional trade reform.
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The benefits of intellectual engagement with Asian success might have accrued not 
simply in the form of adapting the lessons of Asian development to Australia's 
circumstances. Australia's economists might have returned to the discussion by pointing 
out how Australia might usefully incorporate the possibilities inherent in 'new trade 
liberalisation' into its own trade negotiation agenda. In addition to arguing the case for 
foreign countries to reduce their tariff and quota protection directly, Australians could 
have pointed to the scope for its Asian trading partners to advance their own interests (as 
well as Australia’s) by expanding and liberalising the instruments of concessional trade 
liberalisation which they had already introduced. In so doing Australian economists 
might have been able to point to their own country as a pacesetter in these matters in 
combining inter-industry and intra-industry trade reform. Had the temper of Australian 
economics been less preoccupied with the dichotomy between protection and free trade 
and more focused on adaptation and amelioration, an Australian economist might have 
published a paper such as the one Paul Wonnacott published recently entitled "The 
Automotive Industry in Southeast Asia: Can Protection be Made Less Costly" (1996).101 
Indeed the earlier in our period the issue had received attention from Australian 
economists the better position they would have been in to help Australian trade 
negotiators influence the evolution of automotive protection in the region. As it was the 
Commission showed little interest in such a course.
And one thing leads to another. The traditional attitude to trade liberalisation as 
exemplified by the IAC's fear of the dangerous supplement of export assistance is 
broadly mirrored in the international disciplines on trade embodied in the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In particular, the GATT provides privileged 
status to existing tariffs beneath any internationally negotiated 'bound' tariff ceiling, at 
the same time as absolutely proscribing industrial export subsidies. For any country 
using export assistance to help it make the transition to freer trade, such as Australia and 
many countries in Asia, the GATT disciplines threaten a return to the inward orientation 
of the past. This suggests the possibility of moulding the GATT disciplines to 
accommodate greater pluralism in the means of trade liberalisation. In fact from its 
inception, the GATT did accommodate the one form of 'non-traditional' trade 
liberalisation widely acknowledged within the economics canon at the time - regional 
trade liberalisation by way of customs unions or free trade areas. Although the condition 
that internal tariffs within regional trade agreements are eventually entirely eliminated is
101 The paper advocates lower, more uniform assistance in the region and proposes that, where countries 
cannot be persuaded to remove local content plans, they allow exports to qualify as local content.
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no guarantee of welfare improvement (Cooper and Massed, 1965: 471-2), this 
concession to pluralism appears to have facilitated significant net trade creation.
By analogy, Australia shared an interest with many Asian countries in bringing policies 
such as import/export links within the GATT and developing specific GATT disciplines 
for them (as opposed to outright prohibition) so that they might be used in ways which 
reinforced rather than undermined trade liberalisation. Such issues barely raised a 
mention amongst Australian economists and policy commentators, who continued to 
focus on the need for inter-industry trade liberalisation as suggested by the HOS 
framework - the need for agricultural trade reform. Of course Australia could benefit 
from inter-industry trade liberalisation. But it - and its trading partners - could also 
benefit from intra-industry trade liberalisation providing it was consistent with trade 
liberalisation more generally.
On this matter as on so many others, Martec provided a promising lead, even if it did not 
provide the last word:
A further problem arising for the Australian motor industry is that 
important export destinations like South Africa, New Zealand and South 
East Asia, are increasingly succumbing to their own protection policies and 
local content programs. The way around this is to cultivate 
complementation programs for regional vehicle manufacture, with Australia 
participating fully (1972: 1.7; also see AMI representative, IAC, PMVs,
1974, Transcript: 362).
10.3 Martec and the Commission: A Summary and
Postscript
As Chapters Six to Nine argued, the skills and perspectives of the IAC and other 
participants to the debate were highly complementary. This was nowhere more clearly 
exemplified than in the case of Martec. Although neoclassical economics was weak at 
handling the dynamic 'evolutionary' perspective which was Martec's forte, many of 
Martec's ideas could be adapted to a neoclassical understanding of the industry by way 
of existing concepts such as 'optimal intervention' and concepts which could be readily 
developed, such as intra-industry trade facilitation policy. Much of Martec's message 
boiled down to the joint assertions, backed with persuasive examples, that scale 
economies were important for the industry and that intra-industry trade (and so intra­
industry trade facilitation) were essential to realising them. But it is remarkable how little 
impact Martec and other apparently heterodox voices had.
The technical orientation of the economics profession and the Commission's work 
certainly played its part. Both major IAC reports referred uncritically to minimum
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efficient scale (MES) as (arbitrarily) defined in some economics textbooks. The 
Commission proceeded to focus on the highest production scales achieved in large 
developed countries, presumably as a consequence of its understanding of MES and of 
the fact that these were the examples which had been well worked over by economists in 
previous studies. How much more pertinent was Martec's observation, devoid as it was 
of the trappings of scholarship?
Certain vehicle producing companies in other parts of the world have in 
their home country, a similar, or lower domestic sales base than do GMH 
and Ford Australia EACH have in Australia. Yet these overseas companies 
are not only domestically successful, they are viable in international terms 
through a world wide perspective and a strong export orientation. . . .
Volvo of Sweden, GM associated Isuzu of Japan, Chrysler associated 
Mitsubishi of Japan, Honda of Japan, and BMW of Germany, all fall into 
this category (A/M, October, 1974: 13).
Indeed as it turned out virtually the whole of the IAC's technical apparatus actively 
concealed the issues which were central to Martec's contribution. The Commission's 
demand studies focused on the domestic market only, its assistance evaluation assumed 
that there were no exports and that there would be none irrespective of policy change 
(§ 1.3.2.1). And like its assistance evaluation, its ORANI modelling assumed that there 
was no product differentiation in the industry and so was incapable of shedding light on 
scale economies or intra-automotive-industry trade.
However to explain the IAC's failure of vision as a failure of technique would be 
seriously incomplete. It would invite the conclusion which Krugman has proposed 
elsewhere, that the ongoing march of economists' technique will ultimately ameliorate 
these problems (see § 1.3.3). That is why I have argued that the IAC's failure of vision 
was ultimately a failure of the conversation which took place between itself and others. 
In this the IAC was not the simple victim of the technical resources of economics at the 
time of its inquiries.
It was motivated to deprecate many inquiry participants' contributions because they 
raised the spectre of the dangerous supplement. As the IAC came to see it, this 
compromised the politics of reform by admitting the possibility of 'compensation' rather 
than 'elimination'. Often there was a harder edge to the IAC's motivation in which its 
opponents were seen - usually correctly - as motivated by self interest rather than 
economic efficiency. Indeed the self-interestedness of industry and the disinterestedness 
of the IAC was one of the building blocks of the IAC's political economy (see §§ 6.1, 
6.2 above). Before Rattigan's chairmanship of the Tariff Board, assistance policy had 
been far too receptive to business lobbying. The IAC accordingly prided itself on
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"maintaining the distance from industry groups that is required for balanced decisions 
and advice" (Carmichael, 1986: 345; also see Rattigan, et al, 1989: 79). Bill Carmichael 
is undoubtedly right to identify this as one of the great achievements of the institutions he 
helped create. However the act of 'distancing' itself from industry carried with it the risk 
that the Commission would be a poor listener. This study has tried to show how that 
risk was aggravated by the professional culture of economics itself which conceived of 
debate too much as a competition between those with different views, and too little as a 
search for common ground.
And sometimes there was a fine line between keeping one's distance and arrogance. 
Economists friendly to the Commission in the Priorities Review Staff prosecuted the 
IAC cause in the following terms: "The Martec report and plans are professionally 
unsound and should be regarded as irrelevant" (Quoted approvingly by Rattigan, 1986: 
223). Certainly the Commission kept its distance from Martec. In 1976 Martec invited 
the IAC to comment on its most recent analysis of automotive industry policy which it 
intended to send its clients. It received the following reply:
21st October 1976 
Dear Sir,
I am returning, without comment or endorsement, the copy of selected pages from a 
confidential draft of a study entitled "The Australian Motor Industry in the Years to 
1984" which the Chairman received this morning.
Yours Faithfully,
(A. E. S. Davey)
Secretary (Martec, 1976: A 2)
The late Tom FitzGerald argued that "[i]n economics, qualities of personal character can 
be no less important than technical competence" (1990: 41). Certainly the story set out 
here suggests that in policy making, as in life, it is difficult to be rigorous or fruitful in 
conversation if one focuses on exploiting the weaknesses of others' arguments - instead 
of meeting their strengths.
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Items appear and are numbered according to the chapter and in the order they are first 
referred to in the text.
Table A2.1 G eneral M otors-Holdens Export Perform ance
Year Domestic Export CBU Export CKD Total Exports Export Intensity - 
by volume (%)
1948 100 0 0
1949 7700 0 0
1950 20100 0 0
1951 25200 0 0
1952 31900 0 0
1953 44200 0 0 .
1954 54500 300 300 0.6
1955 62400 1300 1300 2
1956 66700 2200 2200 3.2
1957 90100 1300 3200 4500 4.8
1958 108300 900 1500 2400 2.2
1959 111900 1300 2100 3400 3
1960 129700 2500 8200 10700 7.6
1961 105700 2500 4400 6900 6.1
1962 127000 2600 3700 6300 4.7
1963 155300 3800 7000 10800 6.5
1964 156500 4900 8800 13700 8.0
1965 132100 19400 12.8
1966 137700 15100 9.9
1967 131800 11200 7.8
1968 154000 14400 8.6
1969 161000 13400 7.7
1970 165600 24000 12.7
1971 168000 24400 12.7
1972 160900 33500 17.2
1973 164300 41200 20.1
1974 157900 32600 17.1
Source: Correspondence with GMH.
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Tab le  A7.1 
L e v e l
Motor Vehicles at the Three Digit ASIC
Motor Vehicles Clothing Total Motor Vehicles
and Parts (ASIC 242) Manufacturing as % of Total
(ASIC 321) Manufacturing
Capital Intensity (Index) 88 13 100 88
Labour Productivity $7,200 $3,102 $6,049 119
Average Wage $3,191 $1,996 $3,023 106
Exp't Intensity (%) 4.0 0.8 6.5 62
Source: IAC, Annual Report, 1973-4, Appendix 4.1: 74-83.
Table A7.2 Motor Vehicles at the Four Digit
ASIC Level
Proportion of 
Total Mfg (%)
M otor v eh ic les (A SIC  3211)
Capital Intensity 110
Output per worker $8,446 140
Average Wage $3,382 112
T ru ck  and B us B odies (A SIC  3212)
Capital Intensity 33
Output per worker $4,695 78
Average Wage $2,900 96
V eh ic le  In stru m en ts (A SIC 3213)
Capital Intensity 49
Output per worker $4,901 81
Average Wage $2,837 94
M otor V eh icle  P arts n .e.c (A SIC 3214)
Capital Intensity 61
Output per worker $5,408 89
Average Wage $2,937 97
Source: IAC, Annual Report, 1973-4, Appendix 4.1: 74-83.
Table  A7.3  
Industry
Export and Im port Intensities of the Autom otive
Export Intensity Import Intensity
Motor Vehicles and Parts 4.0 22.3
Total Manufacturing 6.5 16.8
Source: IAC, Annual Report, 1973-4, Appendix 4.1: 74-83.
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Table A7.4 Comparative Statistics of the Motor Industry and
Other Manufacturing *
Year T/O Sales Value Impts Expts Exp Net Exp Imp T'over/
Added Intens Intens Intens VA
$m Sm $m $m $m % % % %
ASIC 323 - MOTOR VEHICLES AND PARTS
68/69 1,519 1,396 561 325 50 3.3 -18.1 23.3 271
69/70 1,713 1,562 625 375 72 4.2 -17.7 24.0 274
70/71 nc nc nc 391 92 na na na na
71/72 1,948 1,763 719 364 102 5.3 -13.4 20.6 271
72/73 2,088 1,890 707 356 151 7.3 -9.8 18.8 295
73/74 2,350 2,124 888 499 158 6.7 -14.5 23.5 265
ALL MANUFACTURING
68/69 18,671 17,298 7,501 2,947 1,605 8.6 -7.2 17.0 249
69/70 20,727 18,403 8,273 3,354 2,090 10,1 -6.1 18.2 251
70/71 nc nc nc 3,679 2,151 nc nc nc nc
71/72 23,688 20,936 9,688 3,550 2,557 10.8 -4.2 17.0 245
72/73 26,404 23,410 10,723 3,718 3,365 12.7 -1.3 15.9 246
73/74 31,297 27,653 13,127 5,424 3,513 11.2 -6.1 19.6 238
TOTAL ELABORATELY TRANSFORMED MANUFACTURES **
68/69 9,420 8,066 4,255 2,148 415 4.4 -18.4 26.6 221
69/70 10,393 8,855 4,670 2,467 533 5.1 -18.6 27.9 223
70/71 nc nc nc 2,686 586 nc nc nc nc
71/72 11,870 10,025 5,443 2,577 655 5.5 -16.2 25.7 218
72/73 12,899 10,868 5,895 2,689 826 6.4 -14.4 24.7 219
73/74 15,305 12,710 7,318 3,818 814 5.3 -19.6 30.0 209
The table generates three indicators of the competitive performance of the industry - export, net 
export and import intensity. Export and import intensity measure exports against turnover and 
imports against domestic sales respectively. Net export intensity measures net exports (exports - 
imports) over turnover.
 ^ • • • •Selection of three digit ASIC industries to represent ETMs follows the selection offered in Industry
Commission, Annual Report, 1991-92: 70._________________________________________________
Source: IC, 1995. (NB the Commission has revised the data since its use in the IAC's 1973-74 
Annual Report.)________________________________________________________________________
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Table A7.5 C om parative IIT
In ten s ity
IIT Intensity ( %)
ASIC 323 ETMs 323/ETMs
68/69 27 32 82.5
69/70 32 36 91.0
70/71 38 36 106.0
71/72 44 41 108.3
72/73 60 47 127.0
73/74 48 35 136.9
Source: IC 1994.
Table A8.1 C om parative Export
In ten s ity
Year Turnover Imports (M) Exports
(X)
Net Exp't 
Intensity
$m $m $m (X-M)/ 
T'over %
ASIC 323 - MOTOR VEHICLES AND PARTS
72/73 2,088 356 145 -10
73/74 2,350 499 154 -15
74/75 2,741 788 132 -24
TOTAL ELABORATELY 
M ANUFACTURERS
TRANSFORMED
72/73 12,899 2,689 663 -14
73/74 15,305 3,818 703 -20
74/75 17,174 5,012 854 -23
Source: IC 1994.
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Tab le A10.1 The Real Exchange Rate 1970-92
M arch Q tr June Q tr S ept Q tr D ec Q tr
1970 100.0 99 .7 99 .8 100.2
1971 100.3 100.6 101.7 102.5
1972 101.7 101.1 102.1 102.7
1973 111.5 112.2 112.3 119.7
1974 120.7 117.1 120.9 108.3
1975 109.6 109.8 109.1 112.7
1976 113.4 113.3 114.2 111.8
1977 103.3 103.1 102.4 101.5
1978 99 .4 97 .6 94 .3 94 .5
1979 95 .0 95 .7 95 .8 96 .5
1980 95 .7 96 .2 97.1 98 .3
1981 100.1 103.1 107.5 108.0
1982 106.1 105.8 104.8 104.6
1983 102.6 98.1 101.3 105.8
1984 107.1 103.6 101.7 105.5
1985 97 .7 85.9 88.1 82 .6
1986 82.3 81 .0 70 .6 75 .8
1987 76 .9 79 .5 80.8 7 7 .0
1988 77 .7 84 .0 90 .4 92 .7
1989 94 .9 90 .4 91.1 93 .8
1990 92 .9 94 .6 9 6 .0 9 1 .0
1991 90 .9 9 3 .0 94 .2 92 .2
1992 88 .0 87.7 82.1 80 .6
Source: R eserve B ank  o f A ustralia
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References are presented in three sub-sections. § 12.1 cites archived documents. 
§ 12.2 cites Commission reports and papers which are referred to frequently and which 
have accordingly been abbreviated. § 12.3 is the main bibliography. It cites material 
not cited in §§ 12.1 or 12.2.
To enable the reader to determine whether the full reference for a particular citation is 
located in § 12.2 or § 12.3, abbreviated citations cite the "IAC" as the author, and the 
date of those citations appears after a word or acronym indicating the nature of the 
reference. By contrast, unabbreviated citations carry the unabbreviated title of their 
author "Industries Assistance Commission" with the date appearing immediately 
afterwards. The full references to all such citations appear in § 12.3.
Thus, "(IAC, PMVs, 1974)" refers to the following publication cited in § 12.1:
IAC, 1974. Passenger Motor Vehicles Etc, Report Number 21, Australian 
Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 10th July.
"(Industries Assistance Commission, 1982)" refers to the following publication cited in 
§ 12.3:
Industries Assistance Commission, 1982. Export Incentives, Report No. 300, 
Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 28th February cited in the 
bibliography.
In the body of the dissertation, the draft of a report is indicated by the word "Draft" in 
the citation immediately preceding the date. Where this does not appear, the report cited 
is a final report. Likewise, the word "Transcript" appearing in the citation of a 
Commission report refers to the official transcript of the inquiry.
12.1 References to Archived Docum ents
Archived Documents
Unless otherwise stated, minutes are minutes to Commissioners. Dates given for drafts 
or reports are the dates on accompanying minutes. The numbers appearing at the end of 
each entry (and in two entries in subsequent sections) specify the Folder, Box and 
Report Numbers respectively as classified by Australian Archives. The number 
12/17/265 indicates a document to be found in Folder 12 of Box 17 of the documents 
relating to IAC Report No. 265.
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Papers Relating to the 1974 Report
All Working Papers identified with a "A" are filed under 1/17/21.
Working Paper A2, "Price and Cost Comparisons"
Working Paper A10, "The Market for Australian Vehicles"
Working Paper A12, "Passenger Motor Vehicle Reference - Recommendations"
Working Papers identified with a "B" are filed under 2/17/21.
Working Paper B7, "Vehicle Pricing"
Working Paper Bl l ,  "Natural Protection"
Working Paper B13, "Export Incentives",
Working Paper B14, "Regional Complementation & Co-operation"
Working Paper B16, "International Agreements".
Minutes
Undated Minute to Commissioners, "Effects of Recommendations on Australian 
Manufacture of Light Vehicles", 6/18/21.
Undated Minute, "Comments on IED's Passenger Vehicle Demand Projections", 1/4/21.
Letters
Component manufacturer to IAC, 24th June 1974, 4/3/21.
Rattigan to Steel, Letter from A. Rattigan to G. N. Steele, 21st October 1974, 6/18/21.
Miscellaneous
Working Document, "Production", 9/17/21.
Working Document, "Export Sales of Motor Vehicles - CBU & CKD by Company" 
6/17/21.
Working Paper, "Assistance to the Passenger Motor Vehicle Industry", Number 
Unidentified, 7/16/21.
Working Paper "A Tariff Proposal for Motor Vehicles Mark II", Folder 6/18/21.
Documents Relating to the 1979-81 Reports
Dated Commission Documents in Chronological Order
Minute, 26th June 1979, "ORANI Simulations: Motor Vehicles Export Facilitation 
Proposals", 3/17/267.
Minutes dated 26th, 27th, 28th June and 4th and 5th of July 1979, 3/17/267.
Minute, 9th October 1979, "Motor Vehicles and Components - The Commission's 
Approach to Reporting on the Effects of its Proposals", 3/20/267.
Draft, 9th October 1979, 3/20/267.
Minute, 2nd November, 1979, 12/17/267.
Notes accompanying Minute of 2nd November 1979, 12/17/267.
Minute, 30 November 1979, 4/20/267.
Note, 21st December 1979, "Notes on Motor Vehicles and Components Proposals", 
7/23/267.
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Minute and Note, 16th April 1980, "Phased Reductions in Assistance", 9/23/267.
Minute, 21st May, 1980, "Motor vehicles and Components - Post 84 Assistance 
Arrangements", 12/17/267.
Notes, 21st November 1980, "Motor Vehicles and Components - Post 1984 Assistance 
Arrangements", 9/23/267.
Undated Commission Documents in (Approximate) Chronological 
Order
Minute circa October 1979,* "Qualitative Analysis of the Effects of the Commission's 
Proposals", 9/23/267.
Working Note, circa October 1979, "Passenger Motor Vehicles - Quantitative Analysis of 
the Effects of the Commission's Proposals", 9/23/267.
Minute, circa November 1980 to January 1981, "Passenger Motor Vehicles and 
Components Post 84 Assistance Policy", 7/23/267.
Documents from Third Parties
FAPM, Letter to the I AC 27th April 1981, 14/2/267.
12.2 Commonly cited Commission Reports, Papers
and Submissions
Reports and papers abbreviated below were published in Canberra by the IAC or 
Industries Commission (IC) as indicated (in the case of papers) or by the Australian 
Government Printing Service (in the case of reports). References in the text which do 
not appear with the abbreviations appearing below, appear in the bibliography.
IAC, "Commercial Vehicles", 1974
IAC, "Components", 1980
IAC, "Concessions", 1987, 
IAC, "EF Discussion", 1979 
IAC, "Evaluation", 1974
IAC, 1974. "Commercial Vehicles, Parts and 
Accessories", Report Number 17, 17th 
September.
IAC, 1980. "Passenger Motor Vehicles and 
Components - Export Facilitation for Specialist 
Component Producers", Report Number 247, 
30th June
Industries Assistance Commission, 1987. Export 
Concessions, Report Number 399, 19th January.
IAC, 1979. "Passenger Motor Vehicles - Export 
Facilitation: Discussion Paper", 8th March
IAC, 1974, "Commission's Evaluation of the 
Report by the South Australian government 
Committee on Assistance to the Passenger Motor 
Vehicle Industry", 1974, (Mimeo).
The relevant minute appears at the bottom of a folder of files which are compiled in (roughly) 
chronological order. This and the tone of the minute in the context of other similar minutes - 
particularly that of the 9th October 1979 (see below) - suggest a date of around October 1979.
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IAC, "Glass”, 1974 
IAC, "Martec", 1974 
IAC, PM Vs, 1974 
IAC, PMVs, 1974, "Papers"
IAC, PMVs, 1975 
IAC, PMVs, 1981
IAC, PMVs-EF, 1979
IAC, "Reductions", 1982
IAC, "Trends", 1981
IAC, 1974. "Glass and Glassware", Report No. 
10, 23rd May.
IAC, 1974. "Martec Motor Vehicle Report and 
IAC Comment", (Mimeo)
IAC, 1974. Passenger Motor Vehicles Etc, 
Report Number 21, 10th July.
IAC, 1974. "The Passenger Motor Vehicle 
Industry", Industry Economics Division, Papers 
of IAC, PMVs, 1974, (Mimeo), NB. Page 
numbers not given.
IAC, 1975. Motor Vehicles - Import Restrictions, 
Report Number 65, 31st October.
IAC, 1981, Passenger Motor Vehicles - Post 
1984 Assistance Arrangements, Report Number 
267, 24th June.
IAC, 1979, "Passenger Motor Vehicles and 
Components - Export Facilitation", Report 
Number 225, Interim Report, 19th September.
Industries Assistance Commission, 1982. 
Approaches to General Reductions in 
Protection, Report Number 301, 2nd March.
IAC, 1981, Approaches to General Reductions 
in Protection: Information Paper No. 3, 'Trends 
in Australia's Trade in Manufactures", April.
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